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ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS OF FLEMISH PARTIES

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 16 Oct 85 pp 12-18

[Article by Marc Reynebeau: "It Will Simply Be the Martens VI Administration"]

> [Text] Two big winners, two big and a whole series of small losers: since 13 October the political map of Belgium has fallen so much into the old fold that Wilfried Martens can calmly continue to work on the road.

It looks like a replay of 1968: a Christian democracy slightly over the threshold of 30 percent, socialism supported by about 28 percent of the people, and next a good 20 percent liberalism. This way the traditional political parties once again gathered four-fifths of the votes behind them, which is always a significant scale from which to read the continuity of the Belgian body politic. The year 1968 was the precursor of a period thus far unique in the recent political history of Belgium, in which the continuity and in a sense also the stability of the relationships was altered by a short-lived moment of hesitant decline of the pillars, a process from which the People's Union [VU], as the challenging anti-establishment party, gathered the fruits.

An opposite movement seems to have developed last Sunday with election results which so much resemble those of 17 years ago. Following a great deal of electoral rumbling, with a socialism that is caving in, a strong liberal success which fluctuates according to moods and election promises, and especially a Christian democracy which has gotten to know the limits of its natural support (approximately one out of three Belgians), affairs are being put back in order now. The pillar partitions are once again being put up. It is particularly typical that since last Sunday it has become unthinkable that more or less non-traditional parties like the People's Union and especially AGALEV [Live Differently] might count on being called to government responsibility. VU Minister Hugo Schiltz can drive any illusion of even becoming a member of the Flemish Executive, which is so dear to him, from his head. Experiments such as the one under Prime Minister Leo Tindemans (CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)]), with the VU, the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] or the RW [Walloon Rally] in the government, have become unthinkable.

This process of setting up pillars was completed through essentially a particularly simple process. As a matter of fact, the voters did not have a large variety of alternatives at their disposal last Sunday. The choice on the other hand was very simple: the voters were repeatedly invited to vote yes or

no, for or against the policy which has been conducted over the last 4 years, for or against the prime ministership of Wilfried Martens, with the added request to state plainly whether the Roman catholic-liberal policy should be continued.

The rebound necessarily had to create a polarization, a juxtaposition of two camps, each one with a clearly outlined position. Because Martens specifically wanted to depict himself as the figurehead of the government policy -- and in the process had no hesitation about a clear continuity between his government announcements and his election propaganda (even if only with the image of a metronome) -- that policy would automatically be identified with the prime minister's party. The CVP in Flanders and the PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)] have experienced the remarkably positive effects of that evolution.

Correctives

An equally obvious effect of such a bipolarization expressly desired by the majority -- reversal or not -- was the fact that the socialist opponent was also very well able to present himself as an opposite of what the government was offering the voters. Hence,Christian democrats and socialists became automatically one another's sparring partners, a process which was summed up in the two slogans which were brought into the discussion: "no reversal" as against "if you want things to change." Moreover, both antagonists had a distinct figurehead: Prime Minister Martens on the one hand, SP [Socialist Party (Flemish)] President Karel van Miert, who had remained very popular since last year's European elections, on the other hand.

That the other parties would be sandwiched between the two antagonists was inescapable.

It became a particularly painful matter especially for the People's Union. Given that the stakes of the electoral struggle were completely monopolized by the socio-economic debate -- it was the government which had chosen the terrain for the confrontation and only the socialists were able to accept the challenge with equal weapons -- the federal options of the People's Union had little chance of success. That, in the view of the VU, the economic crisis could be fought best through an enforced federalization of the country was an idea which entailed too many intellectual assumptions and uncertainties really to be played out in the campaign. Furthermore, VU President Vic Anciaux felt compelled, especially toward the end of the campaign, to state at every moment that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the essence of Martens' policy, that his party's opposition to it only involved a number of "social correctives."

Hence, the result of all this could only be that the People's Union did not succeed in distinguishing itself from the majority. Actually, the community themes, which are peculiar to the VU, did not play the slightest role in the campaign even though the government itself had provided quite a bit of potential gunpowder: the lamentable Happart affair, the military compensations, the behavior of PSC Minister of Foreign Affairs Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb which was not very community oriented, and especially the sabotage by the PSC of every constitutional amendment in general and of the communitarization of education in particular.

When the average VU voter, who is certainly not the worst, is invited to vote on the socio-economic policy, then he will naturally vote for Martens and the CVP and thus return to the old stable, which he had left during the wave of depillarization.

Moreover, the People's Union backed down on the missile issue by refusing to commit itself to a calendar for the withdrawal of those nuclear arms. The fact that the right wing within the party was placated this way however also meant immediately that the pacifist VU parliamentary party could immediately get better value with the SP.

The reverse of the polarization idea also meant that the CVP in particular could sweep its electoral opponents onto a single heap. Consequently, that party did so very specifically by simply cataloguing all those who did not agree with the Martens program right away with "the leftists," together with the SP and AGALEV, an identification which in Flanders still carries a pejorative connotation among the great majority of the people and certainly does not sit well in VU circles, given that this party, like the CVP, also adheres to a social order of class reconciliation and solidarity.

Rival

The PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress (Flemish)] was not able -- albeit in a different manner -- to impose itself in the polarized electoral fight either. First of all, the liberal party suffered a great deal from the fact that the campaign was focussed completely on Prime Minister Martens and thus on the CVP. PVV Minister Guy Verhofstadt added another measure to that by playing on the indirect effect in a manner nearly impossible to understand: vote for the PVV in order to support CVP member Martens ("our prime minister").

In addition there was the fact that the PVV did not succeed in developing its own accents in the electoral fight as such. The liberals were unable to do anything but defend a project symbolized by someone from another party, with achievements which had been realized by a collective government body. The PVV even had to remain quiet about the typically liberal issue of taxation: not only did the PVV not succeed in making its famous electoral promise of 1981 about a drastic tax decrease ("not you, but the state..") a reality, on the contrary even, the extremely modest tax reduction for citizens enacted in August cannot be felt in the pocketbook yet.

However, the picture of the electoral results of the PVV is distorted by the fact that in 1981 the party had reached a nearly unnatural strength with its anti-tax program, which coincided with the landslide to the detriment of the CVP. At that time the right wing of Christian democracy had unquestionably abandoned the old maternal lap to find its salvation with the PVV (and partly also with the RAD-UDRT [Respect for Work and Democracy (Flemish) - Democratic Union for Respect for Work (Walloon)]). With the broad unity which existed between the liberals and the Christian democrats during the current campaign, the antisocialism of the CVP leaders and the firm will of the Christian democrats to pursue the strongly neoliberal-colored Martens policy, there was no longer anything to prevent the return of that conservative CVP wing to the mother party.

From the moment last Sunday when the first electoral results became known and the scope of the PVV defeat became clear, the problem of leadership within the liberal party immediately arose. Guy Verhofstadt's leadership has indeed been a gamble, which was possible only because it so happened that the party lacked an intermediate generation to take over the helm from stars such as Herman Vanderpoorten who has since died, Willy De Clercq who has since disappeared into the European Commission, or Frans Grootjans who actually prefers being a newspaper director by far. The sole pretender to the throne could have been Herman de Croo (who did not do all that brilliantly on 13 October in his Brakel fief either) whom some people considered either too young or too fickle.

In this context the PVV was particularly ambivalent in the way it went into the Verhofstadt interregnum. On the one hand, based on a great deal of reading he had fashioned a type of ideology full of principles which no right-minded liberal could be opposed to; on the other hand, it is equally clear that specifically the PVV mandataries in parliament and in government never took much heed of Verhofstadt and happily went their way, as they had always done. And Verhofstadt's ideological background actually sounded like dramatics to them.

Influential figures such as member of parliament Ward Beyssen and even Minister De Croo unconsciously emphasized that ambivalence, perhaps even schizophrenia, when on the eve of 13 October they expressed criticism of the too radical statements made by their young president, who was actually only consistently pursuing what he had pushed down the throats of the PVV congresses in Kortrijk: a consistent liberal ideology, which was virtually adopted by the congresses as a matter of form, but which was apparently never intended to be implemented as well. But in the meantime, Guy Verhofstadt, consistent with himself, continued to say that in his opinion there was no reason for the existence of anything like national education and that the state as a whole with its nearly 1 million civil servants is in fact a perfect "horror."

Sooner or later such statements inevitably had to clash with the more pragmatic people in his party -- Guy De Witte of the liberal civil servants union VSO [expansion unknown] for example, who has quite a number of members among that army of civil servants, or the traditional anti-clericals and other masonic brothers, who know full well that public education must in fact function as a counterweight to the all powerful catholic education.

What is taking place around Verhofstadt is virtually a classic drama, in which there are conspiracies and knives are ready to carry out the ritual regicide; and Verhofstadt may well to his own surprise discover a Brutus among his murderers. Nevertheless, he did win one battle. In his own Ghent, where he headed the PVV parliamentary list, he held his ground convincingly against his rival and pretender to the throne Yannick De Clercq, son of his father, who competed with Verhofstadt in a nearly embarrassing manner in the news and who hoped to be able to drive Verhofstadt as successor to his father as PVV leader out of the market with a strong show of votes (as first successor on the parliamentary list). In spite of a circus of advertising never seen before, De Clercq obtained barely one-third of the preference votes won by Verhofstadt.

Deserters

In the end the dominant fact remains that the two antagonists in the battle of the titans drew everything to themselves and thus came out of the battle as major victors. The SP undoubtedly lured a part of the VU voters and quite a number of potential AGALEV sympathizers away, while the so-called small leftist parties disappeared virtually into nothing, undoubtedly because of a "wasted vote" reasoning. We are even going to experience the fact that the next parliament will no longer include a single communist. Only in the area of Antwerp was the Labor Party able to hold its own somewhat, and if the trend continues it may hope to win a provincial chamber seat next time around.

And the CVP can once again breathe with relief. Christian democracy apparently controls a "hard core" of about 35 percent in Flanders. Through a massive mobilization of its ranks it managed to pull the deserters back in and convince the doubters to remain loyal anyhow. Last Sunday the labor wing of the CVP affirmed its trust in the party and in Martens, and at the same time let it be kown that it wanted nothing to do with half-and-half solutions like PAKS [Progressive Agreement of Christians and Socialists] (as fourth on the SP list in Ghent, "deserter" Paul Pataer did not really score well) or with the courageous but disquieting doubts of someone like Luk Dhoore in Genk, who suffered a serious loss. Hence, the so-called ACW [General Christian Workers Association] Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene noted with satisfaction on Sunday that the Walloon Christian labor party SeP [Solidarity and Participation] did not even get off the ground.

Consequently,if any kind of breakthrough operation, a transfer of ACW votes to socialism, is to be successful it will take its time and inevitably become a process of a "sociological" and not of a political nature. It is true that Karel van Miert can take comfort in the thought that those districts where people fought longest and hardest against the renovations in the SP which he advocates, have done rather poorly and their voter gain lies substantially below the Flemish average (2.2 percent in Antwerp and barely 0.3 percent in the city of Mechelen).

However, with the recovery of the CVP, chains are primarily placed around the Christian pillar, an operation which could be carried out only through the polarization model. The largest party in Wallonia, the PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)], is experiencing a similar evolution and is maintaining a high level status quo. As a matter of fact, it is particularly striking that among the Walloon socialists, Walloon extremism has become a guarantee for success, which is proven by the success of "Mister Wallonia" Jean-Maurice Dehousse and of the Happart brothers, while the results obtained by the much more moderate party President Guy Spitaels were far from brilliant. The PSC in particular was rewarded well for the services the party was able to render to Wallonia from the national government.

The PRL [Liberal Reform Party (Walloon)] of Minister of Justice Jean Gol was able to recapture convincingly an old, pillared power position in Brussels by pulling the very pragmatic French speaking inhabitants of Brussels from the swiftly shrinking FDF back in, among other things thanks to the presence on

the lists of the very controversial mayor of Schaarbeek, Roger Nol, and that other Brussels baron, former socialist Henri Simonet.

There is no longer anything to prevent a restoration of the Christian-liberal administration, led by the big winner Wilfried Martens, which will be able to count on expanded majorities in parliament and in the regional and municipal councils. The Martens VI administration will perhaps be able to get going quickly, although the PVV will certainly ask for guarantees so that last Sunday's blow would not be likely to be repeated, while the ACW will also demand a reward for so much loyalty. VBO [Federation of Belgian Enterprises] President Andre Leysen said it already: given the target breaking government finances, the time has come now to really curtail government spending: in the spring of 1986 the Belgian franc may well experience a European monetary readjustment, the economic growth indicators do not provide a uniformly favorable image of the immediate economic situation, and the C-5A transport plane, which will fly 32 additional cruise missiles to Florennes, has already been ordered in California.

And the CVP has taken new heart. On Sunday evening, President Gaston Geens of the Flemish Executive, quickly hurried to his militants in the triumphant Louvain CVP, not only to congratulate them on the beautiful result they achieved, but especially to put them back to work: "All those town halls we were thrown out of, Tienen, Aarschot, Kortenberg... that has to change."

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FRG POSTPONEMENT OF SDI DECISION ANALYZED

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 11 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Rolf Zundel: "Much Ado and No Decision. The SDI Decision Has Been Put Off Till the End of the Year"]

> [Text] Late last week the coalition in Bonn seemed to be moving toward a basic agreement with Washington on German participation in SDI. In the meantime, it has changed its course again. The government continues to have difficulty dealing with the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Bonn, October--Whenever truly fundamental controversies take place in Bonn, the moment always comes where government spokesmen in exaggerated innocence and reporters in quiet resignation ask the question: did something happen? For one or two days it appeared as if the decision had been made in Bonn concerning the involvement of the FRG in the American SDI--contrary to the presumed desires of the foreign minister and for reasons which contradict the judgment of the research minister. By week's end, however, after many damage control and good-will missions--the chancellor had spoken with the foreign minister, his department chief with FDP caucus chairman Mischnick, who had previously publicly rebuked the "civil servant" ["official"]--everything was back where it started.

Following the meeting of the Federal Security Council (a cabinet committee of those ministers who are concerned with security questions) came the announcement that the matter would continue to be studied. The decision is to be made, if at all, at the end of the year. Perhaps, thus one learns without prompting from many experts, the Reagan/Gorbachev meeting in Geneva will cause the whole thing to appear in a different light. And what, after all, is meant by a "decision re SDI," thus the second communication, when the only matters being debated are the conditions under which a number of firms are to take part in the basic research of the Americans for their space defense program. There have been no negotiations on development and production, to say nothing of strategy. It is at most a question of giving the firms legal-technological assistance; there was no trace here of high-level politics.

At least one thing is shared by the protagonists in this controversy, the department chief in the chancellor's office, Teltschick, who on the occasion of a recent address on the subject of SDI was introduced with the remark that his

official title did not do full justice to his political significance, and the foreign minister: both wish to dedramatize. Genscher is telling everyone not to pour oil on the fire; Teltschick considers himself misunderstood as an SDI fan. Did nothing happen?

Somersaults of the Imagination

From the beginning, ever since Reagan announced his program, the controversy has been hard to follow: is it a major shift in strategy, which with the aid of new defensive weapons will, following its realization, offer a trude defense against missile attacks and will finally put an end to the deterrence doctrine, or is it only another round in the arms race? The only thing that seemed certain at the beginning was that this program, provided with $26 billion for the first 5 years, signified a tremendous technological thrust for the United States. Aside from this, much could be read into it, and this did in fact happen.

The bait for the FRG was probably the hope of being able to latch on to a project which in its dimensions is comparable to the Manhattan and the Apollo projects, so as not to fall behind in modern technology. Proponents of FRG involvement point this out already at the outset of their argumentation; many, including the chancellor, have clung to this view to this day. And the imagination turned souersaults, ran wild; there was talk of billions that would go to West German industry, and there were dreams of financial participation and of taking over whole subsystems of the research. Several members of parliament, fascinated by military strategy, already saw themselves at a laser cannon in a spaceship, sighting in on the onion towers of the Kremlin. And in North Rhine-Westphalia, Bernhard Worms [CDU chief in that state] well-meaningly but without success brought to life the expectation among the populace that SDI would mean new jobs.

A second factor insured that SDI became a major topic of domestic politics. Washington does indeed attach some importance to European and German support. The statement heard later, that participation was not a touchstone of loyalty to the alliance, was by no means so clearly voiced at the beginning, and even today basic criticism and quibbling over details are not especially welcome. But whenever German-American relations are affected, the reactions in the FRG quickly grow beyond all bounds. Part of the CDU/CSU caucus in the Bundestag was of the opinion anyway that the faster and more of SDI, the better. The great majority, who gave less thought to the program, felt that a clear signal of loyalty to the alliance was necessary in any event. In addition, the program provided the CDU/CSU caucus with the opportunity to pillory the SPD, which had rather quickly agreed on rejection in principle of SDI. For many a CDU/CSU strategist, SDI became welcome proof of the anti-Americanism of the Social Democrats. And Minister for Youth, Family and Health Geissler even went so far as to make a vote in favor of SDI a question of political morality.

In this phase the chancellor's office almost appeared to be the homestead of doubters. In the spring, when German and American experts were meeting in Dallas, the Social Democrats were still praising the circumspect and restrained argumentation of Teltschick, who at that time did not by any means speak of approval, but of studying and evaluating and of the need for additional information. Defense Minister Woerner, on the other hand, after an initial phase of

skepticism, had by that time long since avowed his support publicly. Already at that time it became evident that SDI was destined to become a matter to be dealt with by the chancellor. The CDU/CSU would probably not have permitted Kohl to put the controversial issue on ice in one of the ministries, least of all in the foreign ministry.

Here a third element in the decision-making process becomes evident: the growing displeasure of the CDU/CSU with the foreign minister. One can safely assume that Strauss, who bet on SDI from the outset, and whose critical remarks stemmed only from concern that the transport of the technology could be hindered, will use every opportunity to find fault with the foreign minister. But in the CDU as well the feeling is widespread that Genscher is making a name for himself, at the expense of the CDU/CSU, as an authority on foreign policy reason: never entirely comprehensible but yet discernible--and, as the CDU/CSU suspects, thanks also to skillful background talks--at an annoying distance.

Where Genscher says No, as in the maritime law convention, for instance, the Yes of the CDU/CSU is significantly advanced. Where he pleads for restraint, as with SDI, even those Christian Democrats who basically feel the same way are put in a difficult position. One's career aspirations are not helped by being caught agreeing with Genscher in a matter of controversy.

The situation is further complicated by two factors: For one thing, by the fact that Horst Teltschick, department chief in the chancellor's office, has more than any of his predecessors attained political stature of a special kind. The dangerous dualism which for a long time marked American politics--the rivalry between the security advisor and the secretary of state--is now also no longer completely unknown in Bonn. Teltschick is power-conscious, and he has been sent forward on several occasions by the chancellor as his foreign policy spokesman, especially with respect to SDI. This is a situation which does not exactly facilitate the smooth decision-making process.

For another thing, the CDU/CSU, and sometimes the chancellor's office as well, has deliberately circulated the notion that Genscher's tenure as foreign minister is not permanent. One hears accounts that the chancellor treats FDP [national party] chairman and Minister for Economics Bangemann with particular amiability in the cabinet, there are no problems as far as he is concerned. And one can learn without asking in CDU circles that, actually, the economics minister felt destined for other things--as foreign minister, for example. However, the problem will take care of itself if the FDP returns to the Bundestag in the same strength as today, or perhaps even stronger. The FDP will not drop Genscher. And as far as SDI is concerned, the party is, if anything, more obstructionist than the foreign minister.

Power Struggles in the Coalition

All these things, the emotional domestic reaction to SDI as well as the subtle power struggles within the coalition, were responsible for making an objectively difficult decision even more difficult--a situation which is strongly reminiscent of the days before Bitburg.

Basically, a very simple course of action could have been taken: To deal with the SDI project as noiselessly as possible, to leave it with the foreign ministry, to wait and see what the project actually offered, to avoid fanfare: business as usual, as in the other European countries as well. For the time being, all that is at stake, as has meanwhile become evident, is that the Americans are interested in awarding individual contracts to German firms in the basic research area. No one can prevent this, otherwise the government would have had to pass an "anti-SDI-law" which would have been difficult to reconcile with our interpretation of the constitution, and not even the SPD is demanding this.

Opposing this were the dynamics of the SDI discussion in the FRG. We have tried, thus the chancellor's office--and the line of reasoning is not false--to keep the discussion objective, to guide it into sensible channels. These efforts, however, were accompanied by an increasing commitment to the project. This is the one trend, which has been discernible since spring. The other trend, probably found more in the foreign ministry, attempts to relativize the motives for SDI and to narrow down the foreign and security policy conditions for its acceptance. It is clear that these two political courses can be reconciled only with difficulty, if at all.

The commitment to SDI, in principle already contained in the first reaction of the CDU/CSU, increased the moment an interministerial working group chaired by Teltschick was formed. An institution such as this, to put it into political German, generates a "need for decisions." The expectation that results and unequivocal decisions would soon be forthcoming increased. Added to this was an intense information and promotion exchange between the United States and the FRG, which finally culminated in the dispatch of a high-level and much publicized delegation to the United States. This delegation was additionally tasked by the chancellor to study the possibilities for a basic agreement. How else could this delegation have been expected to return but highly impressed by the willingness of the Americans to release information, with positive feelings about the possibilities for German participation, and satisfied by the fact that the Americans considered a basic agreement, which was desired by the industrial representatives of the delegation, to be possible.

Teltschick's public report of this trip as well as the positive assessment of its results--a rather unusual occurrence--marked the end, for the time being, of this policy of commitment. It was supplemented by a political assessment by Teltschick, nicely wrapped in the empty rhetorical phrase that the FRG must make up its mind whether it wants to be the subject, or the object, of developments. The chancellor will have difficulty backing away from this formulation, assuming he even wants to.

The second course of development, the relativization of SDI, began initially with the primary argument of its proponents, namely that SDI represented a major opportunity to enter the technology of the future. Genscher does not deny that, for the Americans, SDI means a tremendous technological effort utilizing enormous government resources. His doubts, however, begin where the scope and the value of the technology transfer for the FRG are under discussion. The scope of possible German involvement can be expressed in terms of

thousandths of the overall program, and the proportionate relationship of this participation to the overall state-sponsored promotion of research in the FRG is similar.

The technology transfer, which is tied to American laws anyway (for the contracts will be paid for by Americans), is on a modest scale. Here the foreign ministry is of the same opinion as the research ministry. Minister Riesenhuber stated this for the record even more clearly than Genscher: "SDI cannot be justified on the basis of the civilian research-political benefits to be derived therefrom." For the foreign ministry, the far more promising method of accomplishing the technological leap is the "Eureka" project, which offers the additional advantage of bringing the Europeans together.

Open to All Interpretations

The second relativization--in the form of a limiting condition--was the argument that the FRG must stay in the European commune and that above all the sensitivities of the French must be considered. "No singularity" is the formula, which means: The FRG cannot participate in the SDI program in the form of a state-level agreement as the only, and as the first, country to do so. A condition that is difficult to fill if it is strictly interpreted.

The third relativization consists of the conditions which the Federal Security Council established in March already for a German SDI involvement, and which Federal Chancellor Kohl explained in the Bundestag--among them: no arms race, no variable security zones, no strategic instability. The conditions are so formulated that a national German participation is actually impossible. It is highly improbable that these conditions can be met, at least no one can safely predict that they will be.

In the chancellor's address to the Bundestag on 19 April, the two courses of action--commitment [to SDI] and a skepticism armed with conditions--met in an astonishing way. Kohl agreed with the limiting conditions and nevertheless asserted that the FRG supported "in principle the American program for strategic defense." Small wonder, therefore, that Bonn's position admits of all possible interpretations.

The logic of Genscher's argumentation suggests concluding--he himself has never said this, however--that the foreign minister views very skeptically the commitment of the FRG to SDI in the form of an agreement with the United States. At any rate, he stands opposed to the trends expressed in a draft of the agreement, whose authors probably sit in the defense ministry, the preamble of which sounds as if the Americans and the Germans together had to invent NATO all over again.

Not only European irritation, above all in France, could result from a surging forward by the West Germans. And this irritation has been clearly evidenced already, at least during the time of the economic summit meeting in Bonn. Even in the CDU one takes note of unpleasant warnings from the East: an agreement will be taken as a political signal and answered accordingly. There is even talk of Honecker's visit being jeopardized. The assessment of these signals

within the CDU/CSU varies, but one can safely assume that careful note is taken of them in the foreign ministry.

And now? Basically, the whole problem has been condensed down to the question whether the FRG concludes a politically inconspicuous agreement of a technical nature with the United States or renegotiates the security agreement, which the foreign ministry as well does not rule out--or if, as would probably make the most sense, nothing at all happens.

Again the question thrusts itself upon the mind: Did something happen?

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SHELL STUDY SHOWS MAJOR CHANGES IN YOUTH, ADULT VALUES

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 10 Oct 85 p 12

[Article by Axel Hacke: "The Balance of Power in the Family is Tottering" / Shell Study Shows that Adults are More willing Today to Learn from Their Children/ Parents React More Understandingly, but also More Helplessly/ Youth of the 1950's and 1980's]

[Text] "They face the world impudently, defiantly and challengingly; they are sure, even overbearing and full of bold pride when they appear in groups. They have no respect at all, they don't even know fear, and are therefore almost immune to punishment."

Question: When was this written? Counter-question: Is that important? Always and in every generation, adults have said that about youngsters, in this case someone named Muchow "On the Psychology and Pedagogics of Rowdy Teens" in the year 1956. But it could just as well have been 1985. Because this is the same old generational conflict, right? Is there really something new to be said on this subject?

Let's turn the question around: How could one learn something new? In the age of public opinion polls, the answer must be that polls alone won't do it. It does not say much if youngsters, perhaps, have many fights with their parents, whether they like to study or prefer to bask in the sun. What would be important to learn is whether they have more fights with their parents than preceding generations, whether they are learning more, or if they bask in the sun more often. Thus it would be more important to have studies over longer periods of time rather than quick snapshots.

This has never been done before, mostly because the science of polling is not a very old discipline yet. And now there are three works at once that introduce the "time" factor into the studies of youth. At the beginning of the year, the study "Youth without Future?" was published (Serie Piper 433, DM 12.80; see SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG of 16 March), in which Frankfurt scientists Klaus Allerbeck and Wendy Hoag compared attitudes, values and life perspectives of young people in the years 1962 and 1983. Somewhat in controversy with this work is the new study by Arthur Fischer, Werner Fuchs and Juergen Zinnecker, financed by the youth welfare work of Deutsche Shell (Leske und Budrich, DM 39), which makes no fewer than four comparisons on more than 2,000 pages in five volumes: young people in

1984 and young people in the 1950's (according to Shell and EMNID studies between 1953 and 1955); youths of 1984 with adults of 1984; young people of the 1950's with adults of today (the very same generation who were youngsters 30 years ago); and lastly, a comparison with the last Shell study of 1981. In addition, there is another work just published which is sort of an interim survey of young people since World War II, a mosaic of contemporary history, put together by the Deutsche Jugendinstitut in Munich ("Always these Young People!", Koesel Publishing Company, DM 36).

Actually, do such scientific bombardments still provide insights ? Do they themselves not create even greater distance between the generations, a tendency described by Allerbeck and Hoag: namely, where young people and adults do not do badly at all when they know each other personally, but become increasingly alienated on a different level, as representatives of different generations? Walter Hornstein, professor of pedagogy in Munich, studies this in the Jugendinstitut volume and claims that studies of youth can also have a differentiating effect if they avoid labels and do not melt the varieties of young people into one "youth" pot. It should be added here that one should also focus attention on the youngsters' daily life, that one should ask them about their view of life; the Shell studies were the first to do so. Only in this manner could the mistake of polling young people be avoided, i.e., simply projecting adult fears of the future onto young people. Then they are anti-technology, spoiled and whining, and maybe don't even want to finance pensions--a continuation of the generational conflict with different means.

Reality is more complicated, and the most important element of youth in 1985 is the fact that this concept of "youth" is fading, if it means a uniformity of life style. For example, the longer young people go to school, the longer the period of youth is extended, but it also becomes more indistinct. At age 28, one can be a student--or a master craftsman. And who of the two is a "youth?" Comparing generations also means sharpening one's observation of new developments. One of the most astounding results of the Shell study is how much "the traditional balance of power between younger and older family members is tottering."

In the light of comparison it appears that parents sometimes are more helpless than their children, that it is they who don't know their way around the world. Even in the 1950's they were role models for only a minority, for 16 percent of the 15 to 24-year-olds. Today, only 3 percent of all young people cite their parents as their models. Forty-one percent of parents think they have changed under the influence of their children; one-third of them believe they have become more understanding and more tolerant. Forty-one percent of parents can discuss "all" their worries and concerns with their children, 42 percent "most of them." The Shell authors write: "We are surprised by the great extent to which parents of 1984 seem to be willing to discuss personal problems with their children."

Naturally, it is trite to say that the family has changed fundamentally in industrial society, that parents today compete with public and secret educators. But the extent of change is surprising, nevertheless. In the

1950's, between 18 and 27 percent of youngsters stated the intention to raise their own children "differently" or "very differently" from the way they themselves were raised. Today it is 48 percent. In 1954, 28 percent of adults talked about a break with traditional upbringing, today it is 54 percent. Many who, 30 years ago, did not think they were being treated badly, have broken away from the same methods. "The growing number of those who deal critically with parental upbringing is an indicator that parents have become more open to attack," the Shell researchers write.

Two examples by way of illustration: for one, there is the change in meaning suffered by the word "strict." In the 1950's, "strict" was still considered a quality sign of good upbringing (even by the young people themselves). Today, among those polled, the word almost always has the connotation of "too strict." A majority of those who in 1955 considered that they had had a strict upbringing, intended to treat their own children the same way. Those who today think their parents are too strict, would act the same way only in rare cases. A second example: in the first study in 1953, youngsters were asked to criticize one of the authority figures of their daily life. Fifty-five percent had no answer at all to this question--such a challenge was simply too much for them (as the Shell authors note).

The most important results of this youth study do not really concern youth, but rather adults. Not only are 88 percent of youngsters of the opinion "that adults can learn something from young people," but also 76 percent of adults. The study notes that "the understanding of daily life by today's adults has made the age of adulthood a period for learning."

Nowhere else has the change of a generation of adults and of an institution such as the family been described as clearly as in this Shell study. Compared to 30 years ago, a decisively larger number of adults have abandoned the position of unassailable authority in favor of partnership with their own children, in which they themselves no longer have a monopoly on the power of emotions. The authors write, "increasingly, problems of the relationship between parents and their children come to the fore. It is the parents who (must) fight for the love of their children; they need young people as substitute partners; they cannot detach themselves from their growing-up children." Thus adults do not live with unchangeable attitudes; they themselves are willing to learn. And further: they "have moved farther away from their own youth than have today's young people from the youth of that past era."

Is this really true? On political questions, the change in attitudes of young people is at least as great, so that the Shell study states: "Compared to the youth of the 1980's, youngsters of the 1950's were authoritarian." Answers to the question: "In your opinion, what were Hitler's characteristic traits?" can serve as an example. In 1953, 26 percent of young people listed positive traits, in 1984 it was only 7 percent. From these results, the scientists come to the conclusion that today's West German youth are a "generation of tolerant democrats with a liberal bent."

Of course, more important than such statements (which appear in most serious youth studies in similar form) is something else, not easily captured in figures, concerning the political understanding of this generation. The Shell study also contains a volume of literary and artistic self-expressions of youngsters, selected from 15,000 samples sent in response to an appeal. The authors conclude from them that political action forms in the narrower sense, such as voting or collecting signatures, are truly meaningful to a minority only.

Instead it can be observed that increasingly more young people imbue private actions with socio-political meaning--a dimension which is overlooked only in studies of a political science nature. Young people also see their private way of life in political terms. Whether someone drives a large or small car, how he raises his children, whether he likes to talk to his fellow men--all this has for many of them also a "political" aspect in the sense that they consider it very important for a better future.

It is possible that this new vagueness of the concept is simply a new form of a non-political consciousness; but it is not simply a variant of withdrawal into private life. Both generations share the social orientation pattern of "privacy," the wish to maintain and build up one's own little world. But in addition, there is also a new element which was not yet there among the youth of years past. It is the desire for "self-assertion" of the young who "call for assertion of the individual against the social world, who see the chance for their own vitality and perhaps also their self-assurance in resisting social orders and dictums, in eluding the social 'dragon,' by fighting it in small and large matters" (Shell study). For example, 83 percent of the young rate as good or very good the sentence, "I want to live and not just swim in the wake of others;" the sentence, "I am little concerned with things outside my private world," is approved by only 22 percent.

To break out of the restrictions of society, not live according to plan, not become a small cog in an indeterminable mechanism--these are for many young people self-evident thoughts about their life plan. If one were to ask what is different about the young generation of the first half of the 1980's compared to other young generations, one would probably have to answer that there are not a few among them who define "life" as did a 17-year-old highschool girl: "Life is when I know that I disengage, that I do what I want to do, really, and that I am doing it for myself! And not for some state that I supposedly serve!"

And then, there are still a lot of young people who think quite differently about it. And as for the eternal generation gap, which is always the same: most adults would probably define "life" somewhat differently.

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CP CHAIRMAN AALTO ON INTERNAL PARTY DISPUTE, TIES TO CPSU

Sees Strengthened CP, SKDL

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Oct 85 pp 8-10

[Article by Tuomo Lappalainen: "FCP Is Not A Penitentiary"]

[Text] The party sections operating in the area of the minority districts expelled from the Communist Party will be faced with an important decision in the next few months: whether to continue separate activities according to the old model or whether to return to the fold of the mother party. "People join us voluntarily and leave if they are dissatisfied," states controversial Chairman Aalto in advising his comrades.

Aalto is establishing a new party. Aalto torpedoed the discussions. Aalto has divorced himself from the movement. How can Aalto continue? Aalto is disqualified. Aalto is responsible for the dissolution of the party. Aalto has broken away from Moscow. Aalto's path is the path of destruction. Aalto initiated the slide into the chasm...

Those are a few of the titles from around the middle of October in the mouthpiece of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] minority faction, from the week when the Taistoites [Stalinists] commented on the expulsion of the TIEDONANTAJA districts by the Central Committee and and began to make preparations for their own national October meeting. The texts are such that even the attacks directed against the worst class enemy pale in comparison.

"I have not been able to take TIEDONANTAJA's articles seriously for several years already. They reveal a journalistic morality subordinated to only a pure expediency. As far as the SKP's internal issues are concerned, their own arguments cannot be made into facts merely by continuously repeating them," commented the much maligned chairman himself. His voice is serious and quiet, the words come forth at a deliberate pace.

"When I was labor minister, I received the impression that a more difficult task than this society cannot be found. But it has not been any easier for me now.

"I experience the resignation of each section and each member with a heavy heart. There is no cause for joy in it. The fact that I for my part have had an influence on the clarification of the SKP's internal situation is based on a long and serious deliberation. Also in the conviction that the attempt to continue in the previous manner would certainly have resulted in disaster. There is more than enough concrete evidence of this.

"I have not dealt and do not deal with these matters from the point of view of what will be attributed to me personally in the history books. By these measures I have most seriously and responsibly acted so that history will show evidence of a Communist Party formed by Finnish Communists and which has more to give to the Finnish nation and people than any other single political faction."

The Idea Is Safe

The SKP's 20-year civil war has over a period of time created numerous trends personified in the names of individual communists. There are Saarinenites, Taistoites, Kemppainenites, Kajanojaites, Aalto's men, and the Kainulainen clique. The spectrum is so great that at times one cannot help but receive the impression that it is not the issues that are in conflict but the men.

The chairman, however, is of a different opinion. Mere personality differences are not sufficient to explain the conflicts. Dissolution would not have been possible without profound ideological differences.

"When the conflict broke out, in the background was a situation in which the SKP accomplished a revision of its strategy before any other party operating in a developed capitalist country," points out Aalto.

"We wanted to state unambiguously that the socialism at which we are aiming is profoundly democratic, is based on the will of the majority, will expand the rights and freedoms of citizens, and will be built on the lasting results of the work accomplished by Finns so far.

"However, these basic policy lines were not considered to be orthodox by some comrades. From this the fuss began, and they took upon themselves the task of restoring Marxist-Leninist policy lines and eliminating the revisionism resulting from it."

There would not have been anything objectionable in the matter if the minority had been satisfied with acting on behalf of their positions and views in accordance with the regulations, assures Aalto. The situation became contrary to the interests of the party when the dissidents took for themselves the right to organize themselves into a separate faction. This brought about the need to exclude the minority districts outside of the party.

"This undeniably is a problem in that at least some of the comrades in the TIEDONANTAJA faction feel that they genuinely represent a pure and only correct proletarian internationalism. But, on the other hand: we can say that we are supporting the essence of Marxism in those same issues in which the minority

is supporting Marxism. Naturally, we do not accept their argument that we have supposedly rejected the essential premises of our ideological world with our strategic policy line."

Social Democrats in Crisis

Now that the internal situation has finally been settled, the SKP again has an opportunity to sharpen its ideological profile, promises Arvo Aalto unabashedly.

Peace work, the elimination of poverty, a new division of labor, a halt to right-wing policies as well as an effort to increase the personal opportunities of citizens to participate are listed in a five-point "energy discharging program".

"It is now high time to return Finland to the path of democratic development. Present government policy is leading society on a bourgeois and right-wing path, which has already substantially increased asociality and injustice.

"The Social Democratic Party is pushing itself into a deepening crisis inasmuch as it continues this policy. The signs are visible in many connections. For example, dissatisfaction in the ranks of the SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions] is already noticeably great, and it will certainly not be eliminated by those means being attempted now. They are supposedly more militant and more active, but in fact the trade union movement is being made into a silent supporter of government policy.

"The Center Party, on the other hand, in attempting to prevent an increase in the public support of the Conservative Party, has ran to the right at such a speed that it has become increasingly more difficult to see what would make it different from the Conservative Party as far as the content of policy is concerned.

"As far as the Conservative Party itself is concerned, it must indeed be admitted that a radical change in the social position of its supporters has changed as the growth of public support and power have increased. It is no longer the same stable extension of employers' organizations as before. Now its parliamentary group is already declaring a sympathy for strikes, for the process going on in the social labor relationship to be sure, but anyway for strikes. Naturally, there is no reason to close one's eyes completely to these changes."

The basis of a new historical compromise? Not yet, specifies Aalto. "We consider it important that the workers' movement comprises the basic force of government, a force which will provide the direction and tone of cooperation. And not the kind that is only shackled to the hegemony of the will of the bourgeois parties."

A Question of Months

The future prospects of left-wing cooperation are not, however, considered to be too rosy at this time. The predicted defeat of the Communists in the next

elections has been considered as a factor reducing the prestige of the whole socialist camp and also weakening the position of the Social Democrats with respect to parliament's bourgeois camp.

"It may be that when we restore order to the party and sacrifice our energy on behalf of the nation, the people will punish us. This I do not really want to believe," says Arvo Aalto in arguing against this.

According to him, election behavior will be influenced by many such factors which cannot even yet be foreseen. "It is, however, certain that in the final count the SKP and the recovering SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] will appear to be more sensible that they are today."

Not even Arvo Aalto wants to explain the flight of 150,000 supporters from the ranks of the People's Democrats by mere disgust with internal squabbles. On the other hand, it is considered that the departure of the TIEDONANTAJA faction is facilitating the return of the disenchanted. The chairman continues to place his hopes in youth, among whom many have said outright in private discussions that "there is no sense in supporting such a ragged movement".

"It is outright inefficiency on my part and the part of other SKP leaders if we are not now able to demonstrate to those youth who have left our ranks that our objectives are such for which it is prudent as well as possible to return to the party."

The restoration of credibility as an objective of practical policy is important in another sense also. Aalto, General Secretary Esko Vainionpaa, and comrades must quickly be able to redeem the confidence of the CPSU and demonstrate that the concern expressed by the large fraternal party for the dissolution of the SKP is after all unfounded.

The chairman denies having speculated with the personnel changes that have taken place at the top of Soviet society even in his own thoughts. However, it is self-evident that the wave of reform initiated in the Soviet Union will also in time affect the international communist movement. "And relations between the SKP and the CPSU are not detached from this whole."

There is not yet exactly any cause for optimism at this time. Indeed, the Sputnik publishing controversy, among other things, clearly demonstrated that there is still a readiness in the Kremlin to put down anyone threatening its will.

Could it be that the CPSU's economic support will over a period of time create such operating conditions for the Taistoites that they will soon also influence the internal power relationships of Finland's communist movement?

"Not one single political party has been eliminated in this country by money issues. Even as important as the economic side is in organizational activities, parties do not live in a dependency on money, but on whether they have public support and a social obligation in the time to come. Indeed, the whole workers' movement came about in this country without even a bank account."

Thus the development of support as well as the patience of the CPSU will be measured many times during the coming winter when the party leadership intends to make a final break even formally from Taistoite-oriented sections remaining in the SKP.

"Everyone has been offered an opportunity to come into the party with equal rights and responsibilities and within the framework stipulated by the regulations. The decision has been made with a serious purpose in mind and not in a tactical sense. Each section will come to its own decision and will choose its place. No one can be forced and there is no desire to do so. The SKP is not a penitentiary, people come into it on a voluntary basis and leave if they are dissatisfied," states Aalto.

"As far as the time schedule is concerned, the decisions of the Central Committee mean that when the internal situation is resolved, it will also be completely resolved. Such a time period cannot be long, it is a question of a few months at the most."

Subsequent transfers will be made at the level of sections remaining thus far in the shadow of the districts and highest leadership. The Central Committee's role will be limited only to accomplishing what has happened.

"Those sections which do not join the district organizations in the party will adopt a stand on whether they want to remain outside of the party either by a precise answer or a failure to debate the issue."

Like Brothers Together?

Is the worst enemy of a European communist another communist?

There is good reason to ask this question when one examines the postwar tale of woe regarding the extreme left wing in our part of the world. In this framework the only astonishing aspect in the dissolution of the SKP is that the paths of the majority and of the minority are only now going their separate ways.

A division into nationalist communists and communists faithful to Moscow is not at all any kind of a typically Finnish phenomenon even as strongly as it has become personified here into "Taistoites" and "Saarinenites". Perhaps, the only thing that is homemade -- or should we say Eurocommunist -- in this matter is that here the dogmatists have become defendants. In many other countries they have had the initiative at the moment relations were broken off as well as control of the organizational machinery.

For example, in Norway at the end of the 1940s already the local communist party was purged of individuals who were suspected of "abandoning the class struggle for bourgeois nationalism", a doctrine which at that time was inseparably connected with the name of the Yugoslavian strong man Josip Broz Tito. The solution did not benefit anyone; the leader of those labelled as heretics became unacceptable because of so-called personal problems and soon disappeared from the political scene, the core group, which retained its orthodoxy, on the

other hand, lost a large portion of its former constituency and withered into a mini-party without any influence.

In Denmark Titoism did not divide the communists until 10 years later, 1958. However, the old party leadership, which was pushed aside, established the new Socialist People's Party with the support of the intelligentsia and active members of the trade union movement, a party which declared opposition to a market economy, but conceded that social development has not progressed everywhere according to the predictions outlined by Karl Marx. The newcomer soon grew larger than the mother party and achieved a stable position in Denmark's fractured political arena.

Sweden's communists have succeeded in avoiding the Finnish-type open split. Nevertheless, there have been sufficient causes for dispute on the home front. In the 1960s the party was divided into three distinct camps, "dogmatists", "reformists", and a kind of third-line "traditionalists". Since then differences have been restrained by the whole party's fear for the future and the possibility of falling below the voting threshold as a small party outside of parliament.

The rule according to which the strength of a communist party is directly proportionate to its independence from the Soviet Union seems to be valid for the Nordic countries -- Denmark and in the future apparently for Finland also. Elsewhere in Europe, however, this does not necessarily hold true. An example to the contrary can be found in Greece where the External Communist Party, which adheres to Moscow's line, has risen to a more important position than the Internal Communist Party, which primarily represents a Eurocommunist policy.

The "three greats" of Eurocommunism, the French, Italian, and Spanish parties, have clearly been in the hands of reformists. This has not, however, meant that there has not been some strong arm-twisting about future policies under the exterior of reformism. According to many assessments, the membership, particular veterans of the underground era, is clearly more conservative than the party leadership and has not always without grumbling approved the political perceptions of Enrico Berlinguer, Georges Marchais, and partners.

The Spanish Communist Party, whose support dropped in the last parliamentary elections from 11 percent to less than 4 percent, seems at this time to be experiencing the worst internal crisis. The former number one man Santiago Carrillo and present General Secretary Gerardo Iglesias are openly fighting over personality questions as well as ideology. It is, indeed, ironic that Carrillo, the creator of the reform policy, is now accusing his successor of "excessive Eurocommunism". Many others seem to be of the same opinion since two factions positively disposed to the Soviet Union have already broken away from the party in the 1980s.

SKDL Reports Membership Aging

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Oct 85 p 8

[Article: "Half of SKDL's Members on Paper Only"]

[Text] The SKDL's Executive Council discussed the party's situation and future prospects in Helsinki on Saturday. Vice Chairman Tuomo Molander of the Executive Council painted a gloomy picture of the SKDL's current situation in his introductory statement.

According to Molander, the majority of the SKDL's nearly 1,400 member associations exists in fact only on paper. They issue proclamations which no one reads and deal with personnel matters which do not advance ideology, criticized Molander.

Also the SKDL's membership structure is problematical, stated Molander. The average age of its members is more than 48 years of age, and the party does not seem to interest youth: there are only a few dozen members under 20, less than 0.2 percent of the total membership.

Real Socialism Does Not Attract People

In Molander's opinion the People's Democrats have failed in the presentation of their objectives. "The SKDL has clearly stated that it is acting on behalf of socialist solutions. However, that socialism to which the SKDL is aspiring has probably remained unknown to the general public," he stated.

"The image of socialism is generally based on the experiences of today's socialist countries. A comparison of their situation with conditions in Finland does not persuade people to be enthusiastic about socialist solutions."

According to Molander, today's socialist countries have proceeded to build their own socialism from different premises than in Finland.

"Concrete models of Finnish socialism have not been presented. Also it has perhaps not been emphasized that in addition to being an alternative to capitalism Finnish socialism will also be different than the presently existing socialism," stated Molander.

In Molander's opinion the SKDL should seek new momentum from idealism and extraparliamentary activities, among other things.

The Executive Council also discussed the SKDL's and Finnish Communist Party's internal disputes. However, no decision as yet was made on the expulsion of the SKDL's two Taistoite district organizations, the districts of Kymenlaakso and Joensuu.

The meeting of the SKDL's Executive Council will continue on Sunday. An educational policy resolution, among other things, was approved at the meeting.

SKDL Again Appeals to Stalinists

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Oct 85 p 13

[Article: "SKDL Again Appealed to Minority Faction"]

[Text] On Sunday the SKDL's Executive Council offered the minority Communists an opportunity to be included on the SKDL's candidate lists in the next parliamentary elections.

However, the now familiar condition was attached to the offer: the members of the minority districts must agree to carry out the principles and decisions of the SKDL and they must renounce all activities contrary to the SKDL and its member organizations.

According to the position adopted by the SKDL's Executive Council, there is a place in the SKDL's ranks for "all democratically thinking people for whom the goals and principles of the SKDL are dear".

The Executive Council appealed to the Taistoite district organizations expelled from the SKP so that they "would feel a responsibility for the influence of the People's Democratic movement as well as demonstrate in a convincing manner their willingness to accomplish the SKDL's objectives".

The position of the members of minority districts expelled from the Communist Party will be brought up again in the SKDL after these districts have responded to the SKDL's inquiry on their future conduct.

In letters sent to the minority districts it is asked whether they want to work in the SKDL while adhering to its operational principles. At the same time they are reminded of the minority's infractions so far. The SKDL's Kymenlaakso and Joensuu districts are controlled by the minority.

The minority members of the SKDL's Executive Council are demanding that election work and the nomination of candidates be accomplished "without even the slightest discrimination against any present or future partner in cooperation".

In the opinion of the minority faction a broad negotiating meeting should be convened to rectify the present situation.

The Executive Council, which met in Helsinki, also approved a budget stand in which it is assumed that the position of underprivileged segments of the population will in the future be treated separately in the state budget. The Executive Council also gave its complete support to striking janitors in Hyvinkaa.

10576
CSO: 3617/24

EEC CHAIRMAN DELORS VIEWS COMMUNITY'S FUTURE

PM021315 Paris LE MATIN in French 28 Nov 85 p 12

/Interview with EEC Commission Chariman Jacques Delors by Alexandre Adler; date and place not given/

/Text/ LE MATIN; Most of the big European states are now community members: Could this be an opportunity to look at what stage we have reached with this expansion?

Jacques Delors: I do not think that anybody was aware enough of the significance of the community's expansion from 6 to 9, and then to 10, and 12. All those who wanted a 12-member Europe failed to assess what it meant. I note that some governments are frightened by the decisions which they themselves have taken. The expansion of Europe to include Greece and then Spain and Portugal is a political enrichment. Europe has decided to expand, and this obviously entails a culture shock, but a positive culture shock. Northern and Southern Europe are together. It must be stressed that the PS hoped for this union at the appropriate time, and in my view this is a political and cultural opportunity. There are 12 of us, and that is a good thing, a political success, but it is also an economic challenge because it can administer the heterogeneous nature of the new entity.

LA MATIN: However, there are new problems facing the community, for instance the current institutional problem.

Jacques Delors: It is rather strange to see how in the past 3 years, after years dominated by pragmatism and the recognition of national interests, institutional issues have resurfaced. If you believe that Europe can only exist if it is united, you must provide it with institutions which exert pressure on national interests and transcend the legitimate interests of each country. Pragmatism cannot be the only rule of conduct in a Europe which faces daunting challenges linked to the geopolitical changes in the world and the scientific and technological revolution. The institutional question must be faced.

LE MATIN: Does this mean that the rule of unanimity should be entirely set aside?

Jacques Delors: In the EEC's province, in other words the economic, financial, social, and monetary spheres, it is appropriate to move quicker and go further. After the problems we encountered in preparing for the European Council meeting in Luxembourg, Francois Mitterrand's clear restatement of his positions is a pacifying factor and a contribution to a clear dialogue. The president is not questioning the EEC's development. He thinks that it should have a political extension. This extension takes the form of political cooperation and cooperation on security.

LE MATIN: There are the monetary tool, political cooperation, European technological cooperation, and European cooperation on defense. All these are of primary concern to the EEC commission and its chairman....

Jacques Delors: Let us make things clear. I am where I am because I believe in Europe. Since God moves in a mysterious way, and history does too, I will not be upset if Europe is also built through channels other than ours. However, I might as well say immediately that I do not see how the Europe of the future could be built on the ashes of the EEC. I fail to understand that. This makes me vigilant. Consequently I think it is impossible to build Europe as a political entity by attacking the community method.

As chairman of the EEC Commission I do not claim to have a monopoly of the channels of European building. That must be clearly understood. But there must be a minimum, after all, and this minimum is administering the ECC's development. I believe that this involves what I have described as the foundation of the community's recovery--a huge market of 320 million people without any kind of border or barrier. It involves a degree of economic and social cohesion, a demonstration of solidarity, to the extent that each makes an effort. It involves institutionalized monetary cooperation.

/Delors continues/ Finally, it involves a minimum of technological cooperation, which I say is entirely compatible with the development of Eureka. This is the foundation; if it does not exist, then we are building on sand. This is the minimum required. I do not claim that we--the Commission--have a monopoly on European interests. This is proved by the fact that I am trying to help Eureka to succeed; it is proved by the fact that I would understand the existence of a political cooperation treaty outside the community. I simply ask that there should be some prospect of a single treaty which might one day enable the European union to exist. Now and in the future we will only live, exist, influence the world, and be citizens of the world if we are together. The community method is required to create an entity with 320 million citizens. Is the community method adequate? I have never claimed that. If you try to stifle it, then you kill Europe.

LE MATIN: Over and above technological cooperation there is, of course, a common political will. How does the European Commission chairman now view this political revival?

Jacques Delors: I am not opposed to a separate treaty formalizing political cooperation and introducing the problems of security and defense. What I ask is that the future should not prejudiced, and that there is a possibility of these 12 countries' one day forming a political and economic community.

I note with satisfaction that the French proposal aims to achieve this.

LE MATIN: Do you intend to rely on the European Parliament and European opinion to make progress, and if so how?

Jacques Delors: The European Parliament is like me and you. We live with our extremes of honor and indignity. The European Parliament was elected by universal suffrage and it was not I who decided that. I was a European deputy, and I was very often criticized for its behavior, but I now think that the European Parliament has something to say about European building. I regard it as a duty to help the European Parliament in reviving European building. This does not mean that I am in favor of maximalism. I am not alone; there are 13 other commissioners.

LE MATIN: People now feel that no European country is openly opposed to European building. Paradoxically people feel that Europe has less to say than it did just 30 years ago.

Jacques Delors: For 7 or 8 years I said: Take care, Europe is threatened with decline. And I now say: No to Europessimism. We are getting back on our feet economically, socially, and politically. I have confidence in Europe's strength. I remain faithful to the European model, based on a balance between society and the individual--a Europe which aspires to a universal role, which in other words is capable of winning respect and working for greater fraternity in the world.

/12228
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REGIS DEBRAY ON NICARAGUA, GUERRILLAS, SOVIET ACTIONS

Rio de Janeiro MANCHETE in Portuguese 16 Nov 85 pp 106B, C

[Text of interview with Regis Debray, foreign policy counselor to President Francois Mitterrand, by Jose Hernandes/Gamma-Sigla, translated by Alexandre Raposo, date and place of interview not specified]

> [Text] In 1971, Regis Debray came out of a Bolivian jail, where he had been imprisoned for 4 years because of his involvement with Ernesto Che Guevara, and threw himself body and soul into French political life. In 1981, Debray was named foreign policy counselor by President Francois Mitterrand, with whom he traveled to Brazil this year as a member of the official party. Although he refused to talk about his past as a guerrilla, Debray's high official position did not keep him from expanding on his political analysis of international relations among the states, as seen in this exclusive interview with MANCHETE.

Question: When the French president appointed you as foreign policy counselor, responsible, among other things, for Latin America, some foreign ministers on this continent made their dissatisfaction very clear. Do you think their attitude is explainable?

Answer: Explainable, yes, but the images always lag behind the reality; the image of a man more or less 20 years behind what he really is today. The stereotypes have not been favorable to me. This explains the concern of some foreign ministers, as you put it so circumspectly. The facts will show that they have been mistaken.

Question: You have changed. This is irrefutable. However, there is the impression that your development has not been reflected in your relations with Latin America. Your friends, the people you communicate with, are always the same. You seem to have ignored individuals who have also sought much more pragmatic solutions in Latin America. Why?

Answer: [This impression is] because of the perpetuation of the images and the memory of the guerrilla in the beginning of the 1970s. On the other hand, I practically stopped traveling to Latin America after my release in 1970.

Question: But you have gone to Cuba several times.

Answer: I have also gone to Mexico, Panama and Costa Rica, but I have not had occasion to go to other places. It happens that my horizons have broadened. I have gone more to Asia, to the Pacific countries and to the United States. This means that, until 1971, I was keeping up with Latin American affairs at some distance.

Question: Was it a deliberate decision?

Answer: Yes. In 1981, the president of the republic put me in charge of this sector, which gave me an opportunity to bring my knowledge up to date. But early in 1982 I gave up responsibility for this area.

Question: Why?

Answer: Because men must grow. Because the world is large and varied. Finally, because French interest are concentrated primarily in Latin America.

Question: What is not understandable is why you limited your contacts to people who have something to do with the guerrilla image.

Answer: I believe that life has phases, just as it has years. I had a very strong Latin American phase, a very exciting phase and from which I still have good memories of the friendships I made and of the Latin American vitality and creativity, which I could appreciate. Since then, I have had other phases: Asian, Pacific, North American. But I am not thinking of changing my friendships, because I am loyal to my friends and I am certainly not going to deny publicly what I was, since I am not a turncoat.

Question: The problem is that some of your friends embody a type of power which you have denounced in other places, but not in Latin America.

Answer: I never denounce. What I do is to attempt to understand how political systems function. I am not interested in the model of society but in the power relations among the states. It is an area which one should approach with a clear head, devoid of passion. We must coldly consider power relationships, which are cold. In this way, I have no accounts to settle or accusations to make. I have never made speeches in praise of this or that form of capitalism or socialism. I have tried to understand the relationships among the states.

Question: You cannot be faulted for your personal friendships, with Fidel Castro, for example. But, in the eyes of many people, these friendships are a form of defense of a certain type of power...

Answer: I do not have political relations with Fidel Castro. I have them with Mitterrand. I defend the interests of France.

Question: Do you think that the guerrilla phenomenon is justified in Latin America today?

Answer: In a democratic era, there is no justification for guerrilla action. It is only justified against a dictatorship which prevents the expression of popular sovereignty, which denies freedom to meet and to associate. When the only remaining course is violence, it might be justified. I say "might."

Question: In your book "The Empires against Europe," you were not very kind to your former allies. Speaking about the Communist parties in Colombia, Brazil and Venezuela, you referred to them as "little maverick groups" and "societies of old men."

Answer: We are witnessing a fantastic decline of the classic communist movement in Latin America. It catches our attention.

Question: Does the development of the Sandinist. regime correspond to what President Mitterrand and even you would have wished?

Answer: In any case, we had no great illusions. We are in favor of self-determination. Therefore, we recognize President Ortega as the legitimate president of that country. Moreover, we maintain a cordial and close dialogue with the Sandinist leaders. In any event, it is not strangling a country which we are helping to breathe. [Sentence as published]

Question: Do you apply the same reasoning in the case of Salvador?

Answer: We follow the same principle. France has no reason to challenge the legitimacy of this or that electoral process. We are not the arbiters of the authenticity of an election. For this reason, the French Government recognizes Napoleon Duarte and Gregorio Ortega.

Question: Speaking of the United States: do you think a country can be imperialist and democratic at the same time?

Answer: Naturally. Seen from abroad, particularly from Latin America, America is nothing if not imperialist. We forget that behind this is a dynamic, creative and innovative society, capable of staying the hand of imperialism under some circumstances. Nicaragua is an example. There are two sectarian visions of the United States: one that sees only an open society, an extraordinary laboratory of ideas, associations and changes; and one that sees only the imperialist role and the extension of its influence in the world. For my part, I am very happy when I am in New York, but I would not like every city in the world to look like New York.

Question: In the name of the national interest, you accept many things in France that you have criticized on other occasions. According to the same logic, I don't see that one can criticize American policy that also "defends its interests."

Answer: I argue that I am a nationalist of the Left. A nationalist of the Left is someone who acknowledges the reality of other nationalisms. It is

someone who does not seek to impose his will on those who are weaker but is content to resist those who are stronger. There is a form of nationalism which I cannot accept: arrogance, the desire for hegemony and contempt for fellow beings.

Question: According to you, in Europe there is an "ideological" way of perceiving the Soviet phenomenon: the country of the Gulag, with KGB agents everywhere. Do you think that in Latin America--so unconcerned about geostrategic realities--there is also an ideological vision of the "USSR as the Evil Empire," or is it seen as "allied against imperialism"?

Question: There are no absolute truths in politics. There are relative truths at the time and place in which we are speaking. In France, for example, there is a political microclimate which defines itself as antitotalitarian and which sees the USSR in terms of the Stalinist experiment and its consequences. I think this is a mistake. The USSR is changing and it is a much more complicated country than the Gulag. There is another form of myopia in the Third World. It is accustomed to seeing the USSR as the rearguard of the national liberation movements. This is a pure abstraction which ignores the situation of the countries of East Europe and Afghanistan and, finally, the backward character of social and political life in the Soviet Union.

Question: Yours is the classic centrist discourse.

Answer: I know. For this reason, I am seen as anti-Soviet in the Third World and pro-soviet in intellectual circles in Paris. And this is the problem with having a balanced vision.

Question: You say that the USSR has no future as an expansionist power. Isn't it a paradox that this is how you see a superpower which in recent years has extended its influence to Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Angola, while the United States was losing some of its influence in Asia and such faithful allies as Somoza and the Shah of Iran?

Answer: I believe that the United States won the war in Vietnam. They lost at the military level, but they gained, politically, throughout Asia. The American presence has never been as strong as it is today in Southeast Asia, Japan and China. Thus, they won the war. Today, actually, wars are not won with arms, but at the economic, cultural and commerical levels. Moreover, the United States has tipped the overall East-West military balance in its favor, particularly by virtue of its progress with Star Wars technology.

Question: So the expansionist question is still based, in the last analysis, on military power.

Answer: It is true that the USSR is competitive with the United States in the arms area. Otherwise, it is very far behind. But a modern power is no longer a military base because the nuclear deterrent prevents a major war. What is the purpose of amassing so many armored divisions? They are an unproductive expense. Today, power is based on science and technology. When the society cannot benefit from the scientific progress--which is the case in the USSR--it is an underdeveloped society. The armed forces do not weigh in this.

Their psychological threat can be activated but their actual use in a ground war is almost impossible because, I reiterate, of the nuclear deterrent. The Soviets have nothing to offer the Third World but tanks and Kalachnikovs. But the era of the colonial wars is past. The poor countries need capital, engineers and computer systems, which they cannot get from the Soviet Union. In Europe, the Soviets have very few unconditional defenders. They are either met with polite indifference or visceral hostility. It seems to me that, at this time, the important issues are the image, the computers, the communications satellites, the microprocessors, artificial intelligence, the capacity to store, process,and distribute information. This is where the power lies. In this race, the Soviets are behind. Today, the USSR is an empire which is administering its conquests. Afghanistan is a demonstration that to seek new conquests is to invite new difficulties.

Question: Couldn't these disadvantages make the Soviet empire more aggressive?

Answer: This is the theory of Jean-Francois Revel and the French Right. I don't believe it is well founded. It is one thing to have an aggressive policy; it is something else to have the means to carry it out. The Soviets do not have the means. The important thing to know is not what they want to do but what they are capable of doing. It is not a question of good or ill will. It is a question of the relationship of forces. As long as there is a balance of power, the Soviets will not be able to use their military advantage in Europe. So France has the defense policy that you know about. I am not a pacifist. Peace is achieved with a balance of power.

6362
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UNIFICATION OF SECURITY CORPS SEEN MISSING GOAL

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 27

[Text] The intrinsic problems concerning the unification of the security corps get bigger every day as they are becoming more acute lately in a geometric progression, threatening to jeopardize the unification itself which, as is generally agreed, constitutes a substantial achievement of the PASOK government.

The problems which are accumulating because those at the head of the Ministry of Public Order have become rather inept at dealing with them threaten the very cohesiveness of the Greek Police, especially since some claim that an attempt by some high officials--with proven democratic convictions--to uproot the ELAS [Greek Police] can be detected.

Today the Greek Police is faced with undeniable phenomena of discord which have the most serious repercussions on the quality of security and the efficiency of the police services offered to the whole of society. Police bulletins that are getting ever bulkier and "richer" every day are an undeniable testimony to those phenomena.

It is now common knowledge that although numerous steps, at least "visible" ones, were taken to unify the security corps (same uniforms, badges etc.) nevertheless nothing at all was really done to unify...the spirit of the police officers who come from the two corps. In the precincts the prevailing climate is very bad for those who come from the "other" corps and constitute a "minority" in a particular precinct.

A series of administrative measures, particularly in the area of transfers, compounded the problem and created pockets of opposition among police officers where comradeship should reign between them in the face of crime.

The reproach made to the present civilian heads of the Ministry of Public Order is that they have made no attempt whatever to achieve this aim, wasting their energies on trivial matters such as the one that arose recently, namely, whether in official ceremonies police officers should wear...swords, following the precedent of officers of the armed forces.

The essential matter lies elsewhere:

That the heads of the Ministry of Public Order are proceeding by slow but

steady steps to militarize the Greek Police, a fact whose consequences it is impossible to discern now.

With regard to this, it is mentioned that one of the original aims of the unification of the security corps was their demilitarization and their coming under the control of the civilian heads of the Ministry of Social Order.

Now, for unknown reasons, the demilitarization of the police is being abandoned, and before there is any proof of what and how much can be expected from that model, the establishment of a Corps headquarters is being promoted, a development which means that control of the ELAS slips out of the hands of the civilian heads of the Ministry of Public Order and gets into those of the administration of the Corps.

Connected to the whole issue of the Greek Police which, curiously, has been left to its fate in the sense that it elicits no one's interest at a higher political level, is the issue of the rumored retirement of Lieutenant General Manolis Bosinakis and Major General Stelios Tzanakis.

Officially, the reason invoked for their (rumored) retirement is that in the case of the KYP [Central Intelligence Service] agent Danos Krystallis' arrest they acted without informing the civilian heads of the ministry, with the result that the familiar problems of relations between the KYP and the Police were revealed. Particularly where Mr. Bosinakis is concerned, those in favor of his being retired, who have strong contacts in the government machine, charge him with his genuinely bad relations with the KYP director of counter-espionage, Lieutenant Colonel Ioannis Alexakis, and claim that the Krystallis case "surfaced" precisely because of the personal conflict between the Lieutenant General of the ELAS and the high-ranking officer of the KYP.

However, it is also a fact that, apart from the concrete accusations, the circles agitating to have Messrs. Bosinakis and Tzanakis retired, also exploit the general mud-slinging.

According to evaluations of members of the Greek Police as well as of the Ministry of Public Order, the attempt to retire the two generals must be ascribed to the feud for succession to the top of the Corps, a feud that broke out behind the scenes between the highest ranking officers belonging to the former Gendarmerie and to the former Urban Police. The rumored retirement, the same objective observers emphasize, means nothing more than that, at this point, the hands that pull all the strings in the Greek Police belong to those who came from the former Gendarmerie. The result of this reality being that the succession is being prepared for someone who will again be coming from the Gendarmerie, whereas all signs had been pointing to the lieutenant general, Mr. Manolis Bosinakis, as head of the ELAS after the eventual retirement of its present head, Mr. Romosios. (If, in the end, Mr. Bosinakis is retired, the "favorite" for the position of head of the Greek Police is Lieutenant General Ioannis Stavrakas).

However, up to this point nothing has sealed the fate of Messrs. Bosinakis and Tzanakis, and this because their meeting with the premier, Mr. Andreas

Papandreou, that was planned for ten days ago but was postponed, has not taken place yet.

Meanwhile, those who come from the former Urban Police are faced with a most serious problem with regard to information about the possible retirement of the two generals. According to information that has been verified as accurate, officers of the Greek Police have sided with Messrs. Bosinakis and Tzanakis, but as they are government sympathizers they have to remain nameless.

Naturally one cannot believe everything that is being rumored about mass resignations of democratic officers in case Messrs. Bosinakis and Tzanakis are retired, but the stepped-up disinformation around the two generals and the studied refusal to take a clear stance on the issue of the alternate minister of the interior and public order, Mr. Th. Tsouras, have led to the disruption of key services in the ministry and the ELAS, a situation that is at the citizens' expense.

12278
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CIVILIAN CONTROL OF KYP PLANNED IN TEN YEARS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 6 Nov 85 p 7

[Article by reporter Mikh. Kanimas: "Demilitarization Ten Years Hence"]

[Text] The Central Intelligence Service [KYP] will remain in the hands of the military for at least another ten years after its expected return to "civilian" control. This is what is specified by the presidential decree regarding the new organization that will take charge, which states that demilitarization will be gradual and will be completed in ten years. At that point, the number of the military serving in the KYP is foreseen as being limited to 50 individuals (versus 350 at present), but they will hold the most sensitive positions. From that standpoint, they will totally control the service. The presidential decree, however, does not specify a timetable for the withdrawal of the military from the KYP, nor does it include binding provisions to that effect. Thus it gives the government an opportunity to remain unconcerned about the matter of demilitarization on the one hand, and to be in a position on the other hand, through further presidential decrees, to change the service's orientation, which is a return to civilian control foreseen by law No 1415/84.

With a new organization, the processing of which has been completed and is expected to be submitted soon to the president of the republic for his signature, the military continue to manage the various services such as, for example, espionage, counterespionage, communications, the Security Bureaus and the terrorism section which is being maintained. They will retain those same privileges after "demilitarization" is completed. Civilian employees are entrusted with the control (administration) of the personnel and typing pool directorates and of the sections in charge of processing political information. Civilian employees will be promoted normally, only in services not controlled by the military, who will serve for only a maximum of three years in the KYP. The spirit of article 11 of the Junta decree No 360/69 with the force of law, which put a sergeant above any civilian employee regardless of his qualifications or what service he belonged to, pervades the presidential decree.

The Head

The provision that the head of the KYP can be a civilian, who will have the status of a civil servant or a diplomat, is viewed as an innovation of the

presidential decree. According to the new organization, its head could also be a military person in active service or a retired officer.

Two more positions for seconds in command, who will have the same status as the director, are projected.

While the presidential decree foresees an increase in the positions held by civilian employees of the KYP, to 1,800 versus 1,500 today, it neither restructures, merges nor eliminates services of the KYP, and does not restore the vested rights and incentives of the civilian employees which the PASOK had abolished. Those were the secrecy and productivity allowance (50% of the basic salary), the dangerous work allowance and the right of recognition of the 5 fictive years enjoyed by the military.

The presidential decree is the work of a committee appointed by the premier which consists of the alternate minister of national defense, Mr. Ant. Drosoyannis, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Ioannis Kapsis, the head of the KYP, General G. Politis and the premier's advisers, Messrs. Ant. Livanis and Mikh. Ziangas.

According to information, the attempt to demilitarize the KYP was opposed by the military who, as it is rumored, extracted the "promise" that at least during the first stage of implementation of the new organization, the head of the KYP will belong to the military. It is also rumored that the first steps in demilitarization will be taken with the actual boss of the KYP, Mr. G. Politis, as its head.

Not Even Symbolically

As reliable circles note, the new organization of the KYP does not ensure even symbolically the demilitarization of the service which, according to law No 1215/84 is a clearly political and independent service under the premier's direct control. They stress that the enactment of the 3-year period as the maximum time limit for officers to serve in the KYP is insufficient for them to become informed and adequately proficient in staff duties, and they underline that decrees such as these should be enacted with special laws so that points can be debated in parliament.

In fact, according to one view, the above mentioned presidential decree cannot abrogate provisions of law No 380/69, for the revision of which another law is required.

12278
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ND DISORGANIZATION, LACK OF OPPOSITION RAPPED

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 27 Oct 85 p 48

[Editorial by Panos Loukakos: "Why ND is Not 'Alternative Solution' Today"]

The recent economic measures and the ensuing dispute did not expose only the government's weaknesses.

They proved once more that there is today no credible main opposition which can both oppose, obviously, the government's policies and in the long term constitute an alternative solution. Thus the problem nowadays is not only what the government does or doesn't do. It is also the New Democracy's inability to advance convincing political arguments and adequately play the role of chief opposition. A role which, in the final analysis, is not strictly a party one since, manifestly, a strong opposition always makes the government more careful.

Among the high officials of the New Democracy there is a common feeling today that the leader of the party, Mr. K. Mitsotakis, failed in what he had been elected for, and that consequently he must be removed from the leadership of the party. The reasoning being that Mr. Mitsotakis had been elected as the "anti-Andreas" of the New Democracy, to wage the battle of the elections "with the same weapons the PASOK used." But the New Democracy suffered a crushing defeat in the elections and its leader failed to justify the hopes that went with his election. At the same time, since he came from the wing of the Center and not from the Right, he remained a foreign body within the New Democracy, as his opponents within the party say.

Thus the recent vote of confidence for which Mr. Mitsotakis asked was voted more as a necessary evil, to avoid a deep rift within the party, and much less because the majority of the ND's parlimantery group wants him for a leader. And it is here, perhaps, that one of the chief points of the opposition party's leadership problem can be found. Though they don't want Mr. Mitsotakis, they are scared to overthrow him. They are scared because they fear that his being overthrown might trigger a further split in the ND, a split which this time would be both deep and final.

For the first question that arises is, what could happen if Mr. Mitsotakis were overthrown? Thus, at this point, an alternative solution does not exist. According to one of the scenarios that are circulating, Mr. Rallis,

summoned from the reserve, could succeed Mr. Mitsotakis. But there are some obstacles to that solution. First, that Mr. Rallis was voted down in the past by the ND's parliamentary group. And second, that if Mr. Rallis were elected, not only Mr. Mitsotakis would leave the main opposition but quite possibly Mr. Averof too, as well as a group of deputies who, in the older quarrel between "Rallis and Averof followers" had clashed with the former premier.

The second scenario that can be heard today in the bosom of the main opposition is the designation to the leadership of a younger member. According to the logic of that version, all the old ones were tried and failed, and now the time has come for the New Democracy to proceed to a renewal in depth by promoting to the leadership its younger members. But here also there are obstacles. First, the younger members who consider they can assume the leadership number over five, and it is an impossibility that they will accept a solution which would not focus on their person. Second, the "elders" would never anoint an individual whom they felt they could not control. Consequently, it would be almost impossible to achieve a majority in a normal election.

All inside the New Democracy see and know that there can be no majority centered on one person today. Not only because the older groups have broken down and no one can orient an adequate number of deputies in this or that direction, so that through deals at the summit firm majorities can be formed. But also because the Damocles' sword of a rift hangs over every attempt that is made.

Thus at present there is an opposition problem. Not strictly a party problem, for then it would be of no interest to those outside the New Democracy. But, more generally, a political problem since a normal course for the nation requires not only a government but also an opposition. And these days the principal opposition is totally unable to play its role. If for one reason or another the present government relinquished power, it is certain that chaos would ensue. Because at that very moment, the way portfolios and offices are distributed, the New Democracy would disintegrate into the elements that com-posed it.

It is precisely this that is a dangerous historical cycle for the nation. In the years after 1974, there were strong New Democracy governments and there was also a very strong opposition, which expressed itself chiefly through the present premier, Mr. Andreas Papandreou. That is, the New Democracy's downfall was a blow to itself but not to the political life of this nation as well, since there was a ready alternative solution. Today there is no such alternative solution. And this is more generally dangerous. It creates a void, and voids in politics lead to more generally undesirable situations.

Today we have entered a crisis phase. A crisis which is political, social as well as economic. Strong party figureheads, that could function over and above persons, do not exist in Greece. Thus everything moves around Mr. Andreas Papandreou. Konstantinos Karamanlis is no longer president of the republic, there is no reliable leader to succeed the actual premier, so what is to happen when at some point, at the destined time, the hour of the PASOK

to complete its cycle as a government strikes?

The New Democracy which, despite today's critical conditions sleeps the sleep of the just and only bestirs itself to mobilize housewives in the squares, must provide the answer to this question.

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PASOK SAID TO HAVE LOST POPULAR TRUST

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in GREEK 2 Nov 85 p 9

[Excerpts from an article by Vasilis Filias: "Questions Awaiting Answers"]

[Text] However optimistic one is, one cannot help worrying about the turn events are taking. Questions such as "where are we going?" and "what is going to happen?" are among the first people ask themselves.

Signs of erosion, inefficiency and disorganization are manifest everywhere and recur every day.

The PASOK government has managed to exhaust the huge reserves of almost total trust, "veneration" and approval the people freely gave it. We don't wish to be nor are we unfair, but nothing confirms this claim of ours better than the events of the last two or three months, that came as a final touch to the tactics and mentality which sealed the course of the government party after the '81 elections. What are the characteristics of these tactics and mentality?

First, what jurists call a "contradiction between statement and intent" that is, in this specific case, failing to act in accordance with what is being said.

Second, taking initiatives and measures without studying all-around consequences, resulting in disfunctions, retractions, oscillations, with a consequent loss of prestige for the government.

Third, secretiveness and unpredictability in matters where information and exchanges are essential to mutual understanding in society, without which no significant measures have any chance of success.

Fourth, a populistic resilience which shakes and disintegrates social structures without conversely increasing the real coefficient of responsible popular participation in the critical sectors of the nation's public life.

Fifth, a tendency to improvisation and amateurishness which goes together with the promotion of unqualified persons, inappropriate and uninformed, at the decision-making level.

Sixth, "bending the rules" (as jurists would put it again), that is, bypass-

ing institutions by creating parallel "channels" and procedures.

Seventh, cultivating a "conspiratorial" and alarmist climate aimed at creating situations that pose a dilemma to the people, of the type: "without us, or after us, cataclysm."

Eighth, the attempt to blow small matters out of proportion or, on the contrary, to minimize big ones, so as to form each time an image of reality that "suits" the government.

Ninth, a determination of the government party to dominate and control all the expressions of collective and trade union [activities].

Tenth, avoiding the ascription of responsibilities where they really belong and, conversely, avoiding provision of any explanation about developments in the government's work.

The consequences are known, and we have had particularly striking examples of late.

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LEFT URGED TO ASSUME FITTING RESPONSIBILITIES

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 8

[Article by Y. Massavetas: "The Left Faced With Historical Responsibilities"]

[Text] The nation truly finds itself at a critical turn. Not, of course, because there are strikes. Nor because someone planted a bomb. A bomb blows up a democracy when it is not solidly built. When it is ready to topple on its own. The democracies that work properly don't get blown up that easily. They don't get destabilized at the least provocation.

If, for instance, in Italy the parties were not determined to defend democracy in every possible way, if contacts between government and opposition were not so soundly established, if above all there was no respect and safeguarding of institutions, then what should have happened there, where bombings cost innumerable lives, where blind political violence had reached extremes?

But democracy remained steady and triumphed. It remained in its place to witness the decay and degeneration of terrorism. Because no one viewed those phenomena as a golden opportunity for an attempt to expand power, to weaken the role of the other parties or the trade unions.

If our own democracy still appears to be terror-stricken, this is due to the weakness of its parties. Of its political leadership. And chiefly to the undermining of the regime for which the parties themselves, which blow up the bridges of cooperation and communication between them, are responsible.

Until yesterday the PASOK was blowing up the bridges of communication with the Right. Now it shows a determination, a maniacal effort to "cut itself off" from the Left. To emerge as the sole guarantor of a democratic course, of legal and social order. And, if possible, to push that Left to the periphery.

Today, however, this Left which has so exhausted itself is invited to assume its responsibilities. The dangerous factor in our political life is that we have a government which discourages the people more every day, a main opposition which doesn't inspire them with any confidence as a possible alternative solution and a Left which offers no hope. A Left plunged until now in its own internecine war. Clinging to outdated stereotypes. With anachronistic slogans and ways of thinking and acting. And this concerns not only a segment of this Left but its entirety.

During the political crisis of March, this Left found itself [in the role] of comical rear guard in a game played chiefly at its expense. And it emerged as hawking precisely the opposite of what it really wished to happen. Even its supposedly more progressive segment presented an image lacking credibility, which grievously wounded it. Because it was dragged into the anti-Karamanlis hysteria even though...it was praying for Karamanlis' election. But it lacked the courage to take openly a political stance which went against the current that was artificially contrived. It thus accepted the legalization, sometimes through its cooperation and sometimes through its silence, of methods which undermined the prestige of institutions. It accepted everything. From colored ballots to parliament abolishing itself, rejecting the advice of the investigating committee in charge, under the stricture that it might be accused of siding with the Right. But in democracies, the tactical coincidence of factions with different ideologies to protect institutions, is essential, it is a necessity and not an occasion for rhetorical imprecations.

The latest political decision of the KKE gives hope that most of the Left has decided to rid itself of its complexes and actively enter political life as one of the nation's political forces which has the same rights and the same obligations as the others for a smooth functioning of the democratic regime, as a regime of dialogue, of mingling, of cooperation, of consensus and not of the blowing up of bridges.

On the other hand, everything that is being debated inside the [KKE of the] "Interior" gives hope that the leaders of that party will be finally rid of the constraints of proving that it is the one which represents true communism in Greece. Of the constraints of the iconolatry of the hammer and sickle and of persisting in an endless lawsuit for the distribution of an indivisible inheritance which has already been made legal by others through usucaption [long practice].

The leaders of the KKE (Int.) are responsible for the degeneration of the most wonderful hope to be born within the Greek Left. As well as for the killing of an experiment which had already succeeded and which was the envy of Italian communists. That is, of the political vehicle EDA [United Democratic Left] which was the answer to the challenge to overcome the historical rift between socialists and communists.

It was a huge wealth which they allowed to evaporate. Appearing thus today as a schema with a "given" political presence. Today they are offering us some hope. The search for a new persona. But they are in danger of committing another error. Because in none of the position statements that we read did we see that anyone was interested in the prospect of reassembling the "United Democratic Left".

Today the Left has decisive responsibilities toward the future course of the nation. It is invited to play the role of the guarantor of a normal democratic course, respecting all the rules. But new strength is needed. A strength that can be achieved only by overcoming all those factors which prevent a

concrete cooperation between its segments, as well as the practices which bog down its credibiliity, the range of its political message to such low levels.

The time has come for the Left to rid itself of its constraints. Both those of "orthodoxy" and of "progressiveness." Otherwise it will be the first to pay for this crisis, this feeling of political decay which is becoming dangerously stronger every day.

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'DESTABILIZATION ' ACTIVITIES SEEN ONLY WITHIN PASOK

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 48

[Excerpts From an Article by Panos Loukakos: "Who Is Endangered by Whom And Why"]

[Text] Destabilization, then. And anomalous solutions. And the climate of 1965.

So, what destabilization, why a destabilization and who causes it?

Barely five months have passed since the June elections, which gave the PASOK an impressive majority. So who could be thinking today of overthrowing by abnormal procedures a government supported by such a recent popular verdict?

Could it be the army? At this point it is certain it is not. There is neither the proper climate that could lead to a military intervention, nor are there today such foolishly ambitious officers who could ignore that those who made such an attempt in the past are still in Korydallos. [Athens prison]

The "traditional Left"? There is no doubt that, even if it wished to, it lacks at present the mechanisms which could lead to anomalous solutions. But at any rate it has no reason whatever to make such an attempt. Because if an anomalous solution is resorted to, the Communists will be the first to be called to account, as is always the case.

The Right? Today it anything but moves outside the framework of parliamentary politics. Contrary to 1965, it doesn't have even the smallest wing that would agree to or cover anomalous solutions.

The Americans? This is no longer 1965. And American services know very well that nowadays they can't overthrow a Greek government. Besides, they have no reason to do so. It is with this government that they negotiated the continuance of the bases, and it is with this same government that they are negotiating an extension of their continued activities here. While the overall climate prevailing in Greek-American relations is anything but a climate of acute confrontation.

Therefore, the "vehicle"--to use an in word--that will bring about the anomalous solution is missing. But, furthermore, the conditions that could lead

to such an overthrow are totally missing. Because an overthrow presupposes a general lack of government and general chaos as was the case in Greece in the pre-dictatorship years.

Therefore, since today conditions for a destabilization are lacking and because "destabilizers" don't appear to exist, we should perhaps look elsewhere for the causes of this startling alarmism: to the response and reactions elicited by the economic measures.

So, the economic measures led eight PASOK trade unionists to "remove themselves from the Movement." They led to reshufflings in the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] which removed Mr. Raftopoulos from its head. They led to admittedly odd judicial actions which took justice out of the courts. They led to justified and moreover predictable reactions from the communist left and trade union organizations which, according to the government, put them outside the pale of democratic legality. And who is left within? Only those who applaud the measures, applaud the expulsion of fellow-militants and anything else they are told to applaud?

All of which lead to the conclusion that if there is some kind of destabilization today, it exists inside the PASOK and not outside of it. Because all the occurrences of recent days are clear examples of a lack of level-headedness.

When the government announced its economic measures, it cannot have failed to foresee reactions. And surely those reactions and the ones that will follow cannot overthrow it. Governments have never fallen in Greece because they took harsh economic measures. Neither can legitimate public discontent, under present conditions, lead to anomalous situations.

On the other hand, what gives rise to the problem is the lack of level-headedness these days. Because it is precisely this lack of level-headedness which prevents establishing the suitable climate which is essential if the economic measures are to be productive.

Because this lack of level-headedness creates the feeling of a governmental destabilization which, under the circumstances, is unjustified.

Unless, of course, something else of which we are not aware is happening. Unless the government has some other kind of information which shows that something more general, more serious and dangerous is evolving behind scenes unknown to us. If such a thing exists, and it seems unlilkely that it does, let the government inform the Greek people, so that all can confront the danger together.

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AREAS OF COMPETENCE DEFINED IN PASOK EXECUTIVE BUREAU

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 10

/Text/ The duties and responsibilities of the members of the new PASOK Central Committee Executive Bureau were assigned yesterday. Also assigned their duties and responsibilities were the secretaries of all party sectors. The following assignments were made:

Organizational Sector: Khatzopoulos, Sotirlis and Papoutsis. Enlightenment Sector: Skandalidis, Givalos and Tzoumakas. Youth Sector: Papoutsis, Skandalidis and Tzoumakas. Trade Union Sector: Souladakis and Tzoumakas. Cooperative Sector: Giotas, Mamalakis and Tzoumakas. Cultural Sector: Souladakis and Karaveli; Women's Sector: Kypriotakis and Karaveli. Local Problems Sector: Khatzopoulos, Karaveli and Souladakis. Economic Sector: Mamalakis and Souladakis. International Relations Sector: Karaveli and Tsokhatzopoulos; Support for Government Program and Parliamentary Control Sector: Giotas, Givalos and Sotirlis. Support Committees Sector: Giotas, Papoutsis and Sotirlis. Problems of Greeks Abroad Sector: Sotirlis and Kypriotaki.

The mobilization bureau will have direct liaison with the executive bureau and specifically with Khr. Papoutsis, even though he is a member of the Organizational Committee. The same holds true for the press bureau that belongs to the Enlightement Sector. Responsible officers are Givalos and Skandalidis.

Secretaries

The new secretaries are the following: Local Self-Administration: Vasilis Papagiannakis; Kapetanakis and Kharalambous, alternate secretaries. Economic: D. Sapountzis. International Relations: Vasilis Konstandineas; Mandzouranis and P. Nearkhos, alternate secretaries. Support for Government Task: Manolis Khatzinakis. Support Committee: Kedikoglou; Markakis, alternate secretary. Greeks Abroad: Zarlis; G. Kissonas, alternate secretary. Organizational: Pandelis Oikonomou; K. Malesios and N. Mikhalopoulos, alternate secretaries. Enlightenment: Giannis Papadatas; Vourkouvalidis and F. Petsalnikos, alternate secretaries; Youth: Thanasis Papageorgiou; Mangriotis, Karydis and Papadogiannakis, alternate secretaries. Cooperatives: Aslanis; Makis Konstandinou and Giannis Khardalias, alternate secretaries. Trade Union: Made up of a three-man secretariat composed of Spyros Kaloudis, Loukas Apostolidis and Giannis Koulaxis. Cultural: Andonis Tritsis; Rena Lambraki, alternate secretary. Women: Maria Kypriotaki; G. Praxiadou and Ar. Bourdara, alternates. Press Bureau: N. Athanasakis; Mobilization Bureau: G. Papagiotakopoulos; Takis Giambouranis, alternate.

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POSSIBLE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN KKE, KKE(INT) ARGUED

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 24 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by T. Papadopoulos]

[Text] PASOK's antipopular front, expressed with the announcement of the new measures which directly hit the workers, has come to tear down the pre-electoral sloganizing about better days; at the same time, by revealing the current power's mask, which has been maintained with deceitful machinations, it has come upon the procedures for another confrontation with the government by the traditional Left.

The picture given today by both the KKE and KKE(Int) is that of reorganizing the forces, with prospects for cooperation to jointly confront PASOK in the imminent municipal elections.

The procedures in KKE(Int) to change both the party's title and physiognomy are facilitating contact between the two parties.

RIZOSPASTIS has already toned down, while I AVGI is not being bothersome.

The word splintering has entered the KKE's official documents and "legalized" the second communist party which emerged after 1968.

In the parliament, the KKE has extended helping hands, seeking for the voice of one deputy to be heard, while at the same time it has shown itself a supporter of Leonidas Kyrkos' demand to acquire a proper shelter in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Re-Evolvement of KKE(Int)

The prospect of the KKE Interior's re-evolving has particularly encouraged the KKE in these steps toward rapprochement.

The recent electoral result, which shrank the KKE and gave a parliamentary representation to the KKE(Int), was at the same time a message that PASOK is drawing power from the communist Left, since the slogan, "PASOK or the Right," has finally come through positively for the governing party.

The presence of the KKE(Int), even if with only one seat, in the Greek Parliament and Chamber, has belied the hopes and expectations of those who believed that, sooner or later, the prodigal son would again be incorporated in the KKE.

The differentiations, applied daily, in the positions of the KKE(Int), and its withdrawal from the line professed by the orthodox, pro-Soviet tendency, divided de facto the two parties. Its title is a formal element of contraposition, while the differing direction is by now assumed.

Already, the president of the KKE(Int), in his speech to the Central Committee [KE] plenum last weekend, has rejected PASOK's absorbing the party in the coming municipal elections, and he did not exclude a partial cooperation with other parties.

Given the electoral system, cooperation of the two communist parties in the municipal elections is at the threshold.

This means that the "democratic forces" of the traditional Left have decided to shake off the yoke of PASOK, which wants them to follow it in every difficult circumstance, though it takes care to betray them the day after this favor.

The End of Insincere Friendship

It appears the era of insincere friendship between the two communist parties and PASOK has ended irrevocably. This can be seen from the stance of these two parties toward the conservative faction. They no longer deny its liberty-loving character, they have eliminated the epithets of denunciations and they are inclined to go along with the anti-PASOK campaign.

But the alliance is not restricted to the leftist area.

The two communist parties do not exclude cooperation with the other side either.

Both L. Kyrkos, in his speech last Saturday to the KKE(Int) KE, and the resolution of the KKE Central Committee plenum issued on the same day, reject the bogyman of the Right which PASOK has cultivated for its own benefit, and place the liberal bourgeoisie among the broadest democratic forces.

The Simple Proportional A Unifying Element

The bridge which apparently will unite the two sides in the immediate future is the simple proportional system.

A permanent and firm demand of the two communist parties is establishment of the simple proportional system. Not that which PASOK called the simple proportional, which was only a variation of the reinforced system, but an electoral system which will distribute the seats more analytically and will not endow the great ones or the first one.

And this is because, in the conservative area, where until yesterday no one talked about the simple proportional, the voices supporting it are multiplying daily. First G. Boutos supported it. K. Stefanopoulos followed. And finally, G.Varvitsiotis and G. Palaiokrassas have now become its supporters from the New Democracy area.

The prime minister has not taken a position on this demand, which will broaden as long as the two largest parties exhibit centrifugal tendencies. Before the elections, he had let it be understood that the demand is being re-examined.

It is clear that, for the prime minister, the simple proportional is a scenario which will be played out only if in the future--near or far, it makes no difference--he aspires to the presidency.

As it broadens, the demand makes it easy for him to use it at any moment, with the justification that he was heeding the common desire. Such a development will result in multi-splintering and, particularly significant, the role of regulator in the governments of many parties. In this way, he escapes the bitter cup of the economy which from here on out will be the government's permanent anguish since everyone agrees that none of the measures can deliver if not combined with a dynamic developmental policy, which is not visible.

"Gains" From the Expulsions

At any rate, the economic situation is a unifying element for the leftist area, which is looking forward to broader benefits with the prospect of absorbing the trade-unionists recently expelled by PASOK.

And, as was shown by the administrative councils of the large organizations which applauded the trade-unionists' stance, these people represent not only themselves; alined with them are many workers who were ensnared by PASOK's unguaranteed, pre-electoral phraseology.

So rearrangements in the area of the Left, beyond changing the KKE Interior's title, are assumed.

They have been accelerated by events, but also the ideas which have ripened in the two rival communist parties.

The fruits of these procedures and cooperations will be counted in the municipal elections, although this does not mean that the political formations are not getting ready.

With the prospect of some early political developments. The theater of politics is under way. The whole troupe is on stage.

The elections did not help to relax things because it was revealed, post ipso facto, that there are many hidden cards--economic ones--which have led to a new turmoil.

The efforts to shift responsibility for the measures to the past have not succeeded.

The violations and national security are the new game which has been taken up to disorient.

This time the Left has not agreed to follow PASOK.

A collision is unavoidable. But alliances, both kindred ones and dissimilar ones, are visible and evident.

(Editor's Note: The opinions expressed in this article are independent and not binding on MESIMVRINI, nor do they necessarily express its political line.)

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SCENARIOS FOR DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN PASOK

Athens I ANDI in Greek 25 Oct 85 pp 4-5

[Excerpts] In the beginning, the reaction from Kastri was four words only: "Expel them! Expel them!". Later in Kastri, more mature thoughts prevailed: Since we are "freezing" wages and salaries for two years, let us also "freeze" the expulsions temporarily. And let us try to load the agitation and wave of strikes on third parties, on certain "deviative associates who have reasons to undermine Allagi"....

It is commonplace that people in Kastri behave as if they live on another planet. And this despite the fact that they knew--and still know--that the first reaction to the notorious government economic measures came from their own trade-unionists, who are members of PASOK's Central Committee or distinguished trade-union cadres with abundant activity in critical sectors of the trade-union movement.

It is being said that Prime Minister Papandreou did not expect the popular reaction and wave of strikes to take such dimensions. And that, terribly annoyed, he is avoiding meeting even with close colleagues, such as Minister to the Prime Minister A. Tsokhatzopoulos or Minister of Interior M. Koutsogiorgas. On the other hand, it is reported that the PASOK Executive Office's statement, which characterized the strike on Monday almost as a fiasco, gave him the feeling that he is being deceived by his colleagues: "They do not inform me, they misinform me!".

This, of course, in no way means that the prime minister disagreed--or disagrees--with the "line" of the Executive Office statement, in which everything is charged to a certain "atypical front" between the reactionary Right and the "blind" Left, "ignorant of history."

Oppositions Within New Democracy

Of course, such a front does not exist.

RIZOSPASTIS notes that "similar neo-conservative, anti-popular measures" had been announced before the elections by New Democracy, which today "agrees with the essence of the government measures." Therefore, according to RIZOSPASTIS, there is no "co-navigating" between ND and the Left; on the contrary, there is a "holy alliance" between the government, the Association of Greek Industrialists and the "very broad conservative world."

In any case, it is certain that, within ND, there is no common approach to confronting these measures. "If we were the government," say certain leading ND cadres, "and our economy had reached the sorry state it has reached ('Naturally, PASOK's fault,' they explain) we would apply similar measures."

Some Perverse 'Scenarios'

Of course, the PASOK leadership denies there is any "turn" to conservatism. "We are building socialism," they say, even if we lose our credibility, even if the prospect drawn by the new government measures is aggravating all the economic conditions.

Nevertheless, behind these announcements (with the evocation of even Mikhail Gorbachev) is a diffuse anxiety about where the differentiations, and proceedings being completed at this moment within PASOK, may lead.

The PASOK leadership believes that with the mutilation of the ATA [Automatic Cost of Living Readjustment], two-year freezing of salaries, cancellation of all public investment programs, and EEC loan (the latest information refers to a loan of two billion European Monetary Units), and perhaps with some increased rent for the U.S. bases, the Greek economy can take a breather. But life does not roll on with prayer books. Cancelling the public investment programs means an increase in unemployment.... And "increased rent for the bases" means that the bases (or at least part of the bases) will remain in Greece--a condition placed by the Americans so the official invitation can come from Reagan! Who will pay the political cost of increased unemployment, or the bases staying, when you have educated your adherents with deceptive slogans like: "The struggle is now justified," or, "Bases go home"? And what will happen with "socialism" when everyone looks for it and it is nowhere to be found?

Of course, some perverse scenarios--in the area of conjecture--exist. One of these, for example, could be "expanding" the present government schema by embracing center-right cadres, who could be called simply "technocrats," of the Zolotas, Pepelasis, etc. type. Who would object? And, above all, who would accuse PASOK of betraying the "socialist transformation" because it turned to the good services of "technocrats"?

A second scenario could be the prime minister jumping to the presidency of the republic, since the current president, Khr. Sartzetakis, "looks at politics as he would a legal document"! (In such a case, part of the constitutional amendments approved by the previous Chamber of Deputies--after the 9 March surprise--could be not promoted and the president of the republic could keep certain powers in his hands.) Such a jump, which certain government factors place around the end of 1986, could be achieved in exchange for certain trade-offs (for example, the simple proportional), or some "accomodations" to K. Stefanopoulos or certain ND cadres.

Finally, there is always the solution of "distractions" which, as long as they are dangerous--particularly when touching on sensitive areas such as the Aegean--can, at any given moment, help in downplaying the most acute economic problems. Furthermore, the "good" (pro-government) press usually goes "as far as possible," as happened last Wednesday with the "Saratoga" and the U.S.-Turkish violations.

The conclusion--not at all original: The times remain exceptionally difficult. And tricky. And everyone gets his responsibilities.

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REPORTED PURPOSE OF PROTEST AGAINST U.S. VIOLATIONS

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 24 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by K. Skouras]

[Excerpts] One only had to take a look at yesterday's pro-government newspapers and read the headlines on the front pages to understand what this sudden anti-American outburst aimed at, with the excessive dramatizing of the violation of Greek airspace by U.S. and Turkish aircraft on the margin of the maneuvers which took place in the Aegean's international waters after the allied exercise "Display Determination 85."

The headlines were so strident, so excessive and farfetched, that they were almost to the point of creating the impression that Greece had been bombed by U.S. airplanes.

The government propaganda machine thought it had found the opportunity to disorient public opinion away from the one, colossal problem which currently not only concerns it, but is literally consuming it: the dreadful course of our economy.

Suddenly

It is not accidental, of course, that the government's sudden anti-American outburst was expressed on the same day the official opposition party organized its large protest rally in the center of Athens, the same day the strikes were continuing on a panhellenic scale, the same day the appropriate ministers in no way refuted that the Christmas bonus is not going to be paid to the workers, and the minister of national economy half stammered that the constitutional right to strike and publicly assemble "will not be suspended, at least for the present...."

In the midst of all this panhellenic earthquake, the government remembered to promote anti-Americanism as a method of disorienting public opinion.

At any rate, irregardless of the inexcusably excessive tone used by the government--for reasons which concern itself exclusively--violations are tending to become a custom now whenever there are allied maneuvers in the Aegean's international waters.

The U.S. position is firm: The United States does not think they are violating the national territory of any allied country when their aircraft, while

participating in allied exercises, enter the airspace of a friendly and allied country. This position is valid not only for the Aegean, but for the whole world, and it is known to the United States' allies (it is also known to the PASOK government which has learned it in practice in recent years).

The government communication is creating a problem connected directly to the United States, as well as a very important one concerning the general climate in the area where the exercise occurred, that is, in the Aegean. The first: How true is it that the U.S. aircraft-carrier "Saratoga" was present, and the entire U.S.-Turkish exercise took place in international waters, but the Greek Government had not been previously notified. In such a case, the actual firing created a real danger for the Greek, but also the international, air forces which could have been hit. The second, contiguous problem is, without a doubt, more burning for Greece. It concerns the flights, and violations of our national territory, by Turkish aircraft, irregardless of whether they occurred during an allied exercise.

On this point, the U.S. side had an obligation to show greater care and sensitivity since it knows very well the serious problems existing in the Aegean and can easily forsee how such actions by it encourage Turkish provocations and dangerously feed Ankara's ambitions.

Understanding

The new U.S. ambassador, Bob Kelly, should have warned his government since, in the unforgettable testimony he made to the Senate, he showed such a great understanding of and admiration for the positions supported by the PASOK government, distinguishing, in fact--to an insulting degree--the stance of all previous Greek governments.

He perhaps has appreciated that the bilateral relations are now entering, from developing affairs, a new phase, under conditions very difficult for the Greek Government.

A phase in which it will soon have to be decided formally that the bases will not be leaving, but will stay, that Greece has need of U.S. defensive aid and, in order to maintain the balance of forces in the Aegean, the government needs the U.S. contribution to confront--aside from other things--the very serious economic crisis which is threatening to blow up everything.

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ECONOMIC MEASURES SEEN UNAVOIDABLE, POLITICALLY COSTLY

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 20 Oct 85 p 9

[Article by Potis Paraskevopoulos]

[Text] The government measures to save the economy have two aspects. One is unquestionably economic: If they are the most indicated. If they could have been less oppressive for the workers. If they will bring the result the government hopes for. If...if...if. Differences, partial criticisms and opinions exist, and have been expressed on these. But a complete and concrete counter-proposal has not been developed yet by any party from the Right or Left opposition. And this is not accidental.

The bunch of economic measures announced by the government is a strategically significant political choice. The PASOK leadership, after four years of wielding government power and the various experimentations in search of a non-capitalistic course for developing the economy, in the end chooses with its new economic policy--at least for the forseeable future--a capitalistic course for the Greek economy. This is the political aspect of the government measures.

Everyone is confronting the question of whether the correlation of internal social forces, and the country's international commitments from its historic payments to the western political-economic-defense system, leave room for a radically opposite choice. Because this is the problem, and not the corrective interventions which may be made on some of the announced measures.

In four years of government power, the PASOK leadership has attempted ruptures in the political-economic establishment and in the network of Greece's western defensive allies. All, or nearly all, the anti-Right ruptures have been made successfully. The correlation of political and social forces allowed it. Impasses appear where there begin socialist improvisations, violations of the Greek economic reality, terrorizing of private initiative with socialist verbalism, rejection of a European orientation and a search for third-world supports. But socialism is a serious matter and no one can experiment with it with impunity, whenever he wishes.

PASOK failed precisely in its socialist experimentation. Today it is undertaking a turn, with a forced adjustment in the facts of the Greek economy. It is not too late to prevent economic collapse. It is, however, probably too late to regain the workers' faith in its socialist visions. It handled these frivolously

and failed as a socialist party, whereas it could have broadened the popular support if it had effectively completed the democratic, anti-Right reformation of the country's political and economic life. Then the workers and the economy and the republic would know better and better days, without retrogressions, with open roads for approaching the socialist visions.

Now it was to be expected that the necessary choice of tough economic measures would cause the workers' oppositions, and a political and ideological rupture in the PASOK area, which had been nourished with the "Third September" revolutionary proclamations and with "Socialism here and now."

With this choice, the atypical front of the forces of Allagi crumbles, once and for all we could say. The country's political map is changing. Other correlations of political and social forces are being created. And all this because the PASOK leadership, in the workers' consciousness, lost its socialist features because for four whole years it "played around a lot" with socialism.

It is characteristic--and, as we said above, not accidental--that the leftist opposition to the government measures does not have a completed, concrete and persuasive leftist solution to counterpropose to get us out of the economic crisis. The reactions are restricted mainly to protests about suspension of the ATA [Automatic Cost of Living Readjustment], without another, radically different stategy worked out.

But the ND leadership is also not counterproposing another solution. And it cannot because it would be refuting itself and its policy. It is only trying to politically exploit the popular reactions without being followed by the social forces it expresses politically. It is indicative that leading ND cadres are rejecting the negative stance of their leadership to the government measures and acknowledge they should be supported. Furthermore, the leader of ND has not rejected the measures--beyond his belated populism--and maintains only that the PASOK leadership cannot ensure their success because it has lost the trust of the productive classes.

All these show that these measures, as a strategic choice for stabilizing the economy, were unavoidable. They were made unavoidable by PASOK's government policy in the first four years. And here lies the responsibility of PASOK's party and government leadership.

But political mistakes also have unavoidable repercussions. And these will not delay in appearing on the political field.

9247
CSO: 3521/29

SAKHAROV CASE BARES USSR 'CONTRADICTIONS'

PM111633 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 6 Dec 85 p 4

/Adriano Guerra commentary: "When the Scientist Dissents"/

/Text/ The fact that Yelena Bonner-Sakharova has been granted permission to return to Italy to consult the doctors she wants, following public pressure and her husband's hunger strikes, is certainly a good thing, and it is certainly also legitimate to regard it as indicative of possible interesting innovations in the Soviet Union's attitudes and stances. Of course it is still only the story, however dramatic and lamentable (consider what their children have now told us about Sakharov's days in Gorkiy), of a Soviet family. There is even a risk, one could add, that the excessive publicity and unscrupulous political exploitation of the case by the press (but also by foreign ministers, as we saw in the preparatory meetings for Geneva) could prompt boredom and symptoms of rejection. But we must continue to talk about Sakharov, both to continue asking for the Soviet physicist to be allowed to live where he wants and continue his studies and to enable the issue to permit the identification of important aspects of the Soviet situation.

Indeed, in this affair one rediscovers some of the elements--we are talking about the factors which led to the paralysis of the seventies and to the demand for change, which seems to be becoming increasingly pressing--that now form the complex problem of what reforms to introduce into the USSR, facing the new leadership group as it now does. Of course, the fact that the situation is not static is shown--as we were saying, and to cite just one instance--by the events of the past few days, with the granting of a visa to Mrs Sakharova. However, it is puzzling that the measure was taken--so one infers from the Soviet authorities' behavior--more as a "goodwill gesture" to the West (and especially the United States, which is itself not entirely immune from reproach for its policy on visas, however) than as a step designed to rectify previous decisions and thus to grant a Soviet citizen the right to travel abroad.

Moreover, it is extraordinary and worrying that the granting of the exit (and reentry) visa was made subject to Mrs Sakharova's pledge not to discuss political matters during her stay abroad. The least that can be said in this regard is that never, perhaps, has a "press blackout" been worse conceived. But since we are dealing not with errors but with a practice deriving from a particular concept of a citizen's duties and rights, one can conclude that here we have

come up against a measure which--perhaps because it was decided on with the intention simply of improving the USSR's world image--reveals the limitations and difficulties which the subject of reforms is still encountering in the USSR.

On the other hand, precisely what is happening does show that very farreaching and complex forms of action are needed if only to restore the country's image, which--as is now commonly acknowledged--was tarnished during the Brezhnev years. Without them (that is, without a policy whereby the Sakharov case, for instance, is resolved--however gradually it need be--proceeding from a recognition of all citizens' right to be given a passport and to have a say both in their own country and abroad) it is inevitable that the very policy of "concessions" and improvements of image will grind to a halt.

Of course, of all the elements of Brezhnev's legacy with which the new Soviet leadership group has found itself burdened, this, of the "Sakharov case" or, rather, of dissidence seems to be one of the most difficult to handle. True, with the repressive policy of recent years it proved possible sharply to reduce the impact and extent of the phenomenon (as shown by, among other things, the reports of the crisis of identity and orientation which has struck emigre groups), but this was really just an apparent victory. In fact--witness what came to light a few days ago at the Budapest forum--dissidence, with all its motivations and components and the policy proposed and implemented for dealing with it, is still one of the key issues where the various thrusts of Soviet socialism intersect and are revealed. The Sakharov affair is exemplary from this viewpoint because it permits the phenomenon of dissidence to be looked at as a symptom of the new and growing contradiction that has come about in the country between society and government at a time when the huge economic and cultural growth that took place in the past and whereby the USSR became the second world power has caused new demands for freedom and therefore specific pressure for reforms to emerge. To understand this better it may be enough to recall that a real thread connects the Sakharov who in 1953 was elected a member of the Academy of Sciences, at the age of 32, for his contribution to building the Soviet atom bomb to the Sakharov of today.

Neither our press nor the Soviet press talks about it any more, but it is along this thread that one must seek the reasons why the initial enthusiastic support gradually became critical support, then a quest for structures of participation, then dissent. The first issues on which Sakharov proclaimed his right and duty to voice his opinions were the ones that had involved him as a scientist.

Of course it was right to help to eliminate the U.S. nuclear monopoly, but then the situation changed and in any case one could, one can, no longer evade the issue of "what to do" with respect to the mortal dangers--not only war but also famine and pollution--threatening mankind.

One outcome of the deliberation of these issues was the 1968 essay "Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom," which at the time seemed to most people the work of a naive visionary, something midway between "Reflections of an Unpolitical Man" and Volponi's notebook. The fact is that the essay was officially ignored in the Soviet Union. But why was it so difficult even for a scientist like Sakharov to contribute to political activity? The reflections of the "unpolitical man" and the scientist could only be followed by those of the citizen.

On 19 March 1970 Sakharov, together with historians Turchin and Roy Medvedev, sent Brezhnev a letter saying it had become urgent to "implement a series of measures directed toward a further democratization of the country's public life." The democratization, it was said, "should facilitate the maintenance and strengthening of the Soviet socialist order," must be "gradual," and must "be carried out under the CPSU's leadership." "There are no other ways out of the difficulties looming over our country," the letter concluded. A shift to the Right, that is, a victory for the supporters of a hardline administration, "will not resolve any problems but will exacerbate the situation and drive the country into a blind alley. A wait-and-see tactic would produce the same result."

I am certainly not now going to discuss the validity of the proposal of "democratization from above" put forward at that time by Sakharov and his companions. The fact is that after some hesitation, the response to the request for participation was not only to break off the dialogue but to create an atmosphere of suspicion around the document's authors, especially Sakharov. The physicist was thus forced to make his first protests and then to seek in the West the interlocutors he had been unable to find in his own country.

One can also say that the Sakharov case is certainly not atypical, within the more general phenomenon of dissidence. If one peruses official and unofficial Soviet publications of that period one can easily observe the fact that virtually all those whom we rediscovered later, in the seventies, among the protagonists of dissidence, took their first steps in the country's political and cultural life in the wake of the 20th Congress, full of hope and of a desire to participate and aware of the necessity and possibility of a new, democratic phase in the USSR's life.

What strikes one is the extraordinary topicality of some of the analyses of that period. "The technological and scientific revolution," one reads in an essay written by an engineer, N. Alekseyev, and a clerical worker, S. Zorin, from Leningrad in 1969, "necessarily demands a definite democratization of the economic and political structures."

We do not know where Alekseyev and Zorin are or what they are doing now, but what is certain is that many of the things they wrote way back in 1969, like many of the things to be found among the pages written in those years by Sakharov, Medvedev, and other dissident representatives, are to be found--and this is nothing new--in some of the top Soviet leaders' speeches.

It will be said that many things have changed since then. For instance, that dissidence, decapitated by means of trials and expulsions, has in many cases turned into "opposition" and impotant rage, in others, dissillusionment and despondency. But this fact certainly does not make the words of those years any less topical and valid.

/12228
CSO: 3528/36

NATTA OPENS PCI PLENUM ON CONGRESS THESES

PM131317 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 8 Dec 85 p 3

/PCI Secretary General Alessandro Natta opening report to PCI Central Committee and Central Control Commission session in Rome on 7 December: "Substantive and Open Debate; Strong Political Commitment"/

/Excerpts/ 1.

Extraordinary attention has surrounded the work of the Commission entrusted by the Central Committee and Central Control Commission with the formulation of a draft document on which to conduct the congress debate. This task has been fulfilled, and now the result will be submitted to you at this session, at which the final redrafting work must be carried out. The interest shown in our decisions is certainly significant. The fact is that since the moment we jointly decided to convene an early congress the international and domestic situation has undergone some very substantial evolutions, with the result that the nature and quality of this attention have changed. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that many people looked ahead to this date on our calendar with the attitude of someone preparing to write a fine obituary for us, with joyful regret. We can say that those people were shortsighted and are now learning to their own cost how mistaken it is--as we very well know--to rely not on an effort of genuine analysis but on propagandist distortions, which are easier the more power one has.

The communist question has clearly returned as the central topic of the political and institutional debate. The five-party formula which seemed victorious this summer and which was being proclaimed as a long-term strategy has encountered crisis which was certainly not resolved by the worrying resuscitation of an outgoing government. The causes of friction and conflict are all unchanged, and the dispute over primacy within the coalition actually conceals anxiety over an obvious failure, primarily in economic policy but no less in other areas.

The analysis we made together which prompted us to convene the congress has been shown to be entirely wellfounded.

"The essential consideration," we said at that time, "is that following the two elections the strengthening of the five-way alliance seems entirely relative, not only because it still reflects a blocked political system, with all

the typical elements of constriction, mutual coercion, and conflict, and with the burden of contradictions caused by the diversity of interests, backgrounds, and political outlooks, but above all because--this is the most important point--all the problems over which the conflict and struggle have developed over the years are still unresolved and acute."

The past months have confirmed every point in this assessment. We can now more vigorously reassert the need for a renewal of our policy and of our party; and we can do so because, in the presence of others' failures, there is no longer the suspicion that we are motivated--as has happened to some--by the anxiety of somecne who feels that he is losing his strength and convictions. The opposite is true. As we said in July, we must renew ourselves because we are aware how great our strength is and how indispensable our role is in extricating the country from a crisis which threatens to exacerbate.

In fact we can now stress more vigorously the erroneousness of those assessments, too hastily formed in some cases, which exaggerated the significance of the local election and referendum results, perceiving in them only the negative aspects for us--aspects which we sharply stressed right away--while neglecting objectively to weigh other aspects affecting both ourselves and other forces. In the case of the referendum in particular it was no propagandist distortion to point to the very great significance of the fact that one party, virtually on its own, secured the percentage that it did from the entire electorate on an issue apparently of concern solely to wage earners. And, above all, because it was inaccurate to define as a positive result for the government coalition--as though it were a single party--the vote in the local elections, in which there was in fact a redistribution of support among the five parties and which concealed more complex phenomena, together with the seeds of future conflicts.

If anything, we should now say that we were actually too cautious about condemning a situation that was destined to become even more seriously contradictory than we indicated, however, clearly.

The government crisis, arising as it did over very important aspects of the international situation and of our country's independence and defense, highlighted the fact that even what had been considered the unifying element of the coalition was actually extremely fragile and unstable. Confronted with a real test, the PSI, and significant sectors of the DC too, had to acknowledge that the prejudice against the communists on the pretext of international considerations is simply ridiculous.

Geneva dealt a further blow to the forces most hostile to detente, whose influence has been felt even in our own country. It is not a definitive result, but it is certainly an initial success for the forces that set their sights resolutely not only on the need for detente but also on the specific possibility of resuming a process of gradual rapprochment and understanding. So our indictment and our peace struggle were correct--and it is highly significant that some of those in government who criticized it as a partisan struggle subsequently had to acknowledge how easy it is to reverse such a controversy, assuming a real commitment to at least a minimal independence of assessment.

The fact is that on the international plane too we have too long suffered a servile conception of the Atlantic alliance owing to the manipulatory and factious use of foreign policy for the purposes of the domestic political struggle.

2.

Overconfidence has had to give way to the acknowledgement of a disturbing fact--and it is this fact that constituted the starting point for the commission's work in formulating the political and program platform that we will discuss and decide on together.

It has been a major task, which began during the summer with the assignment, entrusted to a group of comrades appointed to coordinate the commission, of submitting in the fall a summary of topical issues in the basic areas of society and the state. Proceeding from this ascertaining of the facts and from the orientation imparted by the Central Committee, the commission conducted an open debate and discussion which dealt first with the form and nature of the documents and then with the substance of each of the topics proposed. There have been five plenary sessions, involving a great amount of work in terms of drafting and revision and hundreds of contributions in the form of specific formulation proposals.

This experience--fully confirming that of previous occasions--shows that the most vigorous and fruitful part of the work occurred when general discussions were left behind for a consideration of the substance of the matters in hand and, finally, individual formulations.

These proceedings--which were prolonged because of the government crisis and the current battle over the finance bill in the Senate--have not been spared vigorous controversy and agitation from outside. This has mainly concerned the confidential nature of the proceedings--as though this were something unheard of and unique to the communists. Of course, this agitation is another expression of interest; however, we cannot fail to perceive the prejudiced and illintentioned aspects, as if there were something murky and improper about our proceedings. There is no serious party or organization of church (because this instance has been cited too) that does not have forums and times for working without the constraints imposed by publicity, which unavoidably necessitate the adoption of definite stances and hinder the process of successive repprochments of which all preparatory proceedings consist. And the Catholic bishops' synod pointed out to us as a model for our commission--though actually more similar to a congress--is at this very moment conducting its proceedings to redraft its documents in absolute secrecy. And it really is not only mean but a sign of a desire to attack our party to say that there has been a desire to conceal something--as though there were some kind of constraint on the debate among the comrades, which in fact developed publicly and openly both before and during the preparatory proceedings and which will resume with the publication of the congress documents. There must be a response to this mystification campaign, and a response from the entire party.

But we are supposed to feel in the wrong because a unitary effort has been made in the commission's proceedings and because this effort should supposedly be considered wrong, as though in itself it constituted a shameful bargaining method.

We are in favor of the frankest and most honest discussion of ideas, proposals, and solutions. But it really is absurd that the communists--and only the communists--should be denied the chance to work collegially in a debate at close quarters in which it is possible for the participants to persuade one another of the shortcomings of the various starting positions or of the validity of other positions. Steadfastness in one's own beliefs is not the same thing as incommunicability.

The dialogue and the discussion will continue, more intensively and with the whole party's participation, after this Central Committee and Central Control Commission session. But as we have stressed before, it will be all the more fruitful the more everyone is guided by a real effort of mutual understanding, complete correctness of conduct, and a use of forums and instruments proper to our party.

The indications with regard to method which we jointly formulated earlier have certainly had positive results in the conduct of the majority, though it would be hypocritical to say that there have been no unpleasant episodes.

3.

It is not up to me, nor is it the purpose of this introduction, either to summarize or to comment on the theses. Nevertheless perhaps I should emphasize the most important innovative elements, partly because it is to them that I believe the Central Committee and Central Control Commission should devote their closest attention and most penetrating analysis.

The aim that pervades the document is to provide an answer to a problem that is, in a way, bigger than us and that transcends the confines of our own country--the problem of an effective counterattack to the prevalence which has been gained in so many parts of the more developed world by conservative cultural and political stances, which have consistently proved to be ineffective in resolving the existing problems of the contemporary world. Consequently there is a resurgence everywhere of the need for a recovery by the left and its fundamental principles. This also lends emphasis to the characteristics and values of the special conception of socialism formulated by Italian Communists--values which combine the aspiration to justice with the ideals of political democracy and of the extension of freedoms.

Hence also the significance and the importance of the European option, which in the theses concerns primarily our position as an integral and essential element of the Left in this part of the world, as a force committed to an autonomous analysis of problems common to other developed countries and which therefore connect us, via many questions and many solutions, with other major parties of the West European Left. This option and this commitment for our party and for the Left are given even further emphasis now by the persistence,

even the exacerbation, of hindrances and obstacles to the European integration that constitutes an indispensable objective--and not for Italy alone.

With regard to Italy's future we reassert our demand for the democratic alternative as a present necessity--not only for the reform and revitalization of the democracy but also, and above all, in order to tackle the most pressing issues: the crisis of the state, the demand for a new kind of development. We perceive the dangers of decline, but they are part of a dynamic situation of transformations, sometimes even tumultous, in the technologies and methods of production, so that the essential issue is that of the government of innovation, of socially directed innovation, and therefore of the resumption of an aware kind of planning.

4.

Hence the real and fundamental problems and the need--not only for us--to accelerate the rate of renewal. We do not need to prove anything to any of our adversaries. It is toward ourselves, that is, toward our comrades and voters, toward the forces that follow us with their support and friendship, that we feel our major obligations. We are not approaching the congress as a force that needs to take lessons from others with regard to internal democracy. If anything, we could deride those who, after so many insulting sermons to us, are seeking or implementing undemocratic, centralist methods which would cause a scandal if we adopted them. But precisely because our party has given such a good account of itself we propose to proceed with the method of internal dialectic, of the real exchange of ideas and stances, of publicized debate, of full powers for elective bodies, of direct involvement of members and grass-roots organizations in the most important decisions, and of the further development of our organization. We do not like emphatic language, which often conceals a vacuum. Nevertheless the theses do present the outlines for a reform of the party, without, however, erasing the positive characteristics that have made it great, strong, and respected.

However, our present duties are not confined to a good congress debate and good congress deliberations. A troubled and tumultous period lies ahead of us. And we absolutely cannot know whether the unrest and conflicts will subside at least temporarily, or whether they will flare up in new and more serious episodes. The fact that the major party of the government coalition felt the need to cite the possibility of an early election the moment the government crisis was over should make us very vigilant. I have already had occasion to point out that a fifth early dissolution of parliament could certainly not be considered normal: Anyone wanting to assume responsibility for it must be well aware that he is thus contributing to the erosion of the democratic institutions. But we know that there is much irresponsibility. And we are accustomed to seeing partisan reckonings set before the country's needs. This is why we must be vigilant and active in the day-to-day political battle, as we have tried to be over the months. Moreover, the citizens' problems cannot wait. And this is why the debate and the clash in the Senate over the finance bill have become combined, partly with our help, with a major mobilization countrywise.

/12228
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PCI'S DRAFT CONGRESS THESES REPORTED

PM131040 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 8 Dec 85 pp 4-5

/Unattributed report: "Draft Theses Proposed by Committee of 77"/

/Excerpts/ We publish herewith an editorial summary of the draft theses for the 17th PCI Congress put forward by the Committee of 77. It is a free summary of the original text without official or formal status. As is known, it is the Central Committee and Central Control Commission that must draw up the final version of the document, which we will be publishing in due course.

The first thesis is devoted to the "characteristics and values of socialism in the Italian Communists' conception." While subjecting the historical ideological heritage to the necessary critical scrutiny and analysis, the comparison remains open with the outlook presented by our origins in the 1848 Manifesto: the objective of a class struggle that will eliminate itself and its raisons d'etre by means of the social form of "an association in which the free development of the individual is the precondition for the free development of all." This outlook takes up the legacy of the liberal and democratic revolutions, taking it beyond their historical class confines and strengthening and embodying its gains in a positive freedom for the broadest possible development of individuals by means of an egalitarian and self-governed form of society. This possible outlook must be set against the present situation.

In the areas of developed capitalism we are experiencing a phase of profound structural changes centering on the technological revolution, which permits an extraordinary strengthening and expansion of human powers and provides a historic opportunity for the promotion of labor. The objective of surmounting certain technical divisions of labor and the more oppressive forms of administration of labor is becoming a topical one. But we are still a long way from an emancipatory social synthesis, which will not occur spontaneously. The process of technological innovation does not automatically coincide with social progress. In fact a conservative offensive is severely trying the values of solidarity and equality, so the answer can only be found in a political regeneration that will grant a voice and a form to the liberation movements. This in turn entails a planning and reform capability directed toward exploiting all the potentials for economic and social development through the effective and democratic government of the processes of transformation centering on the problem of unemployment, that is, impinging on the actual processes of accumulation.

In the present situation a more fluid view of socialism is needed in which the aspect of a real current movement and that of a historical phase converge. This is why ours is not a conception of socialism viewed in terms of the complete state ownership of the economy and the administrative management of planning. It is the processes of socialization and of the expansion of economic democracy that are crucial to us. Public intervention in directing the process of accumulation must be of sufficient extent and quality to orient development in a market in which private enterprise, a public sector, and a strong cooperative sector all operate. Beyond that it will be the forces at work that will decide, as long as they enjoy freedom of movement and the necessary levels of information--an essential aspect of political democracy, whose universal value is an irreversible and permanent option for us. Thus in the developed countries the transcending of the capitalist system can be conceived in terms not of major traumatic breaks but of a complex combination of economic forms through which one style of production and life will come to prevail over another. Capitalism has already experienced profound changes, and it is not the ultimate manifestation of civilization. But the characteristics of the socialist and communist blueprint have changed too. A transition to socialism brought about or accelerated by a major international conflict is now inconceivable. The peace struggle has become an integral part of every progressive movement, while the qualitative aspect of development in relation to mankind's changing relationship with nature is becoming a central issue. And internationalism can no longer have simply class characteristics and can only emerge from the global aspect of the liberation of all peoples.

The PCI centers its policy on the issue of peace, which is crucial to progress and to survival itself. The trend toward rearmament must be reversed. It is not possible to rely solely on the bipolar balance; there must be an initiative on the part of all governments, and a growing role can be performed by the EC, China and the nonaligned countries. A primary condition for a balanced and controlled disarmament is a rejection of the militarization of space. A conception of security based on reciprocity and globality must be established. Major importance must be granted to the mobilization of the public and the involvement of a broad and diversified peace movement. A new peace culture must be inculcated proceeding from the increasingly worrying questions raised by the development of military technologies for survival, national sovereignty, and democracy itself. Movements of differing ideological and political leanings can and must cooperate for the cause of peace. The building of a new order of international relations is of decisive importance, and forces within the two alliances must mobilize right away to this end.

Europe and the PCI's International Position

The European option is fundamental to Italian Communists' policy. Europe has large human and material resources but also has the highest unemployment rate and does not participate on an equal footing in crucial negotiations such as those on nuclear weapons. A new international course is difficult to envisage without an active role for Europe. Reagan's policy has had several anti-European aspects, and the response to it has been inadequate. However, there is a spreading conviction among the leftwing forces--which does not affect loyalty to the Atlantic alliance and European-U.S. ties--that the two sides'

interests often do not coincide, so that a nonsubmissive conception of European-U.S. friendship for the sake of an equal-based dialogue is making headway. West Europe has an autonomous role to perform in the world, which demands a realistic and frank analysis of the conflicts which threaten to reduce the EC simply to a free-trade area. The PCI is fighting for a reform of EC mechanisms and instruments to equip the European Parliament with adequate powers.

The PCI is an integral part of the European Left, with its own particular character that we have built up over the years, with its complete international autonomy, and with its irreversible option for a socialism based on the complete development of democracy. The West European workers movement, in all its component parts, is experiencing upheavals and a quest that are in many respects shared. Often there has been a similar tardiness on the part of the various leftwing forces in tackling innovations. Sectors of the workers movement have experienced profound crises, but the left as a whole nevertheless has great potential. The leftwing forces are not confined to the parties of the workers movement: They include the new peace and environmental movements and, on another level, Christian and Catholic movements. These forces face a major shared task, and a major contribution in this direction can come from the trade union movements. The PCI intends to aid a rapprochment of the two major aspirations and experiences of the workers movement--socialist and communist--and to seek a solution of their historical divisions.

Our European position does not limit, and in fact demands, our cooperation and solidarity with the progressive forces and national liberation movements throughout the world. We will support in particular the peoples of Latin America, Asia, and Africa still involved in harsh battles for freedom and independence, and we support the process of regaining democracy in which many Latin American countries are involved.

The PCI reasserts the major historic significance of the October Revolution, the decisive influence of the USSR in the defeat of Nazi Fascism, and the importance of the fact that one-third of mankind has opted for noncapitalist paths of development. At the same time the PCI confirms its verdict, expressed at the 16th Congress, on the fundamental shortcomings which generally characterizes the societies which have emerged from that experience. Not only can such societies in no way constitute models for other countries, and especially for those based on democratic systems, but they are grappling with serious and still unresolved problems in their economic, social, and political life. This is why we reassert our hope for broad, thorough, and incisive reforms, while we consider with attention and interest the introduction of policies of reform of innovative plans. We are convinced, however, that new forms of economic management cannot be divorced from the promotion of forms of democratic life, individual freedom, political participation, and people's initiative. With the same spirit of objectivity and the same autonomy with which we have pointed to the responsibilities on both sides for the acute international tensions, we express our appreciation of the strong recovery of political and diplomatic initiative on the part of the new Soviet leadership. We consider the new attitudes apparent in China's foreign policy very important. The greater autonomy which we demand for the West European countries must apply to the East European countries too.

Italian Communists do not nurture anti-American feelings: They appreciate that people's democratic traditions and are aware of their influence in world life. We have sought, and still seek, a dialogue with the democratic and progressive currents of U.S. political and cultural life. Criticizing the present administration's policy implies not any anti-American prejudice but a demand for parity between allies. Our attitude toward the United States is dictated not only by our membership of the same alliance but also by our confidence in the U.S. people's democratic energies and by our desire to establish relations of cooperation with them.

The PCI develops its international relations absolutely independently; it does not consider itself part of any organized movement at the European or world level; and it works to realize its ideals in cooperation with all the forces worldwide fighting for the same objectives. It is necessary to transcend obsolete doctrinaire schemas and splittist and partisan practices and to seek instead new forms of intervention that will involve the entire workers and democratic movement in Europe and throughout the world. New internationalism implies new relations between communist, socialist, social democratic, and labor parties, national and progressive movements, and Christian- and Catholic-inspired nonconfessional democratic movements. The PCI will step up its international initiative without maintaining special relations with anyone.

Political Conditions For the Democratic Alternative

The democratic alternative requires that all the nation's positive energies be collated. It is necessary to initiate a process, a wideranging movement of struggle, of investigation into the substance of a change which can result in a "program convention." In preparation for this the PCI appeals to all forces wanting to set the country's political situation moving.

The crisis of the five-party coalition increases the need for a new phase in the struggle for the alternative, working for new political groupings. The democratic alternative cannot built solely by indicating a government formula: It demands a regeneration of ideas on the Left, a program effort, and an ability to rally social forces together. This task must involve not only the parties but the broad area of individuals, bodies, forces, and movements of the Left. It is this process that can alter the balance of forces and shift the PSI and other nonconfessional and Catholic democratic forces toward more advanced positions, thus making an alternative government possible. To this end relations with the PSI and the other leftwing forces are fundamental. The policy of the democratic alternative, and the quest for unity on the Left do not rule out broader convergences, extending beyond the composition of governments and majorities, on major national issues.

Party Renewal

In order to embark on a new phase in its policy the PCI must first renew itself. Many objective and subjective factors are causing a crisis affecting parties within systems of representative democracy. In Italy the very policy of the alternative demands as a precondition for a more advanced and open democracy a reform of the parties that cannot be entrusted solely to modifications of the electoral mechanisms.

Over the past decade the PCI has substantially consolidated a broad electoral support and maintained an impressive organized strength. However, there are negative trends both on the electoral plane and as regards membership. Political deliberations on our policy must be combined with a more precise definition of the nature of the party, priority being given to its relationship with society and resolving the difficulties that have occurred in taking prompt account of what is changing and stirring.

The communists' strength derives first and foremost from their government capability, which must now be enhanced. One fundamental characteristic of the PCI has been its internal cultural pluralism, its fight against dogmatism, and the assertion of the party's absolutely nonconfessional nature. The PCI has thus become clearly a party based on its program backed by a strong ideological impetus and by the interconnection--which must be made closer--between political decisionmaking and responsibilities. The PCI must be able to express society's demands without presuming to superimpose itself on society or, worse, to possess the utlimate truth.

A decisive element in the party's renewal is the development of its democratic life. Debate and a multiplicity of stances are not disintegrative elements but a sign of the party's strength and range of assets. A real effort must be made to guarantee members a chance to participate in the debate and decisionmaking, which entails a full use of the elective bodies, ensuring their clear functioning by means of proper decisionmaking and voting procedures and by publishing their proceedings. Broader publicity is needed in order to ensure--especially in the case of grassroots organizations--a concrete opportunity to intervene on the various aspects of party policy. Every comrade who expresses an opinion which conflicts with that of the majority must feel entirely at ease if he considers it right to maintain and support his own stances. Procedures must be defined for consulting provincial organizations and members both on political topics and on choices of candidates. The political leadership has already been decentralized and made more flexible. Improvements must be made in connection with the prime responsibility of the communist representation within the institutions. The full autonomy of our research centers is guaranteed. The party's democratic life is based on and guaranteed by the principle of unity, which must be sought and built through the broadcast and freest exchange of views, in accordance with a conception of democratic centralism that is the opposite of what is implied in this expression for those who pursue the path of uncritical monolithism and authoritarian decisionmaking. For us the rule of the quest for unity means the free formation, in accordance with democratic principles, of majorities and minorities on various issues and problems and an effort to prevent through debate and mutual persuasion of the division into opposing groups and factions supported by their own centralism and constantly at odds with one another. Not only must the unitary principle not impede, it must stimulate the most vigorous and open competition of ideas and proposals in a proper and correct fashion.

The party's renewal demands a more updated and modern line on structural and organizational problems, while standing firm on the principle that the membership drive, the campaign to extend our support, self-financing, and the

widespread information and propaganda effort are in response to a primary political necessity. The role of the sections is essential: Apart from those based on territorial divisions, the workplace, or the place of study, others can be added (for instance, to bring new professional groupings together). There must be a streamlining of the entire organizational structure. A stable apparatus is essential, but there must be a constant effort of improvement so that it can truly become a means of exploiting the party's energies, which must be faithfully reflected in the leadership bodies. There must be a new thrust to make the most of our information and propaganda assets, especially RINASCITA and L'UNITA. The party must pay great attention to the Italian Communist Youth Federation, which is involved in a difficult and courageous phase of renewal and revitalization.

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CSO: 3528/36

PSI'S FORMICA DEFENDS FIVE-PARTY FORMULA

PM051135 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 29 Nov 85 pp 1, 20

/Interview with PST Lower House floor leader Rino Formica by Ugo Baduel in Rome; date not given/

/Excerpts/ Rome--Baduel: How can the answer to the demand for what you call a democracy "of renewal" be the five-party coalition?

Formica: It is no coincidence that the five-way alliance emerged from the ashes of the national unity alliance and as a grouping of all the forces that have been in government, in very different phases (in Center and Center-left governments). It emerged from the troubles which followed the formulation of the national unity alignment and with a non-DC premier, on the basis of the famous "three emergencies" (economic, ethical, and institutional). In other words it is a delicate and essential point of balance which represents "viable national unity" within the old framework. It is therefore--this is the point--the "transition" between the blocked democracy and the democracy of renewal: To that end it is the only feasible way.

Baduel: But at the moment such an important force as the DC does not regard the five-way alliance as a transition.

Formica: No, and I will tell you why. The DC contested the 1983 elections with the aim of restoring a new centrism and therefore a democracy that would have been not only blocked but armor plated. To that end it therefore tried to form a centrist bloc in opposition to that of the leftwing alternative, in which context it placed the PSI and, in the social sphere, the trade unions. The centrist bloc was defeated, however, so it seems clear to me that a return to the hypothesis of the five-way alliance as a transitional phase should be considered inevitable. But this is where the conflict within the formula arises--between those who want the five-way alliance to a transition to the democracy of renewal and to greater social viability and those who regard the non-DC premiership as the price paid for a corresponding distortion of the five-way alliance into a centrist government formula.

Baduel: And this is the problem that faces us now.

Formica: Indeed, and it is a very delicate and serious matter. If centrism is not justified by numbers in parliament it cannot exist in the government formula. The leeway is too small: We only have 55 percent. If, within that parliamentary 55 percent, we succeed in creating a noncentrist mediation (and the PSI is the best point of balance and of leadership as regards social guarantees and democratic stability), then the formula can work as a transition; if, however, it acquires either centrist or leftwing alternative characteristics, then we are concentrating the maximum social and political conflict into a narrow area of government. This is why I believe that the only function of the five-way alliance as a "viable national unity" formula with a Socialist premiership can be to perform the systematic transition that I mentioned. The experiment could be broken off, but it would be a traumatic break in the democratic evolutionary process.

Baduel: Within your framework how do you place the PCI's proposal of a "program" government?

Formica: If the program is a platform to facilitate the task of governing the country, all well and good; but it is intended as a policy to create the necessary conditions with a view to a pre-established outcome (the leftwing alternative), then I say that it cannot succeed in this phase--a phase that must remain one of balance and transition. The program can entail the negotiation between opposition and majority of four or five points for the country's recovery, to enable parliament to devote at least 50 percent of its time to institutional matters. These are the really pressing issues, which is why it would be a mistake to dissolve parliament before time, which would create further emergencies and could lead to successive "overdoses" of early elections, with very serious risks. All parties must now abandon petty games of convenience: The system itself is at stake here and Italy will be governed by whoever salvages it, saving it from the risk of a crisis of parliamentary democracy, which is the real nub of the country's crisis.

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WILLOCH SURVIVES FIRST POST-ELECTION STORTING CHALLENGE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by Trygve Monsen]

[Text] Oslo--No one, not even the Labor Party, wants a Norwegian government crisis today, but no one can guarantee the nonsocialist minority government eternal life under the difficult parliamentary conditions that exist there.

While the first fall storms sweep in over the country, Norway's Prime Minister Kare Willoch can note with satisfaction that he has succeeded in steering the government through the first political storm since the Storting election 2 months ago. Ironically it was the two Progressive representatives who laid the groundwork for the incipient crisis by threatening to vote against all proposals concerning the treasury.

Clumsy internal behavior on the part of the Labor Party is what saved the minority government from collapse.

However no one is guaranteeing the Willoch government "eternal life" under the prevailing parliamentary conditions. The jubilation over the victory the government scored against the socialist opposition could quickly dissipate when Storting continues the debate on the 1986 budget.

The finance debate has not been a personal victory for the leader of the biggest opposition party, Gro Harlem Brundtland. Observers say the government won because of a "tactical error," referring to her conduct toward her own party colleagues. For the first time in several years the Labor Party leader suffered a clear political defeat because a majority of the Storting party group refused to pursue a confrontation line with the government on the tax issue.

Potential Chaos

It can be summed up briefly in this way: no one wants a government crisis in Norway today. And the Labor Party does not under any circumstances want to assume government responsibility while there is a nonsocialist majority, with 80 nonsocialist and 77 socialist representatives. Politicians who can remember back 23 years when the Socialist People's Party (SF) held the swing

vote with two seats in Storting do not like to think about the political situations that arose then. In the end SF brought down the Labor government and that meant the end of 26 years of Labor Party rule.

There could easily be political chaos today, but the tax issue was not a good "crowbar" to use in an effort to break up government cooperation. Therefore the Labor Party decided to vote for the Willoch government's tax proposal, which provides a little real tax relief for most Norwegians.

The government will undoubtedly be able to avert political chaos for a long time to come by seeking support from the right and the left on individual issues. It will then be up to the Labor Party to find an issue that can split the three government parties. Christian People's Party group leader Harlad Synnes caused quite a commotion when he said in an interview that it might be desirable in many ways if the Labor Party helped to shape the final form of the 1986 budget.

That remark just a week before the budget debate showed clearly that there is a definite political possibility of creating unrest in the nonsocialist ranks. Willoch's deputy, Kjell Magne Bondevik, "deputy prime minister" and leader of the Christian People's Party, will have no easy task acting as the government's link with the Storting group.

Political opinion polls do show that the Labor Party continues to make gains but there is nothing to indicate a political "landslide."

Impossible Conditions

In Norway there is no provision for calling an early election and this means that politicians are forced to remain in their seats for 4 years, even if working conditions in parliament are impossible. This is not made easier by the fact that Storting representatives have to cast a vote. With its majority of three votes at the most the government cannot afford many "defectors" on important issues.

Many lively debates are expected in the national assembly before Christmas. There is a lot of suspense, especially with regard to security policy, since there are a couple of "hand grenades" hidden in the two middle parties, the Center Party and the Christian People's Party. This is particularly relevant with regard to the government's attitude toward a possible proposal from Mexico in the United Nations calling for a "freeze" on the superpowers' nuclear stockpiles.

6578
CSO: 3613/28

POLL FINDS INCREASING RESENTMENT OF IMMIGRANTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen]

[Text] Public opinion has become somewhat more positive with regard to foreign workers in the last 5 years. But the prevailing attitude is still "Norway for the Norwegians." A large majority would like to maintain very strict immigration controls and would prefer to have fewer foreigners come to this country. It is true that a majority felt that foreign workers represent a positive acquisition for our society and also thought they were treated well in this country, but even so half the people asked wanted as many of the immigrants as possible to return to their homelands rather than stay here in Norway.

In the extensive survey Gallup/NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute] conducted for AFTENPOSTEN only 22 percent of those interviewed said that the immigration ban should be lifted. In a similar survey made in 1980, 16 percent gave this answer. At that time 30 percent said the law was not strict enough in limiting immigration. This figure has now fallen to 22 percent. A large majority still feels the law is strict enough but there are still more who think it is too loose compared to those who think it is too strict. In 1980 9 percent said the law limited immigration too much compared to 12 percent today.

No Relaxation

Despite the fact that as many as 84 percent of the respondents opposed any relaxation of immigration policy a minute shift in a liberal direction could be detected. However this trend is somewhat more apparent when it comes to public opinion concerning foreign workers who are already in this country. More people think their conditions are substandard compared to those who think their opportunities are too good. The majority said foreign workers represent a positive acquisition for Norwegian society. The figure here was 52 percent compared to 48 percent 5 years ago. The number of those who feel that foreign workers are a pleasant addition to the local scene rose from 57 to 67 percent.

Such figures might lead some people to think there is little racism in this country. But 42 percent of those interviewed said there has been too much racism in Norway. Other answers also confirmed that there are many disheartening attitudes prevalent--whether one calls the phenomenon racism, xenophobia or prejudice. At least a quarter of the respondents held views that could be given these labels. And this does not take into account people's attitudes toward immigration policy itself, since there could be a number of different motives involved there. Someone could have very positive personal feelings about immigrants and still oppose a more liberal policy because he or she knows how much poorly-concealed racism there is in this country.

Even a question as provocatively worded as this: "Would you prefer not to see foreign workers on our streets?" got a positive response from a quarter of those interviewed. About the same number felt that foreign workers are a negative acquisition and that as many of them as possible should return home. There is no question here of nobler motives behind a restrictive attitude.

Hope for the Future

But even so there were some hopeful signs in this survey. Prejudice, or whatever one wants to call it, turns out to be decidedly stronger among those who have not had personal contacts with foreign workers, those who live in outlying districts and people with a low educational background. Younger people have a more positive attitude than older people do. All these factors suggest that much of the prejudice is based on ignorance and irrational feelings and can therefore be changed over a period of time.

The most liberal attitudes were found among women, people under the age of 45, groups with a high social status and people living in the Oslo area and in the southern and western parts of the country. Some distortion in the selection of interviewees also suggests that the results are a little too negative. Women, Oslo/Akershus residents and people with a high level of education are underrepresented and no correction was made for this distortion.

There is also a clear connection between party sympathy and one's view of immigrants. The most positive are definitely those who vote for SV [Socialist-Left Party] and the Liberal Party. KRF [Christian People's Party] voters are somewhat more positive than the average, which is where Labor Party voters can be found. Conservatives are somewhat more negative than the average, closely followed by those who vote for the Progressive Party. Center Party voters are clearly the most negative.

This finding may have a natural connection with the party's geographical and social makeup. This survey must be far more discouraging for the party whose former leader was so strongly involved in the struggle for greater tolerance. Conservative voters have traditionally held far more liberal views on cultural and social issues than Labor voters, for example. Like other recent surveys this poll shows that this is no longer as true as it used to be.

The very fact that a high educational level, contact with immigrants and residence in a central part of the country are background factors leading to tolerant attitudes in this area makes it even more remarkable that the figures for Conservative voters do not lie closer to those for SV and Liberal voters. Actually a high educational level does not have as much of a liberalizing effect on Conservative voters as it does on the rest of the population. While the view of immigrants has become more positive among most groups since 1980, Conservative voters feel just about the same now as they did then.

This may indicate that the classic Tory liberalism is a dying phenomenon. If that is true it is the price the Conservatives have had to pay to become a large popular party.

Nice as Long as They Don't Stay

Norwegians obviously regard immigrants as guests who are paying us a visit. A pleasant addition--as long as they don't stay too long. The majority of Norwegians feel that immigrants will always remain a foreign element in Norway and half the respondents would prefer to have as many as possible return to their homeland. It may be poor consolation to our new countrymen that they are regarded as a pleasant addition to the local street scene.

Some 47 percent felt that the immigrants should stay and 47 percent thought it would be better if they returned home. We must assume here that people were talking about first-generation immigrants. It would be incredible if half the people thought that children and teenagers should return to a country they had never seen, whether their parents are British or Pakistanis.

We must make the same assumption with regard to the 57 percent who said that immigrants would always be a foreign element in Norway. But even so these answers stand in clear contrast to a similar majority who said that Norway and Norwegians are well-suited when it comes to taking in immigrants.

Thus in spite of the negative responses to these two questions, a majority of 52 percent said that foreign workers are a positive addition to Norwegian society. And even more people (67 percent) felt that foreign workers are a pleasant sight on the street. But especially with regard to the last question it is probable that the wording had a big effect on the responses. Most people probably do not care much whether or not they see foreigners on the street. But what many people regard as positive about immigrants is the culture they bring with them--whether this concerns family solidarity, eating habits, a service orientation, shops that stay open in the evening or exciting restaurants. On the other hand this restriction to the street scene may be offset by the fact that many people answered that foreigners are a pleasant element without really meaning it, because they do not want to be put in the same category as those who would rather not see foreign workers walking down the street.

The somewhat paradoxical conclusion to be drawn from this is that people who feel there is a lot of racism in this country think the immigrants ought to

stay. And those who feel there is little racism here think the immigrants should go back where they came from.

Closing the Door

The majority of those surveyed did not favor a different immigration policy than the one we are pursuing today. Popular opinion is more apt to favor increased restrictions than a milder policy. Only when it comes to political refugees does this survey indicate some willingness to take in more.

Some 47 percent of those interviewed approved by and large of the policy in effect now while 31 percent did not approve, but of these people, more wanted a stricter policy than a milder one.

As many as 72 percent wanted an extension of the immigration ban and 84 percent thought the law does an adequate job of limiting immigration or that it is not strict enough.

However there is an interesting point here in that some of the respondents obviously opposed legislation as a tool. Some 22 percent wanted the immigration ban lifted, but only 12 percent said the law is too strict. On the other hand there are people who do not consider the law restrictive enough but want it rescinded anyway. It may be that some people oppose the law because they think it is unfair and discriminates against dark-skinned immigrants.

General Dislike

Thus there is not much enthusiasm for acquiring additional countrymen. But if we believe the figures there is a dislike of immigrants in general, not just those with darker skins. Only 12 percent wanted to let more people enter the country--whether they are light or dark. A few more wanted to accept fewer dark-skinned than light-skinned immigrants, but the difference was only 36 percent compared to 30 percent.

But we view political refugees a little differently. Some 37 percent said we take in enough of them, 35 percent wanted to accept more and 19 percent wanted fewer refugees coming to this country. This means that majority support does not exist for letting in more political refugees than we do today.

Norway Best

If we Norwegians are not very enthusiastic about having immigrants come to this country, at least we are well-satisfied with the way we receive them. The majority felt we treat immigrants well, that Norway is well-suited to accept immigrants, that there is little racism in this country and that immigrants are given the same opportunities as Norwegians in all areas.

At the same time many disproved their own assertions. For example, among those who said there is little racism in this country 61 percent felt that immigrants would always remain a foreign element in Norwegian society. Some

41 percent in this group said that foreign workers are a negative addition to Norwegian society and 33 percent would rather not have to see them on the street.

The fact is that those who represent negative attitudes toward foreigners to a large extent are the most inclined to boast about the warmheartedness and tolerance that exist in this country.

But not everyone thinks conditions are as they should be. In spite of everything 42 percent of those interviewed admitted that there is a great deal of racism in Norway and a majority held that view among the group with the highest educational background. Some 42 percent also felt that Norway and Norwegians are not well-suited when it comes to accepting immigrants. A majority of SV and Conservative voters supported this view.

Do we give foreign workers the same opportunities as Norwegians? Yes, said a majority with regard to jobs, housing, health care, social security, wages, education and the opportunity to build houses of worship. But it is worth noting that down the line there are more people who think foreign workers have poorer opportunities than there are those who think they have better opportunities than Norwegians. The only exception to this is in the area of social security benefits.

Results of Poll on Norwegians and Immigrants

Question: Do you think it would be better if as many of the immigrants as possible went back to their own countries or would you prefer to have them remain here?

Answer	Percentage
Return home	47
Stay here	47
Don't know	6

Question: Do you think the immigrants will eventually be absorbed into Norwegian society or do you think they will always represent a foreign element?

Answer	Percentage
Will be absorbed	40
Will remain a foreign element	57
Don't know	3

Question: All in all, do you think the foreign workers we have in Norway constitute a positive or a negative addition to Norwegian society?

Answer	Percentage
Positive	52
Both	4
Negative	35
Don't know	10

Question: Do you think foreign workers are a pleasant sight on our streets or would you rather not have to see them?

Answer	Percentage
Pleasant sight	67
Rather not see them	26
Don't know	6
Think foreign workers are a positive addition and should stay here	33
Think they are a positive addition but should go back where they came from	18
Think they are a negative element but should stay here	8
Think they are a negative element and should go back where they came from	26

Question: Do you think the law barring immigration to this country should be extended or repealed?

Answer	Percentage
Extended	72
Repealed	22
Don't know	6

Question: Do you think the law has been too restrictive or too lenient with regard to immigration or do you think it is all right?

Answer	Percentage
Too restrictive	12
About right	62
Not restrictive enough	22
Don't know	4

Question: Do you think we should take in more or fewer immigrants in the following categories than we do now or do you think the present number is about right?

Category	More	About Right	Fewer
Those with skins a different color than ours	12	44	36
Those with skins the same color as ours	12	49	30
Political refugees	35	37	19
Immigrants looking for work	10	34	45

Question: Do you generally approve or disapprove of the policy we pursue with regard to immigrants?

Answer	Percentage
Approve	47
Disapprove	31
Don't know	22

Question: Do you think we treat our immigrants well or poorly?

Answer	Percentage
Well	67
Poorly	24
Both	4
Don't know	5

Question: Do you think Norway and Norwegians are well-suited or not when it comes to accepting immigrants?

Answer	Percentage
Well-suited	52
Not well-suited	42
Don't know	6

Question: Do you think there is a lot of racism in Norway or not?

Answer	Percentage
A lot of racism	42
Not much racism	53
Don't know	6

Question: Do you think we have given foreign workers opportunities that are too good, about right or too poor compared to the opportunities Norwegians have in these areas?

Category	Too Good	About Right	Too Poor
Jobs	11	55	31
Housing	11	52	31
Hospital care	3	68	9
Retirement homes	3	63	9
Wage level	5	53	32
Social security	12	64	8
Education	6	66	20
Houses of worship	14	51	20

6578
CSO: 3639/36

COMMENT ON SALGADO ZENHA CANDIDACY CHANCES

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Nov 85 p 6

[Editorial: "The Candidate and the Circumstances"]

[Text] The universe of presidential possibilities began to be peopled early on, but only this week, if Saldago Zenha's candidacy is confirmed, which is more than likely, will the pack of theoretically "strong" candidates be complete. False entries and frustrated backstage maneuvers to launch individuals who did not succeed in becoming anything more than "candidates to be candidate," along with some really bizarre surprises, like Firmino Miguel and Costa Bras, signaled this long "warm-up" for a political battle of great relevance to the institutional picture and one which could be decisive for a possible reordering of forces at the party level. This explains the anticipation surrounding Zenha's potential candidacy.

The strength of a candidacy is not measured just by the candidate--that, is, by his personal prestige or the national image which the candidate may or may not have--but also by the circumstances. In 1976, Ramalho Eanes was a military officer, honored certainly, particularly for his decisive action on 25 November, but, for the vast majority of the electorate, he was no more than an illustrious unknown. It was the combined support of the party machines of the PS [Socialist Party], the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] which lifted Eanes into prominence and made him the president of the republic. In 1980, something similar happened to Soares Carneiro, who, in a few months, went from anonymity to the limelight--and then down to defeat, yes, but with more than 40 percent of the votes--thanks to the personal efforts of Sa Carneiro and the solid springboard which the AD [Democratic Alliance] represented then. In 1986, will the declared support of a major party--or more than one--be the necessary and sufficient condition to elect a candidate? Or rather, will it suffice to add up the votes won by the parties in the legislaive elections, or divide them among the presidential candidates according to their political origins, to determine or predict with some accuracy which of them will be the victor? This appears to be the greatest question which the list of possible candidates--Zenha included--is raising at the present.

All the "strong" candidacies which have already been announced or are expected, with the exception of Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, benefit or could benefit

from party support, but none of them appears to be in a position to "make a sweep" of the voters to whom their campaign is directed. Freitas do Amaral cannot be entirely sure of all the CDS and PDS votes; Mario Soares cannot be assured of winning the favors of all the voters who remained loyal to the PS on 6 October; in the unlikely event that he goes before the voters, Angelo Veloso is not guaranteed to win the some 15 percent of the votes which the APU [United People's Alliance] won in the last elections. The same can legitimately be said of Salgado Zenha, if he should come to receive the formal support of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party]. Actually, if 6 October proved that the boundaries of the electorate of each party are not immutable, there is reason to believe that, in January, they could become very unclear because, in these presidential elections, more than in any other elections, "no one's vote is in anyone's pocket," to [paraphrase] Soares Louro, who is backing Zenha's candidacy.

Be that as it may, party support is important, not only as a useful instrument in the campaign work of any candidate, but as a point of reference for the electorate itself. This is true, whether one is speaking of candidates who do not need a public introduction because they are prominent individuals in national political life, even if they are temporarily out of the limelight--men like Freitas do Amaral or Salgado Zenha-or of individuals who have a good "curriculum vitae" but who are not familiar to the public, as happened with Costa Bras. One of the questions that arises regarding the virtual candidacy of the former number two man in the PS is whether he will succeed, unlike the High Authority Against Corruption [Bras], in winning consensus within the leadership of the PRD, the only one of the major parties which has still not defined its position regarding a presidential candidate.

The profile of the potential candidate and his political career are enough to indicate that the electorate to which he addresses himself is at once vast, strongly contested for and sensitive to various imponderables: the combined voters of the PS, PRD and APU, the area in which Mario Soares, Lurdes Pintasilgo and Angelo Veloso are also active. Veloso must be taken into consideration even though he is described, so to speak, as a merely tactical candidate.

Of all of them, Zenha is apparently the one with the greatest capacity to make a showing in the socialist sector and cause the greatest damage to the candidacy of Mario Soares. This may be reason enough for the PCP leadership to decide to support Zenha at the polls, even enduring the pain of having to explain how the "pay off" will be big this time. Pintasilgo's impact on the APU and PRD voters is perceptable, however, and here may lie the greatest of all the imponderables. In fact, if "no one has anyone's vote in his pocket," the PCP and PRD leadership are not in a position to guarantee the loyalty of their respective constituencies if they come out, directly or indirectly, for the former number two man in the PS. In this context, another factor could weigh significantly: whether Eanes intends to take a public position or not. The Costa Bras episode surely left its scars. What attitude will the president adopt?

Thus it is that the possible candidacy of a man with unquestionable prestige and with no need of public introduction depends on more than these; it depends on the circumstances under which it occurs. Whether they are favorable or damaging to his designs remains to be seen.

6362
CSO: 3542/33

FREITAS DO AMARAL APPROVED BY PSD MAJORITY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 pp 1, 5

[Text] Almost three-quarters of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] voters (72 percent) agree with the decision of the National Council of the social democrats to support Freitas do Amaral as the candidate for the presidency of the republic. This result was revealed by a national EXPRESSO-Euroexpansao poll taken this week among PSD voters on the permanent panel of 500 interviewees representing the continental Portuguese electorate.

In contrast with the 30 National Council members (42 percent of the membership) who voted last Saturday against the Cavaco Silva motion to support the former leader of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], only 14 percent of the PSD voters expressed disagreement with this decision, while the remaining 14 percent expressed indifference to the choice.

The choice made by the party leadership also, on the other hand, increased the total number of PSD voters who have now decided to give Freitas do Amaral their votes from 36 percent to 63 percent, in the short period of 15 days (as the charts below show). Simultaneously, the number of undecided voters dropped 30 points (from 59 percent to 29 percent), with the intention to vote for other candidates remaining without significant change (5 to 6 percent).

Individuals among the 29 percent still undecided said that they agreed with party support of Freitas do Amaral, but have not yet decided how they will vote. Thus according to the poll 6 percent of the social democratic voters say they "probably will vote" for the Christian democratic politician, although they are not supporting him at this time, 2 percent have now decided "never to vote for him," while 21 percent do not know or did not indicate what their decision will be. It was established, moreover, that at the time when the interviews were held, 3 days after the meeting of the National Council of the PSD, 28 percent of those questioned still did not know whom their party had chosen for the Belem race.

Urban Disapproval Greater

In analyzing the approval, disapproval or indifference indicated by those interviewed (who by then knew that the former AD [Democratic Alliance] leader had been chosen by the PSD), it is curious to note that a definitely higher level of disapproval can be seen in the Greater Oporto region than in all the

other zones of the country (21 percent as compared to 14 percent on the national level), and that there is greater disapproval in urban than in rural regions (18 percent as compared to 11 percent).

It is also on the youngest age level and in the highest social stratum that the relatively greatest disagreement with the 41 social democratic National Council members who approved the Cavaco Silva proposal (18 percent and 19 percent, respectively) is seen.

Among the reasons volunteered by those questioned for their agreement with the choice of the founder of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], the fact that Freitas do Amaral "will be a good president" (46 percent), "is consistent with the ideas of the PSD" (15 percent) and "I have always liked him" (14 percent) stood out. On the other hand, there were only two reasons which were the almost exclusive justification of the attitude of those who disagreed: "He is not a PSD candidate" (47 percent) and "I do not like him" (50 percent).

It should be noted, finally, that this was the second EXPRESSO-Euroexpansao political poll in a series which will by the end of the year provide a record of the major changes in the development of the electorate. The panel established for the presidential election includes 500 voters chosen from 262 localities (sampling points), distributed as follows: two (cities of Lisbon and Oporto) for the population concentrations with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 60 for those with 2,500 to 100,000 inhabitants, and 200 for those concentrations with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants.

Since the same individuals are repeatedly interviewed by Euroexpansao (with possible adjustments based on availability in terms of time), the figures provided by the survey take on a higher level of reliability, according to the officials in charge.

In this instance, in order to analyze the development of the PSD vote between 7-8 and 22 October, 180 voters on the EXPRESSO-Euroexpansao panel who said they had voted for the PSD in the last elections were personally contacted. As usual, the poll was taken by Euroexpansao and the analysis of the results was the responsibility of EXPRESSO.





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CSO: 3542/24

SERIES OF POLLS ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES REVIEWED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 p 21-R

[Text] The surveys published in the press over a period of almost 2 years make it possible to note some significant movements in the popularity curves of the candidates for the presidency, despite the hesitation which may exist about the quality and the figures provided by some of the polls. For example, it can be seen as natural that the total number of those interviewed who are abstaining or indicating indecision has declined with the approach of the elections and the definition of the most important candidacies. But let us examine the curve for each candidate, and the changes which have occurred in the course of this period.

Lurdes Pintasilgo

This candidate ranked very high long before she had publicly indicated her interest in the Belem race. The gradual rise which the polls revealed showed a decline in the summer of 1984, when the initial meetings of the former CNARPE led to reservations about her candidacy. In October of last year, in an interview granted to EXPRESSO, she indicated her intention of going ahead with the candidacy, coinciding with a definite rise in her "score." There was then a slight decline, during the same period, curiously enough, when Firmino Miguel enjoyed the greatest popularity--at the beginning of 1985. Until the collapse of the Central Bloc at the beginning of this past summer, the curve declined slightly, while at the same time those for Mario Soares and Freitas do Amaral were rising. With the fall of the government and the establishment of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party], the popularity of Pintasilgo rose again, reaching its highest point at the beginning of October. The influence the results of the legislative elections and the launching of the Costa Bras candidacy will have on the position of the former prime minister remains to be seen.

Freitas do Amaral

He has over a period of more than 1 year maintained a percentage level of between 10 and 15 percent, very little affected by his resignation statement in the summer of 1984. At the end of the first quarter of 1985, with the departure of Mota Amaral and, in particular, Firmino Miguel, he declared as a candidate and saw his support almost doubled, benefitting further from the

sympathy shown for Cavaco Silva at the Figueira da Foz Congress. The emergence on the scene of Lemos Ferreira (who reached a 10 percent score) caused a decline in the period between June and October.

Mario Soares

His curve has stayed at a low level for a long period, with ups and downs generally complementing the movements of the Lurdes Pintasilgo curve in the other direction. Also, he seems to benefit from the moments of greatest instability in the leadership of the PSD [Social Democratic Party]. There was a gradual increase from February 1985, reaching its highest point at the time of the collapse of the Central Bloc and our entry into the EEC. The Soares curve then began a decline which continued until the October election.

Other Candidates

The PSD has been the source of a number of proposed candidacies which never worked out. Mota Amaral remained, until the internal referendum, in the 10 percent area. Alberto Joao Jardim showed sporadic surges at the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1985, reaching a maximum of 15 percent. Mota Pinto (9 percent maximum), Pinto Balsemao (7 percent) and Cavaco Silva (10 percent) were also among the militants suggested as a result of the instability of the party. Firmino Miguel even surpassed the Freitas do Amaral "score" at the beginning of this year, following his resignation. Lemos Ferreira emerged in the summer of 1985 at the 2-3 percent level, showing an increase up to 10 percent prior to October, and affecting support of the former CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] leader. Costa Bras, however, never succeeded in rising above the 3 percent level in the course of 1984, and later disappeared from the polls. And this has happened, moreover, with a goodly number of others, including Rocha Vieira, Fernando Amaral, Adelino da Palma Carlos, Francisco Nogueira, Almeida e Costa and Salgado Zenha.


%
45
40
35
30
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10
5
INDECISOS + ABSTENÇÃO
(1)
PINTASILGO
FREITAS
SOARES
MOTA AMARAL
FIRMINO MIGUEL
(2) Congresso PSD em Braga (Mota Pinto vence Mota Amaral)
(3) Com. Perm. PS em Sintra (Soares prepara sucessão)
(4) Ex-CNARPE anuncia reticências a Pintasilgo
(5) Renúncia de Freitas
(6) Pintasilgo avança candidatura (entrevista ao EXPRESSO)
(7) Reunião no Pátio Alfacinha (Mota Pinto apoia Firmino)
(8) Com. Nac. PSD no Bonfim (Mota Pinto afasta-se)
(9) Referendo PSD (opção por candidato independente)
(10) Renúncia de Firmino
(11) Freitas apresenta candidatura
(12) Congresso PSD na Fig. da Foz (Cavaco apoia Freitas)
(13) Queda do Bloco Central (críticas de Cavaco à candidatura de Soares)
(14) Adesão à CEE
(15) Anúncio de candidatura de Lemos Ferreira e Convenção PRD em Tomar
(16) Soares contacta Pintasilgo para este desistir
(17) Eleições AR
(18) Candidatura de Costa Brás
(19) PSD apoia Freitas
(20) PSD-CDS não chegam a acordo para legislativas
(21) Candidatura formal de Soares (Convenção PS)
Jan Feb Mar Apr May JUN JUL Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
1984
1985

Key.

1. Undecided + Abstaining
2. PSD Congress in Braga (Mota Pinto beats Mota Amaral)
3. PS [Socialist Party] Permanent Commission meeting in Sintra (Soares plans succession)
4. Former CNARPE voices reservations about Pintasilgo
5. Freitas resigns
6. Pintasilgo announces candidacy (interview with EXPRESSO)
7. Meeting at the Pateo Alfacinha (Mota Pinto supports Firmino)
8. PSD National Council meeting in Bonfim (Mota Pinto withdraws)
9. PSD referendum (choice of independent candidate adopted)
10. Firmino resigns
11. Freitas declares candidacy
12. Figueira da Foz PSD Congress (Cavaco supports Freitas)
13. Collapse of the Central Bloc (criticism by Cavaco of Soares' candidacy)
14. Entry into the EEC
15. Announcement of Lemos Ferreira's candidacy and PRD convention in Tomar
16. Soares urges Pintasilgo to withdraw
17. AR [Assembly of the Republic] elections
18. Costa Bras candidacy
19. PSD supports Freitas
20. PSD-CDS fail to reach agreement on legislative elections
21. Formal candidacy of Soares (PS convention)

COSTA BRAS' DEPARTURE SAID HUMILIATING TO EANES

Eanes' Power Seen Diminished

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 9 Nov 85 pp3-4

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

> [Excerpts] In a brief 15 days, Gen Ramalho Eanes has been defeated--worse than this, publicly humiliated--by his own base of support. In fact, in a little more than 2 weeks, we witnessed the birth, growth and death of the candidacy of Col Costa Braz [sic], which had been supported by the outgoing president of the republic.

The candidacy was born with the promise that Eanes would support it, and there are those who assure that he signalled this at the outset; the president is said to have made his position known in an informal conversation with a member of the press.

The candidacy grew under the auspices of Lt Col Melo Antunes, who is considered to have been assigned by Belem to work with the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] and the 25 April Association to create the conditions to promote the candidacy.

It suffered a reversal when the president went to the United Nations, taking Lt Col Melo Antunes with him.

It savored the short-lived consolation of another meeting in Lisbon, with General Eanes again expressing his approval and support of the candidacy; the election committee was being created (featuring Cmdr Mario Aguiar) and efforts were underway to set up a campaign headquarters.

During this hectic period, the sublime optimism of Lt Col Melo Antunes was nourishing the hopes of Col Costa Braz, until the fatal day when he had to be told the whole truth: his name did not attract either the PRD or the MFA [Armed Forces Movement], which was increasingly taking control of the PRD.

The MFA won the power struggle with General Eanes, which confirms what we have said here so many times.

General Eanes is no de Gaulle--the real leader of his henchmen. He is an umpire who has been overruled by his alleged supporters. He does not command; he brings up the rear. He does not impose; he submits. He does not make the decisions; he carries the banner. He does not have a trusted party; he is a useful political tool for this party. He does not have the loyalty of the military; he has temporarily been the most suitable instrument of the April officers.

As we predicted, the MFA has returned in devastating triumph, so triumphant that it has wagered on taking control of the PRD, so devastating that nothing has stopped it--not even General Eanes and his chosen candidate.

The April officers did not like him. They vetoed him, even after the president expressed his position twice. And General Eanes had to admit defeat, allowing Col Costa Braz, in announcing his early withdrawal, to state expressly that he had had the support (to no avail, obviously) of the president of the republic.

Score: MFA - 1; Eanes - 0. The first accounting of yesterday's allies and today's commitments, with larger scores to come.

PRD Civilians React

Offended at the takeover by the resurgent MFA, some civilians in the PRD reacted promptly:

--In an attempt to save the president's face and also to save a party which cannot long survive division, the weakening of its patron's authority and the furious and broad-based momentum of Engineer Pintasilgo's candidacy.

So they looked again to a civilian candidate for Belem. As for plausible military candidates, those who exist have either been inviable for a long time or became inviable following the unexpected crucifixion of Col Costa Braz at the hands of his former friends. Implausible military candidates there may be.

Prominent among the civilian names is Dr Francisco Salgado Zenha, a stubborn man, unattached, Socialist, reasonably acceptable to some areas of the PRD.

He is well accepted by the PRD rank and file and is thus a possible substitute for Col Costa Braz. A "historical" Socialist," he is ideal to create division within the PS [Socialist Party], splitting the former secretariat between the desire to promote Dr Vitor Constancio in the next May Congress and the desire to settle old accounts with Dr Mario Soares. A solitary man, he has an aura of independence, equidistant from everything and everybody. He is a stubborn man and perhaps not one to fear obstacles or to give in to defeats.

If Col Costa Braz was the retaliation against Engineer Pintasilgo, Doctor Zenha is the revenge against Doctor Soares, a vendetta that begins with Medeiros Ferreira and ends with Mario Mesquita (and one or another, inside and outside the PRD, who have powerful reason to grumble).

Doctor Zenha is not a match for Engineer Pintasilgo, nor does he appear to have half the chance of Col Costa Braz of reaching the second round, but he might take away a little more of Doctor Soares' support and fragment the present

and future Socialist leadership. In particular, the possibility of the ascension of Doctor Constancio, Doctor Sampaio or Engineer Guterres would be summarily erased.

However, under normal conditions, no one would be willing to take on this role of fireman in a fire that is already almost out of control, much less that of a substitute fireman, for want of better one.

In the specific case of Doctor Zenha, it will be interesting to see what will weigh more in the balance: good sense, which will tell him that no one has ever been used so patently as a tool to rescue another party from desperation; or a mixture of conviction and eagerness for revenge, which would tell him not to lose the chance of his life to get back at his former comrade, Dr Mario Soares.

In some measure, Doctor Zenha was well chosen. It would be difficult to find another individual who would hesitate even for one minute to take the path of good sense, because no one could see General Eanes or Dr Palma Carlos giving him their entusiastic support. It is certainly not edifying to see a president who would like to leave office free and clear thumping for a candidate for Belem, but it would be ethically intolerable for General Eanes to change his choice of candidate every 15 days or to give his general support to a whole series of exchangeable candidates chosen by his barons, who, it would seem, do not respect the inclinations of their leader.

In any event, as a presidential candidate, Dr Salgado Zenha will represent another fascinating item for the psychoanalysis of Portuguese political life.

Anti-PRD Party

While Doctor Zenha appears to be the last desperate hope in the final effort to find a candidate to ease the shame of the Costa Braz episode, there are Eanists who are calling for a more profound and radical solution.

The PRD has not gone along with General Eanes, they say. It has used his name and the image of his wife. It has deserted its patron, if not betrayed him.

Hence General Eanes cannot risk the formal leadership of a party over which he already has no substantial control. He must create a true party of his own, a truly Eanist party.

These sectors have even pressured Col Costa Braz to lead this movement, since he has the legitimacy of having been the choice of General Eanes himself for the presidential nomination.

It is clearly unlikely that Col Costa Braz will want to take even one more step beyond the steps which have already brought him to the unpleasant situation of political disillusionment.

It is even less likely that an anti-PRD Eanist party would be more than a temporary reaction of protest by Eanists who perceived that their leader had been humiliated.

The important thing is what effect the failure of Costa Braz will have on the crisis within the PRD.

The PRD is destroying itself. The MFA is eroding its unity. The candidacy of Engineer Pintasilgo is breaking up Eanism and its support structure.

This is good news for the Right, of which Pintasilgo has been a real ally from the outset. Even the moderate socialist electorate is beginning to understand what President Maria Lurdes Pintasilgo is about. She is the country.

From Morality to Unity

In politics, the state of grace always generates favorable results, and disgrace generates more disgrace. These are cumulative, inevitable and perhaps unfathomable processes.

Thus it is with the PRD. There was the defeat of General Eanes and Col Costa Braz. There was the party division and the disorientation of the leadership. There was the renunciation of a candidate for the presidency of the republic. There will certainly be parliamentary effacement, since the party will have to submit to tacit support for the program of the new executive. There will certainly be erosion in the local governments.

How many years, how many months can a party remain united and cohesive in an ideological vacuum, a party whose patron has been humiliated on a vital issue, a party in which the MFA carries more weight than the civilian component, a party subjugated, dominated, paralyzed by the candidacy of Engineer Pintasilgo?

First Conclusions

Politics is dirty business--it reveals party weaknesses when least expected; it does not spare anything or anyone, even giants with feet of clay.

Less than 2 months ago, going over the list of winners in the 6 October elections, wasn't everyone talking, among others, about the PRD and General Eanes?

Now, after just a few weeks, one of the victors of 6 October has already been defeated.

The PRD, then so full of hope, is now a divided, disoriented party, looking for ways to camouflage the loss of its presidential candidate. The then moralistic PRD runs the risk of being discovered today in the most puerile, if symptomatic,of election frauds--the falsification of signatures.

The then ascendant Eanism is now divided between a vigorous MFA, which has chosen Engineer Pintasilgo, and a lone general Eanes, who supports candidates who have no followers. General Eanes gives the movement its name but he does not command it. The MFA and the Pintasilgo supporters provide the troops, using a borrowed name.

--Until the day when Pintasilgo no longer needs the Eanist label. Why? "Pintasilgoism" will be the future, redemption with a touch of Christian utopia, which seduces the military, attracts the multitudes and even wins over members of the Episcopate.

It remains to be seen--to use a Biblical metaphor--if General Eanes will resign himself to the role of Pintasilgo's John the Baptist.

And the president's wife, sitting in the little television room at Belem Palace, recalling the public baths of a few weeks ago, evoking the importance of her contribution to the PRD campaign, remembering what she said about morals and politics, must be aching inside, aware of the fleeting quality of the mandate, of the ingratitude which is the inevitable payment for those who sit in the seats of power, and of the chagrin of the faithful who yesterday rejected the presidential choice of today.

Moreover, Eanes was not undone by Dr Cavaco Silva, whom he has treated kindly, as demonstrated in an inaugural address very different from the one he made when Dr Sa Carneiro was the prime minister. Nor by Dr Mario Soares, nursing his bitter thoughts of the defeated Eanes. But by men the president trusted, by [Pintasilgo] his closest advisor and friend, by his united and loyal comrades-in-arms.

As any reader is well aware, we are not dying of political sympathy for the current president of the republic and his wife.

But it is only fair to point out how humiliating for the president the Costa Braz episode was. The same man who carried the banner to attract a million voters is now denied the right to point out the political path for his followers.

Sic transit gloria mundi.

MFA Influence Seen Powerful

Lisbon O TEMPO in Portuguese 8-14 Nov 85 p 11

[Article by Ribeiro Ferreira]

[Excerpt] "Ramalho Eanes does not fool us any more. Now we will be the ones to determine the strategy to see that the power in Portugal will again be inspired by the April principles. We do not support, in any way, any project for personal power, no matter who that person may be."

This statement, made to TEMPO by a prominent member of the 25 April Association, reveals the truth about the withdrawal of Costa Bras [sic]. It was the MFA [Armed Forces Movement] and only the movement which decisively opposed the candidate chosen by Eanes. The war between the April officers and the president of the republic is now public and notorious.

Costa Bras woke up Friday morning with the firm decision to notify Ramalho Eanes and the public that he was withdrawing his candidacy for the presidency of the republic.

The official, who has been responsible for combating corruption since October 1983, had arrived at his decision on Wednesday. Before he carried it out,

there was a long exchange of views with Eanes, the only person who had clearly and unequivocally given his full support to the Costa Bras candidacy.

The straw that broke the camel's back was the Pintasilgo debate at the National Culture Center.

Most of the military officers in the 25 April Association, except for Vasco Lourenco, attended the debate in an open demonstration of esteem for Pintasilgo, not to support her in the presidential race, but to say to Ramalho Eanes that they did not support his choice and that they were clearly drawing the line at Costa Bras.

Still the Garcia dos Santos Affair

Before then, however, the old comrades-in-arms of the frustrated presidential candidate had the delicacy to explain the meaning of their gesture to him. Basically, they had nothing against Costa Bras. Their gesture was, above all, directed against the strategy of Ramalho Eanes. The so-called April captains have not forgiven Eanes for not having used his power immediately after the 1980 presidential elections, for having allowed a constitutional revision which did away with the Revolutionary Council, for having failed to save the only MFA representative among the Armed Forces chiefs of staff. Thus the Garcia dos Santos case came to the fore in the intense discussions which culminated in the April officers' decisive refusal to align themselves, once again, with the strategy of Eanes, designed and executed without the consultation of his faithful supporters and often against his own military base of support.

Costa Bras could not run the risk of having his candidacy opposed by the MFA, resuscitated in the 25 April Association, and with the PRD itself bringing up the rear.

Incidentally, one of the prior conditions set by the reserve lieutenant colonel was precisely the support, or the lack of opposition, of his former comrades-in-arms.

Is There a PRD?

For its part, the PRD remained passive throughout the process. Several observers have confirmed that the PRD members are already paying the price for having taken a large percentage of the votes on 6 October, solely because of the prestige of Ramalho Eanes.

Although Jose Carlos Vasconcelos and Marques Junior, two of the prominent leaders of the new party, clearly support Lurdes Pintasilgo (the engineer's campaign was basically launched by the weekly O JORNAL), Herminio Martinho and the so-called PRD advisors, namely Joao Botaquilha and Miguel Caetano, held the party structure to the strategy defined in Belem by Eanes and Melo Antunes.

In the case of Costa Bras, the opposition manifested by the major support for the Eanist movement (the military) and the stands in support of Lurdes

Pintasilgo by some influential civilians who have always sought to wrest the PRD from Eanes' hands (although using his image to establish the party) brought Portugal's third major party to a total standstill regarding the presidential elections.

Without the capacity to say yes or no, for over a week the PRD was totally incapable of defining a position regarding the Costa Dias candidacy.

Incidentally, this silence suited Ramalho Eanes and Costa Dias perfectly. Basically, the PRD only exists in terms of the purposes of the president of the republic.

The PRD silence did not trouble Costa Dias. With Eanes' support, any candidate or party can mobilize a significant mass of voters and, moreover, be assured of the implicit or active support of the Communist Party.

Thus the so-called April officers were solely responsible for the fall of Costa Dias. Morover, the revitalized MFA not only intends to control the strategy of Ramalho Eanes but to take charge of the Eanist party.

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CSO: 3542/33

JARDIM ACTIONS SEEN AS PART OF PRESSURE PROCESS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 p 4

[Editorial by J. C. B.]

[Text] Since Alberto Joao Jardim has already called Ernani Lopes a "Nazi" and has already denounced a Masonic plot to destroy the country by reducing holiday lighting, it will come as no surprise that, at the beginning of this week, he appealed for abstention during the presidential election.

This was a reflection of the council meeting at which the PSD [Social Democratic Party] approved support of Diogo Freitas do Amaral as a candidate by 41 votes to 30, and at which other party members expressed their intention not to participate in the campaign.

For once, Alberto Joao Jardim is not alone in fanning the winds of polemic argument.

Only while the others spoke for themselves, not seeking leadership of anyone publicly, the Madeira region leader went farther, announcing his intention to "ask the people not to vote in the elections for the presidency of the republic."

The masters of Canedo now have an outstanding follower.

But with some differences: this was not a question of urging the building of a road in a region beyond the mountains, but of attacking the excessive liberalism of a social democratic sector putting its faith in as "unliberal" a candidate as Freitas do Amaral.

It was not a question of a boycott by anonymous people, but of a rebellious gesture coming from one who is affiliated with the decisions of the main social democratic body between congresses.

It was not a question of a proposal coming from a group excluded from the system, but an act undertaken by one who, although stubbornly opposed to the political system in effect, has allowed himself to be elected within it and who governs within it, and without it, would never have become a national figure.

In short, this would fail to be a case for consideration by the disciplinary commission of the PSD only if Cavaco Silva did not want it to be, or, what is more likely, lacked the strength to cancel out the traditional maneuvering room of a man who, for 7 years now, has channeled the dissatisfaction of the people of Madeira toward Lisbon.

This is a skillful maneuver which has also, moreover, been used by Mota Amaral, but with the circumspection typical of him, and without such spectacular electoral results as those on the neighboring island.

Alberto Joao's peevishness, his tirades, his polemics, are not as wild as they seem to be. They are a part of a continuing process of exerting pressure, so that the source, the millions of voters who nurtured the development of Jardim, will not dry up.

Threatening with the right hand and beckoning with the left. This is what seems to be happening now as well, in the alleged boycott of the elections. Four days before the appeal for abstention, the PSD in Funchal had already agreed to support Freitas do Amaral if, on the second round, the former leader of the CDS were to be opposed to a candidate like Costa Bras, Lurdes Pintasilgo or any other for whom the communists vote. This is the same as saying to the future prime minister: "You can even count on me. However, let the millions of voters say."

5157
CSO: 3542/24

NORWEGIAN UNEASINESS OVER SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY DETECTED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Nov 85 p 9

[Commentary by Olav Trygge Storvik]

[Text] Over the weekend 12 prominent officers in the Swedish Navy sharply criticized their government's handling of the submarine incidents. The 12 officers, who were interviewed by SVENSKA DAGBLADET, said that there are many more submarine violations than official statements indicate and that the government tones down navy reports. They also said that the government seems to assign a higher priority to normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. The action of the 12 officers is remarkable and really focuses the spotlight on the substance of Sweden's neutrality policy.

Norwegians have also questioned how much correspondence there is between the "liturgy" and the reality of Sweden's neutrality policy. Are there aspects of neutrality that cannot tolerate the light of day, that do best in the dark? Historian Rolf Tamnes posed this question in an article in HISTORISK TIDSSKRIFT.

Tamnes used a review of an article by two young researchers, Kersti Bildberg and Klaus Misgeld, as his starting point. They examined Swedish policy up to the mid-1950's from several angles, but Tamnes expanded this perspective and questioned the very credibility of Sweden's neutrality policy in our own era.

It is suggestive, for example, that Sweden is very restrictive when it comes to giving even serious researchers access to its archives. This is particularly true of the period after 1945. In other countries, such as Norway, researchers have been able to consult foreign, especially American and British, archives when the authorities turned down their requests. But that move is almost completely ruled out for Swedish researchers. Those who work with national records in Washington and London are struck by the fact that they have little to say about Sweden's relations with the West, especially when one gets into the 1950's, Tamnes writes. Is that because Sweden's situation is exceptional and highly sensitive from the viewpoint of Washington and London?

But then what about Yugoslavia? In the same archives one can find a lot of declassified material about the "plots" of the western powers with Tito following the break with Stalin in 1948. This tempts one to ask if it is the Swedes themselves who have put pressure on the Americans and the British to keep the material under wraps. Whatever the reason the result is that research has simply revolved around topics that lie outside the fundamental issue, namely the substance of Sweden's neutrality policy, Tamnes writes.

Unusual Fare

It is thought-provoking to read Tamnes' evaluations in the context of an article by Captain Hans von Hofsten in SVENSKA DAGBLADET. And von Hofsten's criticism has been echoed by several other naval officers.

This was unusual fare for the readers: the captain revealed that the Swedish people (and those in the rest of the Nordic region) had not been informed of three serious episodes in which foreign submarines penetrated Swedish waters. The first took place near Faro as early as 1962. There was another episode in Gullmarsfjorden in 1966 and a third off Karlskrona in March 1980. In all three cases there was clear evidence that foreign submarines had entered Swedish territorial waters. Von Hofsten knows what he is talking about since he took part in the operations himself. At the end of this period he was the commander of the destroyer "Halland" which used armed force against a submarine in connection with one of the previously undisclosed episodes.

Von Hofsten said that Swedish defense policy has rested for far too long on a foundation that refuses to face the facts. And in addition: "The extent, intensity and seriousness of foreign underwater activity in our waters has been hushed up--and even ridiculed--by both the prime minister and the foreign minister in a way that can only be interpreted as an indication that they really do not believe or perhaps do not want to believe the reports they receive from the chief of defense."

Credibility

Coming as it does from a high-ranking officer who is subject to strong loyalty demands, von Hofsten's criticism is quite remarkable. It can probably only be explained against the background of many years of frustration on the part of a career officer who is very familiar with what is really going on in Sweden and the Baltic Sea region and is in despair over the political leadership's passive and almost excusing attitude when confronted with hard facts.

But this again raises with full force the question of whether Sweden's neutrality policy is credible. It is of little interest how Swedish politicians responsible for this policy would answer that question. It is outside Sweden's borders, primarily in Moscow and in Oslo, that credibility can be measured. But here one immediately runs into difficulties, for in both capitals the official comments that are made public are never totally sincere, whether the reason is politeness or opportunism.

Viewed from Moscow

However Rolf Tamnes feels that Sweden's nonaligned status did win some recognition in Moscow starting in the mid-1950's, although it is doubtful that this attitude had any effect on Soviet war plans. But in the 1980's there have been new signs from the Kremlin that suggest a lack of confidence in Sweden's doctrine of neutrality.

In addition to the series of submarine episodes, which speak for themselves, a book came out in Moscow in 1984 that tells us something about political thinking among those in power when it comes to the Nordic countries. Author Lev Voronkov, who is described as a researcher, indicated that Moscow has never accepted the idea of "Nordic balance." On the contrary, he advocated a new security policy arrangement involving nuclear-free zones in which Sweden would be expected to play an active pro-Soviet role.

At this time it is probably being noted with great interest in the Kremlin that the Swedish prime minister is making strenuous efforts to stablize relations before his trip to Moscow. It is also interesting that he considers it more valuable to visit the Soviet capital first before making a trip to Washington.

Viewed from Oslo

For reasons of self-interest it is not considered good manners in the Nordic countries to criticize the defense and security policy of one's neighbors. As far as possible politicians avoid saying anything that could add to or intensify the difficulties and that could present problems for them the next time around. And Sweden's neutrality policy has never been publicly criticized in Oslo. On the other hand no one has ever expressed satisfaction with it either. And one can detect signs of incipient uneasiness in Norway concerning the credibility of Swedish neutrality even though the uneasiness is not yet visible on the political level.

Indications of this uneasiness have been heard in connection with the Defense College's plans to arrange seminars and later on a big conference for the purpose of examining developments in Sweden's defense and security policy.

In the past Norway felt fairly certain that Sweden could not be used as a route for Soviet forces and that Soviet airplanes would not take a shortcut over Sweden to attack targets in Norway. In the 1950's and 1960's there was little doubt that Swedish defense, and especially the air force, was strong enough to deter attempts like this.

But now, unfortunately, doubts are beginning to arise. Recently the chief of the Swedish coastal fleet said that his resources were inadequate and that as a result the Swedish Navy had abandoned the idea of defending large parts of the coast. This involves the entire west coast and the northern and southern coastlines along the Gulf of Bothnia.

What about the Air Force?

But the Swedish Navy is not the only one with a lack of resources. From a Norwegian point of view the situation in the air force and developments in that branch in the future are of greater importance.

It would be interesting to find out if the Swedish Air Force has also been cut to the point where it must concentrate its forces on certain areas. And how many dangerous "holes" for Soviet overflights toward Norway would this create? These questions involve complicated evaluations but there seems to be no doubt at all that the credibility of Sweden's ability to maintain its neutrality should be examined very critically in the future.

6578
CSO: 3639/36

NORDIC COUNTRIES' ARMED FORCES CHIEFS HOLD QUIET MEETING

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Oct 85 p 2

[Unsigned article: "Commander-in-Chief on Foreign Territory"]

[Extract] Commander-in-Chief Lennart Ljung, who is now in his eighth and last year as the government's defense chief, is in a quiet way very anxious for a functioning Nordic military cooperation.

Its being quiet is due to Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland having three different military and security policy solutions, in which the dependence upon NATO in the West and the Soviet Union in the East cannot be overlooked. Sweden, in the middle, is more independent, having committed itself to strict neutrality.

At intervals of several years, all four commanders-in-chief, or, as he is called in Finland, the commander of the defense force, meet so that they can discuss common problems. Some time ago this occurred in Trondheim, Norway, when the Nordic reserve officers' federation celebrated the 50th anniversary of the exchange of reserve officers among the countries, not least in the area of field sports.

At the jubilee banquet, Lennart Ljung could cautiously admit that he had already visited Norway the day before the official invitation, in a Swedish military helicopter, which in heavy fog strayed several kilometers across the state border at Sulitelmamassiv. He was immediately forgiven by Olof Palme.

9909
CSO: 3650/48

ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL RESTRUCTURING, TRAINING PLANNED

Equality Among Two Groups of Officers

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 2 Nov 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Officers and Officers"]

[Text] In the personnel system development plans of the Defense Forces made public last week attention was focused primarily on changing military ranks even though they are in themselves a secondary issue in the whole matter. The emphasis of the reform is on improving the quality of training, above all, by means of accomplishing the intermediate educational reform in the military area also.

Naturally, military training must also be renewed as the work of the Defense Forces and, above all, weapons systems develop along with the great leaps in technical development. The work of the training instructor will become ever more demanding. It is also reasonable to reclassify duties. In many duties a long military training is not necessarily imperative; for example, a professional nutritionist coming from a civilian occupation as chief of a garrison mess hall can manage just as well as a sergeant-major.

The question presenting the most problems will be the merging of the career paths of warrant officers and cadet officers. The distinction between professions has not in itself been as drastic in Finland as it is in many other countries. Cadet officers have received normal recruit training and in wartime capable noncommissioned officers were generally promoted to captain. About 10 years ago the concept of warrant officer was created and the path was opened up for them to advance to the lower officer ranks without attending the cadet school.

Now it is intended to open up the path for warrant officers all the way to the rank of major. Since more than half of the whole warrant officer corps will retire from this rank, those who have received an intermediate or higher education will have been made rather equal.

Even the smallest outward symbols from spruce twig decorations on the collar badge to the lion fighting against swords are important in the army. Now the

concept of warrant officer will be eliminated; the career of an academy officer will begin again from the rank of second lieutenant. An experienced sergeant-major or a warrant officer received more respect in the eyes of an outsider than a young lieutenant. If, however, the academy level officer corps considers a reduction in differences in hierarchy to be important, it is probably not too dangerous.

One of the important principles of today's society is the elimination of educational blind spots. A college-level engineer can work in the same job as a graduate engineer, and a graduate of a commercial institute can direct a bank office just as well as an economist. From this point of view it is justified to overlap the graduation of ranks at the lower end of the hierarchy of cadet and academy officers as well as emphasize the opportunity for an academy officer to acquire a higher level of training.

On the other hand, an incorrect thinking on equality should be avoided in an educated society if anywhere. A demanding task presupposes a demanding education -- and as such it is not reasonable to run everyone through all the channels. The new proposal does not mean a transition to a uniform command in the manner of Sweden and Norway; higher-level duties presuppose the training of a cadet officer, and the highest level duties presuppose studies at the War College with its various continuation classes.

Satisfaction of the demand for equality easily results in an inflation of titles in all organizations. The opening up of the rank of major to academy officers means that the rank of a unit commander will change to major. In the final count the consequence of this will be a step up on the ladder of ranks for all other duties, which can cause problems in international comparisons, among other things.

It is just as clear that in the Defense Forces there are numerous duties in which an officer is not needed. Are enlisted men becoming a new group of noncommissioned officers? The title of "professional military personnel" has then been proposed for enlisted men to crown their own distorted concept of equality. What then is a noncommissioned officer?

And if the Defense Forces deem it important to give in to the backward demand of apparent equality -- indeed, it does not in itself cost anything -- it would be much more important to correct the inequality prevailing in the economic position of the professions.

Lieutenants, first lieutenants, and captains, who have come from the ranks of warrant officers, receive a better salary than officers of the same rank who have graduated from the Cadet College. This can, perhaps, be even justified by the various increases for seniority -- indeed, a capable cadet officer will have an opportunity to go quite far. On the other hand, it is senseless that, for example, in field exercises commanders receive a smaller salary than their subordinates because of a different compensation system.

The friction between the two professional groups in the Defense Forces is an unnecessary hitch in the security policy machinery even though the positions

of the trade unions [officers' leagues] should be seen in the proper perspective as a straightforward promotion of interests. On the basis of the proposal of the Defense Forces we should begin a process in which respect is given to the other party, economic inequality is eliminated, and outward status symbols are not exaggerated in modern society in a strange manner.

Defense Forces' Personnel Structure

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Nov 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Defense Forces Personnel System Being Reformed"]

[Text] The restructuring of the personnel system in the defense forces was begun about 10 years ago. The elementary school based noncommissioned officer corps was changed into a comprehensive school based warrant officer corps. The reform still had the stamp of a partially experimental nature and many questions remained open. Now it is a question of taking the whole reform to its final form so that the new educational structure of society as well as the effects of the intermediate educational reform, in particular, and overall technical development will be correctly applied.

The General Staff has naturally conducted its work independently, but very aware of the demands and limits established by the practical differences and differences in principle in two unions operating among the personnel. Simply stated, the concern of the Officers' League has been the retention of the traditional identity of the officer and the high level of training. The position of the Cadet College as the basic university based training school for the higher level officer corps has remained as an essential demand. In the matter of salary the league is especially irritated by the fact that an officer who has graduated from the Cadet College must wait several years before reaching the level of a warrant officer of corresponding rank.

The young Warrant Officers' League, for its part, has proposed the transition to an integrated officer system, in which the Cadet College would be replaced by an officers' academy based on secondary and higher education and officers would be appointed to the officer corps without any distinction. University level warrant officers have not been satisfied with the opportunity reserved for them to enter the Cadet College through a long process in the manner of the general intermediate educational reform. And the rank of captain as the highest rank in a warrant officer's career has been too modest.

The general framework of the training and educational system in the final personnel plan will remain the same in principle, the academy level and cadet school will be retained. The granting of the title of officer to everyone without distinction is the most surprising reform. It could be retained as a mild inconsistency as differences in basic education and duties remain more or less the same since one can advance from the command of basic unit or company to the highest leadership in peacetime only by means of the academy level cadet school.

Those individuals graduating from a command academy or an officers' academy according to the reform would continue to work within the framework of maintenance and technical duties though they can now advance to major from the rank of captain. This concession in the restructuring plan was also made so that trainers will not be required -- as the Officers' League has unconditionally demanded -- to have a college level education, the officers' academy being sufficient. The acquisition of qualifications in officers' colleges and advancement through various courses and the War College would guarantee the same opportunities for those who have completed the officers' academy as graduates of the Cadet College under the new system. In practice a longer road will remain a possibility only for the most persistent, but in any event a quota for nonuniversity graduates will be reserved in the officers' colleges according to General Valtanen.

In spite of the elimination of the noncommissioned officer rank and the generalization of the officer designation, the basic personnel corps will not, however, make up a uniform officer corps. The officer designation most certainly pleases the warrant officers, not to mention the additional benefits. On the other hand, the chief demand of the Warrant Officers' League to obtain a simplified and uniform command system with officers' schools and advancements will remain unfulfilled. The plan will retain the prevailing partial overlapping, but it will apparently satisfy -- as the General Staff has probably thought -- the principle segment of officers, the higher officer corps, with relatively few changes.

Even modest changes here and there are in themselves important. Inconsistencies in beginning salaries would be rectified, as well as the system of compensating education. The acceleration of career development is promised as an essential improvement in the plan. Its speed will be revealed only after we can be certain of the new ranks and funds, and this is already in the hands of individuals other than those compiling the plan.

Younger Recruits, Longer Service

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Nov 85 p 21

[Article: "Military Service at Age 19 Already"]

[Text] The number of recruits will decrease at an even rate until 1992 when a new increase will begin. For this reason consideration is being given to a law by which the number of recruits will be evened out. Therefore, 19-year old males will be accepted into the military. There will be the least number of 20-year old men in 1992.

Generally, there are 35,000 men in the military every year. From this the number will initially fall off drastically and will then even out at 31,000. In 1992 it is expected that only 27,000 men will enter the services.

Large fluctuations in the number of recruits are not good from the point of view of the garrisons. However, not one of the 38 garrisons will be closed, but dispositions will occur in the garrisons. The fact that men would enter

the military from two age groups thereby preventing the depopulation of garrisons has been considered as an equalizing factor.

The hope has been expressed in the Defense Forces that 19-year old men would be approved for the Army. Therefore, the Defense Ministry is now preparing a proposal to amend the selective service law.

Fewer Entering Civilian Service

The number of individuals applying for civilian is continually decreasing. The greatest number was in 1982 when 1,174 men chose civilian service. This is 2.9 percent of all recruits.

According to the new civilian service law, the duration of service will be increased from 12 months to 16 months. The law has already been approved and it will go into effect in 1987, and the inquiry board system will be eliminated at the same time. The law required an even more detailed approval of the statute.

It is believed that an extension of the service time will reduce the desire for civilian service. Last year 894 men entered unarmed military service, and the number is still under a thousand. The first time there were more than a thousand men in civilian service was in 1978. Men in civilian service make up 2--3 percent of all recruits, even last year they comprised 2.3 percent.

The Defense Forces assign Jehovah's Witnesses and others who refuse to enter the military for religious reasons to unarmed service. Their number has usually been about 200. Thus the fluctuations in the number of those refusing to enter the military are for ethical reasons.

10576
CSO: 3617/31

SWEDISH CHIEF OF STAFF ON NORDIC MILITARY IMPORTANCE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Nov 85 p 15

[Article: "Nordic Area Has Become Important to Super Powers"]

[Text] The security policy situation in the Nordic area has undergone an essential change in the last few decades. The Nordic area is no longer a remote area from the point of view of the super powers, but rather quite important when examined from a strategic point of view, stated Swedish Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Bror Stefensson in Helsinki on Tuesday.

Economic questions as well as technical development have affected this change according to Stefensson. Oil has become an important factor for each power group and this, for its part, has increased the significance of the North Sea and the Barents Sea. As a result of technical developments, attempts at direct overflights in Nordic airspace must be taken into consideration, particularly in a crisis situation. The surveillance of much more extensive areas is easy by means of computers and satellites, he said.

Stefensson also touched upon recent border violations in his presentation. Most of them, especially those committed by aircraft and surface vessels, have been unintentional. On the other hand, those committed by submarines have more often than not been intentional. This is a clear sign of the increased military attention being given to the Nordic area and particularly of the importance of the Swedish coast in a possible conflict, stated Stefensson.

Small Countries Must Do Something

"The weather prediction is rather bad if we are to compare the situation in the Nordic area to the weather," said Stefensson. This does not mean an increased danger of a major war, but rather a deterioration of the general atmosphere. Small countries must not just be satisfied with observing these changes, but they must do something in order to improve the situation, he emphasized.

So far Sweden has succeeded very well in its material defense readiness. However, our defense capability must be measured according to what is happening around us. The question becomes even more problematical when we remember that if we are not masters in our own house, our credibility is lacking.

If we make our defense weaknesses public too forcefully, the consequences will be negative, and if we keep them a secret, the consequences are the same, said Stefensson. He predicted that the discussion on maintaining Sweden's defense capability will be animated until the spring of 1987. At that time the decisions to be made will provide a picture of how credible Sweden's neutral policy can be considered.

10576
CSO: 3617/31

TOP DEFENSE OFFICIALS VIEW MILITARY SITUATION

De Ruiter on Image

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Oct 85 pp 11-13

[Article by Minister of Defense De Ruiter: "Defense, Not in the Wrong Place"]

[Text] The striking thing in the Netherlands is that despite all the troubles and problems, over the cruise missiles and nuclear arms for instance, the vast majority of the population feels that this country must continue to be a member of Nato. That has been and is the view of our successive governments. We continue to be firmly convinced that without Nato our security absolutely cannot be guaranteed. And fortunately there are no important groups in Netherlands politics that think differently on that score. Seen from the Netherlands, the Netherlands-Nato relationship is not problematical, and the reverse is true as well. Nonetheless, in this country people assume that Nato's view of the Netherlands is more negative than it is in reality. The appreciation felt for the Netherlands within Nato has of course suffered because we have been working for several years on a decision on something that Nato sees as a central point of its policy--the cruise missiles. But even so I notice that within Nato, and this includes the military commanders who deal directly with the Netherlands armed forces, there is a wide appreciation of the Netherlands' contribution and of the dedication and training of our units.

Nato Contribution

Also partly responsible for that view is the fact that in recent years we have been able to keep our contribution to Nato respectably up to snuff, based on the agreements included in the coalition agreement. That does not however give us the right now to think that we can get by with a little less. After all, for this cabinet period we have assumed annual real growth of two percent in defense expenditures, although an earlier Nato agreement--which was also accepted by the Netherlands--laid down growth on the order of three percent. This agreement was recently reconfirmed by the Nato ministers.

When this cabinet took office, the economic situation in this country was much gloomier than at present. For that reason we told Nato at that time that we would just have to take a small step backwards. A small step, moreover, that has had considerable consequences for planning. We also accepted that, and the entire Netherlands political world also supported that decision. Now that we are finally beginning to see some improvement in the economic situation, there is all the more reason not to slack off. So it is entirely realistic once again to take that agreement on roughly three percent growth as our starting point for the period after 1986. The fact that Nato partners like the United States are now temporarily reducing their budgets is irrelevant. You have to remember their much greater financial efforts in past years. It would be unreasonable, if not unfair, to conclude from their reduction that the Netherlands will be contributing more than those partners. We have to maintain a certain modesty on this point.

Not Weapons Fanatics

In addition I would like to make it very clear that we in the Netherlands never talk about weapons and money for armaments in isolation; rather we always see those things in a wider context of international consultation, of negotiations aimed at arms limitation and, more broadly, at disarmament. So we are not weapons fanatics who simply think the more the better. Politically speaking, we want nothing more than reductions all along the line, East and West. It is however dangerous and actually in conflict with that goal to draw fixed financial consequences from it, in a kind of vague hope that those negotiations will someday succeed.

There is also that fact that modern weapons systems such as we do have to acquire as part of the process of renewal, even though we do not blindly keep up with developments in this area, are much more expensive than in the past. That has aptly been described as a sort of structural disarmament. If we do not take that into account, if we purchase new weapons with the same budget as before, than we will fall clearly behind.

Political Spectacle

What we also have to watch out for is that we do not place too high expectations in the negotiations between East and West on arms control and arms limitation. Those expectations have often arisen from strong hopes and from the understanding--and this is not unique to the West--that we simply cannot go on arming ourselves unrestrainedly all over the world. Negotiations are politically the only feasible way to work on that. Sometimes, however, you see that not much effort is being made at the negotiating table; instead they carry on a kind of global discussion in interviews on both sides and in speeches. The only purpose of this can be to win a more favorable position at the negotiating table and in public opinion. That public pressure certainly works against the real negotiations.

Compared to the excessive expectations, the results must certainly fall short, and that can give people the impression that we are gradually getting very close to war. Fortunately that is not the case. There are no indications that either of the superpowers is considering undertaking any adventure. The entire political spectacle surrounding the negotiating table has a bad effect on the atmosphere, which must however be a good one if they are to reach results. I find that a very troubling development. But there are also hopeful signs. Despite the laborious negotiations and the charges on both sides, we do have various negotiating fora and extensive trade and cultural relations between East and West.

Necessary Growth

Let us come back to the Netherlands defense effort. I have already said that a certain growth will be necessary in the defense budget, if we do not want to fall behind compared to the present situation, which itself still gives some cause for concern. We do however have to take into account the fact that deep cuts are having to be made in very many sectors in this country, and thus that the defense growth will always be less than it should. For that reason we constantly have to ask ourselves whether we are spending the defense budget as efficiently as possible. To prevent more money from being spent than necessary, we have possibilities at the international level, such as cooperation on equipment, something that State Secretary Van Houwelingen is working for. But at the national level too we can do what needs to be done. The defense apparatus itself will have to reduce the weight of the administrative side in order to imporove the operational side.

After all, everything we do--politically and administratively, from highest to lowest--is aimed at fulfilling the operational mission as well as possible. If there are things in the organization that are in the way, then they will have to be altered. There are innumerable complaints that the organization works imperfectly, but it is not so easy to seek out where the real bottlenecks are. You will not find discover them just by setting up all

sorts of working groups, internal and external; to discover them you need the cooperation of everybody in the organization. I think it very important that at every level, even where the large political totality is not visible from day to day, people join in thinking about concrete measures to improve operational readiness. That demands that people be well informed and well motivated.

Social Acceptance

And that brings me to another important point: social acceptance of the defense apparatus and of the people that work in it. In my contacts with military personnel I do find that they wonder about that. I always point out--and I cannot emphasize this enough--that it is not just that the Netherlands political world finds defense necessary, but that the vast majority of the Netherlands people also believe it to be essential. And there is no reason at all for the military to think that they stand apart in Netherlands society and are not genuinely accepted.

The Netherlands is a country--and that is a very fine thing--where people discuss policy a great deal, defense policy too. No day goes by but the papers are full of articles about subjects connected with defense. Just take nuclear weapons, for instance, and now I am intentionally not talking about the cruise missiles. Churches, political parties, writers, professors, and others ask: "Do we have to, can we?" That is a normal and also a politically desirable process. This kind of debate also takes place in Parliament. The government takes the point of view that in the present situation certainly, but presumably also for a much longer time yet, nuclear weapons are necessary to a strategy that aims at security, but that on the other hand everything must be done to reduce the pressure that nuclear weapons exert on the entire world. Anybody who claims--and I know some people do--that this means we question the value of the armed forces, well, they are wrong.

In Nato too there are talks underway everywhere as to what is the best function and structure for the armed forces now. Nor must these debates lead to a feeling that the governments have come to view the military as second class. On the contrary, the precise point of them is to employ poltical understanding as a guide to optimize their contributions to the total process of preventing war and furthering peace.

Not a Necessary Evil

Naturally things can happen that give a bad picture of the armed forces. Take the affair in Oirschot, where conscripts were truly treated in an absolutely impermissible manner. The sole correct reaction in such a case is not to conceal or minimize the affair, but to admit right out that mistakes have been made, that we do not view that as normal, and to keep on with the process of creating conditions such that abuses like that become known and can be combatted. On the other hand, you must not get the idea that the armed forces are made up solely of saints. They are after all a large organization, and things can go wrong there. That is still no reason for the people who work there to think that they are in the wrong place. They, like me, have a task to carry out as responsible citizens in a large operation, which in this case happens to have a defense mission.

For that matter you often hear people describe the armed forces as a necessary evil. I think that is much too negative a way to look at it. The armed forces are a necessary contribution by the government to stability and to preventing war in the world.

Motivation

In an earlier connection I used the word "motivated." During my visits I have been able to see that the armed forces not only function well but are well motivated as well. Of course there is concern about things that work less well, about falling behind as a result of all the financial difficulties, about the questions of pay that are so important to everybody. Even so that cannot be grounds for lack of motivation, because other

organizations in our society too have to accept restrictions. The important thing, however, is that people be able to bring up the problems with those who bear the responsibility, that those problems be recognized there, and that they be worked on.

I am convinced that the vast majority of our armed forces are striving to achieve the best possible results with the means available. It does not go unnoticed that the Netherlands armed forces are like that. From my international contacts--and this sounds like a little sales pitch from a minister who wants to say something nice--I find that people know that the Netherlands soldier likes to make the effort when a challenge comes up. And that is true not only of the volunteers but also very certainly of the conscripts, for whom I have great respect. The nice thing about the Netherlands conscripts is that they like to grumble and sometimes come across as a bit unmilitary on the outside, but when it counts, they cut an extremely good figure. And you cannot expect young men between 18 and 20 to work the whole day with a smile on their lips.

It is also good from another point of view that we have conscripts in our armed forces. They form a cross section of youth in our society and force the armed forces to be attentive to social developments.

My impression after being minister for a few years is that you can indeed offer some criticism of the Netherlands armed forces, and that the armed forces also have reason to direct questions at us, but that all in all they are a well-led and well-equipped organization within our society, one that we can rely on if need be.

Van Houwelingen on Modernization

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Oct 85 p 14

[Article by State Secretary Van Houwelingen: "Modernization Demands Close Attention"]

[Text] What we have given a high priority to in recent years is changing how things are organized, which is necessary if we are to make the transition from relatively simple to complicated equipment. Although that transition had already been announced in the Defense Note of 1974, the idea that this would also have consequences for organization only came up much later.

Another important organizational point has been that, parallel to the modernization of our defenses, which includes all sorts of large projects, the decision-making process within the entire Ministry has been further streamlined. That has led to the introduction of an entirely new procedure: the Defense Equipment Selection Process (DMP). This has brought much more order into the decision-making process for equipment projects, from beginning to the end, including the final phase of disposal, although that still needs to be worked on some more. The regulation covers everything from, say, the initial study up to the actual purchase and introduction of new equipment.

A second point that I think is very important is that of the measures to get better control over the operation of the armed forces. We have now reached a point where we are certainly going to plan and organize their operation better in advance. You can only do that if you know precisely what is happening. The final work is being done on the information system that we need for that. It will take a few years more. This is a broad policy, and it will take time before steady control over operations leads to control of costs and improvements in the quality and thus the readiness of weapons systems. We have already noted some improvement in recent years however.

International Cooperation

Another point that has received very close attention is international cooperation on equipment, the attempt to achieve more standardization. Within the defense organization a policy has been developed for this. The acquisition of important projects also calls for a different approach. The Ministry has become not just the purchaser, but more the project developer--jointly with the other countries and, on a political level, with industry. The goal of this policy is to get more defense in the end from the same budget. In addition, Netherlands industry should benefit more from that budget. This must not however be turned into artificial acquisition procedures, which often lead to additional costs. The Ministry has in the past spent hundreds of millions of guilders extra for that.

The main point is to buy products where it is most advantageous to do so, i.e. to let competition work. On the other hand we want to use international cooperation agreements in such a way as to have Netherlands industry share in the profits as much as possible. Not only has management been improved, but more money has been made available for the operation of the armed forces. One specific example that will show up at the working level is the improvement in the supply of spare parts and maintenance equipment. Modern equipment and adequate operation will lead to an improvement in the level of training.

Good training grounds and the use of simulation techniques are of essential importance in carrying out training programs. After all, and certainly in a conscript army, you have to be able to train quickly, and that demands the most modern means. In this connection it is also important that the matter of training grounds has been clarified in the Netherlands. The plan for the structure has been accepted by Parliament, and we are now coming to the point of setting things up.

Accent on Quality

We have not put the accent only on the quality of organization, the decision-making process, and operations, but also on improving the quality of working and living conditions. In a large organization like the armed forces you cannot escape the need to modify plans. An effort has always been made, however, to avoid making too casual cuts in budgets for working and living conditions, which are so important to a soldier. That does not mean to say that it never happens, but it is at all events weighed carefully when it does. You would be safe in saying that people see a change in policy in this regard.

Summing up, I would like to say that the Memorandum of Explanation in the 1986 budget reveals that after years of talk about standardization and European cooperation, that has now become our integrated policy. If you compare this Memorandum with one from 3, 4 years ago, you will find a big difference between them. And that is due to a clear policy choice.

Hoekzema on Personnel Issues

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Oct 85 p 15

[Article by State Secretary Hoekzema: "Priority on Personnel Is Correct"]

[Text] The more familiar I got with my job, the clearer it became to me that over the years the legal position and working conditions of the military and the civil servants in the Defense Ministry had moved very close together. I believe however that the limits to that process are emphatically determined by the unique mission of the soldier in the armed forces. His position in the organization is definitely somewhat different from that of the civil servant by and large. That is why I very intentionally began on a comparison of pay and benefits packages in 1983, to lay the foundation for personnel policy. A comparison like that is of course a gigantic job, and the fact that it was accomplished in 18 months shows how seriously we took the matter.

Pay Structure

Now that we have gotten this far, you hear people saying we should draw the financial consequences. To do that, we will first have to draw up a new pay structure. Where the comparison gives us averages, we will now have to determine how the pay structure should look rank by rank. That is a very different matter, because there are some ranks that have not fallen behind. So it calls for careful thought. Although it may take some time before we have that new pay structure, it is of course important to make a start. Well, we have.

The sum of 50 million guilders has been earmarked for the first stage of the compensation adjustment, as part of the work and rest time adjustment. That represents a doubling, and that is very noteworthy at a time when finances are extremely tight. What must also not be forgotten is that pending the new pay structure, we have held up the decision on the health cost regulations for soldiers and their families. And that despite the fact that as far back as the 1982 Spring Note, it had been determined that health cost regulations for the military should be made the same as those for civil servants. Now that will only come about in connection with the new pay structure.

Reduced Working Hours

Something else that demands quite close attention is the reduction in working hours. This does not have to be a problem for the armed forces, as long as the 80 percent of the lost time that is made up to us is directed at the main problems we face now. If working hours should be reduced even further in the future--even for the armed forces--than something will have to be done about the length of initial training.

To be sure there are jobs that a person can carry out after a very short training period--guard duties, for instance--but that will not work with other jobs. Because of the increasingly advanced technology in the armed forces, training people to use complicated equipment will require a certain minimum time. That means that you will have to move toward a variable service time of around 12 to 18 months. The question is how you convince conscripts to choose the 18-month jobs for officers and specialists. Pay will have to provide the answer in one way or other. In my opinion we can do that within the constraints of the budget, because a longer period of service also means that you need fewer people each year. In addition we will be able to stop the trend toward having to attract more and more volunteers, which is expensive.

In any case, for the armed forces there is a limit somewhere to reductions in working hours. They have to remain in total readiness, and in that way there is no comparison with other operations.

Visits

The Inspector General of the armed forces has found a discrepancy between policy at headquarters and how it is understood at the working level. You can only overcome that by carefully providing information explaining that policy. Visits to units lend themselves particularly well to that. In talking with people you find out where the problems are. On the other hand you must not be afraid to give them your own policy ideas. So as a minister you have to move around in the organization regularly to see what is happening.

Looking back at the recent past we can conclude that in the personnel policy area a lot of things have been begun and completed. Besides the measures already discussed, we could also mention the integration of women into the armed forces and the regulation on disputes, which was connected with the completion of the whole system of consultation. The list could go on quite a bit, but the important thing is to show that the defense leadership has to a considerable extent put the priority on people. And the people have, I am firmly convinced, very much earned that.

12593
CSO: 3614/30

BOFORS PROCEDURES IN ILLEGAL ARMS SALE TO IRAN DESCRIBED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Bo Gandersson]

> [Text] Businessman Karl-Erik Schmitz in Malmo -- said to be Bofors' middleman in the suspected smuggling of war materials to Iran -- has now decided to speak out openly. In a newspaper interview he said that last winter he helped Bofors sell 200 tons of gunpowder to Iran by way of Yugoslavia.

Through his company, Scandinavian Commodity, Schmitz was to buy a hundred million dollars' worth of oil from Iran last year, he said in the newspaper, EXPRESSEN.

During negotiations in Teheran, representatives of the Iranian defense department said they wanted gunpowder, military explosives, detonators, and cartridge cases in exchange.

Schmitz, who for a decade has done business in Iran, made contact with gunpowder and explosives factories in a series of West European countries in order to set up an exchange.

Got a Bite

In Yugoslavia he got a bite. A factory was prepared to deliver 500 tons of gunpowder and explosives. But the crux of the matter was that this supplier could not provide the whole shipment.

"The supplier contacted Bofors in Karlskoga. To be more exact, Nobel Kemi, which is located within Bofors. After a few days, Bofors called me up to discuss the deal," he said in the interview.

In November of last year Schmitz and a representative of Nobel Kemi traveled together to Yugoslavia and concluded the business.

According to Schmitz, the transportation was accomplished by a ship from Sweden that took the load of gunpowder to Yugoslavia. There the cargo was

immediately loaded onto another vessel, which took the gunpowder to Iran.

Bofors' subsidiary company, Nobel Kemi, which acted as the seller of the gunpowder, had the permission of the Swedish government to export to Yugoslavia. But the authorities there had concluded a so-called final user agreement in which they guaranteed that the war materials would stay in Yugoslavia.

"Unknowingly"

Schmitz says that he himself was not aware of the export conditions and that he had no way of knowing about such things.

"Bofors has been in this business long enough to know what it is doing. And the company didn't have to concentrate on anything except the delivery to Yugoslavia."

In answer to the direct question as to whether Nobel Kemi knew that Iran was the real receiver of the gunpowder, he answered: "Yes, Iran was mentioned in the discussions. And besides this, there are only two large users of gunpowder and military explosives today -- Iran and Iraq. Bofors benefitted from the exchange of goods I arranged. Nobel Kemi's man talked about the fantastic market down there. They aren't exactly buying gunpowder to put it on the shelf. He complained that the market was closed to Bofors."

The Only Business

Schmitz deals through his business firm in Malmo for most of the goods: socks, food, chemicals, fertilizers, among other things. He says that the business with the 200 tons of gunpowder is the only one he has done for Bofors' account.

On the other hand, he says that he was the middleman for a great many Western countries that sold gunpowder and explosives to Iran.

As DAGENS NYHETER has reported earlier, most Western European countries are involved in this business, and many governments are also connected with the dubious business of smuggling to Iran.

Last summer the Italian authorities halted the export of war materials to Iran. The matter concerned, among other things, a 50 ton load of gunpowder from Bofors that was discovered when it was on the way to Iran through Italy.

Sealed

Swedish customs officials followed the 50 ton shipment on its way through Europe, and, according to the report, informed the Italian authorities, who took action. Bofors was later forced to take the shipment back. Today it is confiscated and sealed in Karlskoga.

Schmitz says that he has contracts for the delivery of gunpowder and explosives to Iran for a total of 70 million dollars. He says he delivers 200 tons of gunpowder a month.

Nobel Kemi is suspected of having smuggled a 200 ton, a 50 ton, and another shipment of gunpowder to Iran. The criminal investigators from customs think that the company misled the government when it sought permission to export to Yugoslavia and Italy when it was selling to Iran.

Not until April of next year at the earliest will the prosecutor, Stif L. Age, decide whether to prosecute Schmitz and the representatives of Bofors.

"The Deal Was Intended for Yugoslavia"

Nobel Kemi's manager, Hans Sievertsson, told DAGENS NYHETER that his company undertook some gunpowder business with the help of the Malmo businessman, Karl Erik Schmitz.

"But the deal was intended for Yugoslavia, not Iran. Our documentation shows this," Sievertsson said. "Through Karl-Erik Schmitz and his company, Scandinavian Commodity, we received a business contract in Yugoslavia. I don't remember how many tons of gunpowder were involved," he continued.

"We then sought and obtained the permission of the Swedish government to export gunpowder to Yugoslavia. After all, this is a country to which we normally sell war materials. The Yugoslav authorities also concluded a so-called final user contract, and we also have proof of receipt from there that shows that the gunpowder was imported to Yugoslavia."

In the interview in EXPRESSEN, Schmitz said that Nobel Kemi knew all along that Iran was really the final receiver of the war materials. But Sievertsson will not confirm this statement.

"I can only say that our internal documents contain nothing that indicates that the gunpowder went farther than Yugoslavia. To say that the gunpowder was intended for another country would presume that we cooperated with the Yugoslav authorities. We don't do this, and besides, it is a practical impossibility," Sievertsson said.

Sievertsson would not discuss the question of whether he could have been misled by his subordinate officers and not received sufficient information about the gunpowder and explosives.

Nobel Kemi is an integral part of the Bofors company and manufactures and sells, among other things, gunpowder and military explosives. The customs police suspect that the company is smuggling war materials to Iran, Syria, Egypt, and other countries in the Middle East in the amount of about 100 million kronor.

Soon Hans Sievertsson will testify at an inquest, and there he will, in his capacity as manager, more or less automatically be informed that he is suspected of the serious crime of smuggling.


(1)
Affärsmannen ombesörjde transporten av 200 ton krut från Sverige till Jugoslavien. Regeringen hade givit Bofors tillstånd att exportera dit.
SVERIGE
(2)
I våras försökte Bofors på egen hand transportera 50 ton krut till Iran via Italien. Men lasten stoppades av de italienska myndigheterna och tvingades tillbaka till Karlskoga.
JUGOSLAVIEN
(3)
ITALIEN
I Jugoslavien lastades omedelbart krutpartiet om på ett annat fartyg som tog det till krigets Iran i strid med svensk lagstiftning.
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1000km

Key:

1. The businessman arranged for the transportation of 200 tons of gunpowder from Sweden to Yugoslavia. The government had given Bofors permission to export there.
2. Last spring Bofors attempted on its own to ship 50 tons of gunpowder to Iran by way of Italy. But the shipment was stopped by the Italian authorities and returned to Karlskoga.
3. In Yugoslavia the gunpowder shipment was immediately reloaded on another ship that took it to wartime Iran in violation of Swedish law.

9124
CSO: 3650/69

PAPER COMMENTS ON ARMED FORCES' CHIEF SUB INCIDENTS REPORT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Commander-in-Chief Shows His Pictures"]

[Text] In his last quarterly incidents report, the commander-in-chief is again more definite. About five observations during the period from July to September are considered to have no other explanation than that foreign underwater activity has occurred on Swedish territory. The probability that this is the case is assessed by the commander-in-chief as high.

This is a message with more serious significance than the report in July, according to which an intrusion could have occurred, and in which it was emphasized in a new way that "incontrovertible proof" was lacking. Before then, in April, the most uneventful period in 15 years was spoken of, and the January report was unprecedentedly cautious. The number of sightings reported reports declined this September in comparison with the two preceding months, but in comparison with the corresponding quarter in 1985, there has been an overall increase.

It is politically significant that the government is thus unfortunately far from being able to assume that Sweden's efforts to defend its territory have led to tranquility in our waters. This is also evident from the departing defense minister's comments. As part of his political testament, Anders Thunborg emphasizes the need for a continued rapid build-up of the Swedish submarine defense.

The fact that the commander-in-chief is making public an example of the sightings during the year is an outstanding initiative. If anything, however, the material confirms the suspicion that exclusively visual observations are in practice worthless. With today's obviously more rigorous sifting, one wonders whether the defense staff and analytical groups would really be able to give the same basis for a Harsfjarden incident today that the the submarine defense commission gave late in the winter of 1983.

Evidence has to stand up in the courts, where different parties can conduct an interrogation. One requires something else from a basis for conclusions that could lead to security policy assessments.

The commander-in-chief's latest report is certainly going to be noticed most because of the photographs published, the first of their kind in years of hunting for submarines. It is said here that this that had to do with military personnel on guard, who were alerted. The pictures are reported to have undergone spectral analysis and data processing. It has been asserted that the object was artificial and moved through the water under its own power. To put it differently, it could accordingly be a part of a foreign submarine. The layman, of course, cannot draw any conclusions whatsoever of his own just by looking at pictures that have given the experts a great deal to ponder.

The defense staff's information chief also says that the pictures do not amount to any proof. This is a bit of an embarrassment. But even so, thanks for the candid account!

9909
CSO: 3650/48

NAVY CHIEF RENEWS REQUEST FOR SPECIAL ANTISUB CORVETTES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Navy Requests Four Coast Corvettes"]

[Text] Next week, the navy will get four new coast corvettes, specially equipped for hunting submarines, if the government decides in accordance with navy chief Bengt Schuback's wishes.

The four corvettes, which will cost a total of 1.2 billion kronor, will be built by Karlskronavarvet.

"The coast corvettes are a crystal-clear issue for us. It is the minimum required for us to be able to meet our surface attack requirements and strengthen the submarine defense organization," DAGENS NYHETER was told by Commander Anders Timdahl of the naval staff.

The four new coast corvettes will supplement the two corvettes "Stockholm" and "Malmo," which are currently conducting their trial runs and are to be operational during 1986 or 1987. The navy's coast corvettes are to replace torpedo boats of the Spica class.

According to the navy, the coast corvettes are a necessary addition to give the submarine defense organization more staying power.

The corvettes are equipped with radars, mines, depth charges, and a new towed hydrophone, "Fisken" [the Fish], which makes it possible to search for submarines for a long time. The coast corvettes are capable of operating for an entire 24-hour period.

Motor Replacement

The navy has so far only been able to rely on its Vertol helicopters, which do not have the same staying power, and whose active hydrophones are primarily intended for searching for submarines out at sea.

At the same time, these heavy helicopters will get different motors. The replacement of the motors of the 20 Vertol helicopters of the air force and the navy will cost 500 million kronor.

9909
CSO: 3650/48

NAVY COMMANDER DISCUSSES ASW EFFORTS

PM191700 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 8 Nov 85 p 3

[Swedish Navy Chief Bengt Schuback "Focus" article: "Our Efforts Have Been Inadequate"]

[Text] The 1969 defense law paved the way for a drastic reduction in ships and other units which, in addition to their normal role in the defense of our coasts, were particularly suited to protecting shipping, against submarines attack, for example.

The then Navy chief announced that he considered the developments in the Navy to be unacceptable. The lack of helicopters and ships for submarine hunts was then raised year after year, but without result.

The rundown in the Navy's capacity in this respect is clear from the table below:

Number of units	1968	1985
Surface attack ships	60, including 20 destroyers and frigates	34, including 2 new corvettes
Submarines	21	12
Minesweepers	39	22, including 2 new minehunters
Helicopters	10	10

Thus it took approximately 15 years to reduce our submarine hunting capacity to today's low-water mark. It will take at least half this time to begin to build it up again.

It is not simply a question of acquiring materiel. Hunting submarines requires long training and great experience among personnel if success is to be achieved. Regaining lost competence will take time. The situation is similar in the field of research into underwater technology, which has been neglected as a result of the shortage of consumers.

For more than 2 years now the Navy has been restructuring its activities and devoting its energies wholeheartedly to improving its antisubmarine defenses with the very limited resources at its disposal. With the support of the government, normal training has been put on one side. Comprehensive materiel purchases have been initiated.

Over a 2-year period more than 2 billion kroner are being invested in various antisubmarine measures. A little more than half this sum has been given to the Navy through various measures, and the rest has been achieved by adjustments to previously planned and much needed purchases for the fleet and the coastal artillery. In addition, the level [of] ambitiousness of normal training has had to be reduced.

But this restructuring will take a fairly long time--too long a time in the view of some, to judge from recent signs of "frustration" among my officers.

Some 10 to 15 ships and helicopters were constantly at sea and engaged in antisubmarine activities for 215 days during 1984. Some entrances to Sweden's archipelagoes were kept under constant surveillance. If the ice period is ignored, this means that Swedish units were in service day and night, on ordinary working days as well as on public holidays--something without parallel in the postwar period.

This effort has been possible because of the sacrifices made by personnel, despite the large amount of overtime involved and lengthy absences from home. Despite inadequate resources people have done their best to get the violations to stop.

This certainly deserves great recognition!

But our efforts have not been enough. We have been forced to note this the whole time. However, much has been tained in the way of experience about the nature of underwater activities and the management of antisubmarine operations.

The two coastal corvettes, the "Stockholm" and the "Malmo" will become operational next year. As a result submarine hunts which embrace a range of ships, helicopters and aircraft will be given a further component which will be able to engage in submarine hunts for a long time and in difficult weather conditions. Two Landsort-class minehunters are already part of this force, and there will be further units. Considerable quantities of underwater sensors and weapons are beginning to make their appearance with different service units, at sea and on land.

In 1987 the situation will be further improved. A submarine hunt force of a size able to carry out its task along a section of coastline for a considerable period can be set up in 1990 when the four coastal corvettes whose funding was approved last week enter service. At the same time even more entrances to Swedish archipelagoes will have been equipped with modern surveillance materiel and new weapons.

We know from experience that submarine violations have been used against us simultaneously on a broad front over several sections of coast. We must therefore be realistic and begin to plan, because not even then will our resources have a sufficiently deterrent effect. More forces and more well watched areas are needed for the simple reason that our coast, which needs to be kept under close surveillance even in peacetime, is so long.

The measures so far decided should therefore be seen as a first step in the expansion of our defenses against submarines and correspond pretty well to the Navy's production capacity in the coming years. What happens then is one of the most important questions facing the present Defense Committee.

If the present level of defense spending is maintained a second submarine hunt force cannot be set up until the turn of the century! The Armed Forces commander in chief has presented his report, which is to serve as a foundation for the 1987 Defense Bill, in his long-term plan part (o885). With the 3-percent annual increase in the defense budget recommended by the commander in chief it will take 10 years before two all-round forces and some significant strengthening of the surveillance of the entrances to Sweden's archipelagoes can be achieved.

The commander in chief has decided that he is unable to give the Navy a larger share of resources in the total equation for the armed forces that he has had to draw up. A symptom of how much the strength of our defenses has fallen since the beginning of the seventies!

The Navy chief has proposed a considerably more rapid buildup which could give 3 to 4 forces by the mid-nineties, but has accepted the commander in chief's equation within the proposed economic framework. The future will show whether this will be sufficient. I doubt it.

After the serious submarine violations in 1980-1982 the government issued new rules in 1982 for the action to be taken by the Swedish Navy against violations of our territory. The rules mean that in so-called Swedish internal waters, in our archipelagoes, for example, arms may be used against foreign submarines without prior warning.

The rules state that in territorial waters advance warning must be given before arms are used with the aim of bringing the submarine to the surface. By international standards these rules are strict and represent a delegation of the decision whether or not to use weapons to the man in command on the spot, which shows confidence in the Navy's personnel.

Contacts with submarines are often short because of the configuration of the waters in which the contact takes place, and swift action is therefore important.

When I give lectures I am often asked if one of the reasons why we have never succeeded in bringing the submarines to the surface is the fact that political restrictions have been placed on us. My predecessor, Rear Admiral Per Rudberg, generally replies to this question by saying that he "survived five governments

and six defense ministers" and that none of them imposed any restrictions on him over and above those contained in the IKFN [expansion unknown] rulebook.

I myself have been taking part in submarine hunts for a long time in a position of responsibility. I too have never experienced any form of political interference or been given any instructions as to how the job is to be carried out.

Nor has the government sought to limit the openness with which the reporting of indications and observations of foreign underwater activity has been carried out. I want this said to put an end to the misunderstandings occuring at present.

Naval combat forces have their most important role in cooperating with the other combat forces to create a deterrent to attack from the sea. Practically all the Navy's units have an all-around usefulness in various conflicts in peacetime, neutrality, and war. The capacity to combat submarines is important in all these situations. Violations of our security can never be accepted.

The reconstruction of our antisubmarine defenses has up to now tallied quite well with the Navy's capacity to administer the resources that have been given to it. The political leadership has played its part in this respect.

The approach adopted in the 1987 defense bill will be crucial for the continuation of our desire to demonstrate our determination to maintain credible anti-invasion defenses and to put an end at last to the violations of our territory.

/8918
CSO: 3650/73

NAVAL HELICOPTER UNIT DEVELOPS ANTISUBMARINE CAPABILITY

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Oct 85 pp 11-17

[Text] Based on the experiences of World War II the Swedish Navy was the first military service in our part of the world to latch onto the early development of helicopters. The need for an airborne platform integrated with the naval forces--primarily for reconnaissance purposes--was no less important to us than to other navies. Aircraft carriers were completely excluded and obtaining access to coordinating aircraft from the Air Force also was not an entirely frictionless process. The helicopter then seemed to be the answer to our prayers. It was small and had the unique property of being able to be based--at least temporarily--on cruisers and destroyers, for example. Land bases were relatively resource-economical and, last but not least, the Navy itself was able to decide when, where and how to deploy the helicopters.

Said and done. Tests were initiated as early as 1951, and the Navy Chief's Helicopter Committee in 1955 had plans for no fewer than five helicopter wings. Each wing was to consist of eight heavy and three light helicopters, as well as a special long-range reconnaissance helicopter intended for direct cooperation with our coastal missile batteries.

Unfortunately, since then the times have been characterized by fiscal belt-tightening. New Navy plans at lower funding levels have had the result that many good projects have been delayed or cut back in quality and quantity. Some have never even been realized.

Of the committee's proposals the only ones to remain were two helicopter divisions which were established in the late 1950's and which are still in existence and are stationed at Berga in the Sodertorn region (1st Helicopter Division) and at Save outside Goteborg (2d Helicopter Division).

On the other hand, over the years these units have undergone a rapid operational and technical development and today form two small but efficient units with many and difficult duties to perform.

The submarine incursions of the last few years, as well as the rearming of the surface attack units with long-range sea-based missiles, have, separately, once more confirmed an old truth: No navy worth its name is able to fulfill its duties without an integrated airborne component. It is even possible that the submarine incursions during the 1980's would never have been initiated if the five helicopter units contained in the proposal by the 1955 helicopter committee had been realized.

The Helicopter--a Naval Unit of Many Pursuits

The helicopter has many unique properties--some have a positive effect on the performance of its duty, others affect the task negatively. In order correctly to utilize a helicopter in naval connections, it is necessary to create circumstances such that the positive properties are exploited to the maximum, at the same time as the negative ones are minimized. Failure to do so often results in something other than what was anticipated.

The all-overshadowing positive characteristic is the operational and tactical mobility of the helicopter. Two and one-half hours after starting from a field base in the Stockholm region a fighter group, after rapid refuelling in Blekinge, can for instance be deployed for antisubmarine hunting outside Karlshamn. During the actual mission the group can be redirected from the Karlshamn area to the Utklippan region, for example, in about 15 minutes. An enemy submarine, which in its periscope spots one of our antisubmarine helicopters on the horizon--far beyond sonar range--could 5 minutes later be involved in fighting for its life with that same helicopter, which has surprised it by rapidly moving closer. A submarine which slowly approaches our coast in submerged position without perceiving any threat could in the next minute be exposed to armed action by a helicopter equipped with guided and target-seeking antisubmarine torpedoes. This operational and tactical mobility thus permits the realization of one of the most decisive basic rules of warfare--the desirability of surprise.

The most limiting property of the helicopter system is its absolute base dependence. This can vary from a simple advanced refuelling spot to a major base, where the helicopter can be repaired, rearmed and obtain fuel and ammunition as well as food, rest and new orders between missions for the crews. A well-functioning base system is necessary if the helicopter system is to retain its combat endurance.

There are those who maintain that the major weakness of the helicopter is its short tactical endurance, which is limited to 2-4 hours. This assertion is both correct and incorrect depending on what it is compared to and the criteria used.

A missile boat naturally has greater endurance during a reconnaissance mission than a helicopter, which, however, in turn has greater endurance than a reconnaissance version of the Viggen, for example. But in comparing the three systems and their capability of reconnoitering a large area of the sea as a function of time--meaning with the actual result of the endurance for the same type of mission, the order must be reversed.

The limitations of an individual platform in terms of action time can always be compensated for by having more units--and this is primarily where our problem can be found. We have sophisticated helicopters--but too few.

The Spheres of Action of the Naval Helicopter

The unique flying properties of the helicopter have resulted in its use all over the world for many types of duties, both military and civilian.

The heavy helicopters of the Swedish Navy have two principal tasks:

--Antisubmarine activity
--Radar reconnaissance with target data transmission to missile boats

Furthermore, they have a multitude of secondary duties, such as:

--Rescue service
--Materiel and personnel transports
--Minesweeping
--Fire-fighting

Antisubmarine Warfare in War and Peace

Today the antisubmarine function is the totally dimensioning function--a circumstance which can scarcely have evaded anyone. The entire HKP4 weapon system (see the fact box) is built upon this type of mission, and all other duties are more or less a result of expanded utilization of either the antisubmarine equipment on board or of the helicopter platform as such.

The capability of the helicopter to stand still in the air above a point results in, for example, the possibility of lowering various sensor equipment into the water. It may be said in a somewhat oversimplified way that in the antisubmarine task the demand on the system is primarily to bring a sophisticated vertically adjustable hydrophone with a well-trained operator to exactly the desired location. If there is a submarine at that spot the system is supposed to be able to indicate and classify it and subsequently deploy weapons. All equipment on board is optimized in order to cope with this task independent of weather and light conditions.

Our helicopter system is primarily developed for antisubmarine warfare outside the coastline and at sea and not inside the skerries. It is essential to remember this. The enemy is then a conventional submarine which normally must behave actively in order to reach its targets. These may be for example our routes of transportation to and from Gotland or to and from Sweden or our naval forces during operations at sea.

The helicopters are then utilized either in a "free antisubmarine search" when searching areas at sea before our ships arrive or in a "fixed antisubmarine hunt," in which the helicopters are grouped around our ships in a protective antisubmarine screen.

An enemy submarine, which in a similar situation is forced to act passively--to lie still or lie low on the bottom--has great difficulty in completing its mission. An escort force consisting of ships and helicopters completes its mission principally by seeing to it that the escorted ships arrive safely in port--not primarily by rendering the submarine harmless. By forcing it to act passively the same result is achieved.

If the enemy submarine is on an intelligence or mining mission, for instance, it should act in a different manner. The time factor is not equally important. In the event a submarine threat occurs, a passive submarine tactic is the only correct thing to do--wait out the opponent and continue when the threat is reduced. A submarine acting in this manner--particularly inside the skerries--today has a significant chance of avoiding discovery, a fact that is just as well-known as it is deplorable.

Here the endurance and performance charcteristics of the respective system come to the foreground. After the Harsfjarden incident the Submarine Commission determined among other things that we had many too few antisubmarine helicopters and that their equipment needed to be improved with respect to the new threat picture. Subsequently measures have been taken which will increase the number of helicopters and provide us with additional new equipment in order to be able to identify objects on the bottom.

Within the foreseeable future helicopters will be needed for antisubmarine warfare both in wartime and during incidents in peacetime, there is no doubt about that.

No Reconnaissance--no Information

The above motto, borrowed from the air reconnaissance units, is obviously applicable to our naval units as well. Leaders of operations both on land and at sea must have information about the opponent's position and strength in order to be able to undertake necessary measures ahead of time--moving, concentration of strength as well as preparations for coordination and protective measures etc.

Since an antisubmarine-equipped helicopter requires a radar for various purposes (searching for periscopes, fire control, navigation etc.), it became natural to use it for radar reconnaissance against surface targets as well. "The seagull that flies highest sees the farthest" is an axiom which is valid for radar stations as well. Raise up the radar into a high tower, in a helicopter or in an aircraft, and the range increases dramatically.

Consequently, our heavy helicopters have been used in many years of exercises in order to provide information about the location and strength of the opposing units--information which is transmitted via radio to fire control centers on land, outlying combat ships and attack aircraft. The new missile system of our surface attack units has such a long range that external target information sources are necessary if in a missile duel with the opponent we are to win the "battle for the first strike."

The development in this area follows other navies, which already utilize helicopters for the same purposes. New and more powerful radar stations for HKP4 are being procured and their radar images will be transmitted to our ships via encrypted data-based radio link.

The Helicopter Units Undergo Change

The two helicopter divisions of today are largely self-sufficient units as regards training, helicopter materiel and maintenance and base services. However, much argues in favor of keeping primarily training and helicopter maintenance together in one place under the leadership of one authority. But at the same time there are operational demands to have helicopters permanently prepared for deployment in the various regions.

The Navy chief has therefore decided to introduce a new helicopter organization within the Navy beginning with the 86/87 fiscal year. The background for this is the supreme commander's decision that four heavy helicopters (HKP4) are to be transferred from the Air Force to the Navy and equipped for antisubmarine warfare and, further, a government decision that

the Navy is to have only one helicopter maintenance facility and that a third helicopter division is to be established in southern Sweden (Ronneby).

Work on the introduction of this organization is already in full swing. In principle, materiel and personnel will be distributed according to the table below.

All three divisions in the new organization have a joint task--maintaining readiness for and undertaking ordered operations in their own region or through a concentration of forces in a region. In addition, the First Helicopter Division is responsible for all basic training of both crews and technicians and base personnel for the peacetime and wartime organizations.

At the 1st Helicopter Division an antisubmarine aircraft is presently being tested for the purpose of gaining experience from this platform, which among other things carries passive reconnaissance sensors against submarines, such as infrared and sonar equipment. There are also thoughts of testing lasers as well as arming these aircraft.

Many navies are using precisely such antisubmarine aircraft. These are normally 2-4-engine large aircraft with long periods of action and with great capability for operating independently at sea, something that a helicopter will never be able to manage.

STRIDS- OCH ELDLEDNING FRÅN HELIKOPTER



Combat Information and Fire Control from Helicopter

These very expensive and sophisticated aircraft are especially suited for use against large and noisy nuclear submarines in Atlantic waters, but are probably not very cost-effective against silent conventional submarines in the Baltic Sea, for instance. But certain systems can be mounted in smaller and relatively inexpensive aircraft and can thus be utilized in a more cost-effective manner for moved-up passive area reconnaissance.

The future will show the ultimate design of these new naval aircraft and their place in our antisubmarine organization.

Increased Base Mobility--Increased Protection

The wartime organization of the helicopter units will also be changed within the next few years. Today's wartime organization is built around a relatively well-covering system of ordinary bases (O-bases) and temporary bases (T-bases). This base system is fundamentally sound since the helicopters are always relatively near an established base no matter where they are operating.

But in recent years above all two factors have brought about a new base philosophy, partly the increased threat against fixed bases, and partly the difficulty of providing many bases with the required technical equipment and competent personnel.

The New Helicopter Organization

	Number					
	HKP4	HKP6	Antisub aircraft	Career officers	Civilians	Conscripts
1st Helicopter Div.	8	8	1	108	5	100
2d Helicopter Div.	3	1	1	38	-	10
3d Helicopter Div.	3	1	1	37	-	10
Helicopter section	-	-	-	6	3	-
Helicopter maintenance facility	-	-	-	-	20	-
Total:	14	10	3	189	28	120

By making the base components for wartime divisions completely vehicle dependent and by applying a mobile base tactic, the threat against the all important bases can be reduced. This mobility also allows the bases to be moved into the vicinity of the operational area.

It is essential for the vehicle park of the helicopter divisions to become suited to the purpose and supplied with the required reserves, or else we risk the helicopter units becoming overly tied to their location.

The most outstanding quality of the helicopters--mobility--must not be limited by a poorly functioning base system.

If You Want the Best--Be Prepared to Pay

Every Navy chief who has an integrated aircraft component surely wishes for an expansion of it in order to retain or reinforce the total effect. But it is also likely that he hesitates at the cost. Procurement and operation of airborne systems are some of the most expensive things available, and the need for advanced personnel is nearly infinite. But if it is not possible to do without, what does one do?

Surely one compromises and tries to acquire as many aircraft components as is practically feasible, at the same time as one tries to keep the operational costs down by limiting flying time allocations and minimizing the personnel

cadre. A limitation of flying time allocation results in a reduced need for funds, spare parts and technicians, since the machine park is then at "half speed." Everyone adjusts to what is possible at this level and time passes.

But then something happens, perhaps an incident, perhaps a conflict--and the system is ordered to operate at "full speed." It is then found that the crews drift back down toward "half-speed" due to a lack of spare parts and a shortage of competent technicians. Then incantations and spells are of no use and one has to pay dearly in terms of time and money for building and maintaining the system at the level intended from the beginning.

Such rebuilding can take several years.

Many dangers lurk and there are no shortcuts. If a reliable air component is desired, it is necessary to let it grow from a number of healthy and strong "roots:"

--Regular turnover of airborne, sensor and weapons materiel. With time old materiel becomes more expensive to maintain and its performance characteristics and availability decrease relative to altered threat pictures and demands.

--Well supplied stockpiles of spare parts and exchange components.

--Sufficiently many and competent technicians at both central and local levels, that is to say as many as are needed in order to operate the system at "full speed" and in order rapidly to be able to handle and take action involving potential technical problems.

--Professional crews, which have mastered their materiel to perfection and, when necessary, are professional enough to get the most out of what the system is capable of supplying.

Shortages at the "root level" sooner or later show up in the form of poorer results, reduced availability of materiel and personnel departures.

With a slight travesty it might be possible to state that to a Navy chief the "roots of the helicopter system are bitter, but its fruits are sweet."

Over the next few years the chief of our Navy intends to add both materiel and personnel to the helicopter units which will considerably improve performance characteristics and availability. The Navy's helicopter units are thus able to face the future with confidence, and all of us are delighted about that.

The HKP4 B/C Weapon System

Number:	3 HKP 4 B	Manufactured by Boeing Vertol, USA, and delivered during the early 1960's. These helicopters are presently undergoing a modernization. (Civilian designation: BV107-II)
	7 HKP 4 C	Manufactured under license by Kawasaki Aircraft Industries, Japan. (Civilian designation: KH107-II)
Note:		Four Air Force HKP4 were modified and will be added to the Navy during the period 1987-1990.
Engines:		Two Rolls-Royce gas turbines of about 1,300 HP each (Bigger engines are intended to be added during the period 1987-89)
Max. starting weight:		About 10,000 kg
Sensor equipment:		Active hydrophone, radar, torpedo fire control
Armament:		Depth charges, antisub torpedoes
Other equipment:		--Automatic navigation system (permits automatic flying during the entire mission profile and thus operation totally independent of visibility conditions). --Decca navigator, Doppler radar navigationsystem, direction-finding system. (VOR and ADF) --Complete equipment for instrument flying --Radio equipment for HF, VHF and UHF --Emergency direction-finding system and rescue gear --Tow hook for towing ships or smaller minesweepers
Performance data:		--Cruising speed about 110 knots --Operational time 1-4 hours, depending on the choice of load
Crew:		2 pilots, 1 observer (tactical leader), 1 hydrophone operator and 1 flight engineer

Fact Box for HKP6

Number:	Navy;	10 manufactured by Augusta-Bell, Italy (Civilian designation: Augusta-Bell 206A)
Engine:		Allison 250-C20, about 400 axle HP
Max. starting weight:		1,450 kg
Sensor equipment:		Radar (Decca 125), bathythermograph
Armament:		Depth charges

Other equipment:	--Direction-finding system (VOR and ADF) --Limited equipment for instrument flying --Radio (VHF) --Cargo hook for hanging loads
Performance data:	--Cruising speed about 100 knots --Operational time 1-3 hours, depending on the choice of load

11949
CSO: 3650/60

NAVAL OFFICER DISCUSSES PROBLEMS IN COASTAL DEFENSE ABILITY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 5 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Fredrik Braconier]

[Text] Harsfjarden--"The submarine intrusions are definitely continuing." This straightforward report was given by the chief of the coastal fleet, Claes Tornberg, when he met Monday with a group of journalists out in the waters of Harsfjarden. While the coastal fleet was beginning its major fall maneuvers and missile ships were leaving port near Berga, the commander took the opportunity to share his views on the situation in the Baltic Sea.

This situation is not especially encouraging from the Swedish standpoint. The Baltic Sea has more and more strategic significance and our entire oblong country borders on this body of water. Even though all our naval resources are now concentrated in the Baltic Sea south of Aland, we still do not have much to offer.

This is particularly true of our resources for hunting submarines. In 1990 we can expect to have 1.5 antisubmarine units, but we will need several more. In addition, while enemy submarines can stay out for 1 month, the Swedish navy operates normal Swedish working hours.

"Being half-blind is not enough. We also have one or two arms tied behind our back," one naval officer dramatically expressed today's situation.

The conclusion is that the Swedish navy today lacks the ability to detect foreign submarines, even if the navy happens to have a vessel on the spot.

This, in turn, means that the true number of submarine intrusions is certainly much higher than indicated by the statistics--and rapid improvement is hardly in sight. Even if the commander in chief should convince the politicians to meet his demands for future allocations to the military--which the leadership of the coastal fleet doubts--this will provide only a slow improvement in our ability to hunt intruders under the surface of our waters. In today's situation, our leaders have other priorities.

"It is considered more important for our coast guard to explore for oil than to hunt submarines," one officer commented bitterly in connection with the

navy's difficulty in procuring airplanes to improve its ability to counter the submarine threat.

The Swedish navy is now occupied not only with submarine hunting in times of peace. On the contrary, the main task is to prevent an invasion on and under the sea during times of war.

Can what remains of the Swedish fleet carry out this mission successfully?

The answer is that it depends on where and when such an attack takes place. An attack from the west would hardly be hindered by any Swedish warships at all. Everything we have, we have in the Baltic Sea.

A rapid and unexpected attack would also meet limited resistance. If our defense is to be effective, it must have time to mobilize. The navy has attempted to increase preparedness with the resources that are available, but these are hardly sufficient. If a serious situation should arise on short notice, only small sections of the fleet would have time to weigh anchor.

One morning in Harsfjarden on board the combined staff vessel and minelayer Visborg a confrontation is revealed between peaceful Sweden and a more and more hostile environment. The sailors confront the threat from abroad far into our own waters, while the rest of the country seems to remain overly calm or even doubt the officers' reports.

The politicians fail to strengthen the military and the leading media discuss again and again whether or not any intrusions have even taken place. In a peaceful world, Sweden would truly be an exemplary member of the global community. We threaten no one and we do not seriously believe that anyone truly has evil intentions against us.

May Providence protect such a naive little country from the dangers of the real world.

There is an imminent danger that the remaining units of the navy will be insufficient to justify this confidence.

9336
CSO: 3650/70

OFFICER REVIEWS DEFENSE PROBLEMS, CALLS FOR STATE RESPONSE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Han von Hofsten, Naval Commander]

[Text] The Foreign Ministry should deal with Sweden's foreign policy, the Defense Ministry with security and defense policy, and the government must manage this entire complex. The commander in chief and the defense branches must obtain and utilize the resources of the military according to the instructions of the Defense Ministry. Lower-level officers must see that instructions are carried out.

All this is logical and bureaucratically straightforward and in a well-developed country such as Sweden, it has a good chance of working. If extensive, detailed control is to be avoided, however, all levels must have the same basic insight concerning the nature of problems and how they are to be solved. If differences arise at the various levels concerning how fundamental facts are to be interpreted or dealt with, then this friction must be eliminated in some way if the overall system is to work.

In a democracy, of course, this is done through discussions, until a consensus based on reasonable arguments is reached.

Must Obey

An officer knows perhaps better than anyone else that rapid shifts in an external chain of events often necessitate actions that seem to conflict with previous patterns of behavior. There is no time for discussions or, for reasons of secrecy, they cannot take place.

In such cases in the military, actions are controlled from above through orders that subordinates must obey, even if they do not understand the overall context. They must have confidence that those above them know best in a given situation. In clear-cut cases this is called discipline. In confused situations it is called loyalty. In the military system, the individual must accept this unavoidable circumstance.

No Problems

In nine cases out of 10 no problems arise, since the officers at the various levels are sufficiently well trained to understand the situation and inform everyone all the way down the chain of command.

Why, then, have signs of breaches in loyalty appeared in recent days? My answer can be summed up by saying that, for far too long, our defense policy has been based on arguments that deny the facts.

The extent, intensity, and seriousness of the foreign submarine activity in our waters have been concealed, belittled, or even ridiculed by prime ministers and foreign ministers in a way that can only be interpreted to mean that they simply do not believe or, perhaps more accurately, do not want to believe the reports from the commander in chief.

As a result, the practical countermeasures have been half-hearted, too little, and too late.

Two-Way Loyalty

If military personnel must be loyal to the government and its policies, then this must be a two-way loyalty. This means that it is impossible, year after year, to mishandle the results of the efforts of this personnel without abusing this loyalty to the extent that the loyalty will fail in certain situations. This is a sad state of affairs.

Theoretically, I believe that there are two possible explanations to the government's actions. The government either ignores the violations intentionally for some obscure reason, or it simply does not believe they exist.

The former suspicion is rather unlikely, so I will deal with it later by relating my own observations.

Uncomfortable or unpleasant circumstances that do not mesh with one's previous concept of the world are often suppressed. If an unpleasant possibility is not supported by clear-cut indications, then one tends to seek other causes for one's observations. That is a natural reaction and I am not ashamed to admit that I was one of the first not to believe what was reported.

Like A Hero

In 1962 a destroyer division was located off Faro waiting for a target for antiaircraft practice. A 0.5 meter thick fog covered the calm sea. An observant young officer saw a small blip on the radar screen with a steady course and a slow speed. Persistent questions from the radar room below up to the officer on the bridge finally made me quite irritated. He "knew" that there was something out there, but I could see there was nothing that could do 7 knots.

Finally, the officer received the chief's permission to start the sonar: distinct

metallic echo, Doppler effect, and propeller noise! The destroyers, all with sonar contact, formed a battle line to turn away the intruder through a dramatic and powerful use of force. It disappeared out into the open sea at high speed, causing a horrible noise in our sonar equipment.

In my youthful enthusiasm, I felt like a hero, especially since my orders included pushing the button to drop depth charges. It was a great shock.

It was an even greater shock when, on my next leave, I found out that the newspapers had expressed doubt that it really had been a submarine. Was it not more likely that the question of defense spending was coming up soon and . . .

Not even all my fellow naval officers were convinced.

Happened Again

It happened again on 1 October 1966. A number of reports indicating submarine activity on the west coast were sent to military district headquarters in Skovde. The staff's submarine officer rejected many reports because the indicated location was difficult to navigate or too shallow. "In addition, it is unlikely that several submarines would violate Swedish waters at almost the same time!"

Those who doubted the incident at Faron supported the effort toward a careful analysis here, however, and the result was that four or five cases must have been submarines. All the naval officers were convinced.

When the report was presented at the defense staff, everyone bit their tongue, but said nothing. I was given a tongue-lashing by the chief of staff for explaining to the press the regulations contained in IKFN (abbreviation for the commander in chief's orders for "Military intervention during violation of Swedish territory in times of peace and neutrality, etc."): "To be sure, the orders are open, but we must not sound bloodthirsty."

The newspapers were skeptical. In an editorial, AFTONBLADET called naval officers obscurantists. The government said and did precisely nothing. In the debate over new IKFN regulations, the commanding general called for tougher regulations against submarines, but his proposal fell on deaf ears.

Budget Subs Appear

In 1972 a political decision was made, according to which the ability of surface vessels to hunt submarines would be eliminated. The naval chief protested vigorously to the government. Individual officers presented arguments in the trade press. With few exceptions, the press was indifferent.

Scattered reports were heard from 1967 to 1979, but no armed countermeasures were taken. This gave rise to the term "budget submarines." The fact that this implies an accusation that personnel made false reports while in service did not concern the mass media. Naval personnel had no way of defending itself and the politicians remained silent. Naval officers kept their clenched fists in their pockets.

United States Shows Interest

On 12 March 1980, after a chase of several hours, the newly equipped destroyer Halland drove a submarine out of the inlet to Karlskrona. For the first time in a long time, a depth charge was dropped as a warning. The captain of the ship was prohibited by the commander of the naval base from using fire for effect. Even the most solidly pro-defense newspapers ran only a small, one-column report.

One person who did show interest, on the other hand, was the United States naval chief, who personally called his attache in Stockholm with instructions to find out everything possible about the incident. To his delight, he found out that the attache happened to have been visiting on board the ship when the incident occurred!

Commander In Chief Prevents Article

No reaction from Swedish authorities was forthcoming at any level. The commander in Halland asked the defense staff for permission to write a newspaper article on what was happening along our coasts, in order to wake up the nation. The idea was rejected, on orders from the commander in chief. The crew of the only remaining destroyer asked their chief why no one believed them or reacted to what had happened. I had no answer.

The so-called Uto incident occurred during the fall of 1980. An analysis showed that several submarines had committed serious intrusions. After several depth charges had been dropped as a warning, the units participating in the chase were prohibited by the military commander from following the IKFN regulations and using fire for effect without his personal orders, contrary to the opinion of the naval base commander and despite the fact that, for the first time, the submarines tried to maneuver themselves free without leaving Swedish waters.

Finally, after warning fire was used several times, the order was given to use fire for effect. Once this happened, the indications ceased immediately. It now became clear that the entire military hierarchy had finally realized that there actually were foreign submarines in our waters.

Sarcastic Press

The government (now of a different color) provided additional, although moderate, appropriations for materiel procurement. Large sectors of the mass media were still not only skeptical, but even sarcastic. More talk about budget submarines and other humiliating words of abuse caused several naval officers to think twice before appearing publicly in uniform and running the risk of being heckled.

Many of us thought that someone at a high level would have the courage to speak up, but this did not occur. This time the destroyer chief wrote an article for the navy's own journal, MARIN NYTT, without asking permission. The conclusion of the article was that we should "drop our gloves" and

implement the IKFN regulations, which are not all that bad, in a more consistent and tough manner. I heard by way of the grapevine that the commander in chief had expressed dissatisfaction. Otherwise, no one reacted.

U 137 A Godsend

The realization that submarines in our waters had become a serious reality had finally sunk in, but there was still no one at a high level who was prepared to make full use of the possibilities for the use of arms that were actually available even then. For the longest time, they did not want to believe that this was necessary.

Thus, on 27 October 1981, submarine 137 came as a godsend. Karl Andersson himself testified that he could not believe what he had seen until the Soviet naval flag was unfurled, showing the hammer and sickle. The whole event was simply unbelievable. But the scales fell from everyone's eyes. All the talk about budget submarines came to an end. Additional material was purchased and the IKFN regulations were sharpened.

Once again it felt honorable to be a naval officer.

The relief was mixed with a feeling of discomfort, however. Two decades of struggle with all permissible and decent means to awaken the nation and make it see what was happening around us, but invisible and under the surface, had failed until the enemy went aground and revealed himself.

It is clear that it is virtually impossible to enlighten one's own organization and the public over a phenomenon that is difficult to observe and that emanates from individual persons and small teams of specialists at the bottom of an organization, particularly when we are dealing with unpleasant facts.

I believe that the example cited here demonstrates that, for unpleasant news to be understood and to permeate a nation, the information must come from the country's government.

Genuine Harmony

After the so-called Harsfjarden incident and after the Submarine Commission's study, which revealed a large operation with a total of six submarines at various locations in the Stockholm Archipelago, there seemed to be genuine harmony throughout the military complex. All levels seemed to be aware of the nature and extent of the threat, tougher regulations were issued, and new materiel was on the way.

Everyone was able to work in a system that corresponded to their training and reason.

Then some strange things began to happen. The prime minister was accused of sending mixed messages to the Soviet Union through GRU officers in New York. Exceptional measures, by Swedish standards, were taken against representatives of the opposition.

Quarterly reports from the commander in chief spoke of continued serious violations and the government said it took a serious view of them, but it gradually toned down statements by the commander in chief until it began to sound as if it were doubtful that any violations had occurred.

The consistent position against the responsible power, which the government spoke of, began to shift back and forth along with the number of violations reported during the most recent quarter.

Began To Wonder

It was not just navy people who began to wonder about the situation. This was demonstrated by the fact that the entire democratic opposition in parliament called for a no-confidence vote against the foreign minister.

All this was followed by professional officers with increasing surprise and discontent. They could not understand what was happening. Personally, I was most surprised when the prime minister said that Gromyko had assured him that the Soviet Union respected Sweden's borders and that we should "make a note" of his "friendly smile."

The fact that many well-informed people in our country were uncertain as to what the government really thought about the submarine violations and what reasons it had for acting as it did was indicated clearly by the actions of the nonsocialist parties, by books that were published, and by newspaper articles and the public debate.

Of course, naval officers were no exception. But none of this questioning and debating has yielded any results. The prime minister still speaks ambiguously and vaguely. Thus, almost out of desperation, I have forced myself to let honesty go before etiquette and speak out in order to provoke an explanation by the prime minister.

Idiots Can Be Right

Thus, in brief, this long article is an earnest plea to the prime minister to explain the government's security policy in plain language, for everyone to understand. It is also meant to elucidate a quote from Churchill: "One of the most important lessons I have learned from an entire life at the peak of power is that idiots are often right."

9336
CSO: 3650/70

ECONOMIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AGENCY URGES NEW MEASURES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Oct 85 p 17

[Article by Emily von Sydow: "Reducing Imports in Wartime Requires Better Preparation"]

[Text] "Increased dependence upon foreign countries is a threat to our neutrality and our ability to support ourselves."

Sweden's economic preparedness must therefore help industry and municipalities to ensure readiness for action in the event of an international crisis.

The National Board for Economic Defense, OEF, has proposed in a report to the government that the country ensure better economic preparedness through closer cooperation between the economy and the authorities, for example in order to develop substitute products for the goods that might be affected by an end to imports. This includes, for example, alloy metals from South Africa.

The possibility of creating a substitute also reduces the need for stockpiling. The OEF wants a drastic reduction in the storing of supplies.

"We have already sold off a great deal of our oil reserves, since the use of oil is declining. We also do not need such large stocks of clothing and naphtha, which is a basic raw material for the plastics industry," says Gunnar Nordbeck, the director general of the OEF.

The sale of these stocks will partially pay for the investments that the OEF wants to make in order to increase the security of electrical power, among other things.

"It is not realistic to count on a blockade with closed borders. It is a 1940's term that does not apply today. We believe that in a wartime situation we are going to be able to import 60 percent of the ordinary goods, like clothing, etc., 50 percent of the strategic goods, like oil, and 20 percent of the goods that are controlled by one of the military alliances, e.g. electronics. We have counted on being able to import half that amount of these goods," says department director Mats Ekeblom.

9909
CSO: 3650/48

RESEARCHER SEES ARMS INDUSTRY RELYING TOO HEAVILY ON WEST

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 26 Oct 85 p 18

[Text] Stockholm (NTB-TT)--Since World War II Sweden's weapons industry has supported NATO's arms buildup. The way security policy is implemented is a breach of Swedish nonalignment, according to peace researcher Bjorn Hagelin in a recent book.

Hagelin is a peace and conflict researcher at the University of Uppsala. He used to work for the Defense Research Institute.

In the book, "Arms Production Booming," he wrote that the longer Sweden tries to be the little land that mainly produces its own guns, missiles and airplanes the more Sweden will be forced to cooperate with other western arms industries. At the same time this increases the necessity of exporting weapons.

Illegal Exports

The book deals largely with the controversial Swedish arms exports. The suspicion that the big Bofors concern has been involved in illegal exports has led many to ask if it is right to concentrate on this branch of industry.

Hagelin feels that no Swedish government can say no to this kind of arms deal. The need for exporting arms and cooperating with the arms industries of other countries increases as weapons become more expensive and more advanced.

He warns against thinking that with its current security policy Sweden is capable of freeing itself from defense industries that produce weapons for the NATO defense system. Hagelin points out that Sweden contributes to the western arms buildup. The Carl Gustaf anti-tank weapon and the Bofors 40-mm anti-aircraft gun have become standard items within the western defense alliance.

The Swedish arms industry helps the United States and the other NATO countries with research, expertise and materiel. The United States used Bofors guns both in Vietnam and on Grenada--while at the same time the Swedish government criticized both the Vietnam War and the intervention in Grenada.

"There should be no doubt about where Sweden belongs ideologically, politically and economically. Neutrality has not prevented cooperation between Swedish and western military industries. There is no corresponding cooperation with eastern countries," the peace researcher wrote.

6578
CSO: 3639/36

ARMY SEEKS NEW TANK FOR 1990'S; OPPOSITION EXPECTED

PM211633 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Nov 85 p 6

[Anders Ohman report: "New Tank An Army Demand"]

[Text] The Swedish Army wants a new tank toward the end of the century. By that time the two current models, the 102 centurion and the S-tank, will have outlived their usefulness.

A new tank will mean a bill amounting to billions of kronor for the armed forces.

The army could envisage some other weapon capable of replacing the tank in the anticipated combat milieu of the nineties. But so far the armed forces have been searching in vain.

"I consider that we need a new tank to meet the anticipated threat scenario of the 1990's. There has been a buildup of armored vehicles around us, and we have to counter this threat scenario. The best countermeasure against an enemy tank is a tank. If it is possible to find some sort of replacement, it is all right with me," Lieutenant-Colonel Anders Sifvertsson, chief of the Army General Staff tank division, said.

A new Swedish tank is expected to be a heated issue in connection with the 1987 Defense Bill.

The army's 101/102 Centurion and 103 S tanks will be rebuilt to cope with anticipated combat milieus up to the mid-nineties. They will be given new motors to increase their maneuverability. Their firepower will be increased and laser targeting equipment will be installed.

It will cost a little over 400 million kronor to modernize the S-tank.

Army Chief Erik G. Bengtsson has ordered from the Armed Forces' Materiel Administration a new armored vehicle called "Combat Vehicle 90." This will be produced in seven versions--from an armored track-laying vehicle to a shell-firing vehicle [granatkastarvagn].

The combat vehicle will give soldiers good protection against shrapnel and will be designed for combat in hilly and densely forested northland terrain. But the army does not view it as a tank.

The tank's military value lies in the fact that it can provide effective heavy fire and at the same time give soldiers full protection. The tank is suitable for combat in open terrain such as in southern Sweden.

Commander in Chief Lennart Ljung has given his views on economic alternatives at the various levels he has investigated in his program plan for the 1987 Defense Bill.

The commander in chief's lowest level for 1987-1992 is a kind of minimum framework for Sweden's defense potential, seen from the military viewpoint. It is the lowest level at which Swedish defenses would have any meaning.

The commander in chief also put forward his own level. For the army this considerably more expensive level would be the only one possible if the present downward trend is to be broken. It does not represent a Swedish military buildup but simply means that the margin by which Sweden has fallen behind the rest of the world will not increase.

As far as the development of combat vehicles in the 1987-1997 period is concerned, the commander in chief proposes that 2.8 billion kronor be spent on development and purchase. This is the figure at the lowest level investigated by the commander in chief.

At his own level the commander in chief proposes that a little over 4 billion kronor be invested in combat vehicles.

The difference between the two levels is most apparent from the figures for the purchase of new equipment in the 1992-1997 period: 1.8 billion against 2.8 billion kronor.

The army has on its shopping list: in addition to the development of a new tank, the purchase of new antitank helicopters and a new antitank missile.

/8918
CSO: 3650/74

ARMY DIFFICULTIES IN RETAINING OFFICERS REVEALED

Stockholm **DAGENS NYHETER** in Swedish 14 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Anders Ohman]

> [Text] The officer shortage in the Swedish army has reached the stage of an acute crisis. The greatest shortage, comprising 700 officers, is found among the group of company grade officers between the ages of 30 and 45. In units that have been discontinued, up to 60 percent of the officers have resigned. Premature departure is also great among young officer candidates who enter the private sector upon completing the military academy.

The army is also threatened with aging in the 1990s, when the majority of the officers will be over forty.

"The army's most important personnel mission now is to retain the personnel we have and to ensure good recruiting. The drain must cease. This must be taken into account in the coming defense resolution," Johan Kihl said. He is a lieutenant colonel and the chief of the army's personnel staff.

Commander in Chief Lennart Ljung has recently conferred with the four defense chiefs. The personnel question has been an important item on the agenda. The defense leadership is preparing for a meeting with the government.

Gloomy

The army is experiencing a gloomy situation. Early departure among the permanent personnel strength, about 9,500 military men, is about 1.5 percent. In an economic recession the number has been down to one percent. Each percentage point corresponds to about 100 persons.

In the units that have been discontinued, the departures have been very large. Sixty percent of the officers resigned.

They chose to stay where they were living and take a civilian job instead of continuing their military career at another place. The army had hoped to liberate personnel resources by discontinuing units, but the departure was

greater than what the planners had calculated.

The greatest officer shortage in the army is among company grade officers on Level 3, where there is an acute shortage of 700 officers.

Aging

The army is experiencing a situation similar to that of the fleet as far as young officer candidates in military academies are concerned. The premature departure is great. About ten percent of the young candidates quit.

Another gloomy matter for the army is aging. Bengt Gustafsson, military commander in upper Norrland, warns that in the 1990s two-thirds of the army's career officers will be older than 40.

The reason for this is the double effect of a high retirement age and a reduced force together with a limitation of new recruiting.

"In order to maintain the necessary physical fitness, particularly for a military organization, a personnel policy resolution is necessary that will allow for early retirement and increased recruiting," Bengt Gustafsson said in his analysis.

Different View

The personnel section of the army staff has a somewhat different view of the aging threat. The many premature departures have a positive effect on precisely this tendency, since new recruiting becomes necessary, and younger military men come into the organization.

DAGENS NYHETER visited the Svea Life Guards on Wednesday in Kungsangen outside of Stockholm and met Major Rolf Jonsson, 35, the deputy company commander.

He had just been out exercising, running in the woods, something the Commander in Chief has permitted during working hours. Running in the woods is a way an officer can relieve tension. His job can contain extreme stress.

"I often substitute for others. My job is to support and help," Jonsson said. He has been in the army for 17 years. He belongs to the largest risk group among company grade officers.

25 Resignations

In the Svea Life Guards the greatest lack is among platoon leaders with the rank of captain, who take five to seven years to train. The unit has had 25 resignations since the beginning of the year. There are 300 officers in the Svea Life Guards.

"I have personally reached the stage where my motivation is weak at times. The positive part of the job is the soldiers. Those doing compulsory military service today are of excellent quality," Jonsson said. But he is worried that the soldiers will be disappointed with their training. It is insufficient. A recent investigation has shown that motivation decreases among compulsory military service soldiers during training.

Available resources are used for the squad leaders, who also experience their military service as more meaningful.

"We are forced to concentrate on the leaders first of all," Jonsson said.

9124
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ARMED FORCES FACING PROBLEMS RETAINING SKILLED OFFICERS

Air Force Captain Complains

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Mats Holmbring, a captain in the Air Force: "Captain on Exodus of Air Force Pilots to Civilian Aviation: 'Make Air Force Attractive'"]

[Text] The MBL [Codetermination Law] negotiations between government and union representatives regarding regulations for the flight of Air Force pilots to commercial aviation will be concluded in a few days.

Those of us who received notification from the government on 14 March this year that no pilots from the Air Force could be employed by civilian airlines, accepted the consequences of this and resigned from the Air Force, should reasonably have had the opportunity, in a country of freedom and legal security, to have a certain amount of time to consider such an important decision. One might be leaving a position which has been held between 10 and 20 years.

The government is now proposing that those pilots who in January 1985 served as career officers in the Air Force, or those who were training for it and who had flight duty, may not be employed by civilian airlines.

Exempted are those who applied to leave in writing before 14 March 1985, that is to say the same day the government made its decision public.

No Time for Consideration

Therefore, this means that no time for consideration was allowed in order to prevent the pilots from leaving the Air Force.

Now in October, when the government has had more than 6 months to ponder this, it is to be MBL-negotiated, and it is probable that once again it will end up being an encroachment on the freedom of the citizens.

The situation can be resolved the way it has been in other countries with greater freedom for the citizens.

Stay of Their Own Free Will

In Norway and Denmark the Air Force pilot's job has been made so attractive that the pilots now choose the Air Force instead of civilian airlines.

If the will is there, we can continue to have a strong and powerful Air Force in Sweden, but only if the pilots remain in the Air Force of their own free will.

Navy Cites Officer Drain

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Resignations Worry the Navy"]

[Text] The Navy is greatly worried over the early departures of technically well-trained personnel. Younger officers in particular halt their military career and choose well-salaried jobs in business and industry.

Navy Chief Bengt Schuback is proposing an extensive program of measures for the next five-year period in order to halt the exodus from the Navy.

Higher salary and increased support for families are on the proposed list.

The expanded antisubmarine activity results in a greater need for military personnel in peacetime, says the Navy chief, and he simultaneously states that the Navy has a troublesome shortage of younger qualified personnel.

The premature departures are numerous, both during officer's school and afterwards. Resignations of military personnel with technical training from the military academy are especially problematic.

"Through the influence of market forces the wage difference between the leading stratum of Navy personnel, as well as qualified technicians, and the corresponding categories in the civilian, state and private market has increased," the Navy chief says.

The Navy's personnel turnover is about 250 per year, who retire or who leave early.

Low Wages

With the help of a civilian consultant firm the Navy has studied the reasons for the large number of people leaving early; 88 officers who requested leave of absence or resigned in 1984 were interviewed.

Forty-two of those who were asked replied, 25 of whom were interviewed and 17 of whom answered a survey.

The boom in business and industry explains the many early retirements in recent years from the Navy. The relatively low wage level in comparison with civilian life is not indicated as a decisive point.

Social issues, of a family-related nature such as stationing, command, family responsibility and working time as opposed to leisure time, and free trips home, are indicated as significant reasons.

Many of those asked have felt shrinking motivation for the officer's profession. This is partly because the naval system has ended up in a vicious circle because of the premature retirements.

Plugging Leaks

Many vacancies are filled according to the method of plugging leaks. Officers have to perform the jobs of two men and must assume positions of great responsibility prematurely. They may never feel the satisfaction of a job well done. This feeling of inadequacy in officers gives rise to thoughts of changing jobs.

An officer at sea in a ship unit can feel motivated more easily than in a post on shore. On the ship he can distance himself from much of that which disturbs motivation and concentrate on getting the ship, the unit, to function as well as possible.

One detail which has also created dissatisfaction is the midshipmen who, live a life of luxury during their training period in Karlskrona. A young cadet can spend up to 9,000 kronor net a month. His allowance permits these advantages.

The officers academy is absurdly perceived by the midshipment as an economic anticlimax. "I won't live this well even as an admiral," they may say.

Among the cadets there is something called the 100,000-kronor club. The members' goal is to live frugally during the period of study at the officers academy and set aside 100,000 kronor. These funds will then be used as college funds--in the civilian sector.

The Navy chief proposes a review of the financial conditions at the officers academy. One suggestion is to introduce a bonus system which is earned after a certain period of service after various schools and courses. A bonus of 40,000 kronor is suggested after 2 years' service at the officers academy. The system can continue up to the level of Navy commander.

The Navy Staff is very critical of what it calls the "economic opportunists in Karlskrona."

Captain Sven Carlsson, new chief of the Navy's personnel administration section, tells DAGENS NYHETER that it is good that the Navy is now talking openly about its hard-pressed personnel situation.

"All of these premature resignations cost a lot on money, and we must quickly find solutions so that the younger guys, in particular, will like it and stay," Sven Carlsson says.

Captain Bror Schweiler who works with placement of Navy personnel says that the situation is now so worrisome that it is time for a completely new strategy.

"Our suit is too large--in the present situation we cannot fill it," Bror Schweiler says.

The Navy chief emphasizes that the measures which must be undertaken in order to correct the personnel problems must take place within the framework of the Navy's economy.

Officers' Group Compares Salaries

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Oct 85 p 11

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Union About Officer's Exodus to Business and Industry: Threat to Entire Defense"]

An academy-trained naval officer can be offered a monthly pay of 20,000 kronor in the business sector--twice as much as he earns in the military. Early retirement among younger officers is a threat to the entire defense organization, say the two labor unions TCO-S [Organization of Salaried Employees-National Government Civil Servants Section] and SACO/SR [Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees-National and Local Civil Servants Union] which organize the officers' corps.

The officer's union shares Navy Chief Bengt Schuback's concern that so many officers are leaving.

Gunnar Rosen, first ombudsman for the National Organization of Officers (TCO-S), is of the opinion that the early retirements are a problem for all of branches of the military, not just for the Navy but also for the Air Force and the Army.

"A strong wage drift in the business sector has created this situation. Our military wage system with 2-year contracts is too rigid. We have not kept up with the wage development. The problem is not new, and it affects the entire government administration," Gunnar Rosen says.

The supreme commander has a so-called "market wage supplement" which is intended to reduce the wage gap. With this supplement an aircraft technician can get a monthly paycheck of about 12,000 kronor. In the aircraft industry he receives 14,000 kronor to do a similar job.

An officer who has completed an upper-level course at the officers academy has a higher market value. If he continues as an officer after completing his training he will have a monthly pay of about 10,000 kronor--in the business sector he is tempted by twice that much, a monthly salary of about 20,000 kronor.

"We have now somehow reached the threshold of pain. In the Navy the job is extremely hard due to the incident preparedness. Soon someone will have to

offer a lot more," says Sune Birke, ombudsman for the Swedish Officers Association within SACO/SR.

Military officers are organized in two labor unions. A merger has not been undertaken since there is dispute regarding organizational affiliation. The SACO officers do not want to join TCO-S or vice versa.

The two officers' unions have various proposals for solutions to reduce the early resignations in the Navy. One trip home per week is a joint demand. Many officers are at sea for long periods and are isolated from their families. The incidence of divorce is pronounced among Navy officers.

The Navy leadership's criticism of the "fortune-hunters in Karlskrona," that is to say the midshipmen who can collect fat monthly pay checks of up to 9,000 kronor net, is not shared by the labor union.

"It is wrong to put any group at a disadvantage. The correct way is to make continuing a career as an officer more attractive from the aspect of pay," says Sune Birke, SACO/SR.

On one point the officers' unions hold divergent opinions. This involves the Navy leadership's and the supreme commander's implementations of the regulations which apply to incident preparedness, within the antisubmarine organization.

Difficult to Interpret

"We believe that the Navy chief, CM, is not handling this very well. Instead of paying out incident compensation they invent other preparedness rules in order to save money. The personnel is given to know that they can do what they want on board but that the ship is expected to leave within 5 minutes. No compensation is paid. This has created irritation among our members," says Gunnar Rosen, TCO-S.

At the other officers' union, SACO/SR, the situation regarding incident compensation is blamed on the fact that the rules are difficult to interpret.

"We take a positive view of a joint solution with the employer on this," says Sune Birke, SACO/SR.

The Navy labor union picture is complicated. The Navy chief is both employer and military commander.

11949
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MYTH OF SCHLUTER'S ECONOMIC POLICY CONFLICTS WITH REALITY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Oct 85 p 16

[Op Ed Article by Jens Maigaard, candidate for parliament, Social Democratic Party: "Poul Schluter Not at All the Blessing People Are to Believe"]

[Text] From as far away as Singapore, the prime minister reports that the government adheres to its objective of achieving a balance of payments equilibrium by 1988. It is quite understandable that, shortly before the municipal elections, Poul Schluter will seek to keep alive one of the myths supporting his government. But that myth is becoming increasingly worn, and the attempts at keeping it alive increasingly unconvincing.

The myth supporting the government consists of two elements: (1) The sanguine Social Democrats were in the process of taking the country beyond the brink of the abyss before they were good enough to leave the government benches in 1982. Actually, it is not surprising, for the Social Democrats have never been capable of handling money, certainly not the money of other people. (II) When Poul Schluter took over, the situation was straightened out, and new objectives were aimed at.

The said myth forms a decisive part of the government's conception of itself and of the way in which it presents itself to the public.

What is the relation of this myth to the actual situation? Summed up briefly, the situation may be presented as follows:

(a) The years of crisis 1978-82 were hard on the Danish economy. That cannot be otherwise in a country where the international trade conditions are more important than the color of the government. But that is not the entire story. It is an interesting feature of the economic policy pursued during those years that it became possible to carry through a line which improved the country's competitiveness.

(b) This became important when the international upswing occurred in 1982. Denmark was in a good position to take advantage of it. The indisputably good results which have been achieved of recent years in the economic area would not have occurred if it had not been for the preparatory work in the preceding

years. When comparing Denmark's situation to that of the Netherlands, this state of affairs becomes quite apparent.

(c) The government's most important contribution in the economic policy area has been a strict incomes policy and budgetary restraints in the area of public expenditures. What has been its effect on the balance of payments trend? Well, the trend of the deficit has been as follows:

1982: 19.2 billion kroner
1983: 11.1 billion kroner
1984: 16.9 billion kroner
1985: 20.0 billion kroner
1986: 15.5 billion kroner.

(The estimate of the deficit for the latter two years was made by the Economic Secretariat. The estimate by the Central Bank is more pessimistic.)

The result is that, whereas the foreign debt in 1982 amounted to 150 billion kroner or 32 percent of the national product, it today amounts to 220 billion kroner or 36 percent of the national product. Nevertheless, a myth has been created that the nonsocialist government has put the country back on its feet.

It is this myth which is being examined during these months. And that is important if one wants to tackle the extremely difficult problem which the growth in our foreign debt naturally constitutes.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that incomes policy and budgetary restraints alone will not solve the problem. It would be a good thing if the government parties recognized that the problems are so fundamental that the shift to a nonsocialist government far from solves it. In order for the problems to be solved, long-term efforts are needed which will create drastic changes in the economic structure. But will a government which has hardly been able to control a boom, be in a position to create such fundamental changes?

It is at any rate important for efforts to be made in such areas as the following:

(1) The rates of savings and investments will have to be increased. This element will have to form part of the upcoming negotiations on a pensions reform.

(2) The research efforts will have to be reinforced. We are at the bottom level within the EC, as far as funds spent on research are concerned.

(3) The education policy will have to be reorganized. Already today, we have got bottleneck problems in the EDP area and within the metal industries.

(4) The technological level will have to be increased. The recommendation by the Independent Economic Advisory Council that the low technological level

within the Danish production sector ought to be followed up by public efforts to counter this fundamental trend.

(5) Many--but not all--of the traditional small and medium-sized Danish enterprises find it difficult to get into or hold their own in the export market. They ought to be supported.

(6) The incomes policy will have to be secured by way of profit sharing and co-ownership. The government's present position on profit sharing undermines the incomes policy, one of the main elements of its economic policy. For it would be irresponsible to believe that the course of collective labor agreements from 1985 may be repeated.

Instead of maintaining that it was the country's fortune that Poul Schluter took over, the interest ought to concentrate on problems such as the above. Since myths are hard to kill, it will take some time. We, therefore, probably have to prepare ourselves for a policy which is insufficient, and which, therefore, will have the effect that, following the municipal elections, we shall experience a traditional tightening of the fiscal policy, the subsequent result of which will be that the objective of a balance of payments equilibrium in 1988 will have to be given up.

7262
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KIEL INSTITUTE TAKES CONTROVERSIAL STANCE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 21 Oct 85 pp 115-126

[Article by Dieter Kampe: "'Everyone Knows What's Coming'"]

> [Text] In recent years, no other institution influenced economic policy debates in the FRG as much as the Kiel Institute for World Economy. Because wages are too high and state influence too great--so goes the Kielers' Song of Songs--the FRG is going downhill. "More market" is to bring salvation. The opinion-forming work of the professors no longer has much in common with science.

The man up front at the dark brown speaker's desk does not have to worry about being contradicted. Vehement nodding of heads, approving mumbles and table rapping confirm that the speaker is talking to sympathizers.

The speaker says, for example: "Wage costs are taboo in this society. But I consider that unbearable. Many jobs remain uncreated because wage demands are too high." Vehement rapping.

The speaker is Professor Norbert Walter of the Institute for World Economy (IfW) in Kiel. His audience are 150 master craftsmen from Gifhorn and Braunschweig.

On Friday evening in the lecture hall of the Gifhorn Savings Bank, the world economist tells the provincial entrepreneurs what's what: evil does not let the good ones act. It is soon clear what is meant by that. Norbert Walter conjures up "the terrible bureaucracy," "taxes and levies that are practically paralyzing," the "exaggerated amount of unemployment payments which stultifies motivation," the "disastrous road to shorter working hours," and "too-high apprenticeship pay."

After an hour-long speech, the professor, neat looking despite a beard, swims on a wave of sympathy. He expresses so beautifully what everyone present has always thought. But now they know. The professor confirmed it.

In the subsequent discussion, one of them wants to know even more details: what would have to be done to get out of the mess? What are the profes-

sor's views about the cost of fringe benefits? The 41-year-old Kieler begins cautiously: "I already addressed this point once, this year. That turned out to be a greater security risk than I had thought." In April 1985, a BILD-AM-SONNTAG interview had led to outraged reader reactions and finally to the banner headline in the same paper: "Walter is Nuts..." So his boss recommended greater reserve.

But here, among friends, Walter cannot hold himself back. Tersely, he outlines his economic and social policy ideas: in health insurance, he wants noticeable cost-sharing, and classification into risk groups ("as with cars"), reduction of continued wage payments in case of illness, lower unemployment payments, loosening the provisions of collective wage agreements, stronger differences between the individual wage groups.

Norbert Walter speaks clearly, simply, almostlike a poster. Still, during the ensuing cold buffet, one master craftsman criticizes that he did not understand everything. "But in principle," he adds quickly, "he is completely right, of course."

The firm represented by Norbert Walter, star salesman of a free market economy, is the "Institute for World Economy." The firm is doing a good business, its product, "free market economy," is in demand.

When associations of medium-sized enterprises are looking for a skilled lecturer who will explain something without offending them--they take a Kieler. When the five big economic research institutes deliver their joint economic prognosis this Monday, then the spokesman for these experts will be--a Kieler. When the World Bank sent off a country mission to analyze Peru's economy and prepare recommendations for that country, it was headed by a Kiel world economist. And when Argentine president Raoul Alfonsin wanted to switch his debt-ridden country to market economy, the Kiel people wrote the new economic program for him.

Be it the NDR Talk Show, WISO-magazine or WELT AM SONNTAG; be it the World Bank, the Ministry for Economics or an expert council--the Kiel people are always in on it.

And if not in person, at least in spirit. Like no other scientific institute, the economists from Kiel symbolize the slogan, "More Market, Less State." And since this is the refrain of the present economic hit song, most of the economic policy papers of the turnabout government breathe the spirit of Kiel.

Organizer, representative and intellectual "super-father" of this school is Herbert Giersch, since 1969 president of the Institute for World Economy. He was able to maintain the high prestige of the institute. But Professor Giersch has changed drastically the scientific profile of the think tank on the Kiel bay.

Its founder, Bernhard Harms, was still proud that there was no "Kiel line." He wanted to research on a broad base, be open to the dispute of viewpoints, give every good man scope for scientific work.

Giersch is different. He has trimmed the institute to a line--namely his.

The research place has turned into a prescription factory. All economic policy recommendations and proposals of the IfW show the same handwriting. The "Kiel" trademark guarantees clean products: flawless market economy. With it, Giersch established for himself and his institute a solid body of regular customers. And also much protest.

This has never bothered the chief economist, now 64 years old. Year after year, the Silesian farmer's son adds to the number of his opponents. He took on the CDU when it insisted on firm exchange rates for the D-Mark in 1968-69. He had fights with SPD economics minister Schiller on the amount of government spending, and later on with chancellor Schmidt on all basic principles. He constantly reviled the trade unions as pursuing the wrong wage policies. The turnaround government of Kohl and Stoltenberg incurred his ire because it is not implementing subsidy reductions and free trade. Now and then, he also accused entrepreneurs of greed for subsidies and hesitant investment attitude.

A nuisance to everyone? The pugnacity of the dynamic and omnipresent economics professor cannot hide the fact that he hits out primarily in one direction: against employees and the trade unions which want to gain higher wages for their followers.

High wages--that is the first fundamental tenet in Herbert Giersch's creed--are the source of all evil. Since he came on the economic policy scene in the early 1960's, Giersch has not tired of preaching this tenet and of developing variations of this leitmotif. At times, it was a "wage policy consonant with stabilization," later a "wage policy not affecting costs," lastly an "employment-neutral wage policy." The message was always the same: a waiver of wage increases.

While the subject of wages has recurred in his lectures and publications of the past 20 years like a refrain, other positions of his have fallen into oblivion. Criticism of power-play markets, where entrepreneurs do not pass on possible price drops, is no longer part of his lectures today. The plea for expansive economic measures by the state, which he co-signed in the special expert opinion of the Board of Experts in March 1967, already was an embarrassment to him two months later. He quickly stepped back from it and declared it all to be a misunderstanding.

His demands for radical inheritance and gift taxes, formulated in 1969, and the introduction of an anti-monopoly commission, show Giersch at that time as a resolute and honest market economist, a man who wants to reduce privilege and power in the interest of comprehensive competition. But the fact that monopolistic power exists not only in trade unions (as representatives of the interests of wage earners), but also in enterprises

which dominate the markets as monopolists or oligopolists--this was no longer a subject for Herbert Giersch by the mid-Seventies.

By then, his picture of the world had already shrunk to the sum and substance of five tenets:
--"The high wage level and legal minimum wages are the cause of unemployment";
--Citizens know better than the state what is good for them;"
--The population must "hold back on consumption," so that the funds thus freed "as profit, can become an incentive for entrepreneurs;"
--"Excessive social security" creates the "mentality of a people's home, a partial deprivation of the citizens' legal capacity, and paralyzes the driving economic forces;"
--"Shorter working hours--a joke."

Professor Giersch summarized these viewpoints in one doctrine: "The self-healing forces of the marketplace are strong when not pinned down."

With this, Herbert Giersch had arrived where Adam Smith had been 200 years before him: namely, faith in "laissez-faire," in the stable, constantly self-redeeming marketplace.

It is doubtful whether this return to the forefathers of classical economic theory is worthy of a Nobel prize, as Hans Barbier, a Giersch student and fan, and also the Bonn economic correspondent of the SUED-DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, has tried to tell his readers.

After all, confidence in the almighty marketplace has been shaken frequently and lastingly during the past 100 years. Ever since the most obvious market failure, the world economic crisis of 1929, economists have been thinking about economic steering and avoidance of crises. In England, it was John Maynard Keynes who presented a complete concept. In the Germany of the 1920's, there were economic scientists Adolph Loewe, Gerhard Colm and Hans Neisser--three outstanding economists who had been called by Bernhard Holms, a genius of research organization, to the very Institute of World Economy over which Herbert Giersch presides today.

The tradition of these Kiel economists, namely, to think about meaningful state intervention, is being hushed up today. Herbert Giersch preaches only the advantages of the marketplace and hits any and all who are not willing to follow him in this.

In conversation, however, this influential economist acts more tolerantly, pleading for understanding, than his writings would indicate. The head of the institute, giving an impression of vitality and concentration despite his age, charmingly describes his activity on the Bonn board of experts in the 1960's. At that time, he himself was still a Keynesian and considered it necessary to steer market forces. "At that time, I still believed that economic crises were avoidable through clever economic steering. I thought that if everyone knew the model and stuck to it, then it had to succeed."

But getting the state, Bundesbank, and employers and employed on the right track did not work out. In retrospect, Herbert Giersch reports: "The experience of talking till your mouth was dry, without getting people to the point of acting as they sensibly should, was a traumatic experience for me." Long before the world crises of the 1970's made evident the limitations of the Keynesian set of instruments, for Herbert Giersch "the theory of state interventionism was falsified" on the basis of his personal experience.

His deduction: if the state can't do it, then the bearers of free enterprise, the entrpreneurs, must take it on themselves. Since then, he has been fighting for "improved conditions of offers, deregulation and open markets; in a word: for more liberalism."

Giersch does not want to acknowledge that, lately, his liberalism has become one-sided, that it is primarily directed against the interests of the employed and against the social welfare state, ignoring mistakes on the part of employers. At most, he admits that his picture of the entrepreneur is idealized. "Perhaps, by describing time and again the ideal entrepreneur, these capabilities and values can become reality."

This narrowing of Giersch's view of the world to a few doctrines has not been without consequence for the Kiel institute. Even the research results from the Kiel institute, "the most beautiful institute on earth" (Schlumpeter, 1935), run on a narrower track. "One can hardly await Kiel studies with any curiosity any more, one almost always knows beforehand what will come out of it," says structural researcher Frank Stille of the German Institute for Economic Research. And Professor Fritz Scharpf of the Berlin Science Center comments: "With all respect for the empirical work of the Kielers, in economic policy discussions they demonstrate a striking naivete in simplifying their fundamental premises. But in a political advisory capacity, there is a responsibility for greater balance. In this respect, the Kielers abuse their scientific standing."

One single economic school dominates Giersch's research institute. As in Scholasticism, theoretic progress consists only in refinements of one's own premise, not in confronting other schools of thought. Only those international controversies are picked up that suit their own business; all others are brushed off with polemics, or ignored. Even conservative colleagues such as economist Harald Gerfin of Constance criticize this as a "partial analytical view." Spelled out, it means: facts that are unpleasant to the Kiel people are simply faded out.

This simplistic view of the world suits the needs of many German citizens. They want to understand something about "economy," but they only get confused by what they read and hear. Supposedly, the price of gold and gasoline depends on the dollar exchange rate, but daily practice teaches the opposite. In the 1983 election campaign, the CDU depicted the national debt as a dangerous threat to national life. But the finance minister is not doing anything different from his predecessor. How does that go together?

In view of complicated circumstances, contradictory political judgments and almost incomprehensible contexts, a simplistic economic view of the world can relieve and calm. The Kiel people provide such a view. That is why they have so many adherents.

Nobody denies the fact that the new spirit introduced into the Kiel Institute by Herbert Giersch in 1969 at first enlivened the FRG economic scene. Precise cost studies for individual sectors of industry and computations on international competitiveness, carried out by the Kiel people following the U.S. model, were new to German economists. The analyses and prognoses of structural changes in German industry due to a changed global division of labor were trailblazing. In data collecting and mathematical processing, the Kielers set milestones. Computer mock-ups and detailed studies brought them great esteem in the early 1970's.

"But in their obsession with numbers, they then lost sight of the limitations of this methodical approach," criticizes Dr Wilhelm Hummen of the German Institute for Development Policies in Berlin. In other words: the concept was flayed to death.

The many young university graduates brought by Giersch into the institute, which is independent but affiliated with Kiel University, were satisfied. Within the existing intellectual framework, and secured by federal and laender institute financing, they could rapidly prepare their own studies by transferring the proven method to other areas. The fact that no one was interested in the results, since everyone already knew what would come out of it, was immaterial. They basked in the fame of their "doctoral father" Giersch who was held in highest regard everywhere.

Giersch, although feared by students as a hard examiner, was and is a popular university teacher. His lectures are lively and well-prepared, they "always have a whiff of the great wide world," one Giersch student recalls. "He tells how he discussed something on the plane with a World Bank director, and everyone believes: if I say something clever now, he'll call the Economics Minister tonight and tell him about it."

Giersch is a patriarch, authoritarian and protective at the same time. "Whoever climbs into my boat, I'll safely put on land," Kiel founding father Bernhard Harms established as the motto of his institute. Giersch, also, takes care of his own. The first circle of colleagues from Saarbruecken moved into leadership positions in Kiel. For some of his faithful, such as Norbert Walter, he obtained the title of professor by political means. Giersch disciple Olaf Sievert first became secretary general of the Board of Experts, then its chairman. Giersch adherent Gerhard Fels heads the Cologne Institute of German Economy. Giersch disciples occupy seats in the Bonn Economics Ministry, OECD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and many German academic chairs.

The size of this worldwide club is one reason why there is hardly any public criticism of Giersch and the Kiel school. Gratitude unites.

The second support column of the continued renown of the Kiel school is the institute apparatus with its research and promotion facilities. The Kiel people have the largest specialized library in the world for economic sciences (1.7 million books, 19,000 current journals, more than 130 employees); with attractive stipends they attract prestigious researchers to the institute; they hold large conferences; they themselves are represented at all important international meetings, and they maintain close contacts with influential organizations. The Kiel Institute is still a good stepping stone to rise in the conservative-minded establishment of national and international bureaucracies.

The close ties to government circles and the heroes of private industry make up for the loss of scientific renown.

The scientific decline of the institute was hidden by the turnaround in Bonn. The triumvirate of Kohl/Stoltenberg/Lambsdorff reduced government economic policy to a few guidelines: wage increases below the productivity growth rate, tax relief for business incomes, fewer government expenditures. This was ideally identical with the Kiel principles. Thus the Kiel people found themselves confirmed by the Bonn crowd. And the politicians invited the scientists to announce throughout the lands that the present do-nothing policy was not the expression of helplessness, but rather was in accord with scientific theories.

This attitude makes it possible for the Kiel people to ignore discussions within their own field and to present their viewpoints in a ritualistic manner. The scientific approach frequently is limited to the Morgenstern theorem that, what must not be, cannot be.

World economic studies, for example, are reduced to the recommendation to imitate in all developing countries, if possible, the industrialization strategy of Singapore, Hongkong, Taiwan and South Korea: opening up markets, export orientation, and capital formation in enterprises. One does not want to hear in Kiel that the strategy, successful in East Asia, cannot be transferred as a patent prescription to 120 other developing countries. Although export orientation fails in many countries today because buyer markets in industrial nations are already taken or are cut down by customs restrictions, the Kiel group still sells this recommendation as a "hot tip." The Giersch team recommends that Third World countries remove all their customs restrictions. Kiel generously overlooks the fact that in Chile, where this very thing was done on the recommendation of market dogmatist Milton Friedman, more than half of the domestic enterprises collapsed.

Rajan Malaviya, formerly spokesman of the association of developing countries, the "Group of 77" at Unctad, opines: "The Kiel group are ideologically biased in the interest of industrial countries. They have no relation to the real political and economic conditions in developing countries." German colleagues also criticize the world economic studies from Kiel as "eternally the same litany." Michael Hofmann of the German

Institute for Development Policy says: "The Kiel team argues in a 'woodcut' fashion where in reality, differentiated and country-specific approaches would be appropriate."

The Giersch party also tries for simplicity in FRG economic debates. With the slogan, "Minimum Wage--Unemployment," the chief had prescribed the direction: wages are costs. They determine the competitiveness of an enterprise, and if they are too high, they cause unemployment through one's own fault.

The dual character of wages, i.e., being a cost item as well as the means for demand, is overlooked by the Kiel group or, if mentioned, is played down. Thus they make themselves into partisans of one side of the management-labor parties. In scientific terms, such a one-track approach is untenable. And so the Kiel team is isolated even in the camp of conservative neoclassical economists.

Harald Gerfin, member of the scientific advisory council of the Federal Ministry for Economics, does not find convincing the Kiel attempts to prove why lower wages would bring higher employment. After all, recent years had shown that, despite declining real wages, no measurable positive employment effects were created, the Constance economics professor writes.

The inflexibility of the Kiel group is particularly provocative for experts because there had been a broad scientific debate on the connection between amount of wages and employment as early as the 1920's. At that time, it was the Kiel scientists Adolph Loewe, Gerhard Colm and Hans Neisser who, at the side of Emil Lederer of Heidelberg, argued vehemently against Bruening's policy of lowering wages: they proved--alas, in vain--that these measures would only aggravate the crisis.

In 1931, Lederer wrote: "The primitive notion that, every time there is unemployment, one could restore the balance by lowering wages, belongs in the junk room of theory." Today, this tradition is passed over silently in Kiel. One prefers to reach into the junk room of theory.

In addition to Norbert Walter, one of the main propagandists of the Giersch school is Juergen Donges, vice president of the inistitute. In his mid-forties, he dresses correctly and in gray, like a Prussian civil servant, and comes on fighting like a macho Argentine hacendero: "That somebody gets angry at us," he says, "I consider a quality sign of our work."

Donges has no doubts about where to look for the causes of the growth crisis: "It is because of institutional rigidity, of Euro-sclerosis. Everywhere, market forces are being hemmed in. Naturally there can be no upswing."

In the certainty of possessing the best of all explanations of the world with the neoclassical model, the professor is not bothered by the fact that his institute is increasingly beset by attacks and enmities: "We are

not squeamish when we dish out criticism. So we also have to be able to take it."

This fresh and merry self-assurance of the Kiel opinion formers is extraordinarily useful when it is a matter of smoothing away disturbing facts. For example, it does not fit into the Kiel world economists' view of life that unemployment could also be a result of labor-saving technical progress. For Giersch and company, efficiency measures have nothing to do with technical changes, only with wage development.

Instead of analyses on technological unemployment, out of Kiel come only accusations of lacking wage flexibility farther down. Actually, an entire scientific branch has developed meanwhile, analysing causes and conditions of technical progress and recognizing the sporadic appearance of innovations. But none of that has reached Kiel.

Wearing such blinders, one can easily get entangled in contradictions. In their studies on division of labor in the world, the Kiel team recommends that industrial countries concentrate increasingly on scientific and capital-intensive production sectors. They accuse FRG industry of continuing to "apply overly labor-intensive production methods." At the same time they recommend that, through lower wages, German workers prevent production from becoming even more capital-intensive. Although this can't be reduced to a common denominator, each recommendation individually sounds wonderfully like free market economy.

That's the way it is with recommendations from Kiel. They warm the cockles of the heart of free market theory ideologues; but they are neither conclusive, nor do they produce a rounded economic policy concept. Slogans such as "adaptation log-jam," "growth slow down," "institutional sclerosis," or "political hindrances," which are employed in explaining crises and lack of growth, indicate that the authors still attribute miraculous powers to the free market.

But what good is it to anybody? The prescriptions "revitalization of industry" and "deregulation", derived from the diagnosis, remain abstract. They leave aside the reality of economic life. Part of this reality is also social peace, a balance of labor-management interests, and the fact that the FRG has a mixed economy in which state activity uses almost half of the gross national product.

The Kiel team and its propaganda is of no real help to entrepreneurs, to whom they feel so close, in questions of economic policy. It is only useful as a political instrument. "None of us want what they demand," comments an employers' representative on the Giersch-Walter demands for wage drops and reductions in social services. "But it's good that they write that. That puts fear into the labor unions and the SPD."

Table



Key:

1. Wages, Cost Too High?
2. Developmetn of unit wage costs by international comparison (adjusted for changes in currency exchange rates; index 1975 = 100)
3. First through third quarter
4. Average income of employees in FRG (real net income, in percent compared to each previous year)
5. Estimated

9917
CSO: 3620/70

SIEMENS INVESTS IN NEW CONSTRUCTION, HIRING

Augsburg Factory Premises Doubled

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 4 Oct 85 p 37

[Text] One of the largest real estate deals in Augsburg's post-war history now permits the Siemens AG, Munich, to more than double the current factory premises of its systems plant in Augsburg and thus make it possible to expand its capacity. In addition to its current 280,000 square meter plant, it has purchased another 290,000 square meters from the City of Augsburg--at a fixed price, in line with the usual terms for industrial sites. The firm holds the option for an additional 40,000 square meters.

As plant manager Hartwig Rogge stated in a press conference the day after the City Council had given its blessing to the real estate transaction, "small and large central units" will be built on the present plant site. On the other hand, products to be manufactured in larger quantities--particularly personal computers and video display terminals--are going to be built in a new plant, the construction of which will begin next spring.

The reason for the transaction, Rogge noted, was the sales increase over the past few years. Sales rose threefold in three years and now total about DM 1.4 billion (according to internal Siemens prices). Employment has also grown in line with sales. Within two years, more than 1,000 new positions were created in the plant, which now employs 4,750 workers, 389 in part-time jobs. In contrast to regions such as Munich, where industry is scrambling for workers, it is relatively easy to get qualified labor in Augsburg, said head of personnel Alfred Ruhland. Nevertheless, he sometimes has "to beat the big drum" in other regions. Ruhland attributes the availability of workers in the Ausburg labor market, among other things, to computer science courses, co-sponsored by Siemens A.G., now being taught at Augsburg's advanced professional school, and to computer science courses applied to economics at Augsburg University. In the near future, the company wants to support the establishment of a chair for applied physics at the university.

Obviously, Siemens's activities in Augsburg have by no means come to an end with the current expansion. No thought has been given to consolidating the design department, now split between Munich-Neuperlach and Augsburg, by combining the workforce in Augsburg (at the moment, that department has 200 employees in Augsburg and 500 in Munich). However, according to Rogge, the decision has been made that future new activities in this area will be "started and continued" only in Augsburg. This means the Munich design department will shrink by attrition, while the one in Augsburg will expand.

Heavy investments are being made for the expansion in Augsburg. The investment budget, with DM 66 million in fiscal year 83/84, has been increased to more than DM 200 million for 84/85. Reportedly it will again be close to DM 200 million in fiscal year 85/86.

Regensburg Creates 850 Positions

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 Oct 85 p 24

[TEXT] The Siemens AG, Munich, will create 850 new positions in Regensburg within the next few years. The company states that, in addition to the 350 jobs in the computer components plant presently under construction, the Regensburg equipment factory is to be expanded in 1986 at a cost of DM 35 million. In the long term, this will mean jobs for an additional 500 persons. The expansion is to meet the growing demand for electronic motor vehicles components. In the past, Siemens has achieved significant increases in its market share of automobile electronics and, in recent years, has hired 700 new employees in its Regensburg equipment plant.

Nurenberg Building Site Purchased

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Oct 85 p 16

[Text] The Siemens AG in Nuremberg-Moorenbrunn has completed, on its company-owned, 200,000 square meters area, the first section of construction for a new site. In close to two years of construction, three new office buildings and several smaller structures, totaling 27,000 square meters, were completed. The second section will have a training center covering more than 9,000 square meters that will be ready for occupancy next summer. Expenditures for the two sections, including development, total about DM 130 million. The Siemens manufacturing sector Energy and Automation Technology plans to consolidate a significant part of its activities in the area of industrial automation at its new Moorenbrunn site. The new buildings are scheduled to house some 1,000 employees and will use the most advanced office technologies directly at the work place.

7821
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RAU BRINGS TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH TO RUHR

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 18 Oct 85 p 41

[Article by Uwe Knuepfer: "Ideasmiths in the Coal Scuttle--Johannes Rau Attempts the Modernization of the Ruhr"]

[Text] At Muelheim, along a side arm of the Ruhr River flowing through rich greenery, there stands a villa which has undergone a change similar to the one planned by the Social-Democrat Land Government for all of North Rhine-Westphalia. The Villa Jula Thyssen, which is named after its former inhabitant, was, until not too long ago, a bourgeois residence, a neofeudalist city palace of the kind the steel magnates of the Ruhr used to like to locate in the prettiest scenic areas of the industrial region between Duisburg and Dortmund: gloomy and magnificent, representative and bleak.

For a good year now, the villa has had a new renter. ZENIT resides here--the "Zentrum in Nordrhein-Westfalen fuer Innovation und Technik" [the Center in North Rhine-Westphalia for Innovation and Technology], which was established in July 1984. The facade of the house--as the sole architectonic component obligated to human measure--has remained as it was. But right behind the heavy entrance door a new world begins. All is bright, large-format oil paintings of the young wilderness bedeck the once superhigh walls, the old luxurious chandeliers now illuminate furniture in the classic modern style. Slender, young, chic people animate the ambience. Their desks hold the finest of high-tech equipment for offices.

ZENIT, this staff headquarters for technology in North Rhine-Westphalia, which is unprecedented in the Federal Republic, is a joint child of politics and home-style economy, which was born with the hesitant midwifery help of the credit economy. It is a limited joint stock company with a budget of DM 2 million, owned one-third by the land, one-third by the West German Landesbank, and one-third by the ZENIT Holding Company which currently has about 50 establishments as members. A good dozen diplomate physicists, engineers, and economists work here who outwardly fully correspond to the cliche picture of young, dynamic entrepreneurs [young upwardly mobile professionals?]: a loose posture wrapped in fine cloth. North Rhine-Westphalian economics minister, Reimut Jochimsen, appeared so impressed by the curricula of his new staff coworkers during the inauguration of ZENIT that he almost became rapturous and promised that this is where he would want to come in the future if ever he had to refuel spiritually.

The fact that the Rau government is able to persuade part of the economy to publicly pull at the same rope with it is essentially due to one committed drummer for the Free Democrats: Peter Dietz--an idea-rich picture-book middle-ranker from Muelheim, who is the spiritual father of ZENIT. He had knocked on the doors of industry so long until hardly anybody dared not to at least show goodwill with respect to participation in this "great joint effort."

It is the mission of ZENIT to do everything it can to finally put to rest the onerous talk of the federal German north-south cultural differences. The idea forge is expected to make it clear that North Rhine-Westphalia is anything but that notorious scrap heap of which Norbert Bluem spoke so deprecatingly during the election campaign. ZENIT business manager, Dirk Beckerhoff, is convinced that it is precisely the Ruhr area which is "technologically massively underestimated." He explains this by invoking the high standard of precision, reliability, and service-friendliness of the local mid-level suppliers for the mining and steel industry.

Similarly structured enterprises at Baden-Wuerttemberg, where the traditional suppliers for the automobile industry are at home, never saw themselves compelled to hew to such a standard.

Before he allowed himself to be hired by Dietz and Jochimsen, Beckerhoff worked, among others, for the Battelle Research Institute, for the McKinsey Consultant Enterprise, and for the federal government. In addition, he also made a name for himself as a reorganizer of a sick machinebuilding enterprise. As a first step, he organized the ZENIT traveling exhibit. This was intended to show intermediate suppliers who had something to do with sensors for temperature and pressures what was available with respect to new developments. Beckerhoff knew that in the early summer the Bavarian State Government had dispatched a bus full of electronic sensors made in Bavaria to the villages. He wanted to charter this bus and then pass on its elucidative work in the Rhine and Ruhr areas. However, according to Beckerhoff, the colleagues from the south proved to be immoderate with respect to their demands for honoraria. It was only then that he says he checked to see whether producers of advanced technology in this particular area existed in North Rhine-Westphalia. Now, the ZENIT traveling exhibit consists exclusively of products of that particular state; some 30 firms are showing what they are able to accomplish.

In the picturesque language of soccer: Team Rau has taken the field in order to prevent its demotion from the first league of the industrial regions, but also in order to surprisingly make up the apparently enormous gap between it and the top club leader, Fortuna Spaeth. ZENIT is the trainer.

A soccer trainer in a similar situation forces follow-on work, studies the tactics of the others, copies them where they are successful, saws away at the technical dexterities of his team, and raises their morale. If his management is behind him, he keeps proven stars, even though it may be expensive, and buys new ones.

ZENIT organizes seminars for artisans and young entrepreneurs, offers "small and middle-size enterprises with innovation interests" participation in

creativity training, and attempts to provide insight for them in the proliferating jungle of the high-tech market; assists them with introducing computer-supported development and design (CAD and CNC). However, ZENIT also attempts to press claims for public development funds or favorable loans from one of the many European Economic Community, federal, or state pots. ZENIT collaborators by now have made hundreds of visits to enterprises and familiarize the small entrepreneur from Detmold, who is fumbling along in solitude, with his unknown fellow combatant in Siegburg for purposes of exchanging experiences.

At first, the newcomers in Muelheim encountered quite a bit of resentment. Quite a few people muttered that the establishment of this thing was as unnecessary as a goiter. Insiders referred to the fact that the more significant industry and trade chambers had been doing what ZENIT has in mind for a long time. The nonstate large-scale banks, which were heavily courted, exercised magnificent restraint during the establishment of the limited company.

Although there are still skeptics to be found today, loud criticism has fallen conspicuously silent. Fifteen of the sixteen North Rhine-Westphalia parliamentary districts have now presented the ZENIT-initiated traveling exhibit with great fanfare and good attendance by the specialized public.

Most of the machine- and installation-building industries in the Ruhr area once had a clearly visible but firm group of customers in the coal and steel industry. Coal and steel were part of the fabric, advertising was barely necessary. And that is why, according to Dirk Beckerhoff, marketing has remained a foreign word for many of them to this day. When they now try to leave their region in order to attract new customers honestly and coyly, "any alert Harvard type dressed in fashionable clothes who happens to have quickly opened a firm in Boeblingen and jabbers something about chips" is able to take the butter from their bread. "The enterprises of the Ruhr have no technical problem, but rather a marketing problem," judges Beckerhoff.

The Rau government seems wildly determined to create a "modern North Rhine-Westphalia" and set forth a DM 400 million program of "future technologies" last year. Almost every advanced school in the state has a transfer position involving the adjacent economy. Three functioning technology centers were established most recently in Aachen, Dortmund, and Essen. The state government energetically resisted the Bonn request to move the biotechnology process out of the Juelich Nuclear Research Facility in order to concentrate all peak research activity of this type at Braunschweig, and thus in Lower Saxony. And as, once more, an internationally esteemed natural scientist, robotics expert Eckhard Freund, was about to let himself be lured to California, the state gave him his own robotics institute in Dortmund.

Completely in the spirit of the Rau pronouncement: "We will not let our country be spoiled!" the Ruhr Communal Association (KVR)--an agglomeration of cities and communities within the confines of the black coal region--has now decided to help the coal bucket finally become a new shining image on a federal basis. Expensive double-page color advertisements in supraregional magazines are expected to silence scoffers in Hamburg, Munich, and elsewhere.

They show, for example, a stylized stage setting from Bochum, a dramatically illuminated Duisburg harbor, or a Lower Rhine bucolic scene populated by grazing cows and subtitled "Which way to the Ruhr area?" The answer says--and who would have thought so--"You are right in the middle of it."

5911
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GOVERNMENT FINANCES RETURN OF GUEST WORKERS TO HOMELAND

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 18 Oct 85 p 38

/Article by Irina Ludat: "A Question of Which Is the Greater Fear"/

[Text] Guest Workers

It was almost like a state visit on that 10 September 1964 as the Cologne-Deutz railroad station: The train from Portugal pulls in; the country's national anthem is struck up; the city's dignitaries are waiting at the platform. Big to-do for Armando Sa Rodriguez, the one-millionth "guest worker" in the Federal Republic. He gets a motor scooter, flowers, and a diploma.

Twenty years later at the Frankfurt airport: Suitcases, boxes, bags, and a painful crush at the windows of the Turkish travel agencies, long lines waiting in front of the container office of the Federal Border Guard. Here, overworked agents stamp "border-crossing certificates" and invalidate the residence permits on Turkish passports. For the passengers of this charter flight, this means saying farewell to Germany, once and for all and irrevocably.

This time, of course, the dignitaries stayed away from the event and politicians in distant Bonn celebrated the return-ticket subsidy law as a "success of our policy."

When Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl took office, he promised to cut the number of foreigners living here in half. A federal-state commission, chaired by Friedrich Zimmermann, was to submit proposals--but coalition squabbles so far have not allowed the federal interior minister to do his job.

This was the time to look into the files of the predecessors in which the Christian-Liberal coalition discovered the draft of a return-ticket subsidy law which--with minor amendments--was passed on 29 November 1983. "Our concern accompanies the returnees," said Federal Labor Minister Norbert Bluem at that time.

With a time limit of 8 months, the law, under certain conditions, called for the payment of "return aid" in the amount of DM10,500 to unemployed aliens or those with only short-time employment; it offered above all Turks and the Portuguese an opportunity to get their employee contributions to their annuity insurance paid out immediately.

Shortly after the law's passage, headlines such as these began to turn up in the press: "Half Want to Go Back Home"--"One Third Wants to Leave This Year." After the expiration of the application deadlines, the following was announced officially in July: "Three hundred thousand foreigners left the Federal Republic with return aid." Today, a year after the expiration of the exit deadline (cutoff date: 30 September 1984) it is however still not clear how many aliens actually availed themselves of the provisions of the return ticket subsidy law and how many the law persuaded to go back home. This, at any rate, is the bottom line worked out by a conference of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation on "The New Alien Policy in Western Europe." Bonn now speaks more softly also unofficially.

This brings up two questions: Did the expectations connected with the return ticket subsidy law materialize? And: Do specifically goal-oriented repatriation measures constitute an adequate "solution to the alien problem?".

First of all, let us explain a concept here; the term "return aid" is one among several measures in the return subsidy law and refers to the one time payment of DM10,500 (plus DM1,500 for each child).

It was not 300,000 aliens who left the country on the basis of "return aid"--as was stated quite consciously or mistakenly a year ago--but rather precisely 13,716 aliens of whom 94.2 percent had a special work permit. This means that they would, in addition, also have been entitled to unemployment compensation if they had remained in the country after their unemployment benefits had run out. Their renunciation saves the Federal Labor Institute around DM330 million.

Bonn prettied up the balance sheet also regarding the number of those who left the country after applying for a refund of their retirement contributions. Returnees have always been able to request refund of their retirement contributions (instead of drawing retirement pay from Germany later on), of course only after a 2-year waiting period which always is and was an important grace period. But since Bonn's success statistics contained all repayment applications from the time the return ticket subsidy law was in effect, the figures simply also include those applications from around 30,000 Turks which have been received in the meantime--the only thing is that those Turks returned long ago to live back home.

In contrast to "return aid," far more than 55,000 aliens--as Bonn had estimated in the beginning--filed an application for early refund. But nobody knows the precise figure, according to Elmar Hoenekopp of the IAB (Labor Market and Occupational Research Institute) at the Ebert Foundation Conference. His institute, he indicated, calculated about 100,000 applications, at any rate, 40,000 less than the federal government had maintained a year ago. Because only employee contributions were refunded--without interest--this eliminates DM4 billion

of otherwise later-due retirement payments going abroad--a sum which now helps secure German retirement benefits.

This statistical numbers game is nothing but sleight of hand for Elmar Hoenekopp and Ursula Mehrlaender who work in the Ebert Foundation's research institute; instead, this introduced some basic doubts as to the law's effectiveness. Return subsidies, to be sure, did influence the timing of the person's return but hardly the total number of returnees. An average of around 300,000 aliens returned to their home countries each year already since 1966; last year, when the law was in force, the figure was only 55,000. According to these two scientists, the reason for tne decline in the number of aliens is not the return subsidy law but rather the drastic decline of alien emigration into the Federal Republic.

Because of the many different restrictions--with emphasis above all on the very narrow group of people concerned and the time limit--the law was, from the very first draft on, not suitable for launching the return of a larger number of aliens. It is, for example, quite obvious that a person needs a minimum of time to think after having stayed in Germany for 20 years. But the federal government demanded that the tents be struck within 4 weeks--otherwise there would be deductions from this "aid," specifically, DM1,500 for each month in excess.

The unspoken hope of being able to make jobs available for German unemployed with the help of this alien policy did not materialize. Anybody who leaves the country with "return aid" after a company has failed or after a plant has been closed down--and that was true of the majority of cases--is not making a job available. And the jobs of those who quit on their own and started home were difficult to fill. Whether it was in fish processing or in the slaughterhouse--the Germans whom the employment agency sent mostly quickly threw the towel in again.

German replacement workers were not skilled enough for Howaldtwerke-Deutsche Werft. The alien affairs officer of the city of Kiel reported that HDW /Howaldtwerke-Deutsche Werft/ desperately ran after the Turkish welders who, being specialists in special welding techniques for submarine construction, could not be replaced on short notice.

There were also bottlenecks at the biggest employer for Turks, Ruhrkohle AG /Inc./ in Duisburg. When 2,700 Turkish miners left there, this resulted in disadvantages for the German work force: It meant more work and less chance for early retirement.

The country between the Rhine and the Ruhr by the way was the regional center of the returnee merry-go-round. According to IAB calculations, most "return aid" applications came from the iron and steel industries, from mining and energy. This is no surprise because firms such as Hoesch, Thyssen, Mannesmann, and others used the Bonn model for their enterprise personnel policy. After all, the law was just about an invitation for "attrition" and "adaptation"--in other words, personnel cutbacks.

IAB calculations document the situation: In 68.7 percent of all applications, the return bonus was paid on the basis of enterprise closings; in the mining industry, the figure was 98.5 percent and in the iron and steel industry it was 96.5 percent.

Let us take Huettenheim as an example: Platoons of reporters turned up there when 900 Turks were "transferred" from the enterprise and were given a "return bonus" as part of a conserted effort by the Mannesmann business management, the shop union, and the Labor Office. This was a fortunate coincidence of the return subsidy law and company strategy; on the computer sheets, the company was able to print out the figures for "aid" and contribution refunding from annuity insurance along with the enterprise severance pay. Turkish male family heads had become "weak by the dozens," argued BR /worker council/ member Mahler--although he failed to note that the employee representatives and the German personnel force had their fingers in the pie.

When management at Mannesmann stopped early retirement pay programs only for Turkish employees and when a whole series of Turks over the age of 55 found it impossible to use this method of leaving the enterprise, there was hardly any resistance from the employee representatives. Faced with the alternative of being out in the cold with or without severance pay, the Turks finally signed the "offer" to the "foreign fellow citizens" which had been drafted by Mannesmann and by the federal labor minister--and that also meant their hasty return.

State Secretary Vogt, of the Federal Labor Ministry, also had to admit recently that the return of alien workers only made very few jobs available for Germans. Jobs held by aliens--according to Vogt in talking to the press--primarily fell victim to rationalization.

This leaves us with the question as to why Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in talking to the employee committees of the CDU /Christian Democratic Union/ in Saarbruecken, among other things blamed the still rather high unemployment figures on the fact that "too many jobs are still held by guest workers"--a remark to which the press paid little attention.

If we investigate the political effect of the return subsidy law, we get four important aspects:

First: "Return aid" presupposes structural coercion, that is to say, the real or threatening loss of the job.

Second: The time limit on the law was designed to force alien workers to make their decision.

Third: "Return aid" forced the alien worker to leave the Federal Republic, along with his dependents, irrevocably and forever, even if re-integration back home later on proved to be impossible.

Fourth: As for the public, it was not so much the fact that the "aid" involved claims based on work and contributions that was so effective but rather the impression that these were "bonuses," in other words, gifts to unemployed foreigners. The law thus helped strengthen prejudices and an anti-alien attitude and it boosted the social compulsion exerted upon foreign families.

Felix Rodriguez, a Spanish clergyman, described this compulsion in one sentence: "If a foreigner is more afraid of being here than of going home, then he will return 'voluntarily.'"

Fear of the future back home is even greater: 4.3 million aliens continue to live in the Federal Republic and politicians know that specifically goal-oriented return measures at best can only slightly increase the number of persons who would go back home anyway.

Return subsidy programs--and this was also touched on at the Ebert Foundation's conference--primarily have symbolic significance because they fool the advocates of a tough alien policy into thinking that something is being done. But at some point in time, this idea faded away and at some point in time the consolation aspect becomes obvious. That leaves us with three possibilities:

The first one would be to tighten the return program in the form of a large-scale forced repatriation. This is unlikely in spite of current debates on making the alien law tougher. International considerations, treaties between countries, and economic factors provide hardly any action leeway. The outward political damage done by the return subsidy law already lastingly burdens relations between Southern European countries and the Federal Republic. The law had not been coordinated with the countries from whom the aliens had come.

The second possibility would be to recognize that the undoubtedly existing problems of the aliens cannot "be returned by means of subsidies" but can only be solved here. In the opinion of Ursula Mehrlaender, of the Ebert Foundation, this includes the recognition of aliens as "durable newcomers" or "immigrants." This is being formulated more cautiously at this time by the Hessian state government whose Interior Minister Horst Winterstein, in response to an inquiry from the Union in the State Assembly, declared that "return aid" could not be the central instrument of alien policy "also because of fundamental considerations."

Said Winterstein: "The children who were born here or who were brought here later will remain here because they have no relationship or hardly any relationship to their parents' country of origin."

The third possibility is presently the most likely one: The talk about returning will continue. This is already taken care of by the "Draft of a Law on Reintegration Aid in Housing Construction for Returning Aliens" which is still being debated in Parliament but which is to take effect as law already on 1 January 1986. According to that law, returnees can use a home-building savings contract, without tax or bonus penalty, in their home countries if at the same time they pledge to return there at the very latest within 4 years after the loan was paid out.

And so the figure juggling begins again: According to the Federal Government, the law could be applied to 185,000 foreign home-building savers (including 130,000 Turks). Once again, speeches are being written for the Lower House. Said Norbert Bluem about home-building and German-Turkish friendship: "That will stand for all time and will remind all generations that the father and the grand-father worked in Germany once upon a time. That could be a contribution to friendship--could it not?"

If this policy is pursued seriously--and no change in the trend is in sight--then conflicts will continue to become more acute.

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END

JPRS-WER-86-002

7 January 1986

West Europe Report

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POLITICAL AUSTRIA

SINOWATZ LEADERSHIP, STRATEGY OF SOCIALIST PARTY VIEWED

Vienna PROFIL in German 11 Nov 85 pp 16-21

[Article by Hubertus Czernin: "'Persons Harmful to the Party Out for Blood'--After 2 Years in Office, Fred Sinowatz Has his Party Under Firm Control, as a Party Without an Ideological Image, and Without Deviators"]

[Text] It was supposed to turn out a tranquil party congress at the Vienna Stadthalle. With a lot of futurism a la "90 Perspectives," with a lot of Kurt Steyrer and a report by the party chairman marking a turning point in the history of Austrian Social Democracy.

As always before important addresses, Fred Sinowatz planned to spend the weekend before the 29th Regular SPOe [Austrian Socialist Party] Congress at his place in Neufeld to put the final touches to the text by hand.

In the days before, he had worked out the key points of his report with staff and friends.

The SPOe, Sino's position was, could no longer be just a party of the proletariat, for the class structure had become porous. The party had become a party of the working person. "What is at stake for us," explains SPOe Vice Chairman Karl Blecha, "is a middle class--the majority of the population today--which has a better than average education but economically is rather insecure, because our core, the stratum of the classic class-conscious worker, is becoming smaller and smaller."

As Sinowatz told intimates, the party must also change the criteria of its functionaries, however; "just because one does not steal any silver spoons does not mean by a long shot that one has fulfilled one's task." The party needed the kind of staff that was oriented toward performance, experts who were open toward the base and learned how to accept the fact that losing a post should not "immediately be regarded as punishment for a mistake"--to quote Central Secretary Peter Schieder.

Yet even before the delegates had assembled at the Vogelweidplatz in Vienna Monday morning, untoward incidents threatened the smooth party congress production portraying the SPOe as a "party of the social center"--to use Fred Sinowatz' term.

There is the case of Guenther Nenning, whose appeal against expulsion from the party--last April--the Federal party executive intended to stifle with a 30-line proposal. Guenther Nenning, the proposal (No 109) states, "shook and demotivated the staff at the base by constant and complete defamation of the party in public."

There is the case of Burgenland Province President Theodor Kery, who had been compelled by his own provincial organization to run anew for the presidium and executive board. The Burgenlander wanted to spare himself the trouble of having to participate in decisions on provincial policy--and was taken to task by the Pussta party. He could not now of all times leave fellow Burgenlander Fred in the lurch.

And then there is the case of Ottilie Matysek who had tried in vain to be seated as a delegate at the party congress. Even the Federal Women's Congress had excluded her.

So the former leader of the Burgenland Landtag [provincial diet] SPOe deputies, never at a loss for a way out, sent letters to party comrades by the score presenting "some facts and background information for your personal use." The letter, dated 5 November, signals the definitive political end of the woman whose downfall had occurred on 20 May. She writes: "The greater my distance from the unbelievable events, the better I realize that I cannot have the 'confidence' of this honorable society." And: "If only in order not to burden the functionaries, I am considering withdrawing from all posts."

The package sent out by the pugnacious politician to all and sundry comprises an 8-page letter presenting a chronology of the ongoing events and 14 enclosures--letters to and from Fred Sinowatz, documents showing comrades delighting in one another.

The aim of this indictment is Fred Sinowatz--not Kery, her patron for many years, who according to a letter from Matysek to the Federal Chancellor dated 23 July 1985 is "a province ruler lashing out wildly with utterances and apparently utterly removed from reality." There is a lot one can do with such a man, she suggests--but not argue. "I feel betrayed by him."

Then Sinowatz gets what is coming to him, because he "massively participated in this unsightly action, even at the expense of the truth." Embittered, Matysek says: "I am...aware of losing this 'fight,' which I never wanted. The reason is that I am still not managing to make the public realize what damage is being done to this country and party, with the assistance of the-Federal chancellor, by a group of 'persons harmful to the party out for blood,' who eliminate anyone warning against these developments."

The chancellor, she claims, telephoned members of the Young Socialists, saying: "How can you back Matysek, who has more weapons then Kery and goes duck hunting with Androsch?"

Vis-a-vis members of the Federal party executive board, he had launched a "similar (but not new) rumor in connection with the province president." The

alleged motive of the chancellor for his campaign against her: "That way one gets rid of annoying questions and journalists, can frighten functionaries and divert people's attention from what really is going on in this province."

For example, says Matysek, to divert attention from the story of the burglary in Kery's house in Kobersdorf. Otti [Ottilie] M., in a letter to Fred Sinowatz dated 18 June: "Your reproach at the party deputies' meeting that I had failed to defend the province president in his 'most fateful hour' in Guessing is quite significant. Allow me to say, Mr Federal Chancellor, that I simply could not manage to expose you before the deputies. You know as well as I that the burglary version surrounding the weapons affair in Kobersdorf was an assumption (journalists claim: an invention) by the party secretary and the province president." And: "I am not prepared to say out-and-out lies to 700 functionaries from the polium."

Fred Sinowatz ("I don't stoop to that level") is going to react to this whopping charge in well-tested fashion: as long as possible, he will maintain silence in public--and take action within the party. While stating that it was the business of the Burgenland comrades, he will doubtless not turn a deaf ear to Mrs Matysek's wish within the party: Otti will lose her last party post--and, incidentally, her membership.

Some time later the expulsion will be justified--not quite wrongly--with the argument which also represents the official party stand in the case of Nenning: "Guenther Nenning engaged in intentional conscious escalation and provocation" (to quote SPOe Deputy Rupert Gmoser).

Though embittered, Fred Sinowatz will take note of the fact that he is risking once again to gain the reputation of a man snapping at anyone, who appears to be a threat--a man who will maneuver out of the party anyone who deviates from him the line he has set or openly rebels against him. But his staff says that it bothers him to be accused of being intolerant. They say that the party is all that he is concerned about, and it has no room for vanity and petty jealousy.

Indeed Sinowatz had already announced during his inaugural speech as SPOe chairman a couple of years ago that he would push anything (or anyone) unpleasant out of the party. "There must not be any fighting any longer," he told the delegates in October 1983; "we all must make an effort to put an end to disputes and intrigues."

The party must remain an open one, he declared unmistakably at the time. However, "what must not happen is to abuse this openness at the expense of the interests of the party. What must not happen is for individuals to develop images at the expense of the party or at the expense of others in the party."

Sinowatz saw to it that this program was put into effect without qualification. "He is incredibly consistent," Karl Blecha too has realized by now.

Whoever did not toe the line, did not subordinate himself, had to go. Herbert Salcher was the first, then came Guenther Nenning, and finally Matysek--and last but not least Hannes Androsch, who was suspended from his party posts "until further notice."

No question, Fred Sinowatz has the party under firm control. When a couple of years ago, as the new party chief, he proclaimed that a "political attitude, but not political ambition" had to prevail at the SPOe headquarters at Loewelstrasse in Vienna, that the management's sole task was to "execute in the best possible way" what had been set forth by the executive board and the chairman, he was still misunderstood.

Most contemporaries interpreted his sharp remarks as a challenge against Karl Blecha and his helper Herbert Tieber--as a confrontation between rivals within the party.

It was that, but not only that. Sinowatz was interested above all in a new style in Loewelstrasse, in hard work under his control. He got himself Peter Schieder as central secretary and executor and changes the team.

Of the old Kreisky fighters with political ambition, now only three men who meet Sino's criteria remain in house--Central Secretary Fritz Marsch, Werner Obermayer (in charge of finances) and Franz Rosenberger (in charge of personnel). They are all staunch servants of their new master.

The others left or were made to leave.

Now there is a precise man in charge of organization, the Lower Austrian Karl Schloegl; a tested PR man, Robert Sterk; a quietly operating municipal-policy department head, Michael Haeupl; a trained diplomat, Peter Jankowitsch, as international secretary; and an editor of the AZ [ARBEITER-ZEITUNG] who tows the line in the person of Guenther Traxler. All experts. Without any ambition.

In the final analysis, the "new AZ" is also evidence of Sino's predilection for a well-oiled machine. Those who during the summer AZ crisis had still hoped to be able to turn the tired central organ into a politically ambitious leftist paper were bitterly disappointed.

Sino and his people prevailed with a small-scale format, a party gazette in tabloid style.

Nevertheless, Fred Sinowatz has accomplished something. He has given the SPOe new self-confidence. He restored the party machine to the priority position it had lost under Bruno Kreisky. As Carinthia's province president, Leopold Wagner, is pleased to say, under Kreisky "the republic governed with the press, whereas Sinowatz governs again with the bodies provided for the purpose."

Never in the recent history of the workers movement, Josef Cap, loyal party soldier, is fond of saying, have things been as democratic as under the sixth party chairman.* Matters were being debated again. Sinowatz, says the Styrian Gmoser, more than ever tries to do some good.

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*Sinowatz was preceded as party chairman by Victor Adler, Otto Bauer, Adolf Schaerf, Bruno Pittermann and Bruno Kreisky.

Formally speaking, this is correct. Under Bruno Kreisky, the presidium and executive board were executors pure and simple. Particularly during his last years of power. If any party bodies kicked up a fuss, he would ask for a vote of confidence--and would be given plenipotentiary powers.

Fred Sinowatz, on the other hand, makes the hierarchy feel that it has again a say in politics. He created the circle of seven*, which oftentimes meets several times a week. The presidium, consisting of 14 members, no longer meets half an hour before an executive board meeting, as it used to in Kreisky's times, but always 24 hours before it. And it debates matters in detail.

In the end, however, whatever the chancellor wants is decided.

To this extent it is true what party circles keep saying: that Sinowatz is more similar to his predecessor Bruno Pittermann than to Bruno K. in the way he handles his power--but with a qualification. Pittermann, being "personally rather weak" (according to Innsbruck political analyst Anton Pelinka), had to lead the party collectively.

Sinowatz, by contrast, leads the party, though perhaps apprehensively, in an authoritarian manner and undisputed. He administers and disciplines as he learned it as Burgenland provincial secretary 20 years ago. "He certainly is a strong chairman," opines JG (SPOe Junge Generation youth organization] Chairman Manfred Matzka; "his strength is the machine." Because he would be nothing without the party.

The only thing Sinowatz and Pittermann have in common is their skepticism toward opening up the party, despite the fact that when he was still a Burgenland provincial politician Sinowatz vociferously supported Kreisky's call for an open party in the late 1960's.

Just as Pittermann tried to prevent an opening up of the SPOe toward the right in the early 1960's, so Sinowatz--verbal pronouncements to the contrary--shuts himself off from the new social movements.

He is marching toward the center of society, aiming at middle-range employees, small independent people. Something like socialism for little people. To win these over, says Pelinka, "he is willing to sacrifice the symbolic figures of the new social movements. This strategic concern has a hard empirical core."

In 2 years the party chief has not managed to win back the habitual SPOe voters whom Bruno Kreisky had alienated with his Mallorca package. On the contrary, the defection of nuclear strata has even increased in the meantime.

The IMAS Institute of Linz has made a comparison between current opinion poll data, of October of this year (which give the SPOe 47 percent, the OeVP [Austrian People's Party] 44.2 percent, and the FPOe [Austrian Liberal Party] 3.7 percent), and data 6 years back. Among the nuclear strata "a dramatic loss has occurred," says IMAS director Andreas Kirschhofer.

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*In addition to Sinowatz, it comprises Karl Blecha, Heinz Fischer, Leopold Gratz, Sepp Wille, Peter Schieder and Fritz Marsch.

In these 6 years, the SPOe has lost 8.6 percent, among skilled workers as much as 9.7 percent. Among young voters, the Reds [SPOe] lost 10 percent, among women more than 5 percent. Only among leading employees did the SPOe register marginal increases.

To this extent, Sinowatz' way to the center does not look exactly promising. There the other established parties are also out to catch votes. There things are getting tight.

Nor will the "90 Perspectives" (about which Herbert Tieber gave a preliminary report at the party congress) help the party chief, who has such firm control over the SPOe but so far has only brought it defeats, to get out of his hole.

According to Pelinka, "he really is cultivating the Perspectives, in the very best Kreisky manner, only as a theoretical playground. He knows that he must cultivate the wing which in part he threatens to alienate, and in fact also has alienated."

As an excuse, Anton Pelinka points out that the SPOe chairman has never been especially fond of theory. "As far as I know," he says, "there has never been a party chairman who has said so little about theoretical questions as he has done. But that does not mean that he is a nonintellectual. He is a mixture of a Burgenland and an American politician. For both of these, theory has always been rather secondary."

Fred Sinowatz prefers to try it with the old socialist virtues, solidarity and discipline.

That appeals to the party man-in-the-street.

Whether it is in tune with the times is another question. Someone who should know is the chairman of the socialist freedom fighters, the old education functionary Josef Hindels. He says: "Solidarity and discipline are virtues of the old party. Otto Bauer already put great store by them." However, "in a fighting situation such a high degree of discipline and closing of ranks is definitely justified. Today this fighting situation does not exist any longer. Therefore this demand does not appear to be justified any longer."

It only creates a different impression. To quote the Social Democratic historical philosopher Norbert Leser, "the wind has become rougher. The ranks have closed somewhat."

In short, "the party has seen better days."

8790/12859
CSO: 3620/126

DENKTAS COMMENTS ON GREEK SUPPORT FOR BULGARIA

TA051930 (Clandestine) Bayrak Radio in Turkish to Cyprus 1630 GMT 5 Dec 85

[Text] President Rauf Denktas has criticized the fact that the Greek Cypriot leadership is supporting Bulgarian oppression of ethnic Turks. Pointing out that, as a principle, the Greek Cypriot leadership has always befriended all the enemies of Turks and supported everyone's evil acts toward the Turks, Denktas noted that from 1963 to 1974 the Greek Cypriot side subjected the Muslim Turkish Cypriots to the same mistreatment that the Bulgarians are now inflicting on the innocent Turkish people. Recalling that the Greek Cypriot representative at the third committee of the United Nations spoke in support of the oppression of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, Denktas noted that the Greek Cypriots have thus demonstrated that if they really dominate all of Cyprus, they consider it the government's (?duty) to do five times worse than Bulgaria.

Referring to election speeches in South Cyprus, Denktas said that these statements clearly expose the Greek Cypriots' desires and policies. The president said that Greek Cypriot Administration leader Kiprianou's statements reveal that the Greek Cypriots do not accept the Turkish Cypriots' right to a country or territory, do not view them as a separate people, reject equality, and regard bizonality and Turkey's guarantee as an obstacle to peace. Denktas declared that the Turkish Cypriots advocate that the Greek Cypriots have no rights to the whole of Cyprus and that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus constitutes the legitimate administration of the Turkish Cypriot people until an agreement is reached between the two sides.

Denktas stated that the phenomenon described as occupation by the Greek Cypriot leaders is actually an honorable, legal, and legitimate act which saved Cyprus from Greek occupation, recalling that it has always been the Greek Cypriot side which attacked the Turkish Cypriots in violation and denial of international agreements signed to protect Cyprus from adventures and disasters. Denktas noted that the Turkish Cypriot does not object to Kiprianou's statement that he is in favor of a solution that will not entirely eliminate Cypriot Hellenism and said: We, too, want a solution that will not eradicate the Turkish heritage on Cyprus.

/6662
CSO: 3554/26

POLITICAL CYPRUS

DISCREETNESS ADVOCATED IN GREEK MILITARY AID

Nicosia O AGON in Greek 13 Nov 85 p 1

/From "The Observer" column: "Let Them Keep Their Mouths Shut"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface/

/Text/ From the very first moment when someone or someones made a public issue of the dispatch to Cyprus of Greek military forces and set into motion the "tug-of-war" of "they should come, they should not come," we had stressed that such critical and sensitive matters should not be made public or discussed in public.

/These matters are brought up and discussed only in closed sessions between leaders and these leaders are bound to keep their mouths completely shut and should not permit a leak of even the smallest item even to the close circle of their associates./

But here in Cyprus what is kept secret and what remains secret so that the matter being discussed will not be leaked out?

Partisan passion and the tendency to impress the people and to get its applause, regardless of the national damage that could ensue, have led us to the sad point where we publicly discuss, even in newspaper columns, matters that should be kept hidden in the room where they are being discussed.

/And the enemy exults over our frivolousness, makes note of our intentions and goals and quietly plans his counteractions to everything that we are planning./

The Turks have learned that our leaders have discussed the matter of the dispatch of Greek military forces. They even known if decisions have been made or have not been made. They know the positions of the leaders. They are certain over what we will do or not do. And they conveniently go about planning their countermeasures.

We have seen to it that they be briefed on everything!

/But here, of course, we have democracy. And it is our understanding that democracy means that everything is permitted! The people have a right to learn everthing. Everthing must be talked about!/

/We have reached a point where what must be said is kept "secret" and what is secret we daily offer up so that all might be informed. Both friends and enemies./

We believe that the leaders must change their mentality over this matter because it is usually from them, if not always, that the leaks originate, as well as the disclosure of important and sensitive matters.

/In short, we ask of the leaders, even in those cases where they may be possibly thought of as "disagreeable," even in that instance where they might be in a disadvantageous position and even in case where they might be provoked, to shut their mouths and not let their tongues say things that should not be said publicly./

In this connection, we mention the position taken by Mr Gl. Kliridis in the interview he gave our newspaper yesterday:

/"I believe that the strengthening of our defense in the above-mentioned manner (note: the dispatch of Greek military forces) is a very delicate and critical political-military matter that can responsibly be discussed only behind closed doors between the political and military leaders of Cyprus and Greece and must be handled quietly."/

Indeed. This is the proper understanding of the matter.

/With the difference that it should not remain an understanding. It must in every case be really implemented..../

5671
CSO: 3521/49

POLITICAL CYPRUS

ALLEGATIONS OF DISY-AKEL COOPERATION REJECTED

Cooperation Seen Impossible

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 12 Nov 85 p 3

/From the "Pro and Con" column by Savvas Iakovidis: "They Do Not Coincide"; words enclosed in slantlines printed in all caps/

/Text/ In an interview with I SIMERINI the day before yesterday, Mr Matsis, first vice president of DISY /Democratic Rally/, stated that DISY's position is correct and altogether proper and that it is not promoting a popular front nor will it seek to lay claims on the majority of the people and to rise to power all alone. Recently and also in the past, Mr Kliridis, party president, in statements to and interviews with I SIMERINI, has repeated and confirmed what everybody knows, namely that any pre-electoral, electoral or post-electoral cooperation between DISY and AKEL is /inadmissible/ and /unacceptable./ Finally, in the last session of the House, Mr Kliridis repeated the above position.

Consequently, the /deliberate/ distortion of the above altogether clear positions for the purpose of enticing naive voters is a desperate propaganda endeavor on the part of DIKO /Democratic Party/ and the presidential publication. The repetition of the same lies from the presidential mouthpieces simply and only to entrap citizens, so they think, is /deceiving/ the citizens to say the least. In the meantime, in a recent speech, Mr Ziartidis, PEO /Pan-Cyprian Labor Federation/ secretary general, said the following:

"It is true that with regard to a few issues that have to do with our political problem, not small issues but important ones, the views of the party and our movement coincide with those of the Rally. This concurrence of views, while never capable of wiping out our ideological and class differences with this party of the Right, is a phenomenon that proves to be useful to the goals of our party insofar as the Cypriot problem and its solution is concerned."

The citizens, of course, are not interested in what comes out of the mouth of Mr Ziartidis or what conjectures or allegations he puts forth. What does interest them is what positions this party supports with regard to the Cyprus question and not if its views coincide with those of DISY. Let us, however, suppose that DISY-AKEL views on /how to handle/the Cyprus question do coincide. What is of greater importance is not only the handling but mainly /the essence/on our national problem.

And with regard to the essence there are /diametrically contrary/ views and positions. AKEL has not told us up to now how we are to succeed in genuinely getting a viable and /functioning/ solution. Nor has it told us how, practically, legally and systematically the survival of Cypriot Hellenism on this land will /be secured./ Therefore, how can and how does the PEO secretary general dare speak of AKEL-DIKO concurrence and agreement?

It was AKEL that was from time to time identified with Mr Kyprianou and, in accordance with the mood, on orders from Moscow and AKEL interests, it either extolled him or humiliated him with unbecoming descriptions and insults. Exactly as it does today. It was AKEL that was identified with Mr Kyprianou and fought together with him to bespatter and insult DISY and its leader. And now it talks about identity of views and concurrence. Mr Ziartidis' approach is /a joke/ to say the least. Mr Ziartidis also says the following. He maintains that "AKEL's biggest opponent will be DISY. It will not give us an inch and we will not give it an inch in the forthcoming electoral battle."

Yes. DISY will not be partial to AKEL. For two main reasons.

- First of all because there are many followers of this communist party who have realized the disastrous and continued errors of its aged leadership. For that reason they are deciding to vote for DISY en masse.

- Secondly because DISY is moving forward to the majority and to power not by steps but by leaps.

These are the things that keep the eyelids of the AKEL leaders from closing and going to sleep. And these are the things that are increasing their confusion.

DIKO Allegations Scored

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 13 Nov 85 p 3

/From the "Wednesday to Wednesday" column by G. Kolokasidis: "Who Is Flirting With DISY?"/

/Excerpts/ References to previous statements by AKEL cadres or those in other party publications with regard to the Rally have been appearing very often in the columns of ELEVTHEROTYPIA and in announcements by DIKO's leadership. This unrestrained mania on the part of DIKO's leadership for delving in the past is, of course, done deceitfully. The government party is trying to show that AKEL said one thing in 1981 and 1983 and another thing now. So, according to DIKO leaders, AKEL is "inconsistent," "untrustworthy," etc.

Of course, among all of these extracted quotations that the DIKO leadership adds it did not find one that says that AKEL has changed its position and its estimates vis-a-vis the Rally. It did not find anything like that because it simply does not exist. Because AKEL has not changed its previous estimates with regard to the ideological, class and political credo of the Rally. DIKO's leadership, of course, knows this. However, it pretends that it does not, wanting instead to fish in the troubled waters of the fairy tale of so-called AKEL-DISY cooperation.

For AKEL it is crystal clear and it does not need DIKO to remind it what and who the Rally represents, whose interests it expresses and in what direction it is orienting itself. AKEL knows and remembers both the history and pre-history of the Rally.

Beyond this, beyond the ideological differences and despite a concurrence of views on de Cuellar's initiative, there are great differences between AKEL and the Rally as regards the Cyprus question also.

For example, DISY's position has been proclaimed with regard to an all-national --as it calls it-- conference and its readiness to accept any line that this conference should decide on. For AKEL, however, it is clear that a line and tactics for the solution of the Cyprus question does exist. This is the line and tactics decided on in 1977 under the Makarios presidency. And, in any case, it is also clear for AKEL that decisions that affect Cyprus and the Cypriot question are made by Cyprus itself and by the Cypriots themselves.

Another point of disagreement is the role of the West. It is not a secret that the Rally is pinning all its hopes on the West and that it is ready to accept a diversion of the Cyprus question from the United Nations, "a solution" within the context of "the Western world to which we belong" that naturally serves primarily and principally the interests of American-NATO imperialism in the region.

For AKEL, however, there is no such question of diverting the Cyprus question from the United Nations. AKEL categorically rejects any idea whatsoever with regard to a "solution" within the NATO context. AKEL insists on a solution within the United Nations, a solution that will serve the interests of the Cypriot people.

For all of these and other reasons, as has been emphatically and officially stated on many occasions, AKEL has not cooperated nor does it intend to cooperate with the Rally on a level of that of the AKEL-DIKO Democratic Cooperation. As has also been categorically stated many times in the past, AKEL is opposed to the rise of DISY to power.

All of this is very well known to DIKO's leadership even though it pretends not to know. So, let it put an end to the fairy tale of AKEL-DISY cooperation and the unrestrained reference to previous statements by AKEL because it does not help either one.

Since, however, we are talking about cooperation with the extreme Right and since DIKO's leadership considers such cooperation a mortal sin, we cannot but observe that the biggest sinner in this land is none other than DIKO's leadership. Because it is DIKO's leadership that denounces Democratic Cooperation so that it might become agreeable to DISY and might win it over.

It is DIKO's leadership that proposed to the Rally a joint sharing of power. It is DIKO's leadership that wasted a whole summer in contacts with Mr Kliridis in order "to hit it off." It is DIKO's leadership that is today flirting with the extreme Right of the Right. It is DIKO's leadership that is trying to seduce it and to attract it to DIKO by making extreme use of chauvinism, anti-communism and anti-AKELism, everthing that would tempt every extreme rightist. Anyone can figure out who is in alliance with or is trying to get into an alliance with the Rally. Anyone can come to his own conclusion on the quality of DIKO's leadership.

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POLITICAL FRANCE

BARRE DISCUSSES POST-ELECTION SITUATION, IMMIGRATION

Bordeaux SUD-OUEST in French 18 Nov 85 p 4

[Interview with former Prime Minister Raymond Barre by Jean-Francois Bege and Joel Aubert; date and place not specified]

> [Text] Not only did former Prime Minister Barre not reconsider his previous refusal to serve as prime minister under President Francois Mitterrand in case of an opposition victory in the legislative elections in March 1986, but, in his view, those who consider such a possibility are opening up a major crisis. Speaking on immigration for the first time since the debate on this subject has again become front page news, he stated what his policy would be regarding this "considerable" social problem.

[Question] In a recent interview Jacques Chaban-Delmas, speaking of "cohabitation" [an opposition figure serving as prime minister under President Mitterrand in case the Socialist Party loses the 1986 legislative elections], indicated that he agreed with you on the dangers of such action because of the advantages it would give the president for the 1988 presidential elections. However, he also added: "Having said this, what about the situation that would be created if the elected representatives of the people would refuse to govern the country. You can imagine the crisis that would be created." In any case, we cannot imagine that you, Raymond Barre, would create such a crisis, in the interests of the country and of your own political future.

[Answer] In his statement to LE POINT, Chaban-Delmas emphasized the dangers involved in "cohabitation." He said: "This would be an unstable government which would have to take the long view of events but which could not obtain immediate results and which, along with the majority in the National Assembly supporting it, would be in a bad position for the 1988 presidential elections. As a result, the president might have the opportunity to regain his position." Isn't this the trap which I have continued to point out? Why should we let ourselves be caught in it, in any case?

When Chaban-Delmas said, and quite correctly, that a government and a National Assembly with no more than 2 years in office should avoid taking a short range view of events, do you think that they could possibly be indifferent to the decisive date of 1988? Cohabitation not only involves a risk of paralysis but, even more, by the very nature of things, could lead to extravagant electoral promises. Our country really doesn't need that!

"The crisis" would not be created by the opposition refusing to govern when it is elected to do so. It would result from agreeing to enter government when there is every reason for thinking that it would not be possible to govern effectively and in an atmosphere of continuity. Now, under such circumstances, all the conditions for a "super crisis" will be present!

However, my basic difference with those who would be prepared to accept the concept of cohabitation relates to my reading of the constitution. Whatever the "elasticity" which we would like to keep in the constitution, I don't think that this can go so far as to accept the view that, depending on the circumstances, we could have, at times, a president who is chief executive and, at times, a president who does nothing more than open flower shows! How could the president continue to be what General de Gaulle wanted him to be when he succeeded in having the people agree to the election of the president by universal suffrage? De Gaulle said: "In the highest position in the government there can only be one person."

After the return to the system of proportional representation and the destructive rule by political parties, cohabitation is the revenge of the Fourth Republic on the Fifth Republic! I don't want that for France.

Believe me, the position I have taken on this question has nothing to do with my political future! If I were merely being careful about my own future, I would have another attitude. The widespread offensive being carried on within the majority supporting the government and the opposition in favor of cohabitation, with the support of all tendencies in the media and powerful interest groups, is enough to show us the reciprocal arrangements which the groups involved have reached regarding this experiment. This leads to the conclusion that for me conforming with the idea of cohabitation would be the most prudent and most comfortable course of action. However, I don't think that I could hide my view of the situation. The expressions of confidence which the French people continue to give me place me under obligation to them. No doubt I will find myself standing alone or almost alone on this subject! It won't be the first time this has happened. In any case, I am no more afraid today than I was in the past!

We Can Count on President Poher

[Question] If the president refuses to resign after losing the legislative elections, what do you foresee?

[Answer] First of all, let's wait for the results of the legislative elections. Nothing is certain in advance. If the president retains the confidence of the majority of the French people, like his predecessors, he will not lose the legislative elections. If he no longer retains that confidence, he will find himself facing a new majority in the National Assembly. In case of a limited defeat, the president can simply wait and see. Moreover, he won't have much difficulty in finding cabinet ministers and a parliamentary majority which will support him.

However, if, despite the adoption of the proportional representation system, the defeat is on a large scale and is unmistakable, I don't see how the president could remain in office. Nevertheless, he has every reason for remaining silent about what he will do and saying that he will stay in office. That's the way to play the game!

It is up to those who ask for the votes of the French people to fight against the president and his policy to express their position clearly. That is, they should follow the example of Edouard Herriot, of Leon Blum, and of the Left in dealing with President Millerand in 1924. I mean their letting it be known in advance that under no circumstances would they support a government, whatever its composition, appointed by a president who no longer had the confidence of the French people. Don't come and tell us that the constitution does not permit the deputies and the National Assembly to censure the president! It is the people who, on the occasion of the legislative elections, will have expressed their disagreement with the president. In effect, how could the president dissociate himself from the governments and the majority which faithfully executed and supported the policies which he advocated! However, to achieve the same result in 1986 that we had in 1924, offers to serve under the president should not be made frequently by personalities of the majority in the National Assembly which may be elected.

Some people hold the view that the prime minister chosen by the new majority in the National Assembly should set up shop in the Hotel Matignon and carry on an open struggle with the president, forcing him to resign by proving that it is impossible to work with him! I can understand those who think that, under the constitution of the Fifth Republic, it is necessary to reach a compromise with the president. However, I don't think this is possible under present circumstances, because the president has behaved in openly partisan fashion, despite his most recent and more broad-minded statements. It seems to me that an "open struggle" with the president would place in question the dignity of the institutions of the republic in the eyes of the French people and of foreign countries. It is therefore better to have the crisis come up immediately, as was the case in 1924, rather than a longer term crisis, following a period during which the dynamics of the electoral victory would be dissipated. Moreover, there will be no crisis because, once again, we could count on President Poher [president of the Constitutional Court]!

The practical conclusion is that in March 1986 the opposition needs to obtain a "clear and massive" victory which will be such an unquestionable act of repudiation that the president will have no alternative to assuming the consequences personally! If he wants to continue in office as president, let him do so with his own resources! The National Assembly, under the Fifth Republic, does not form the cabinets. It controls their functioning and criticizes them. If this is not the case, it means a return to a government made up of political parties, a precedent which we should not create.

As far as I am concerned, if there is some form of cohabitation after March 1986, I will stay out of such an experiment, which can only bring confusion and uncertainty to France. I have no intention of obstructing the process, either personally or in cooperation with others. It will be for the French people to judge!

[Question] What will you do during the elections campaign?

[Answer] I will take part in the elections campaign, first of all in the Department of the Rhone, where I will be running against Charles Hernu and Fitermann. Then I will speak on the major problems facing the country, either on television or radio or at public meetings like the ones I usually attend.

I have no intention of appearing at meetings of political parties.

[Question] Whom will you support? Will your support really be selective? At meetings of the united opposition will you avoid referring to cohabitation and the future presidential elections?

[Answer] I will extend my support to the candidates who wish to have it. This support will not be automatic, and I will not engage in confusing things, which is very common in an elections period. I will be careful to ensure that my name is not used, in the absence of an explicit and written agreement on my part. I will not ask those who request my support to undertake any commitment of any kind. That is not my style! I will support, with the greatest determination, those candidates who have shown sympathy with me, tirelessly and with considerable courage.

During the campaign which I will conduct I will tell the French people that we must defend the institutions of the Fifth Republic against a return in force of the party system. We must be on guard against the promises made, so that we don't go through 1981 all over again. We must have confidence in our future. We will assure France of recovery and renewal through the efforts we will make in a spirit of freedom and solidarity.

Immigration: a Firm and Generous Policy

[Question] Le Pen will have an advantage since immigration is now a question at the heart of the political debate. Do you want to see a specific policy adopted in this connection?

[Answer] I deeply regret that the problem of immigration has been brought to the center of the political debate under the conditions which have been created.

We face a considerable social problem with which we will be living for a long time. Instead of a detailed and serious debate, which the seriousness of the subject deserves, here we are involved in an elections campaign theme which arouses confusion and passion and which makes possible the most questionable kind of political exploitation. I have heard it said that immigration will be the principal issue in the legislative elections campaign. I dread in advance the excesses which will certainly be involved.

I recall the halt in the immigration of new foreign workers in France which was approved on 3 July 1974 and the fact that the number of foreigners with legal status was stable between 1977 and 1981, according to the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior.

As prime minister I dealt with the immigration problem. I know all of its aspects and difficulties. The efforts made by the government of the time to deal with clandestine immigration and for the return of the persons involved to their countries of origin--and particularly the work of Minister of the Interior Bonnet and Stoleru--met with opposition and led to competitive electoral promises.

The decree of 16 November 1977, originally covering a period of 3 years and recognizing the right of "family visitation" for family members who would not seek employment, was cancelled by the Council of State as "contrary to the right of all persons to a normal family life."

The decisions made by the socialist government in 1981 only worsened the situation.

I am now quite determined not to give in to the electoral aspect of the debate. However, there are problems which the French people feel in a negative sense. Solutions must be found which reject racism, intolerance, and segregation, which are contrary to the traditions of France.

[Question] What will be the principal aspects of your immigration policy?

[Answer] I will express quite simply the principles which I have had occasion to present over the past several months before a wide variety of audiences. These principles are much more fully considered than some people at times would have you believe.

First of all, we must fight tirelessly against clandestine immigration and return to their countries of origin those foreigners who are illegally in our country. In this regard we must provide foreigners with residence identity cards which cannot be counterfeited, following the advice of the National Commission on Data Processing and Freedom. However, we must realize that our

borders are not hermetically sealed and that the control of the flow of clandestine immigrants will be difficult, even with a visa system. We must also realize that the policy of sending illegal immigrants back to their own country, which must be steadily carried out, cannot be on a massive scale.

Crimes committed by immigrants are considerable, but this is only one aspect of crime in general.

Foreign criminals must be automatically sent back, after partially or fully serving their sentences.

In the second place we must develop a program of helping foreigners return to their countries, particularly in the case of unemployed immigrants whose families have remained in their own country. The present arrangements, using public and private funds, are attractive. The return of immigrants to their countries must be arranged in agreement with the governments of the countries of such immigrants. No reasonable person up to now has proposed the enforced return of immigrants. However, no one should think that the return of the immigrants will be enough to reduce the problem of unemployment to a noticeable extent.

Finally, there is the case of immigrants who legally entered France, who came because, during prosperous times, they provided the manpower which our country needed. They have been living in France for many years. Their children were born and have grown up here. They have attended our schools. Many of them have become French citizens or will become citizens. We have nothing to gain by creating a category of dissatisfied residents who could become a foreign minority manipulated from abroad. Regarding these immigrants, and particularly the young ones, we need to apply a generous policy of integration: a housing policy aimed at avoiding excessive concentrations of one national group which arouse feelings of rejection by their neighbors and an educational policy for placing young immigrants at the proper level without penalizing the training of French youth. The cancellation of family allowances for the children of foreign nationality living in our country seems to me contrary both to our constitutional principles and to the dignity of our country. Regarding the conditions for the acquisition of French nationality, these could be revised to reduce the impact of the criterion of the place of birth, which is presently in dominant use. The British law approved on 30 October 1981 provides that the father or mother of an immigrant family must be a British citizen resident in the United Kingdom. However, any change in our immigration laws should clearly not be racist.

We should associate this overall policy on immigration with two other policies which are the best future answer for the social problem we now face: a policy of aid to the family and first of all encouraging French families to have a third child, which is likely to ensure the renewal of our population. There should be a policy of cooperation with the countries of North Africa to encourage their development and to provide an answer to the problems posed by their demographic pressures.

Those, in my view, are the elements of a long term policy which is both firm and generous. It should not be turned into an issue in the elections campaign.

[Question] At the same time that you said: "Priority must be given to the reduction of the budget deficit, through a decline in public expenditures," some people in the opposition have commented that it will be almost impossible to avoid a deficit and even a little more inflation. They apparently don't share your view of the need for austerity.

[Answer] I would rather not discuss what some people in the opposition are saying. Rather, I would like to stick to the facts.

The situation affecting our public finances has seriously deteriorated. The official budget deficit amounts to 150 billion francs and cannot continue to increase. The public debt has more than doubled since 1981, and the annual interest on it is in the order of 100 billion francs. We cannot continue to borrow more money each year.

Therefore, and first of all, we must at least stabilize the budget deficit in current francs at its present level and then begin to reduce it by lowering public expenditures. That won't be accomplished in a short period of time. It is easier to save money on paper than in reality. A budget reduction policy must be carried out over the long term.

I was responsible for the French budget from 1976 to 1981. Over a period of 5 years I brought the budget deficit down from 2.7 to 1.1 percent of Gross Domestic Product. In 1981 France was the Western country with the lowest budget deficit. I know the vigilance and the effort which such a policy requires.

The French people must understand that our financial room for maneuver is very limited and that it will be essential to rearrange our public expenditures to carry out certain essential actions. We will have to reorganize our tax structure to favor productive investments and to stimulate activity by private companies and savings. It is only when we have reduced the budget deficit that we will be able, like the Federal Republic of Germany, to achieve a long term tax reduction which we all support. It is only continued action with the National Assembly which will bring satisfactory and long lasting results. Only action of this kind will make it possible, as it did in the Federal Republic of Germany, to achieve once again a stronger rate of growth and a more satisfactory level of employment.

Every elections campaign is a favorite time for the demagogy of economic recovery and tax advantages. I hope that the French people won't get caught up in it again!

Michel Rocard: Look Out for a New Kind of Disappointment

[Question] Basically, what one might call "Barrism" has already been a success, since everyone refers to it. Look at the Left, where Michel Rocard is expressing considerable regard for the policies which you support.

[Answer] I am flattered that people speak of "Barrism," but I really don't know what they mean by that term. I have always tried to look reality in the face and to look for action which could contribute to the stability and growth of our economy.

When I took charge as prime minister in August 1976, I inherited an economic, financial, and monetary situation which some people have forgotten about. France had not yet fully mastered the effects of the first petroleum shock. I was able to stabilize the franc, to reconstitute the reserves of the Banque de France, to reorganize our public finances, to put our social security system in order, to abolish price controls, to assist companies to resume making investments, to slow down increases in purchasing power while ensuring the maintenance of incomes for the French people and farmers in particular, and to avoid incurring additional external debt for our country. The number of persons looking for jobs certainly increased, but until 1981 the French economy continued to create job openings. Price developments supported the consequences of the massive increase in the price of petroleum and world inflation. However, our price increases were about average, compared to our industrialized trading partners. The weakness of the dollar, in terms of the franc, did not prevent our exports from steadily increasing. They continued to increase until the end of the summer of 1981.

This action required firmness and steadiness in the midst of demands, denunciations, and pressures from all sides. However, conducting government policy in a period of difficulty is not a matter of pleasing everyone. Of course, not everything was perfect, and I was the first one to recognize this. However, I was convinced that we should not change policy, as various people wished to do.

In 1981 I warned the French people against the promises which were being made to them and against the policies being proposed to them which were full of danger. They can see today where we are. And Michel Rocard, who, you say, has considerable regard for my views, between 1981 and 1983 supported the policies which have led us to record budgetary deficits.

Today, as yesterday, I again warn the French people. They will say once again that I wish to deprive them of hope. I only want to avoid a new disappointment for them. Once is enough!

The Enthusiasm of the Inexperienced

[Question] Do you believe that the new consensus regarding private enterprise is the first sign of an evolution of political forces in France around two

concepts: one of them we might call more conservative and the other, more progressive?

[Answer] An evolution is under way in people's minds, under the pressure of events, thanks to the lessons of experience. We should be pleased about that.

However, I am not sure that the old myths and the traditional reflexes have really been completely abandoned.

I am skeptical about the "liberal dialogue" when I recall that those who engage in it sharply criticized my view of liberalism prior to 1981 as being inappropriate and regard me today as a conservative attached to the concept of a managed economy. I fear nothing more than the enthusiasm of the inexperienced. In another connection I ask myself if the Socialist Party and the groups which are associated with it take anything other than a tactical view of the situation. The Congress of Toulouse and the very recent National Convention of the Socialist Party brought back in force--and Michel Rocard contributed to this--ideas and proposals which mark the return of the old views of the party!

In France everyone wants to be considered progressive, and no one wants to be called a conservative. And we rapidly see what deep resistance any effort to change things encounters. Our revolutions end up with reforms which leak away into the previous structure.

Let's not exaggerate the process of "bringing things up to date!" Let us allow the harsh realities of today and the passage of time to do their work patiently, and let us support intelligently the changes which are required.

[Question] People talk a great deal about deregulation and even a little erroneously or at cross purposes. You have said you favor the abolition of the requirement to obtain prior permission for dismissing workers. However, the trade unions do not agree with this, and in particular Andre Bergeron, a man whom you know well. So will it be necessary to ignore him?

[Answer] I have always had high regard for Andre Bergeron, without necessarily sharing his views. I have the feeling that once again, in this connection, we are involved in a quarrel about nothing. The abolition of the requirement to obtain prior permission for dismissing workers is considered by the trade unions as an open door to all kinds of abuses and by professional organizations as a panacea for the problems of overemployment in companies. I think that you have to display good sense and modesty on both sides. The abolition of the requirement to obtain prior permission for dismissing workers does not in any way mean the abolition of guarantees in connection with letting workers go. The procedures in the law or contained in agreements negotiated with the trade unions continue in force and must be respected. Action by conciliation commissions can be taken at any time, if it appears that the reductions in the number of employees have gone too far.

The abolition of this administrative provision essentially has the purpose of preventing these procedures from dragging on endlessly. Moreover, the time provided for by law is often extended under occupational agreements, in an area where speed is often the condition for the survival of the company. The abolition of this provision would also make it possible to eliminate a psychological obstacle to hiring new workers in small and medium sized companies. They will know how to display their sense of responsibility, I am sure.

Of course, this action should take place within an overall policy of flexibility carried out over the long term. During a period of cohabitation, we may see the psychological and political exploitation which can be made of it by the advocates of rigid social protectionism against a government held in a vise, as it were, between the future opposition and the chief of state.

Certain reforms cannot be accomplished unless the institutions involved act in a mutually supporting and coherent fashion. If not, they risk being compromised for a long time.

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BRIEFS

CHANGES IN DEPUTY POSITIONS--The decisions of the High Special Court regarding the loss of position of 5 ND deputies and 5 PASOK deputies have just been published. In the ND, the elections of the following deputies was annulled: A. Stavrou (rest of Attiki), Th. Vyzas (Kozani), Th. Khoutas (Aitolakarnania), G. Salangoudis (Second district, Salonica), and P. Sivenas (Pella). The following PASOK deputies will replace them: M. Vathis, Merkourios Kyratsous, A. Dimitrakopoulos, I. Glavinas and S. Kekhagioglou. The election of the following PASOK deputies is annulled: A. Khatzipetros (First district, Salonica), E. Anthopoulos (Serrai), A. Golfinopoulos (Akhaia), G. Doxopoulos (Magnisia) and D. Diamandidis (Second district, Piraeus). They are being replaced by the following ND deputies: D. Stamatis, I. Panagiotidis, A. Zaimis, A. Filippidis and D. Parlas. [Excerpt] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Dec 85 p 1] /7358

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POLITICAL ICELAND

PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE CONGRESS ENDS WITH PARTY AT 'IMPASSE'

Gestsson Reelected Party Editor

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 6 Nov 85 p 37

[Article: "Svavar Gestsson Elected Chairman of the Editorial Board of THJODVILJINN at a Meeting Yesterday"]

[Text] Svavar Gestsson, chairman of the People's Alliance Party, was yesterday reelected chairman of the THJODVILJINN Editorial Board at a meeting of the Board. He received 7 votes and Kristin Olafsdottir 4. Olafsdottir received more votes when the Editorial Board was elected at an extraordinary general meeting of the publishing company on 10 October. It had been expected since the election that Svavar Gestsson would call an organizational meeting of the Editorial Board. MORGUNBLADID sources indicate that Gestsson decided to allow the meeting to take place yesterday, two days before the People's Alliance convention, to strengthen his position before the convention.

Gestsson ruled in the meeting yesterday, after some discussion, that alternates on the Editorial Board would not have the right to vote in electing the board chairman. There were four at the meeting. Hitherto, for some years, the practice has been on the Editorial Board for alternates to take full part in its proceedings. Skuli Thoroddsen stated in the meeting yesterday that he doubted the legality of Arnmundur Backmann, who came to the meeting as a representative of Midgardur, the company that owns THJODVILJINN headquarters, having the right to vote on the board chairmanship since the chairman had ruled that alternates did not have the right to vote. This view was seconded by Olafur Ragnar Grimsson. It was clear that at least three of the alternates would support Kristin Olafsdottir for the chairmanship if they could vote. Thus Olafsdottir would have received 7 votes and Gestsson 7 votes, but it was unclear whom Gudni Johannsson, the fourth alternate, would support. He had stated before the meeting, however , that he would support Olafsdottir if she stood for election. All indications were thus that Kristin Olafsdottir would have received 8 votes at the meeting yesterday, and Svavar Gestsson 7, if alternates could have voted.

A definite group with the People's Alliance has striven in recent weeks to have Svavar Gestsson give up the post of chairman of the THJODVILJINN Editorial Board and hand over the position of influence to Kristin

Olafsdottir, but without success. Hilmar Ingolfsson and Asmundur Asmundsson, both alternates on the Editorial Board, met with Gestsson and requested that he propose at yesterday's meeting that Olafsdottir be chosen chairman. Gestsson refused to do this and said that that would be interpreted to me an that he had given in to the dissatisfied groups within the People`s Alliance. He could not afford to do this in view of the fact that most likely an eventful party convention is in prospect. He must appear there as strong as possible.

Much of yesterday's meeting was spent discussion the position of the alternates and whether or not the should have voting rights in electing a chairman. After the chairman ruled that alternates should not have the vote, one of them, Hilmar Ingolfsson, walked out of the meeting. Eleven took part in the voting--the nine regular members of the board and the representatives of the THJODVILJINN printing plant and of Midgardur, that is, Ulfar Thormodsson and Arnmundur Backmann. Those supporting Gestsson were: Adda Bara Sigfusdottir, Arnmundur Backmann, Kjartan Olafsson, Helgi Gundmundsson, Ulfar Thormodsson and Svavar Gestsson. Those supporting Kristin Olafsdottir were: Skuli Thoroddsen, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, Valthor Hlodversson and Kristin Olafsdottir. Before the vote took place, alternates Hilmar Ingolfsson, Mordur Arnason and Asmundur Asmundsson stated that they supported Olafsdottir.

MORGUNBLADID talked with various THJODVILJINN Editorial Board members and alternates yesterday to find out their views on what had taken place in the meeting. Svavar Gestsson, chairman of the Editorial Board, would not discuss the matter with MORGUNBLADID reporters.

Seeking Election as Advocate of Democracy, Increased Independence of Paper

Kristin Olafsdottir said, concerning her reason for seeking election as chairman of the THJODVILJINN Editorial Board: "The reason is very simply that I think that the general debate within the People's Alliance, which THJODVILJINN is clearly not part of, but closely connected with, has been very much concerned with emphasis on power sharing, increased democracy and increased popular participation. In addition, there has been a substantial amount of debate regarding the independence of THJODVILJINN vis-a-vis the party, especially at the THJODVILJINN extraordinary meeting. This can be interpreted to mean that there is a definite group of people which desires that THJODVILJINN be a support for leftists in Iceland and that it should be read more widely than within the People's Alliance Party. I decided, in view of this debate on increased democracy and the independence of the paper, to seek election, as a spokesman for these views. Also influencing my decision is the fact that there is often complaint that women are not prepared to take up positions of responsibility, that they lack confidence in themselves when they must do so. I would like to refute this and emphasize that which we consider most pressing in our movement--i.e. equality of the sexes. These were the reasons that I became a candidate for the chairmanship of the Editorial Board, and not because I thought that Svavar Gestsson could not do the job. I think that these reasons have also been the reasons why those who voted for me did so. But this is not to say that those who voted for Svavar Gestsson instead of myself were in disagreement with my aims, although it is clear that those voting for Svavar Gestsson view things differently politically than I and many

others. Those voting for Gestsson saw the need to make the strength of the People's Alliance chairman clear to all. The election of the party chairman to the chairmanship of the THJODVILJINN Editorial Board is part of their struggle. I do not, on the other hand, feel that if Svavar Gestsson had not been elected chairman of the Editorial Board it would have meant that he is a weak party chairman. I think that in question here is, first and foremost, a matter of varying attitudes of people within the People's Alliance Party on how one ought to proceed in politics."

Kjartan Olafsson supported Svavar Gestsson yesterday in the elections for the chairmanship of THJODVILJINN Editorial Board. Olafsson said the following in an interview with MORGUNBLADID reporters: "I have no interest in making excuses for myself on this matter in MORGUNBLADID. I have complete trust in Gestsson as chairman of the Editorial Board and assert that I supported him as chairman of the board on this occasion and that I have supported him in the past. Nothing has changed for me in this connection. I can say that I consider Kristin Olafsdottir an extremely effective worker as a person and have much confidence in her. Svavar Gestsson, however, has been chairman of the Editorial Board for some time and I saw no reason to make a change now."

Chairman Will Not Go to Convention Extending a Hand of Reconciliation

Editorial board deputy chairman Hilmar Ingolfsson said in a newspaper interview: "It is clear that the chairman is not going to the convention extending a hand of reconciliation. I deny in no way his power to rule tnat alternates have no vote in chairmanship elections, but what should have been discussed at the meeting, as I see it, was the custom that regular and alternate members have always been invited to meetings, no matter what the organization. It is made utterly clear in company regulations that the editorial board consists of 9 members and that alternates should sit on it if there are less than 9. There is thus no disagreement on the right of the chairman to make the ruling that he did. Nonetheless, it was the custom prior to today's meeting that alternates have the same powers as regular members and that they could vote. It is not to my liking that I can vote when I agree with the chairman but otherwise not. The point of view of those of us who supported Kristin Olafsdottir in the elections for editorial board chairman was simply that we consider the chairmanship of the party and the position of first Reykjavik MP to be a full time job for Svavar Gestsson. I am in favor of power sharing and think that the People's Alliance should be a power sharing party. I am an opponent of the concentration of power in a single person. It is simply democracy that I would struggle for. THJODVILJINN should certainly represent a leftist point of view, but it is one thing whether or not the paper is or is not and completely another as to whether or not the chairman of the People's Alliance Party must be the chairman of the paper's editorial board for it to represent a leftist point of view. The way that things are being done now simply does not accord with the times.

We who supported Olafsdottir consider her one of the most competent women in the People's Alliance Party. She is one of the most capable women in the party and enjoys trust and support far outside party ranks. I consider her to be deputy chairman material for the party, but the situation is now such within the People's Alliance that no such thing will be possible since people prefer

to be self-elected, otherwise it is construed as backbiting and slander. To have a viewpoint in the People's Alliance that is opposed to that of the party leadership means that one is engaged in backbiting and slander and is undermining the position of the leadership.

Svavar Gestsson has thus, in my view, forced himself into the chairman's position on the Editorial Board and has driven away the most competent woman in the party. By giving up his position of Editorial Board chairman Gestsson would have secured the means of uniting behind him opposition forces within the People`s Alliance before the party convention, but he failed to utilize the opportunity.

Decision According to all Editorial Board Customs, Conventions

THJODVILJINN reporter Mordur Arnason is an Editorial Board alternate. He was asked his views about Svavar Gestsson's ruling that alternates could not vote in the chairmanship elections. "This ruling was completely in accord with editorial board customs and conventions," said Arnason and said that he had nothing else to say on the matter.

Arnason also said: "It was not due to personal opposition to Svavar Gestsson that I wanted Kristin Olafsdottir as Editorial Board chairman. Rather I have always been of the view that it is never good to try to hold too many posts at once.

We Think it Benefits Gestsson to Guarantee Increased Power Sharing

People's Alliance Party Secretary Helgi Gudmundsson said: "We think that it benefits the person we have chosen and elected, Svavar Gestsson, to guarantee increased power sharing and to see to it that broader-based forces are formed in the People's Alliance Party. We feel that the distrust that this affair would seem to indicate is completely unreal and baseless. It is no secret that I certainly voted for Svavar Gestsson but I do not think that the fact that we elected Gestsson should be interpreted to mean that we are against power sharing or, likewise, against guaranteeing it. But I think that it benefits Svavar Gestsson to work in the spirit of power sharing and in the spirit of broadening the forces within the People's Alliance.

Opposing the Inference that Editorial Board Alternatives Cannot Vote

Olafur Ragnar Grimsson was one of those supporting Kristin Olafsdottir in the editorial board chairmanship elections. He said in an interview with MORGUNBLADID yesterday: "There have been set forth within the party in past months broad demands for increased democracy and greater power sharing. It is very important, if we are to be successful in strengthening the position of the People's Alliance in Iceland, that the party leadership show by its actions that it supports such new methods of operating. I think it first of all proper that Kristin Olafsdottir, who has served in many positions of trust within the party with great merit and who has likewise worked with THJODVILJINN circulation with brilliant success in recent years, should stand for election to the chairmanship of the Editorial Board. All of the members of the board should have been happy to seize the opportunity. There is no

political necessity that the very busy party chairman should also be chairman of the THJODVILJINN Editorial Board. The election of Olafsdottir would likewise have been a great success in the battle for equal rights of men and women in the party. One member of the board, Skuli Thoroddsen, likewise noted that THJODVILJINN will soon celebrate its 100th anniversary. Thoroddsen indicated that it would be a worthy memorial to his grandfather, Skula Thoroddsen, the founder of THJODVILJINN a century ago and one of the first proponents of increased rights for women in Icelandic political life, that a woman would become the highly respected chairman of the THJODVILJINN editorial board. I was also opposed to the inference that board alternatives have no right to take part in board chairmanship elections, since the custom of having them participate had been in existence for many years and all alternates are always invited to meetings and take full part in the business of the Editorial Board. It would have been much more the socialist way of working to have allowed them to take part in the election of a board chairman."

Chairman Gestsson Addresses Congress

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Nov 85 p 5

[Article: "People's Alliance Party Convention Began Yesterday"]

[Text] The People's Alliance Party national convention was seated yesterday in the Austurbaejarbio Theater with good attendance. Three proposals to the convention were presented by the People's Alliance Young People's Movement and music was performed. After the convention had been seated, Svavar Gestsson, chairman of the People's Alliance Party, presented a proposal.

Gestsson said, among other things, in his proposal: "It is evident that the labor movement must now agree on the seeking of new goals: the demand for purchasing power guarantees is prominent in all labor union newspapers. The labor movement should not and may not let itself be beaten down."

Later in his proposal the chairman said: "The goals of the national party convention are thus the following:

--to underscore the solidarity of the People`s Alliance with regard to the the major points of party policy;

--to provide a clear and incisive answer to the questions of the day;

--to dispel the illusions of the speculation motive--since it is not economic freedom in as much as it involves the bondage of the multitude and the freedom of a small elite group;

--to show what kind of a future the people of Iceland want--a future of optimism and willingness to come to grips with the new century."

There was a break for dinner at 19:00 in the evening. Afterwards the convention was resumed at Borgartun 7 at 20:30. The evening session began with the speech of People's Alliance Party Chairman Svavar Gestsson.

Overview of Congress

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 12 Nov 85 pp 26-27

[Article: "Old Leadership Holds a Majority on Party Executive Committee"]

[Text] The most eventful convention in People's Alliance history ended Sunday evening and those forces in the party which have in the past fought for fundamental changes within it have by and large come out on top. Those most knowledgeable think that, in a political sense, the results of the convention have been a great watershed for the People's Alliance Party. The convention has resulted, among other things, in representatives of those calling themselves the "democratic generation in the People's Alliance Party" occupying very powerful positions in the party. They include Kristin Olafsdottir, elected deputy party chairman, and Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, elected chairman of the party Executive Committee late Sunday, when the Executive Committee assembled for its first meeting following the party convention. On account of changes in party regulations approved at the convention, Olafsdottir will also likewise be chairman of the party Central Committee, which means naturally increased power for her. But it has been pointed out that the party Central Committee has less weight than before in terms of power since the changes in party regulations have subjected the Executive Committee membership to direct election by the convention, and not by the Central Committee. Thus the power of the Executive Committee has grown at the expense of the Central Committee.

Last Spring's Hints

Last spring there were hints that there would be conflict at the convention when Olafur Ragnar Grimsson began his public discussion of "the crisis in the People's Alliance Party." Indications became still clearer when the report of the so-called "Mothers Committee" was published last autumn and in the wake of that report the report of the Mode of Operations Committee, which called for greatly altered party methods. Still another indication of what was to happen emerged in the last week when there was the dispute about the chairmanship of the Editorial Board of THJODVILJINN. Speakers argued hotly about party leadership and party actions, especially during the first days of the convention, and attacks became still more biting during times when the struggle was about personality and not issues. To be sure, those who supported Kristin Olafsdottir will say that moving her into the deputy chairman's position was a matter of issue and not of personality. She is a spokesman for democracy and for power sharing, so that her candidacy was for political reason and not because she is a woman. In practice, the disputes were so bitter when the litigant parties took up the deputy chairman issue early Saturday morning that during that time it might have been said that the People's Alliance Party had broken up.

The labor arm of the People's Alliance Party was very much in evidence in convention intrigues behind closed doors. The prospect lay before it of controlling the People's Alliance Party Executive Committee. Also in contention was the adding of a THJODVILJINN editor, so that there would be three, as before. These two issues were so weighty in the eyes of the labor

arm that Asmundur Stefansson, president of the Icelandic National Trade Union Council, was moved to take the lead in an agreement scheme with Olafur Ragnar Grimsson. The intrigues behind closed doors were in connection with efforts to take supporters away from Olafsdottir in her candidacy for deputy chairman and Olafsdottir and her supporters made it clear to the party leadership that they would not be halted. There were meetings again and again with Olafur Ragnar Grimsson and Kristin A. Olafsdottir in which they were threatened with counter-candidates. First the clique of "party owners" wanted to advance Sigridur Stefansdottir as deputy chairman, but it swiftly emerged that she could not accept for personal reasons--mother of three children, residence in Akureyri. The party leadership was very dissatisfied with Stefansdottir's decision since it felt that she had the clear support of the labor arm as well as that of a large percentage of the farm delegates. There was then careful investigation as to whether or not Alfheidur Ingadottir, the daughter of Ingi R. Helgasson, had sufficient support to be played off against Olafsdottir. Those who investigated the qualifications of Alfheidar said that she had possibilities, but those delegates whom MORGUNBLADID reporters spoke with on Friday and Saturday said that her possibilities were minimal. As events turned out, she was not offered as a candidate since the deputy chairman's position became part of a total agreement concerning a division of the Executive Committee and increased influence of the labor arm on it. There was then effort to persuade Vilborg Hardardottir to change her mind and run for reelection, but Hardardottir refused. At a "Woman`s Revolution Meeting" at noon on Saturday, those women who have been closest to Svavar Gestsson in party actions, namely Adda Bara Sigfusdottir, Gudrun Hallgrimsdottir and Gudrun Agustsdottir, attempted to support the proposition that women should stand united in their support of a single candidate. Other women at the meeting, on the other hand, threw it up before Sigfusdottir and the others that they were in fact there on the business of the old clique of party controllers and were not thinking about female solidarity. Those supporting Kristin Olafsdottir noted that she clearly was a candidate representing certain political points of view but that she was nonetheless a woman whom other woman in the party should agree on supporting. The meeting, however, broke up in attack and quarreling as Bjarnfridur Leosdottir expressed her anger over the Icelandic National Trade Union Council women who happened to be present. The meeting ended as many women walked out.

Intrigue Behind Closed Doors Shocks Convention Delegates

It was clear that the mass of delegates was shocked by what the old leadership clique was doing behind closed doors. One convention delegate worded it as follows on Sunday: "The party leadership has provided three whole days of instruction to convention delegates in its clique activities. This has upset delegates greatly." He said with certainty that a great number of individuals at the meeting, persons who had been somewhat naive and who had felt that solidarity ought to prevail among delegates, had turned to supporting the "democracy generation" against the clique of "party owners." Another delegate noted that those calling themselves the representatives of the "democracy generation" guaranteed the election of their candidate by agreeing that the election should not take place in the Executive Committee. That action was, stated as mercifully as possible, a wonderful beginning for the coronation of "the forces of democracy." Noteworthy, however, in interviews with convention

delegates on Friday and Saturday was the emergence of much distrust on the part of the delegates that much will change in party actions and in the area of party leadership, although the leadership had a somewhat new appearance at the end of the convention. One delegate interviewed by MORGUNBLADID said: "It's good bye. The party will not survive this. The leadership thinks only of self-protection and desires no change. It is characteristic of an isolated leadership, of the old clique of "party owners" that it has very little to do with convention delegates but attends endless conspiracy and clique meetings behind closed doors." Another said: "That which I fear the most of what might be done at the convention is that exactly nothing will be done. This is what the party leadership wants and that is what the conservatives also want. This is because unchanged circumstances will result in a continuing loss of membership for the People's Alliance Party." Still another delegate interviewed said: "What needs to be done at this convention, but will not get done for sure, is to change the entire upper structure of the party."

"Forces of Democracy Have Seized Power"

On Sunday evening the feeling among the delegates was somewhat better, since some said: "Real, fundamental changes have taken place. The 'forces of democracy' have seized power, and the 'owners of the party' will now have to work with them." It was heard that the delegates were generally quite happy with the outcome of the convention and, judging from what people said, delegates felt that in fact a whole new energy had come into the People's Alliance Party during the convention. There was also discussion of the fact that the labor arm of the party had greatly strengthened its position at the meeting, since it now has such a weighty position on the party Executive Committee.

Political De-Worming

Ossur Skarphedinsson, THJODVILJINN editor, belongs without question to that group of People's Alliance Party members that has been in the opposition in the past. Skarphedinsson continued his opposition at the convention with great zeal, with very good response from many convention delegates and with the limited enthusiasm of others. Ossur Skarphedinsson, for example, called the People's Alliance Party on Saturday an object of political de-worming, and this description so irritated some that Skarphedinsson had literally to take to his heels at the convention party on Saturday. Ingi R. Helgason was so angry with the description that he put on his coat, walked out of the convention and never came back. Skarphedinsson made little of the anger of his fellow party members and said only that he had meant by his phrase that a great deal of tension had reigned in the party but that now people were clearing away the trouble and tension that had hitherto existed. The process might well be called a political de-worming.

It was not until late on Saturday that it became apparent that the Nominating Committee would nominate Kristin A. Olafsdottir as deputy chairman and that Alfheidur Ingadottir, who was looked upon as the candidate of the "party owners" and a particular spokesman for women, would not run. The party leadership then began to threaten Olafsdottir's supporters. It was said that if the nomination was not withdrawn they would be putting the People's

Alliance Party into great danger and that there might be a party split. They likewise threatened to run Asmundur Stefansson against Olafur Ragnar Grimsson for chairman of the party Executive Committee. When agreement was finally reached, the compromise was that Svavar Gestsson would continued to be party chairman--there was never, to be sure, any disagreement about that--Kristin Olafsdottir deputy chairman, Palmar Halldorsson secretary, and Margret Frimannsdottir treasurer.

There is an amusing minor saga behind the nomination of Palmar Halldorsson, who is one of the very young people of the party youth movement. He is the executive director of Trades Association and thus has connections with the labor movement. In addition, he is the nephew of city councilman Sigurjon Petursson, who belongs to the "party owners" clique. For this reason the "party owners," the labor arm and young people in the People's Alliance Party all looked to Halldorsson as their representative in the highest administration of the party. Nonetheless, the fact is that his nomination was due to decisions of the party's labor arm.

Clique of "Party Owners" Tried to Prove that Olafsdottir Had Little Support

When Rannveig Traustadottir reported to the convention on nominations by the Nominating Committee for the party administration and Executive Committee, she emphasized the fact that nominations had been very hard work for the committee and she strongly urged that the nominations be approved. Some delegates thought this to be expected of Traustadottir since she had been considered to belong to the "democracy generation." It was also felt that Traustadottir's appeal to the convention reflected the struggle that had taken place in the Nominating Committee.

The election of the chairman itself was historic. Whereas Svavar Gestsson had formerly been reelected by acclamation, as was the custom hitherto, when there was only one man in the race, convention chairman Helgi Gudmundsson now proposed that the convention no longer conduct votes by acclamation since there was a proposal before the convention for a written ballot for the chairmanship. The convention agreed to this but later a murmur of dissatisfaction swept through the hall. There was no doubt that the proposal for a written ballot was presented with the knowledge of Svavar Gestsson. The purpose of the proposal was to demonstrate the undeniable strength of the party chairman and the purpose of the proposal for a written ballot for the deputy chairmanship, a proposal passed after the election of the chairman, was likewise to show how little support Olafsdottir enjoyed. Adda Bara Sigfusdottir and Gisli B. Bjornsson were those behind the proposals on written ballots. Both are very close collaborators of Svavar Gestsson and are also considered loyal party hacks.

The results of the elections were that Gestsson received 243 votes out of 276 cast (88 percent) and Olafsdottir 181 out of 265 votes cast (68 percent). Sigfusdottir and Bjornsson had made their proposal with the hope that Olafsdottir would receive around 50 percent of the vote and hoped thereby to show that a deputy chairman with so little support would be working besides a chairman with 90-percent support. Their hopes were dashed when Olafsdottir's supporters triumphed and claimed that she had good support. They said,

however, that the victory of the chairman overshadowed theirs. He never in any way expressed his desire for cooperation nor extended a hand of reconciliation. Olafsdottir's supporters said that it was an unworthy action of the chairman not to congratulate Olafsdottir on her victory and welcome her to the office of deputy chairman. They pointed out that the one time before that there had been a written ballot for the election of the party chairman, when Olafur Ragnar Grimsson was elected, he received around 70 percent of the vote. They also noted that it was worthwhile in itself that the "party owners" had allowed a written poll of its support and that it had turned out that there were only 80 of them, that is, those who turned in a blank ballot in the deputy chairman's race. Others pointed out, however, that many of those belonging to the "party owner" force are loyal party men willing to compromise and thus many of them voted for Olafsdottir even though much opposed to her.

Kjartan Olafsson, retiring editor of THJODVILJINN, has always been a faithful supporter of Svavar Gestsson. He served on the Nominating Committee and is considered the author of the compromises that emerged from the committee on the party Executive Committee and regarding Kristin Olafsdottir's election to the deputy chairmanship. Baldur Oskarsson, former People's Alliance Party executive, and Throstur Olafsson supported Kjartan Olafsson's proposals, which must have been very repugnant to Svavar Gestsson, especially that part of the understanding that was known in the corridors of Borgartun 6 as the "Gentlemen's Agreement." The agreement arose out of allowing the labor arm to strengthen its position on the party Executive Committee while Olafur Ragnar Grimsson was still to be chairman of the committee. The result was that Grimsson was chosen chairman, but that took place, on the other hand, only at a meeting of the Executive Committee after the conclusion of the convention.

Kjartan Olafsson, Baldur Oskarsson and Throstur Olafsson moved among the delegates early Saturday morning and attempted to mediate. The results of the mediation were that the "supporters of democracy" agreed to the labor movement strengthening its position on the party Executive Committee, while Olafur Ragnar Grimsson was to become chairman of the committee and Kristin Olafsdottir deputy chairman of the party. The supporters of Olafsdottir and Grimsson consider this a great victory for themselves and their point of view, but the labor arm and the old party leadership interpret the results of the compromise as benefiting them and consider themselves to have an uncontested majority on the party Executive Committee and thus in practice power in their hands. The party Executive Committee is now so structured that all the major factions in the People's Alliance Party have their representatives on it. The nominations of the Nominating Committee for the membership of the party Executive Committee were as follow s: Alfheidur Ingadottir (considered to belong to the "party owners" group), Asmundur Stefansson (representing the labor arm), Gudrun Agustsdottir (considered to belong to the "party owners" group), Hansina Stefansdottir (representative of the labor arm), Johannes Gunnarsson (chairman of the Consumers Union, neutral), Olafur Ragnar Grimsson (spokesman for the "democratic" group), Sigrun Clausen (representative of the labor arm), Sigurjon Petursson (considered to belong to the "party owners" group), and Ossur Skarphedinsson (spokesman for the "democratic" group). All were elected.

"What is at stake here is the old politics, wherein matters are resolved through some kind of clique intrigues that take place somewhere in the city after the close of a convention, and what may, on the other hand, be called the new politics, based upon public discussion of issues. If there is a difference it is that everything is open in the new politics. The new politics finds expression in elections on personalities and issues whereby the elections are honest." That is one convention delegate's statement in a nutshell of what he considers the difference to be between the two positions. It need scarcely be mentioned that he belongs to the "democratic arm." He stated in no uncertain terms that the point of view of the "democratically inclined" had won a great victory at the convention since a very large number of delegates had come to the convention with the intention of supporting the chairman, since he needed that support. The development of events at the convention, on the other hand, have been such t hat delegates have sensed the difference between the new policy and the old and have switched over. They have done this without repudiating the party chairman, since he was reelected by a substantial margin. But by electing Kristin Olafsdottir as deputy chairman and showing thereby their desire for change and an improvement of the party mode of operations they have supported the "democracy generation."

Others find the agreement intrigues of the "democratic" group somewhat comical. They say that they place their greatest confidence in the increased strength of the labor arm on the party Executive Committee and in the demand that has emerged from the party convention for the happy cooperation of the various dissimilar factions in the party and their harmonious activities. Through the coordination of the activities of the party and of THJODVILJINN, among other things, the party should achieve success in coming months.

There is the hope that people will look at the future of the People's Alliance Party now that the historic party convention has concluded. "It has never been the case in Icelandic politics that groups which have controlled a party for a decade vanish," said one person interviewed by MORGUNBLADID. He said that the convention should be viewed in terms of the struggle of Icelandic leftists in the future. Young people have, without question, emerged from the convention very victoriously. A strong bloc has emerged within the People's Alliance Party that has every interest in forming the policy and mode of operations of the party in the spirit of the conceptions that the "democracy generation" has struggled for.

Another person interviewed said that what has actually been achieved at the convention is that the "democracy generation" has gained the positions of deputy chairman and chairman of the Executive Committee by accepting minority status on the Executive Committee. He said it should become clear in the coming weeks and months whether the majority will check the "democracy generation" or whether there will be an agreement of all parties on cooperation. At the present moment, therefore, it is impossible to say which party faction came out more victorious.

Experience alone will show whether or not the assertions on good cooperation and sincerity will be put into practice. It is evident, on the other hand, that in spite of the election of a new People's Alliance Party leadership, there are present here representatives of dissimilar factions and points of

view, and that it cannot be doubted that there will be heated contention, not the least due to the fact that the Executive Committee of the party comprises much stronger individuals now than at any time before. Time alone will tell whether or not this will strengthen and consolidate the People's Alliance as a political force of leftists in Iceland.

Battle for Deputy Chairmanship

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 9 Nov 85 p 44

[Article: "Apparently Two Women Will Run for Party Deputy Chairmanship"]

[Text] Issues were by no means clear in the "Woman's Movement Camp" of the People's Alliance Party yesterday evening as the young ladies wracked their brains to decide whether they would support Kristin R. Olafsdottir or Alfheidur Ingadottir for party deputy chairman. It has been decided that there will be a new meeting of the "Woman's Camp" today. The controversy over whether convention delegates should support Olafsdottir or Ingadottir when the People's Alliance Party deputy chairman is elected today dominated the activities of the party convention yesterday. There was also dispute about who will be chairman of the party Executive Committee. Olafur Ragnar Grimsson has offered to run but the clique of "party owners" of the People's Alliance Party say that they intend to run Asmundur Stefansson, president of the Icelandic Trade Union Council, against him, if Olafsdottir is elected deputy chairman. Also dominating convention activities yesterday were major arguments about the actions or lack of policy of the party leadership and there were noisy demands for change.

The in-fighting and conflict within the People's Alliance Party clearly came to the surface yesterday during the party convention and much of the time was spent by People's Alliance counselors in compromise discussions in the side rooms of Borgatun 6 concerning who, or rather which woman, should be supported in party deputy chairman elections that are to take place later today. Kristin A. Olafsdottir is still considered most likely to win the election and this means that those wanting Alfheidur Ingadottir as a counter-candidate are the underdogs. And those supporting Ingadottir are said to belong to the People's Alliance Party "owners clique."

When it became clear shortly before noon yesterday that Kristin Olafsdottir would be a candidate for the deputy chairmanship, whether she was the only one running or not, the party leadership came into the picture and made clear to Olafsdottir's supporters, including Olafur Ragnar Grimsson and Ragnar Arnalds, that if she was in fact going to run the party leadership would then nominate Asmundur Stefansson, president of the Icelandic Trade Union Council, as an opponent of Olafur Ragnar Grimsson in the vote on the chairmanship of the People's Alliance Party Executive Committee.

The leadership of the People's Alliance party made repeated efforts yesterday to get Vilborg Hardardottir, retiring People's Alliance deputy chairman, to change her mind and to stand for reelection, but without success.

Many members of the People's Alliance who have supported whatever party leadership there has been in the party in the past were concerned yesterday, when MORGUNBLADID reporters spoke with them, that if the results of the elections today are that Olafsdottir and Grimsson are elected to the posts they are seeking, then Svavar Gestsson, chairman of the People's Alliance Party, will be, politically speaking, almost completely isolated. He will have far less power and influence than has been the case in the past.

List of Officers Elected

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 12 Nov 85 p 2

[Article: "Ludvik Josefsson Receives Largest Vote in Party Central Committee Elections"]

[Text] Former minister Ludvik Josefsson received the largest vote in elections of the party Central Committee at the People's Alliance Party convention which ended on Sunday. The convention chose 40 members of the Central Committee out of a total of 104 who run for the office. There were 216 persons voting and each convention delegate chose 40 persons, with 3 receiving three votes, 3 receiving two votes and 34 one vote.

Ludvik Josefsson received 226 votes. The following persons were also elected. Vote totals are given in parentheses: Sigridur Stefansdottir (212), Elas Kirstjansdottir (211), Finnbogi Jonsson (200), Thuridur Petursdottir (196), Gudrun Hallgrimsdottir (187) , Helgi Gudmundsson (176), Kjartan Olafsson (173), Tryggvi Thor Adalsteinsson (173), Arnor Petursson (172), Helga Sigurjonsdottir (165), Bergljot Kristjansdottir (160), Gretar Thorsteinsson (160), Logi Kristjansson (159), Thorgrimur Starri Bjorgvinsson (1 54), Erlingur Viggosson (153), Johann Geirdal (152), Bjarnfridur Leosdottir (152), Bryndis Thorhallsdottir (140), Kristinn V. Johannsson (140), Oskar Gudmundsson (140), Berit Johansen (136), Haraldur Steinthorsson (135), Hallveig Thorlacius (132), Petur Reimarssonl (131), Skuli Thoroddsen (130), Ulfar Thormodsson (126), Sigurdur Magnusson (124), Snorri Konradson (123), Olof Rickhardsdottir (121), Adalsteinn Baldursson (120), Thor Vigfusson (117), Gunnar Guttormsson (116), Lena Rist (116), Gunnlaugur Haraldsson (113), Gudjon Jonsson (111), Bergthora Gisladottir (101), Bryndis Sigurdardottir (101) and Margret Gudmundsdottir (97).

Three men received more votes than the last three women on the list, yet the women won election because of the rule that either sex must comprise at least 40 percent of Central Committee members. These men, namely Ragnar Arnason (111), Gudmundur Th. Jonsson (109) and Gudni Johannesson (108), will thus be the first alternates. In addition to elected representatives, there are seated on the Central Committee 4 representatives from each electoral district (34 delegates in all), party officers (4), regular and alternate members of the party Executive Committee (16), party Althing delegates (10) and 7 representatives from the Young People's Movement. The party Central Committee thus comprises more than 100 persons.

Paper: Party 'At Impasse'

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 13 Nov 85 p 28

[Editorial: "Party at Impasse"]

[Text] The People's Alliance Party is a party at an impasse. This is the primary result of the party convention which took place last week. It was clear before the party convention that the position of the party chairman, Svavar Gestsson, had become extremely weak. There was much criticism of him in the party on account of his dictatorial actions. His weakness and the weakness of the innermost kernel of the party came clearly to the fore in a public meeting of the publishing company of THJODVILJINN a short while ago, when the chairman suffered many shocks. This was evident at the first meeting of the THJODVILJINN Editorial Board when it became clear that Svavar Gestsson would not have been elected board chairman if the votes of the alternates on the board had been counted. Actions at the party convention underscored the weak position of the People's Alliance Party chairman. He made repeated effort to prevent the election of Kristin Olafsdottir as party deputy chairman but was unsuccessful in his efforts. At the end of the convention the party chairman stands surrounded by Olafsdottir, deputy chairman and chairman of the party Central Committee, and Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, chairman of the party Executive Committee. Gestsson struggled against Olafsdottir and her hostility and the hostility of Olafur Ragnar Grimsson has now become crystal clear. Svavar Gestsson was thus in no way victorious at the convention, even though he was reelected as party chairman. His position as chairman will be difficult also because, according to party rules, he may not be reelected chairman again by the next convention. His chairmanship will thus end at the next People's Alliance Party Convention.

Svavar Gestsson's opponents have named themselves the "the promoters of democracy." They have maintained in the press that they have won a historic victory at this convention. This is incorrect. Although this faction has succeeded in electing its deputy chairman, and likewise the chairman of the party Executive Committee, they do not have a majority on the committee itself. It is possible to conclude that the old People's Alliance leadership group has held on to its majority on the party Executive Committee or at least that party members in the labor movement have achieved a dominant position and can do what they like there. In any case it is clear that Olafur Ragnar Grimsson has no majority on the Executive Committee. Just like Svavar Gestsson he is isolated on the Executive Committee and is in fact hemmed in. The "promoters of democracy" have thus not come out on top in the People's Alliance but they have achieved a sufficiently strong position to limit the freedom of action of the party chairman. The old party clique has lost so much that it is now lamed. For this reason the People's Alliance Party is a party at an impasse.

It is also noteworthy that all the discussions at the convention were concerned with internal party struggles. All of the energies of the meeting thus went to solve disputes between individuals, which were first and foremost a matter of personality. Since these disputes were not settled between the individuals through elections, but through agreements behind closed doors,

they were unresolved. This fact will result in the People's Alliance party being absorbed in its own internal business in coming months . The party will for this reason be unable to get a good grip on its role as government opponent or in the struggle over issues at a national level. This fact means a great deal for the coalition parties and means that their most important opponents in the coming elections will be the Social Democratic Party and, to some degree, the Women's List. The Social Democratic Alliance is out of contention since its internal struggles have rendered it powerless.

The People's Alliance Party is moving briskly into the same condition that it was in during the years of National Recuperation, a condition which lamed it to a large degree during that decade. Efforts in the future need be stronger and not weaker. The old People's Alliance clique, which is the heir to the old communists of the Socialist Party, will now direct its every effort in the coming months towards undermining its opponents and destroying them. This old kernel of the party has a special knowledge of activities of this kind and is very likely to be victorious because of its experience, although perhaps under the leadership of a man other than Svavar Gestsson, who has has missed his footing to such a degree that he can no longer be an influential leader of the party on a national level in the future. Opponents of the old clique, on the other hand, loom so large in politics that even though they might loose the battle for dominance in the People's Alliance Party in coming years they will not give up. For this reason, we should expect great political tidings from this front in the coming months. The fact that the People's Alliance Party will be taken up with its own internal struggles in the coming months, however, provides the coalition parties with an opportunity that would mean a great deal if they can use it.

Columnist Views Power Fight

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 14 Nov 85 p 9

[Commentary by Staksteinar: "MPs without a Party Line"]

[Text] The power sharing of the fighting factions in the People's Alliance Party was decided in the party convention. However, it is unclear how the relationships will work out in practice. Staksteinar will today consider whether or not Geir Gunnarsson and Svavar Gestsson have misused the age of television when they refused to discuss the budget in the Althing on Tuesday or whether they are not prepared to take their line from their new party masters.

Avoiding the Budget

There is much dispute on whether or not there should be directly telecast meetings of the Althing. Opinions are divided on the subject since many think that MPs are afraid to discuss matters on the agenda during programs and will instead use the time for general party agitation or for attacks on their political opponents unconnected with the issues.

On Tuesday Icelandic State Television televised the first discussions of the budget with the permission of the Althing. MPs were happy with the request of

State Television to telecast the proceedings. Minister of Finance Thorsteinn Palsson accompanied the television crews and later introduced representatives of the political parties one by one. When it was the turn of Geir Gunnarsson and Svavar Gestsson it seemed as if the budget was no longer on the agenda. The newly reelected chairman of the People's Alliance Party began to read a policy statement of the party convention, which was concerned, as is known, with everything else besides party policy. The People's Alliance MPs proved that MPs cannot be trusted to talk straight in the age of television.

Standing Under Party Banner

Although the People's Alliance MPs thus avoided discussion of the budget during the first discussion of the budget in the Althing, it is clear from what appeared in THJODVILJINN yesterday that they were standing under the party banner in what they did. Since the party convention the editors of THJODVILJINN have thought that they have the measure of Svavar Gestsson and look upon it as their function to provide slogans for him rather than to berate him. THJODVILJINN editors now think that their position in the party is such that they can judge what is right and what is wrong in the actions of the party chairman. It is stated in a lead editorial of the paper under the heading "Right Answer:"

"Geir Gunnarsson and Svavar Gestsson, People's Alliance members of the Althing, completely refused to discuss the so-called 'draft budget' during the budgetary discussions televised yesterday. They pointed out correctly that the draft is nothing more than a meaningless piece of paper that means next to nothing. The burlesque of the television program was deceitful and in practice nothing more than a gross insult to intelligent people. The draft budget was patched together with difficulty and as a result of the arrogant Stykkisholmur Meeting of the Central Committee of the Independence Party it was stated by the present minister of finance that the budget means nothing and that no real cuts could be expected.

Since then no report has been made to the opposition parties on proposed cuts and changes in the original budget proposal although government forces are untiring in bewailing the fact that the budget proposal is ineffective. It was only yesterday morning that the opposition parties got to see a rough sketch of the changes. The sketch could not be discussed or marked up.

Such actions are intolerable and comrades Gestsson and Gunnarsson did what was totally correct under the circumstances, by simply refusing to discuss the useless document, and discussed instead the results of the wonderful People's Alliance convention.

May they continue to act in this manner!"

Is This the Shape of Future Events?

The reasons given by THJODVILJINN why Geir Gunnarsson and Svavar Gestsson preferred to discuss anything but the budget proposal when it was under discussion in the Althing are baseless. In what ways were Gunnarsson and Gestsson worse off with respect to the budget proposal than other MPs of the

opposition parties? In discussions of the kind that took place in the Althing on Tuesday, MPs did not need to have the figures of the minister of finance on the tips of their tongues to be able to express their opinions and the opinions of their parties on the budget proposal.

The course of events within the People's Alliance could have been the following: It was only shortly after the party convention that the budget proposal was first discussed. The glow of victory that the party had survived its convention had still not run its course. The new party leadership had not had the time to tell Gunnarsson and Gestsson what the party position was on the budget proposal. The line was developed that it would be best just to read the political resolutions of the convention. When THJODVILJINN saw that Gestsson had done what he was told, they were filled with joy and published the first praise of him in a long time.

What has happened is what is likely to happen in the future in the Althing activities of the People's Alliance Party: namely that the party Althing delegation will have its wings clipped and that its members will be crippled in what they may say before party meetings. The meaningless talk of the People's Alliance MPs during the live telecast is thus perhaps not a misuse of television. The cause of the problem may rather be that they did not know what they could say.

Congress Foreign Affairs Stand

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 15 Nov 85 p 24

[Editorial: "Silence on Foreign Affairs"]

[Text] For obvious reasons there has been concern about the decline that has settled in the affairs of the People's Alliance Party and which characterized to a large degree the party's convention. In connection, very little has been said about the policy that it was intended to map out at the convention. A political statement was resolved there that is characteristically loose. There were also resolutions on such things as "there should be a real reduction in exports of fresh fish" while, on the other hand, foreign affairs were forgotten entirely, if we may judge from convention resolutions as they were published yesterday in THJODVILJINN.

There can be many explanations why the People's Alliance Party convention decided to say nothing at all about foreign affairs in its political resolutions. The irresponsible policy of the People's Alliance, a policy intended to make Iceland simultaneously neutral and defenseless, has suffered much in years past. Through its membership in the 1978 government, without demanding that there be a clause in the government's political agreement calling for the withdrawal of the garrison force, the People's Alliance discarded an important precondition for participation in coalitions. People's Alliance protagonists have demanded to have an accounting about this within the party.

Svavar Gestsson was able to become a minister in 1978 only through accepting in fact the presence of the garrison force. Olafur R. Grimsson is an effective

participant in international associations of MPs which have nothing on their agendas in terms of dissolving NATO or weakening their defenses through unilateral disarmament.

Only those with a hand in People's Alliance business can explain why the party convention passed no resolution on foreign affairs while a general position was assumed on political issues. Is the silence in this area to be understood in terms of failure to reconcile the views of the pro-Soviet and others within the party? Is opposition to Western military cooperation no longer that rallying cry that it once was in the People's Alliance?

There is the need to have public answers to the questions since we are dealing here with a fundamental issue in Icelandic political struggle for decades. MORGUNBLADID thinks there is nonetheless reason to conclude that they who control the People's Alliance, when push comes to shove, have fallen away from their youthful views that Soviet peace is a better choice than the peace that has prevailed in our part of the world for 40 years.

A primary cause for the decline of the People's Alliance is that its members have for so long tried to hide their real views in order to reach the voters. We must view the silence of the People's Alliance Party convention on what should be done to guarantee the independence, security and defense of the Icelandic nation in this light. The members of the People's Alliance are aware that the old policy of "Iceland out of NATO, remove the garrison force" is no longer held in favor--even the Alliance of Military Base Opponents is aware of this--for this reason they have chosen to keep their silence about foreign affairs in their political resolutions. They have no intention of throw the issue before the voters as they have done in the past, hoping that silence in this area would suit them better at this point in time. The old banner will not be waved again until the highest goals of the party--ministerial posts--have been achieved.

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POLITICAL ITALY

CRAXI ADDRESSES PARLIAMENT ON FOREIGN, DOMESTIC OBJECTIVES

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 5 Nov 85 pp 2-4

/Prime Minister Bettino Craxi 4 November Lower House Speech: "Foreign and Domestic Objectives Demand Utmost Responsibility from Everyone"/

/Text/ Honorable President, Honorable Colleagues: In my presentation of the program of the government to the Chamber on 9 August 1984, particular attention was devoted to foreign policy.

Peace, security and independence, together with the defense of human rights and the people's rights, were cited as the fundamental values from which that policy would draw its inspiration. On that occasion I accordingly explained Italy's desire and determination to participate in the process of constructing peace by favoring exclusively the negotiation and peaceful resolution of international disputes. I then declared that "the basis of our political and military alliances is to be found in the defensive and security objectives of the Atlantic Alliance, in the solidarity between the European countries of the Alliance and the United States, and in the responsible and balanced coordination between Europe and the United States in a confluence of responsibilities among free and democratic countries."

In particular, I noted that Italy "is opposed to the doctrine of military solutions, in which--even in those regions closest to us--Italy could not in any case be involved." I reaffirmed that "Italy will always take a stand against the law of might; against the violation of the people's rights; and against pretensions to--and undertakings of--hegemony and oppression. This applies above all to the Mediterranean region, where Italy will continue to exercise all its influence to reduce tensions and to assist in the search for peaceful and negotiated solutions that are respectful of the rights of the people and the nations." I expressed the hope for a renewed peace process in the Middle East--the great frustrated hope of these years--and indicated the government's concern over the situation in that region and its desire to develop friendly relations of aid and trade with all of the Arab nations and the North African nations in particular.

These concepts and these aims were also contained--and specified--in the programmatic policy lines agreed upon by the forces of the government coalition. In particular, one could read there that "with respect to the unresolved Middle Eastern question, Italy will avail itself of the role it has

acquired in the region to promote a policy of negotiation based on reciprocal recognition: a policy that will lead to an institutional solution of the Palestine people's demands for identity and autonomy and of Israel's demands for guarantees and security." And further: "If the safeguarding of peace; cooperation; and the patient negotiated solution of local conflicts are the priorities that most continuously will be the aim of our foreign policy, the government should monitor the multiple and repeated situations in which the defense of the people's rights and human rights is at stake."

Honorable Colleagues, I want to point out today that the foreign policy action of the government has been on the whole completely consistent with the principles and programs expounded, and I can assure you that this will continue to be the case.

In the phase of acute opposition that has characterized East-West relations for a long period, the Italian Government has sought out the possible areas for action. Our objective was to prevent a stagnant situation in U.S.-USSR relations from being accompanied also by a general paralysis in the East-West sector that would have had the effect of making a resumption of negotiations even more difficult and distant.

Someone during this period wrote ironically of an Italian "mini-Ostpolitik," and the way was opened for distorted inferences and interpretations and presumptious admonitions, when in fact it was entirely clear that our objective was basically to assist in reducing tensions and to strive to broaden understanding and create a climate favorable to a resumption of comprehensive East-West negotiations.

The reconstruction of a framework of East-West collaboration--made possible by a patient and tenacious effort on our part and on the part of other nations which like ourselves are desirous of arriving at the stage of dialogue--helped to prepare the ground for a positive outcome of last January's meetings at Geneva between the United States and the USSR, which led to the initial agreements providing for the start of new negotiations with respect to the reduction and control of nuclear and space weapons. The government welcomed these agreements and did not deem the subsequent differences of interpretation to be such as to diminish their importance or challenge their validity. The format adopted for the new negotiations, and the agreed-upon articulated method, are still the most rational structure for safeguarding the respective requirements for security in an overall context that must include offensive and defensive devices, in the search for--and identification of--new balances for the respective forces at the lowest possible level.

At the conference of the major industrialized countries held in New York on 24 October, Italy again set forth its own views and its own concerns, in its endeavor to assist in developing a reasoned allied position that would be consistently open to serious and constructive dialogue.

In recent months, events and situations have taken place that obliged us to explore the possible lines along which an in-depth, updated analysis of all aspects of the East-West relationship could--in the Italian view--be conducted, and in particular those aspects relating to the disarmament negotiations.

A key point that gave rise to great uncertainty over the progress of the Geneva negotiations was--and still is--the Strategic Defense Initiative launched by the government of the United States. Its declared--and reaffirmed--purpose remains peaceful and defensive and therefore does not correspond to the meaning that might be inferred from the inappropriate label of "Star Wars" but rather refers to a new and revolutionary system of strategic defense installed in space. Such a defense project, however, has involved--and involves--essential problems relating to maintenance of the overall strategic balance.

The position of the government has been clear from the beginning: we took our cue from the formulation of the Soviet-American agreements of January of this year, which were freely signed, asserting that--consistent with the so-called "among the three groups'" interrelationship--the reciprocal guarantees should have emerged and been agreed upon without prejudgments, by means of constructive negotiations on definite points which we for our part have proposed to define on various occasions. I wish only to point out that the Italian position of principle--reaffirmed recently by the parties of the government coalition--has always been linked to the concept of a general equilibrium capable of guaranteeing the security of everyone without any position of military supremacy for anyone.

Most important of all, therefore, are the commitment not to obtain unilateral advantages by means of new weapons systems; strict observance of the ABM Treaty; the commitment to impart greater stability to strategic ratios; and finally, reaffirmation of the principle that the ultimate objective of the negotiations must be the attainment of reciprocal security at significantly reduced levels of strength.

As for the Strategic Defense Initiative, the fundamental problem is one of ensuring that on any given occasion the political decisions--and therefore the objectives of arms reduction and arms control--will be capable of conditioning technological development and therefore of keeping the results of research within the confines of effective programs of control. Hence the importance of a succinct debate concerning the defensive character of the SDI and concerning the commitment to a consensual management of the possible results, so as to avoid the emergence of factors for destabilization of the strategic ratio that would lead to Soviet countermeasures and therefore to a new arms race.

Concerning this and other points, we had in New York an interesting and very constructive discussion. We considered various options, and the President of the United States responded to a number of concerns that we--and also the other allies--had voiced.

He showed himself to be aware of the destabilizing effects that a monopoly of a technology could have on the strategic balances, and reaffirmed American readiness to discuss with the Soviets the strategic implications associated with hypothetical new weapons, with a view to determining jointly the ways in which the defensive systems can eventually be introduced into the alignment of forces without any diminution of security. He expressly told us that the

results will be utilized for the benefit of everyone, so that the defensive systems can gradually be combined into a deterrent and thereby progressively reduce the role of offensive missiles. The question now is obviously to ascertain how--through negotiation--it will be possible to determine, concretely and by mutual consent, the practical modalities for managing a transitional phase of this type so as to arrive at a different ratio between offensive systems and defensive systems but in such a way as to ensure the same strategic balance.

In the New York discussion, priority attention was devoted to the ABM Treaty, to the terms of which SDI research must be rigorously subject. This is a point of great importance for the credibility of the negotiations. It is not simply a question of pledging oneself to keep research within the framework of the possibilities allowed by the ABM Treaty but also of defining what those possibilities are. The Italian Government had expressed concern over an initial interpretation--broad in character--made by the American side with respect to the research possibilities allowed by the ABM Treaty and by the interpretative declarations agreed upon in connection with the treaty.

I may say that we received confirmation in New York that the United States will adhere--over and above research activities, which are allowed--to a restrictive interpretation of the limits set by the treaty on the development of, and experimentation with, ABM systems and their components that would be designed to operate in space.

All this bears out the fact that in the phase of forming a negotiating position it is of fundamental importance to have the responsible participation, without disclaimers, of all those who have consistently fulfilled the obligations of Atlantic solidarity and who intend legitimately to strive together for the success of negotiations which because of their enormous repercussions affect the general interest. We shall continue to be alert and determined to have our opinions heard whenever we believe we can put forward useful ideas--as, for that matter, we have done in recent years. Even when the proposals of the USSR contained aspects that were unacceptable or were contradictory, we have never failed to express appreciation every time we have perceived in them an indication of goodwill and dialogue--every time we have discerned in them useful proposals for the resumption of dialogue.

We have expressed a very positive judgment--one that is assuredly very precise--concerning certain aspects of the most recent proposals of the Soviet Union on the subject of the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, and we are very pleased that in New York President Reagan--after announcing the American intention to formulate counterproposals--then informed us of their content and thereby expanded the process of comparing positions--a process that must continue and thereby serve as the most effective guarantee of the maintenance of dynamic and constructive negotiations.

As for Italian participation in the SDI research program, we have assumed--in cabinet session--a specific commitment to evaluate the degree to which such participation would be consistent with a certifiable national interest, in terms of its scientific and technological implications and its industrial

repercussions. The problem of participation is, however, distinct from the problem of evaluation of the strategic implications of SDI--an evaluation which it would be premature today to formulate, given the uncertainty with respect to the results attainable through research on the antimissile defense systems, and should be the object of a continuing process of consultation within the Atlantic Alliance.

As for the technological aspect, we shall give consideration to encouraging the process of innovation that is impacting many sectors not only in the civilian area but also in the conventional military sector. We have already obtained important data, and I believe that the government will be in a position in the coming weeks to complete the study phase and to place the necessary decisions before Parliament, while still taking into account our adherence to the Eureka program. In coming to the final decisions that we will study with a view to their possible adoption in a European accord, we shall take into consideration the specific interests of Italian industry and the need for protecting its competitiveness in world markets.

Honorable Colleagues, at the New York conference we devoted much attention to the hotbeds of international crisis and agreed on the necessity for always exercising the negotiation option to resolve them. We can have no genuine peace so long as in many parts of the world serious crises remain that threaten to spread and involve additional countries and, moreover, exacerbate the always difficult confrontation between East and West. We have appreciated President Reagan's intention to make a renewed commitment to a solution of the hotbeds of crisis by making this one of the principal topics on the agenda of the talks that he will have in Geneva with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. We believe it is equally important that a mechanism for managing the crises be found that will protect fully the functions and role of the United Nations but will at the same time mobilize all forces that are able to make a useful contribution first of all toward containing the crises and then toward resolving them. We have already in the past advocated and supported the role of the regional mechanisms as instruments for solving the crises while respecting the interests and legitimate aspirations of the countries involved. But we cannot do other than agree as to the usefulness of the action of the two major powers, to be carried out in a cooperative posture but without returning thereby to a schematic bipolarism that is no longer possible. It is a question of urging the two major powers to face up to their special responsibilities and therefore to play an enhanced role in the exclusive interest of the parties involved.

I have already observed on other occasions how--unfortunately--the chain of crises in the world has only gotten longer. New links have continued to be added to the chain while not one of the crises that has arisen has been resolved positively.

Of these regional crises there is one--the Middle East crisis--on which I believe I must place particular emphasis because of the gravity of the events that have taken place, with a view to evaluating the situation and confirming the correctness of the peace objectives that we have pursued and shall continue to pursue.

There is no doubt that the events of recent weeks have created additional factors for complicating and hindering this peace process in the Middle East--a process which is in everyone's interest. It is a moment of great difficulty, one that poses the necessity for intensifying efforts to prevent the absence of prospects for negotiation of the crisis from sooner or later giving rise in the area to a new and more threatening recrudescence of terrorism, violence and new and dangerous tensions among the countries of the region.

I believe it would be useful to take a look at the circumstances which in due course motivated the Italian Government to play an active role in restoring credibility and vigor to the peace movement in the Middle East, even amid the increased responsibilities that subsequently devolved upon it from its tenure of the presidency in rotation of the European Community. When toward the close of 1984 the prolonged stagnation of the negotiation process was intensifying the feeling of frustration among the Arab populations and threatening to bring about a new spread of political and religious radicalism, the disturbing picture of the Middle Eastern situation was described for us in particular by President Mubarak, by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and subsequently also by Algerian President Bendjedid and Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali. A new impetus became necessary--a new action that would serve to defuse a situation which in their judgment was one of danger and high risk. When--in this context--King Hussein launched the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian initiative, we viewed it very favorably and strove to have it accepted and developed.

It was necessary to encourage the PLO and to support a definitive clarification of its internal situation so that the Palestinian movement might--without reticences or ambiguities--decide upon a position from which to negotiate an understanding with Jordan.

While recognizing the need for maintaining a dialogue with Damascus because of the importance of Syria's role in the region and in the overt dispute with Israel, we were convinced that the real impetus for negotiation--at that precise moment--could have been provided by Egypt and Jordan through some forms of accord with the PLO. It was during this period that Minister Andreotti and I together met with Palestine leader Yasir Arafat in Tunis and urged him to make a new gesture that would enable the PLO to demonstrate that it had chosen the negotiation option definitively and irreversibly. We explicitly stated on that occasion our opinion that it would be necessary to arrive at a comprehensive Jordanian-Palestinian program that would embody unequivocal responses to all aspects of a solution to the Arab-Israeli crisis--responses, therefore, not only to those questions bearing on Jordanian-Palestinian relations within the framework of a future institutional arrangement to be predetermined and specified but also to those concerning the type and form of relations to be established with all the countries of the region, as well as to those specific questions concerning the security, recognition and rights of the state of Israel.

Until that moment, it would not have been possible for either Italy or Europe to carry out any supporting action or to undertake any initiative.

Under these conditions, however, we were successful in stimulating a most active EEC support based on the principles agreed upon in Venice in 1980. A reading of the minutes of that meeting will prove to be quite useful for anyone who wishes to reconstruct the ensuing chain of events accurately. The chairman of the PLO told me and the minister of foreign affairs that he was aware of all that we were telling him and promised that in a relatively short time he would have a confidential message sent to us, together with a "packet" of measures that would be oriented in the direction requested by us.

This commitment was in fact fulfilled, and Arafat informed us of his intention to reach an agreement with King Hussein on an initiative capable of giving new impetus to the peace process.

The Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, concluded on 11 February of this year, was received favorably by Italy and also by the 10 EEC member countries, which regarded it as a document capable of inspiring a commitment to negotiate a solution that would be consistent with the principles maintained by them and with the resolutions of the United Nations. In the judgment of the Ten the agreement represented a constructive forward step, as was stated in the 29 April 1985 resolution of the European ministers of foreign affairs, which accordingly served to confirm the statements I had made at the conclusion of the European Council in late March--speaking in the name of heads of state and heads of government--that explicitly voiced their appreciation of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement.

But I received encouragement from President Reagan as well, in the form of a positive evaluation of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement and of the potential that it opened up for the peace process. I shall read in this regard the statement I made on 5 March at the conclusion of the conversation at the White House with President Reagan (it was an agreed-upon declaration): "We talked about the situation in the Middle East, and noted with satisfaction the appearance of positive signals capable of reactivating the negotiating process with a view to a political solution of the Arab-Israeli crisis. Both of us noted with interest the recent Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue and the agreements that were reached, in the hope that these agreements will make it possible to arrive promptly at a joint Arab position for the purpose of initiating realistic negotiations with Israel. We agreed to keep in touch with each other so that we may effectively assist any positive movement toward a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East."

Despite certain differences of opinion, in my talks with Shimon Peres I had found appreciation for the actions that Italy was taking in the Middle East. The Israeli prime minister gave our country credit for being able to make a great contribution toward enabling the various parties in the area truly to find a point of convergence.

"We must," Peres said in Rome, "together find peace and respect for all peoples, including the Palestinians. We believe that Italy can play an important role in enabling the Middle East to become once again a cradle of civilization rather than a theater of conflict."

I must point out that these appraisals came after the polemics that were stirred up somewhat hastily over the meeting that Andreotti and I had with Arafat in Tunis.

I repeat, at that meeting the Palestinian leader undertook a specific commitment which he fulfilled, giving rise to a document that was approved by the Ten and was regarded even in the United States as an action helpful to the resumption of a credible negotiating process.

All this did not happen by accident but on the basis of a rapprochement--which we supported--of the PLO policy line to those positions which in the view of the Ten, but not merely of the Ten, would have been capable of moving the peace process forward. I may mention in this regard two factors that are innovative and of undeniable significance: the acceptance by the PLO, from the outset, of a federal union--as requested by Jordan--within the framework of which the right of self-determination would be exercised; and the renunciation (also by the PLO) of exclusive representation of the Palestinians in favor of an appointed negotiating delegation.

The Jordanian-Palestinian initiative was the object of our conversations in Rome and Moscow with Gromyko and Gorbachev, in the course of which we insisted on clearing away the layer of mistrust--if not indeed of hostility--that had suddenly emerged.

Beginning in March, intensive negotiations were initiated with a view to finalizing the intermediate steps toward the start of direct negotiations between the parties. Much effort was centered on the formation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

I spoke of this personally last February with Prime Minister Peres, who said he could not accept preeminent personages of the PLO as members of the delegation, for otherwise he would be compromising with the ideology of violence. Minister Andreotti discussed this with the Jordanian Government, and Andreotti and I together discussed it with President Mubarak at the meetings we had in Rome and in Venice, respectively in February and March of this year.

These were difficult negotiations, in which the United States and the Ten were involved in the expectation of being able to agree on the composition of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would be acceptable to all the interested parties. These efforts have continued to be made with particular diligence--although with difficulty--by King Hussein and President Mubarak, who in September made two separate visits to the United States. It was in New York, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, that King Hussein proclaimed publicly for the first time a readiness to begin direct negotiations with Israel, although under "appropriate auspices." It was, in other words, a formula that clearly provided the margin for a subsequent elaboration that would have been able to reconcile the demand for direct negotiation with the demand for an appropriate international context, which for many was--and is--identifiable as the members of the UN Security Council.

Unfortunately, this attempt--so laboriously constructed--also did not have time to produce the right results for setting in motion a negotiating process with prospects for peace, or time to lay the groundwork for the subsequent steps, because at the very time King Hussein was in the United States developing his initiative to the highest possible degree the bloody Israeli incursion into Tunisia was taking place--an action explained as a reprisal for the slaughter in Cyprus of three Israeli citizens at the hands of Arab elements. It was an act of aggression against a sovereign state, but above all it was a murderous blow struck at a political plan that even amid so many difficulties appeared to have the potential to serve as a credible negotiating option.

The subsequent events--the confusion produced throughout the region--have without a doubt drawn attention to the upswelling of a crisis that seems to have brought everything and everyone again into question.

There can also be no doubt that in a period as difficult as this the PLO has apparently been unable to maintain full control over all those who are recognized members of the organization or who say they are.

We are faced with a deterioration of the entire Middle Eastern situation--one that also involves the PLO and confronts it with problems of consistency in respect to its policy and basic objectives.

It would, however, be dangerous to become involved in hasty judgments.

No one should forget that the Jordanian-Palestinian option originated as a gradualist approach to a comprehensive settlement.

Consideration is again being given to the possibilities for an international conference, while ascribing to such a conference roles, formats and functions so diverse as to make the process of holding it quite difficult and lengthy. Even in this case, however, an adequate response must be found to the problem of Palestinian participation and representation.

We have not interpreted the agreement of 11 February as the only alternative to comprehensive negotiations, which some visualize as taking the form of an international conference and others as a mere consultation or meeting. We have in fact viewed it as an action that is in any case positive, as an action destined to assemble new consensuses within the framework of a gradualist approach--one small step at a time--but without prejudicing the final result of the negotiations.

There are no concrete alternatives to a representation of the Palestinian people that is recognized by the great majority of the Arab states, and Jordan for its part has confirmed that it cannot approach the negotiations with Israel without the Palestinians. It would be risky and dangerous to imagine any scenarios outside of this reality.

Honorable Colleagues, on the basis of a careful and profound analysis of the developments that have taken, and are taking, place in connection with the Middle Eastern crisis, the five parties of the government coalition have agreed on certain principles and on certain parameters.

Italian foreign policy will continue to function in accordance with these fundamental considerations.

These considerations relate to the fact that the basic problems of the Middle Eastern crisis continue to be the unresolved problem of a secure peace among the countries of the region, the problem of a solution to the Palestine question, and the disturbing developments in the Lebanese tragedy. They confirm Italy's commitment--in close and continuing coordination with the European partners and in concert with the United States--to make the appropriate constructive contribution to the search for a comprehensive solution that is just and peaceful, and Italy's support for any peace initiative proposed that rules out any military solution. They confirm the necessity, in any case, of respect for the fundamental right of the state of Israel--and of the Arab states of the region--to exist and to be secure, and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and for the validity of rational Jordanian-Palestinian institutional solutions. They confirm the prospect of a comprehensive peace settlement that would apply to all the countries of the region and thereby draw attention to the need for achieving the broadest possible cooperation and the most constructive international convergence. They confirm the utilization--in whatever manner and in all instances--of the negotiation option, primarily with respect to Israel and Jordan and also with respect to Syria and Egypt, with the association--in the appropriate forms--of the PLO, which will be able to play its role in this process to the fullest only if it follows without reservation the course of peaceful negotiation. They confirm the principles of the 1980 Declaration of Venice, whose validity has constantly been reaffirmed by the European Community and which includes--as is well known--recognition of Israel's rights, the Palestinians' right to self-determination, and the specific and representative role of the PLO. And they confirm the conviction that only through a renewed commitment to a peace process will it be possible to oppose effectively the recrudescence of terrorism, which Italy condemns in whatever form it is manifested and regardless of wherever it originates.

Honorable Colleagues, the fight against terrorism finds us in association with all countries afflicted by terrorism, and participating in all the political and organizational efforts to prevent and combat it. This solidarity and this participation derive from our moral sensibilities, from the laws we have given ourselves, from the risks and dangers we also face and from the necessities that also weigh upon us.

From the paroxysmal high point of as many as 2,513 attacks suffered in 1979, Italy dropped to 75 reported attacks in the first 9 months of this year, with a total of 4 dead and 72 injured.

This is still a negative statistic for a peaceful and civilized nation such as Italy, but it signifies the defeat of terrorism, launched down an irreversible slope: a defeat--that is to say, a victory for the state, won with the aid of its legal, ethical and political principles.

While domestic terrorism was declining there was growing in Europe, and also in our country, what has been called "Euroterrorism"--that is to say, the

type of terrorism introduced by European groups which by the nature of its attacks and the kinds of participation it utilizes allows us to discern objectives associated with destabilization of all Western Europe and its political, Community, military and industrial structures. It is a risk that we still run and against which we have built our defenses in Italy and in Europe.

With the worsening of the tensions and conflicts on the Middle Eastern chessboard, the terrorism of Arab matrix has also resumed. The attacks carried out by this matrix during the present year total 24 in all of Europe, of which 11 were in Italy. Twenty of these attacks were directed against Jordanian, Libyan, Iraqi, Palestinian and Iranian objectives, and the rest against Israeli or European objectives.

We cannot, however, do other than regard as terrorist acts against Italy those terrorist acts that are carried out on our territory and that mow down victims among the Italian citizenry. An offense not against truth but against common sense is committed by anyone who ascribes to us an intention or desire to confront this terrorism all by ourselves, rejecting the solidarity and cooperation of all the other countries that are committed to the struggle against terrorism. Our intention is the opposite: to develop this necessary cooperation, just as it is unquestionably necessary to review the effectiveness of our systems for controlling the foreign influx into Italy, with complete respect for the very ample rights that we ensure to all those who are guests in our country.

You know that the problem of terrorism has been dealt with at the international level on many occasions. Effective legal instruments have been adapted for the purpose, and significant direct political commitments have been undertaken to prevent and to suppress all terrorist activity. Specifically, Italy has subscribed to the five conventions drafted in this regard within the framework of the United Nations, and to the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism elaborated by the Council of Europe. Under the terms of the agreements arrived at among the industrialized countries we are committed to providing the best possible implementation of the measures agreed upon to combat air piracy and hostage-taking. Precise orientations were set forth in the declarations announced at the Summits of the Seven in Bonn in 1978, Venice in 1980, Ottawa in 1981 and lastly in London in June of last year.

Equally significant has been our contribution to the action undertaken by the countries of the European Economic Community, beginning with the meeting held in Dublin in September of last year for the purpose of preventing the abuse of diplomatic immunity and discouraging the extension, by the individual countries, of diplomatic immunity to persons involved in terrorist activities.

Finally, there is the proposal put forward recently at the United Nations--also on the initiative of Italy--to pledge all the 159 countries of the United Nations to combat the alteration of the course of ships for terrorist purposes, through the adoption of a specific international convention.

But there is still another important statistic that I must emphasize concerning the subject of terrorism, in refutation--as always--of a truly excessive quantity of disinformation that continues to be circulated with the appearance of gospel truth. This statistic tells us that Italy is the only European country that has succeeded in identifying and bringing to justice almost all the perpetrators of the attacks carried out on our territory. It is a statistic that reassures us concerning the efficiency of our security systems, but it is also a statistic that tells us that in Italy we are neither closing our eyes nor avoiding our responsibilities.

It is still our profound conviction, however, that no system of prevention or suppression of terrorism can guarantee to us the free and peaceful life to which we aspire, if terrorism is not combated by means of political and diplomatic action at its point of origin, where it is born of the rivalries, injustices and atrocities of which the Mediterranean is now a daily theater of action. For this reason I do not think all this advice, however well-intentioned, that reaches us from various sources to the effect that we should not "become too much involved," should draw back, should wait and see what happens, is the right advice. Our task is to do all possible in behalf of peace, in the Middle East and in the world.

We have also received some criticism for the harshness of our reaction to the Israeli raid on Tunis with its 73 dead and its 16 Tunisian victims. I could end the argument by citing the UN Security Council resolution which agreed with us completely when it described the raid as "an armed attack perpetrated in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and international law." I would add only that this resolution refused to regard Israel's attack as a reprisal, which was the only point on which there was disagreement among the declarations of censure that were expressed unanimously by all the civilized countries of the world.

Honorable Colleagues, I believe there is no need this morning for me to retrace the various stages of the "Achille Lauro" affair. The result achieved--the saving of so many human lives, the deliverance of a great ship that has already been able to resume its normal cruising activity--proclaims that the policy followed by the government in such anguished moments, in that dramatic situation, was appropriate and correct. This is, moreover, now acknowledged by world public opinion. I was particularly gratified by the expression of thanks sent to me by the entire crew of the "Achille Lauro," whom I thank in my turn because I--and all those who worked with me--were merely doing our duty.

The judicial investigations into the entire story--from the planning of the hijacking to its organization, its execution and its conclusion--are going forward. I am pleased with the productive start of these investigations, and I earnestly hope that in a short time it will be possible to know the truth and fix all responsibilities.

Arafat's repeated statements concerning the PLO's noninvolvement in the terrorist acts had seemed to me from the outset to be supported by his obvious political self-interest, as was also his denunciation of an act which is

regarded among other things as damaging to the Palestinian cause. But I still believe that the PLO--where we are concerned--owes us an explanation that I am sure he will want to provide.

In this regard I may note the statements made during this period pledging the PLO to assist in searching for the truth and in fixing responsibilities, either by making itself available for collaboration with the Italian judiciary or by conducting an investigation of its own, such as is reportedly already under way with a harvest of evidence of which we in the government have received only indirect information. On the other hand, it is not foreordained that the "Achille Lauro" affair can hold no further surprises.

Honorable Colleagues, one cannot overlook the role played by the press--and by the mass media in general--in an event that has aroused the concern and emotions of the whole of world public opinion. On the other side of the Atlantic the mass media have shown themselves to be extremely sensitive to the strong emotional content implicit in the case, often--unfortunately--at the expense of the truth and the general interest. I had a very frank meeting with the U.S. press that included a direct and in-depth clarification which made it possible subsequently to report a more complete and better-balanced evaluation of the events.

Certain reactions appearing in the Italian press have proved to be no less emotional. In the course of only 2 weeks, two of the largest national weeklies--going beyond the bounds of good taste and common sense--have taken the liberty of publishing two violent portrayals of the "pro-Arabism" and "pro-Americanism" that allegedly divide the Italian Government. Indeed, in the space of these 2 weeks, what hasn't been written and what hasn't been said?

To use the felicitous expression of one journalist, a process of "indecent verbosity" has in any case been inaugurated--a process that has troubled the entire history of the nation from the Punic Wars to the present day.

We have once again heard talk of "imperialism in rags"; the specter of colonial aspirations has been raised; and we have been accused of susceptibility to populist, neutralist and--I don't know in what sense--Third Worldist temptations, because we favor strong support for efforts to solve the problems of Third World development. Our abandonment by our allies, the Balkanization of Italy, and our descent into the inferno of world mistrust have been predicted--all within the unacceptable context of a wretched Italy that is devoid of moral and material values and is destined inevitably to live in the reflected glory of the powerful, to be the eternal victim of the rhetoric of its own rulers.

This sort of "trial"--this downright poisonous campaign--is a concentrated effort to describe an Italy that does not exist either in terms of economic and social reality or in terms of its international status, its culture or its prestige. The Italy of today is a great modern nation, solidly linked to the life of the major industrial democracies, deeply involved in the reality of the free and civilized world; in the Mediterranean we have no hegemonic or

civilizing function to fulfill, but we do have concrete interests in peace and concrete economic interests to defend. The five parties of the coalition, declaring that peace in the Mediterranean is a "vital interest" of Italy, have by a simple and fundamental statement made clear the entire scope of our duties and our policy in this area. The danger of anti-Americanism--so dramatically feared by certain newspapers--does not exist in Italian public opinion; the phrase "Yankees go home" is a parody of the sentiments of a society that is increasingly integrated into European and world civilization and is well aware of the historical and political importance of the great American nation to our freedom and the freedom of Europe. Other than a few individual questions, all that remains of this entire polemic is the preoccupation with this redundant and unexpected echo of the simple reaffirmation of our sovereignty and our national dignity.

It has therefore been easy--after so much commotion--to clear up and compose the differences that have arisen with the United States.

My meeting with President Reagan was inspired by those sentiments of friendship that he had expressed to me previously in a message conveyed to me in advance by Assistant Secretary of State Whitehead on Saturday, 19 October. We agreed that the difficulties arising in recent days between Italy and the United States must now be studied in depth, with objectivity and without prejudice, so as to avoid any such incomprehension in the future.

The American President reaffirmed that he has complete faith in Italian justice. He has publicly and repeatedly acknowledged the effectiveness with which Italy is participating in the effort to combat international terrorism, and he renewed to me his request for closer coordination between our two countries.

We agreed that the relations of friendship between Italy and the United States are stronger than any incident that might occur to disturb them. We explained that a lack of information and understanding was the principal cause of certain hasty reactions: the United States was not, in fact, cognizant of certain facts and was accordingly induced to make different evaluations. Despite any differences that have arisen, however, they have never cast doubt upon the solidity of the ties between Rome and Washington.

For my part, I explained some aspects of the "Achille Lauro" affair that were not well known in America.

I clarified certain matters of fact and of law that are useful in obtaining a better understanding of all aspects of the entire affair.

I assured him that the judiciary is carrying out all the necessary verifications, in the light, moreover, of the American requests made through diplomatic channels.

Then there was the matter of the events that took place at Sigonella: events that in the interest of both countries and of NATO must never be repeated. I explained--together with Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti--that the NATO

bases in Italy may be utilized by our allies only for the specific purposes of the Alliance and in conformity with all provisions of the agreements in force.

We were thus able to end all the polemics. These events had also created irritation in vast sectors of Italian public opinion, not so much because of the magnitude of the events but basically because of a question of principle.

Honorable Colleagues, the differences that the "Achille Lauro" affair caused within the government--to the point of provoking the cabinet crisis--are the subject of documentation so extensive that it frees me from the necessity of speaking of those differences. I have to believe that there is nothing more to write or say than what has already been written and said in the course of a polemic that in truth could not have been more public or open.

It is precisely these characteristics that enhance the value of the clarifications that ensued, beginning with the unanimous recognition of the correct and effective action taken by the Italian Government to bring about the good outcome of the dramatic adventure of the "Achille Lauro"--action that led to the salvation of the ship and its passengers.

Moreover, I believe that because of the amplitude and complexity of the affair, and because of its repercussions, Parliament has every right to reintroduce a proposal to investigate the matter in whatever forms the parliamentary groups believe appropriate to adopt.

Requests for clarification have also been made concerning the concept of collegiality. I reaffirm the validity of this principle, which is fundamental to the very existence of a government coalition, whose members cannot do without this basic guarantee.

It is a concept that has been fully incorporated into the new regulations covering the activities of the government and of the office of the prime minister, as provided in the government-sponsored bill concerning regulation of the office of the prime minister that is already before both houses of Parliament. We shall solicit their approval of the bill. It has meanwhile been referred back to the cabinet, which will adhere to the regulations prescribing full collegiality, in consideration of the political representativeness that is peculiar to it and that is the justification for its existence.

Along with the unconditional praise merited by all those who in the various sectors strove either to guide the "Lauro" affair to a good result or to cope with a "worst-case" scenario under the best possible conditions, we must acknowledge that this extraordinary emergency found us in some respects unprepared. Disconnectedness and uncertain jurisdictions led to damaging uncertainties and delays in respect to intelligence, the configuration of the overall situation, and the necessary and continuous updating of the situation.

It is therefore useful to find a suitable instrumentality that is capable of going automatically into action for the purpose of managing new--and unfortunately possible--crisis situations, with respect to which it will be necessary to establish forms of liaison and consultation with the parliamentary opposition as well.

Honorable Colleagues, on the basis of these orientations the parties of the government coalition established that the reciprocal clarifications made with respect to the differences that had arisen sufficed to make it possible to surmount the crisis and reestablish governmental collaboration.

The president of the republic, after giving consideration to my communications, rejected the resignations of the cabinet and invited me to appear before Parliament.

Honorable Colleagues, when in late July I announced to the two houses the government's directions and commitments for the future, the calendar was already studded with deadlines and urgency classifications impinging mainly upon the work to be done in Parliament to obtain the approval of important bills being debated.

These deadlines and this urgent business are still before us, alongside the budget bill and measures connected with it that have been rendered urgent by an economic situation that leaves no margin for delay. I have emphasized many times that the central problem of the budget is the 110 trillion lire of expenditure that remains over and above the government proposals for a reduction in expenditures and that will be added to the other 500 trillion of preexisting debt. It is by this yardstick that our proposals must be evaluated, and it is by the same yardstick that the proposals to improve, complete or supplant them that will be developed in Parliament should also be measured.

This leads in any event--and with even greater reason after the unforeseen interruption of these recent weeks--to the need for making haste, and for making haste also with the bills linked to the budget bill. The government--which has already introduced the bill to reform the IRPEF /expansion unknown/--will within a few days introduce the regional and local finance bills, which are an integral part of the strategy, and will strive--by also introducing amendments and supplementary measures--for speedy consideration of the bills to reform the public health system, the social security system and the INPS /National Social Security Institute/, all of which will make it possible to impact significantly the operation of some of the more critical of our mechanisms of expenditure.

For the purposes of organizing the work of Parliament, the government will moreover request that the time left over from the budget session also be utilized for the other bills on which a renewed initiative in the areas of employment and investment in the South largely depends. The government has deemed it necessary to anticipate--in the form of a decree-law--the special plan for youth employment in the South, with the aim of making at least a part of the appropriation already authorized for 1985 available for spending; but it is now essential that the plan be approved in its entirety in the form of a law, so as to make available the appropriations destined for the subsequent years. The bill to reorganize the labor market--which is still in its first reading in the Chamber of Deputies--must, however, also be approved together with the developmental contracts, the new law concerning the South and the law concerning Calabria, all of which have already received Senate approval and are dramatically and urgently needed to put an end to a period of stagnation that has already lasted too long.

I am well aware that the measures indicated are more than sufficient to occupy the few weeks that separate us from year's end. However, I cannot neglect to mention the commitment just assumed by the groups of the majority to expedite the bill concerning the office of the prime minister; the commitment, shared by everyone, to reform the local autonomous entities; and the urgent need for putting an end as soon as possible to the temporary administration of the mixed radio and television system, not to mention the measures concerning housing; the ecology; the measures concerning the system of justice; the new currency regulations; and the urgent antidrug measures that were already partially acted upon for 1985.

Without a large measure of collaboration from the Parliament--a collaboration that involves not only the majority--all roads will be very difficult to travel, if not downright impassible. I hope that a more direct and more constructive dialogue can be initiated--a comparison of positions that is less subjected to rigid prejudgments and more open to the possibility of consensuses and joint decisions.

The government proclaims its readiness now and henceforth to undertake a search for agreements that would facilitate rapid approval of the basic laws and most significant measures. Just as in foreign policy there are major objectives the pursuit of which requires the widest possible national participation, so do domestic, economic, social and institutional questions also involve objectives and needs that are of such pronounced and obvious general interest as to require from everyone the strongest commitment and the fullest exercise of their own responsibilities.

Honorable Colleagues, the government will seek to keep abreast of the situation and of the commitments that relate to it. In difficult situations the government has shown itself capable of making difficult decisions. In a situation of crisis it was able rapidly to find the way to achieve clarification and understanding, inasmuch as this was required, first and foremost, by the general interests of the nation.

This morning, following an illuminating debate, I asked the Chamber to ratify and renew its vote of confidence in that government.

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PCI AMENDMENT STALLS HEALTH REFORM LEGISLATION

Milan L'ESPRESSO in Italian 3 Nov 85 pp 41-48

[Article by Cristina Mariotti: "All for a few more USLs ...."]

[Text] More authority for technicians and less arbitrary placement: that is what the mini-reform in the health care delivery system was supposed to be all about. Comes now a PCI amendment that puts the reform on ice for another 3 months.

It is easy to come up with elegant hypotheses, to believe in total revolutions, to dream of an end to chaos and the dawning of an ideal order.

In the local health units (USLs) we hoped for, there would be no more stressful waiting-lines, no interminable waiting-lists, no hurried doctors, no brutal nurses, no corrupt or absentee office staffers. All this, if the politicians would only wave their wands in the right direction, could in very short order, become reality.

We are told so by Confindustria, which has developed an optimal model for operation of the health-delivery machine at the lowest reasonable cost: it was unveiled at a conference at Milan's Bocconi Institute at the start of the academic year. At the heart of the new, counter-reformed plan would be the patient-as-customer. He/she would always be right, as if in an up-scale shop concerned with its public image. Those who are dissatisfied can protest, threaten, or actually bring suit for damages, as people do in American TV movies. Upon discharge from hospital, the patient will fill in a report card, saying what he thinks of everything about his stay: food, cleanliness,timeliness of diagnosis, nurses' attitudes toward patients. USLs that accumulate too many complaints will have their budgets cut and their staffs put on probation with automatic and immediate loss of incentive pay. If the customers are satisfied, the Usl will get more money, more investments, more bonuses.

In Confindustria's Utopia, would USLs be permitted to compete with one another for more clients and more 4-star ratings? "That sounds

like a fair assumption -- all it would take is the political will to make it happen," declared Marco Campari, director of the National Diagnostic Center in Milan, one of whose undertakings is programming the new breed of health managers.

Ah, yes: the political will. But how much of that is there? As of now, after years of invective and promises and reams of reform plans (a good 14 in all), it is down to zero. A short time ago, the government's bill was introduced in the Chamber, where it sank in a sea of apathy. And yet it did not claim to revolutionize anything, but merely to put off, for a while, the fateful day when the Chamber would have to take a stand on the health issue. The upshot? For another 90 days the whole question is relegated to the deep-freeze, under a special extension: the old USL councils, which only a few months ago everybody seemed bound and determined to do away with, have been sentenced to stay alive. And who was it who introduced the torpedo amendment that scuttled the fragile mini-reform bark? None other than the PCI itself, the very party that has always been first to excoriate log-rolling.

"To tell the truth, in this latter all the modifications attached by the PCI went in the opposite direction," explains Health Undersecretary Francesco De Lorenzo (Liberal), "Did the bill propose installing political directors at the more profligate USLs ? No, they said. Did it call for prefessional auditors? The Communists were against that. Did it essay to establish the principle of a majority that would run things and a minority to keep an eye on them, as is the rule in all democratic agencies? On that count, too, they introduced a counter-amendment designed to revive "consociative participation," which has become a synonym for inaction, lethargy, and lethal erosion of accountability." And, as the latest blow, comes the amendment -- also signed by the PCI -- which, when the chamber approved it, distorted the whole thrust of the bill and forced Health Minister Costante Degan to withdraw it. "Management committee chairmen are to be chosen from among the members of the communal council," the Communists stipulated. In short, a paradigm of log-rolling.

This week's explanation: The PCI, which held a majority of [USL] committee chairmanships in all the major cities (Naples, Rome, Florence, Bologna, Genoa, Turin), following the 12 May defeat, was forced to abandon a lot of its fortified bastions. Hence the "continuity" orientation of some amendments. Probably, though, the forces that hurled Degan's fragile bark onto the rocks are considerably more complex. How many snipers were camouflaged among the very parties that had already signed the agreement on the bill?

"All you have to do is add up the numbers," says Maria Pia Garavaglia, DC chairman of the Chamber's Health Commission, "to see that that amendment was passed not only by those who wanted no change of any kind, but also by those who scorned it as futile, too weak to do the job, and lacking in innovative content."

And yet, only a few months ago, under fire from citizens exasperated at the scandals and reports of waste, not to mention the shortcomings of an increasingly unreliable service, all of them had vowed: either we shall succeed in straightening up the 700 health facilities that are devouring resources in excess of 40 billion lire yet fail to provide acceptable services, or we shall simply shut them down. Yet there were those who wanted to make them into special autonomous agencies, into mini-National Research Centers (CNRs); others thought it would be better to restructure them along the lines of the municipalized clinics and hire professional managers to run them; there were even those who threatened to abolish them altogether -- maybe by way of a referendum.

As things stand now, those pressing hardest for abolition of the Usls are the physicians. At the Rome Polyclinic, they are furious. The funding isn't there, and organization is as bad as it possible could be. On Wednesday 16 October, a surgeon had to interrupt an operating-room procedure and send his assistant high-tailing it out to a drugstore to buy suture silk, because the operating room had run out and the supply room had issued its last spool. "He had to pay for it out of his own pocket," says Deputy Director of Health Carmine Cavalotti who, along with colleagues from his office, fired off a tape-recorded protest to the Region: Either give us the funds, or we'll shut up shop. "Believe it: we had already decided to clear the wards and send everybody home -- doctors and patients alike. Any service that cannot guarantee even minimal levels of care ought to declare bankruptcy and be done with it." At the Polyclinic, they are already more than 2 billion lire over budget, and the fiscal year still has more than 2 months to run.

"Till now, we were counting on credit," they say in the director's office, "but the management committee got the wind up and blocked the funds."

The way things are, at least at the Rome Polyclinic, seems to be a long, long way from the model of efficiency and simplification proposed by Confindustria. "Here, if you want to buy so much as a pair of surgical gloves," the doctors agree, "you have to go through countless administrative channels -- five or six -- and each of them takes an average of 2 weeks' time. Yet if we do run out of sutures or reagents for blood tests, somebody might well die."

What the doctors are stumping for is a clear dividing-line between the two levels of the USL structure, with the political side to be farmed out to the management committees and the operations side entrusted entirely to the professionals. They contemplate a main office staffed by administrative and health-care managers capable of getting all the cogs and wheels of the machine run smoothly.

"I agree that to run the health-care system as it ought to be run we have to reassess the role of the technicians," says the PCI's expert, Iginio Ariemma, skipping over the anti-reform behavior of his fellow-deputies in the Chamber: ("A poorly formulated amendment," is his comment), and he goes on: "In my view, an efficient health service should take on some of the behavioral standards and methods common in the private sector. For example, freedom to hire ranking outside experts on short-term contracts, so as to check out their performance and competence. Even a staff physician, as I see it, could be hired or reconfirmed in his post every 4 or 5 years, as is done in other countries as a matter of routine. And these same standards of performance should be extended uniformly to all hirings: operating-rooms or laboratories, like the divisions of a highly specialized industrial plant, should operate at full speed, thereby raising the overall productivity index. Every department, every medical unit, should keep track -- even if it takes a computer to do it, of costs and receipts. and each should plan a tailor-made budget, cutting back on services or expanding them, according to circumstances. Whatever savings resulted would be reinvested to improve the plant or redistributed in the form of incentive pay to the most capable."

Ariemma's formula resembles the model of Confindustria's dreams, and its thrust is identical: offer satisfactory services at lower cost. And to the Communist leader, as to the Confindustria experts, the key figure in the new USL structure must be theindividual staff physician, the one man who could save the National Health Service enormous sums by common-sense evaluation of patients and restrictions on laboratory analyses and prescriptions, medication, and hospitalization. Sheer fantasy? A very recent report, sent (FYI) to the Botteghe Oscure as well, from one staff physician at San Camillo's hospital in Rome, complains: "The staff physician does not even know how many patients he has; if he wanted to find out, he would have to make the rounds of each of the 20 USLs in the capital." That is why patients are not charged uniform fees, "barring compensation." Result? Five and a half million patients in Lazio, out of a population of 5 million citizens, are treated free. The staff physician farms out patients in a venal "arrangement" with the health system. The staff physician is a "multiplier" of expenditures, the fly-wheel to the merry-go-round that spins out 400 billion lire for the health system to squander: he hands out prescriptions by the dozen, orders patients admitted to hospital for such minor ailments as bronchitis. In sober fact, though, if the man does not know how many patients he has, how can he reasonably be charged with delivering "excessive services"?

One USL chairman once tried to find out just what was going on, using available computer facilities. Answer: the staff doctors in his unit were handing out 20 prescriptions per patient per day, all year 'round. When apprised of that audit, they wrote fewer prescriptions, and saved more than 3 billion lire.

That brings us to the pathological dysfunctions: nursing-homes that treat long-term patients as if they were intensive-care cases and charge very fat fees for doing so; and -- we learn from a report from the Rome Surgeon-General's office -- there are phantom laboratories that produce "a tenth of what they cost," while the outside specialists wax fat; then there is the personnel problem: invariably too many or too few people, but none of them can be transfered; overtime work is an "independent variable" by comparison with the quality of work, and a cost factor that continues inexorably to rise.

That is not to mention -- this from a report by the Health Ministry -- fraud, the traffic in phony prescriptions, the drugs sold on the black market, the padded bills, the inflated investment claims, and more: theft, peculation, bribes for contract awards, and "incentives" from the pharmaceutical companies to prescribe their products. A thousand instances of unethical practices, documented by two investigating commissions and by inquiries conducted by Carabinieri substance-alteration units, have been gathered into a file kept by the central Health Planning Office. This year, though, to make life a little harder for the cheats, the Ministry has aquired a new investigative tool: a quarterly X-ray of every USL's books. If one hospital spends half a billion lire to whitewash a wing and another manages to renovate a whole pavilion for less, which is the more deserving? The performance parameter had already been written into the Health Plan bill enacted last June providing that, below the mean levels of productivity (and the mean for the public sector is considerably lower than that found in the private sector, by 56 as against 85 percent), a department or even an entire hospital will be ordered to close. The Plan lays down the law on a lot of other matters as well: average length of stay, bed turnover, top limits on spending, transferability of personnel, and even competition with private hospitals. The USL, says the law, can offer services for payment, upgrade amenities in their short-term facilities, and earn enough money to enable them to finance new investment.

Will the Plan succeed in getting the derelict medicine show back on the road? In mid-October, 300 USL administrators gathered in Bari to talk about that very thing, at the invitation of the National Association of Italian Communes (ANCI). The tone of the debate ? Acrimonious. Especially when they found out that, with the fragile bark of mini-reform lost at sea, they were doomed to stay on the job for another 90 days, their hands tied, powerless to make even the slightest decision, and bade to sit tight and keep their seats safely warm until the time came for relegating them to the attic.

[Boxed material] All the Figures on the Disaster (by C.M.)

The health-care delivery system is in the red: the 1985 books already show a deficit of more than 2 trillion lire. If Health Minister Costante Degan does not find the missing money very quickly there will be a shutdown of hospitals and clinics in a great many regions. But behold! Meanwhile, the ink still wet on the report from the Planning Office in Costante Degan's ministry reveals its bottom line on the operation of the 1984 performance of the nation's 700 Usla. The first point it makes is that the National Health Service has heightened and, in some instances aggravated the anti-reform unfairness and arbitrariness. What we have here is a health-care jungle that divides Italians into poor people on welfacre and rich people with insurance, offering to one group better health-care at lower cost and to the rest more risk than certainty at very high prices.

Roughly speaking, health-care, like taxes, can be broken down on a regional basis into three categories: North, Center, and South. There is one cluster of regions (Friuli, Lazio, Liguria, Tuscany, and the Marches) spend much more per capita than the nationsl means a second group stick to the guideline of 648,ooo lire per capita per year (they are Venezia, Abruzzo, Umbria, Piedmont, Lombardy, Apulia, and the Val d'Aosta). Lastly, bringing up the rear, come the South and the islands, which spend less than the mean. Among the most spendthrift regions is Lazio, which soaks up a tenth of the national health budget, around 4 trillion lire of it, is certainly a paragon of poor management. Liguria is in part justified for spending so much because its population is older and needier, and therefore requires more health care. In Tuscany, though, the USLs spend a lot of money, but offer a broader and more efficient range of services.

Although funded under the old system (which in practice means bottom-line billing for services, in the absence of any semblance of a [national] health plan at all, and hence of any health planning), "the 1984 fiscal year," we learn from the report, "ended with a narrowing of the gap around the national mean." That means that the health-care delivery system in Italy is a little fairer, even though the two tips of the pincers are still very far apart: Friuli, which spends 20 percent more than the mean (779,000 lire per capita), and Calabria, which spends 17 percent less per capita than the naional mean (538,000 lire per capita). The booby prize goes to Calabria, but that can be explained as part of the underdeveloped syndrome so pervasive in health-care delivery systems in the South in general.

To restore the balance between public and private sectors (in the South the private sector handles close to 50 percent of the demand) the Health Ministry report suggests pruning away the dead branches and beefing up the specialties that, at least until now, are still competitive: cardiology, cardiac surgery, and hematology.

Allocation of Chairmanships by Party


POLTRONE E PARTITI
USL
1. DC 374
3. PSI 125
4. PCI 117
2. PLI 1
5. PSDI 15
6. PRI 7
Liste locali e indipendenti 8
Ecco come sono distribuite, per partito di appartenenza, le presidenze delle 700 Usl d'Italia.

Local and Independent Lists

This is how the chairmanships of Italy's 700 USLs are parcelled out according to party affiliation

Key:
1. Christian Democrat Party
2. Italian Socialist Party
3. Italian Communist Party
4. Italian Republican Party
5. Italian Liberal Party

6182
CSO: 3528/14

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI REGISTERS 20,000 NEW MEMBERS IN OCTOBER

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 9 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] Another 20,000 citizens joined the PCI in 1985. That is the most significant datum in the final count as of the end of October. That brings the sum-total of card-carrying members to 1,588,376, or 98.05 percent of our strength in 1984. Of them, 422,898 were women, making them 26.62 percent of our membership. Those who took out their first PCI cards this year numbered 60,490. There was a clear recovery by comparison with where we stood at the end of September. As of then, we were short about 51,000 members if we were to match the 1984 mark; today we need only 31,000 to reach it. Of the 20,000 who renewed or picked up their cards in October, more than 8,000 were women, and 2,800 registered for the first time.

Last year's membership levels have already been reached by five regions: Abruzzo, Calabria, Basilicata, Molise, and Sardinia.. All told, 40 federations matched or topped that level: Isernia, Sassari, Avezzano, Avellino, Frosinone, Potenza, Cosenza, Latina, Nuoro, Rieti, Capo d'Orlando, Enna, Macerata, Castelli, Carbonia, Tivoli, Benevento, Brindisi, Terni, Ragusa, Pordenone, Salerno, Teramo, Oristano, Trento, Lucca, Lecce, Chieti, Catanzaro, Pescara, Grosseto, Sondrio, Venezia, Gorizia, Arezzo, Campobasso, Viterbo, and, from abroad, Belgium, Lausanne, and Luxembourg.

The drive to complete the 1985 enrolment campaign is currently being fullowed up by activities on the part of party organizations for the 1986 membership campaign, launched on 1 November with "Ten Days of Overtime." Comrade Elio Ferraris, who heads the central organizing sector, had this to say about these latest figures: "We registered fewer members again this year than in 1984. These are not satisfactory figures, as we had found at the national leadership meeting on party problems. These latest figures show, however, that the membership loss is not irreversible. If there is a strong and intelligent commitment, we can achieve our goal of restoring and improving relations between the mass of the Party and the decision-making strata of the society. I believe the figures, including the disappointing ones, made public have helped to stimulate not only some hard thinking, but more action on the part of our organizations.

6182

CSO: 3528/14

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

GOVERNMENT, PARTY SPOKESMEN ON REFORMS IN SURINAME

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 27 Nov 85 pp 1-2

[Excerpt]

T h e H a g u e, November 26 - The Dutch government [illegible] offered to talks with all those taking part in Surinam's new political dialogue to obtain clarification on reforms announced by military ruler Desi Bouterse this week.

The foreign ministry spokesman, announcing this, said the Netherlands was disappointed that the announcement heralded no concrete steps for an early return to democracy.

The wording seemed to imply that there will be no early resumption of aid payments frozen since 15 of Bouterse's opponents were executed in December 1982.

The Dutch have said since 1982 that 'concrete steps towards democracy' were the precondition for resuming an aid programme worth 1.6 billion guilders (550 million dollars) to Surinam.

The ministry's comment followed news that Bouterse and the main political parties had agreed to work towards introducing a new constitution and a form of representative government by April 1987.

Aims Welcomed

The foreign ministry spokesman said: 'We are happy to see a realisation of the need for peaceful change in Surinam, but we are a little disappointed there have been no concrete steps towards democracy, no firm words on consulting the people'.

However, the Dutch government noted that the dialogue started in September between the military authorities and political parties had now led to a reform plan which aimed at a broadly-based political renewel, he said.

The Netherlands was also pleased to note that participants aimed to guarantee a state of law and a peaceful transition to democracy and social justice, the spokesman added.

In parliament here, the major parties reacted sceptically to Surinam's announcement of reforms aimed at 'genuine democracy'.

Labour spokesman Henk Knol said that Saturday's accord aiming at a new constitution and a representative government by 1987 signified 'little or nothing'.

He warned the Second Chamber it would have to be 'doubly watchful' as Bouterse could seek to legitimise his position by using the 'old' political leaders.

'Nothing New'

Knol said the offer of new democratic relations was 'nothing new', as such promises had also been made when the cabinet under Prime Minister Wim Udenhout came to power at the beginning of this year.

Liberal spokesman Frans Weisglas said there could be no question of restoring Dutch development aid to Surinam, as the new reform plan in no way represented the 'concrete steps towards a restoration of democracy and a state of law'.

Weisglas added that he saw the accord as positive in itself and hoped that it would lead to a return to democracy.

He welcomed the participation of the 'old' political parties, but added that the reform plan was too vague, especially on the question of how the Surinam people would be consulted on the composition of a new government and the future role of the military.

Christian Democratic spokesman Harry Aarts said restoration of Dutch aid to Surinam now would be premature.

Aarts advised that the Netherlands should await further developments in the dialogue between the military and leading political figures to gain an insight into how much influence the latter would gain on policy.

He stressed that the CDA demanded concrete reforms towards democracy such as a constitution, elections and freedom of the press as a condition for resumption of Dutch aid.

/13046
CSO: 3600/17

BRIEFS

COALITION GAINS IN POLL--Hilversum, November 25--The ruling Christian Democrat (CDA) and Liberal Parties are regaining popularity and would win half of the seats in the 150-member Second Chamber if elections were held now, an opinion poll released by the Vara broadcasting corporation over the weekend shows. In an election poll results would have produced the following distribution of seats among the major political parties (September 1982 election results in brackets): Christian Democrats 46 (45), Labour 58 (47), Liberals 29 (36). The poll conducted by the Inter/View Bureau showed a loss of one seat for the Pacifist Socialist Party (3 seats), while the Communist Party (CPN) would lose two seats (3). The results for other small left and small right parties showed little change from present parliamentary representation. Inter/View said the tide had turned in favour of the ruling coalition at the beginning of summer when the Christian Democrats started to regain ground. It said the poll had shown that former Liberal leader Hans Wiegel, at present the Queen's Commissioner (governor) for Friesland enjoyed greater voter confidence than current VVD leader Ed Nijpels. [Text] [The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 25 Nov 85 pp 5-6] /13046

CSO: 3600/16

POLITICAL NORWAY

GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS NUCLEAR FREEZE POLICY IN UN

Storting Agrees on Policy

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Morten Malmo: "Norway Votes for UN 'Freeze'"]

[Text] All parties in Storting with the exception of the Progressive Party now support a vote by Norway in favor of a UN proposal to freeze nuclear arsenals. In its explanation of the vote Norway will stress that the country supports what is known as a "negotiated freeze." Both Foreign Minister Svenn Stray and his predecessor in the Foreign Ministry, Knut Frydenlund (Labor), view the resolution of the controversy on the freeze issue as an important contribution to greater agreement on Norway's foreign and security policies.

Norway has voted no and abstained from voting in the past when the Swedish-Mexican freeze proposal came up in the United Nations. One of the reasons why Norway can vote for the proposal now is that passages in the proposal criticizing the United States and praising the Soviet Union have been removed. The government parties started to clear up this issue in earnest last Thursday when the government's Foreign and Security Policy Committee met. This committee consists of Prime Minister Kare Willoch, Foreign Minister Svenn Stray, Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad, Church and Education Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, Transportation Minister Johan J. Jakobsen and undersecretaries Nils Morten Udgaard and Thorbjorn Froysnes. The committee met again yesterday and the parliamentary leaders of the government parties and the chairman of Storting's Foreign Policy Committee, Jan Petersen (Conservative) attended the meeting and joined in the discussion. The final solution was arrived at as a result of this meeting and yesterday afternoon the decision was presented to Storting's expanded Foreign Policy and Constitutional Committee. It was necessary to deal with the matter so quickly because the freeze issue could come up before the UN's first committee as early as today.

Solution

The three government parties agreed on the following six points concerning the freeze issue:

This time Mexico's UN resolution proposal for a nuclear freeze gives support to the talks that are taking place in Geneva. Therefore Norway also regards this as support for a negotiated freeze. This is the type of freeze Norway can support. Reference was made in this context to Storting Report S 225 (1983-84).

Norway stands behind the strategy of the western alliance and disagrees with the references in the resolution to nuclear deterrence. Norway does not agree that "nuclear deterrence has increased the risk that nuclear war will break out and has led to greater insecurity and instability in international politics." In this context too, reference was made to the report mentioned above, S 225 (1983-84).

Norway stands behind NATO's dual decision which is also aimed at negotiations for the purpose of reducing the danger of nuclear war in Europe. Therefore Norway's vote does not involve any criticism of the countries that are implementing this decision or of other related NATO decisions.

With reference to the above points, which will be stressed in an explanation of the vote, the conclusion is that Norway can vote for this resolucion proposal. This position will be discussed with Storting's expanded Foreign Policy Committee before it is made final.

There is agreement that Norway must stress unified conduct in NATO in support of the western negotiators during their talks on disarmament and arms control.

The government supports the Foreign Ministry's letter of 16 April 1985 to Storting concerning SDI and the government has no comment to make on recent statements from official Norwegian sources on this matter.

Positive

The parliamentary leaders of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, Harald Synnes and Johan Buttedahl, said they were both satisfied with the result. Buttedahl did not think the statement last weekend by his party colleague, Ragnhild Q. Haarstad, that she would bring down the government unless it voted for the freeze in the United Nations had influenced the negotiations among the government parties. "We had a preliminary course ready before the weekend," Buttedahl said.

The Labor Party and SV [Socialist Left Party] expressed satisfaction with the government's decision. The deputy leader of Storting's Foreign Policy Committee, Knut Frydenlund (Labor), pointed out that the government has to take into account the opinions held by the majority of Storting members. "That is a necessity if they want to pursue a fixed foreign policy," Frydenlund

said. SV's parliamentary leader, Hanna Kvanmo, is also satisfied although she did not care for all parts of the vote explanation. SV will now decide whether to withdraw the party's proposal calling on Norway to vote for the freeze in the United Nations. Bjorn Erling Ytterhorn of the Progressive Party felt the freeze proposal is in direct conflict with NATO's dual decision and that implementing the proposal would solidify Soviet superiority. "I hope the government's stand does not mean that Storting representatives Lars Velsand and Ragnhild Q. Haarstad are now steering the government's defense and security policies," Ytterhorn said.

Vraalsen Votes at Meeting

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Nov 84 p 8

[Article by correspondent John Crowo: "UN General Assembly Vote"]

> [Text] Washington, 20 Nov--On Wednesday evening Norway voted for a UN resolution to freeze the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons but abstained from voting on another proposal and voted against a third.

In the explanation of the Norwegian vote, UN Ambassador Tom Vraalsen made it clear that the Norwegian government feels that a verifiable nuclear freeze could be an important part of the efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles in the world.

Although the text of the resolution does not harmonize with Norway's views on a number of points, the Norwegian government has decided to vote for the proposal anyway, he said.

NATO Supported

Norway supports NATO's defense strategy and therefore cannot accept the view that dependence on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has increased the risk of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations.

"Therefore the Norwegian vote cannot be presented as a criticism of the countries that have implemented NATO's dual decision or of other decisions agreed on by the western defense alliance," said Vraalsen.

First Time

This is the first time Norway has voted for a freeze proposal. Last year Norway abstained from voting on a somewhat similar proposal.

It was the so-called Swedish-Mexican proposal Norway decided to vote for this time. The proposal was passed by 113 to 11 votes with six countries abstaining. Most of Norway's NATO allies were among those voting against the proposal: Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Portugal, Turkey,

Great Britain and the United States. Israel and Japan also voted against the proposal.

The six countries abstaining were the Bahamas, China, Iceland, Luxembourg, Ireland and Spain.

Other Proposals

An Indian freeze proposal was adopted by 110 to 12 votes with eight countries abstaining. Here Norway was among those who abstained from voting. Norway voted against a Soviet proposal. This was passed by 101 to 17 votes while eight countries voted against it [as published].

The tendency for this year's freeze proposals in the United Nations was that all the proposals received somewhat more support than they did last year.

6578
CSO: 3639/41

POLITICAL PORTUGAL

LATEST POLL RESULTS ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 24 Nov 85 p 5

[Excerpt] The results of polls carried out by Pluriteste and Norma for the EXPRESSO and SEMANARIO newspapers show that Freitas do Amaral will be the candidate who will receive the most votes in the first round of the presidential elections, with the possibility that he will go on to the second round, together with Francisco Salgado Zenha. According to the Norma poll, the former PS official is in second place with 19.4 percent of the votes, as against Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, who gathers 18 percent. Mario Soares is in fourth place among the various candidates, with only 8.9 percent. In the Pluriteste poll, which, unlike the Norma poll, includes also Porto, Coimbra, Evora, Vila Real and Viseu besides Lisbon, Freitas do Amaral receives 38.7 percent of the vote, Lourdes Pintasilgo 22.8 percent, Zenha 16.3 percent and Maria Soares 8.3 percent. Moreover, according to the same poll, Mario Soares lost 11.3 percentage points in one month, while Lourdes Pintasilgo lost 13 percentage points; these votes could all go to Salgado Zenha.

It is interesting to note in the Norma poll that Lourdes Pintasilgo lost 6.6 percentage points following Salgado Zenha's interview with the RTP [Portuguese Radio and Television], and that 24.9 percent of the persons polled did not respond.

The differences between the percentages of Freitas do Amaral in the two polls--taking only Lisbon into account--(37.3 percent according to the Norma poll and 23.7 percent according to the Pluriteste one) is in fact difficult to explain, since it amounts to 13.6 percent. However, one must not forget that the number of persons who did not respond or who did not support any candidate is 15.8 percent in Lisbon, according to the Norma poll, and 24.9 percent according to the Pluriteste poll.

It should also be mentioned that the two polls have a 5 percent margin of error.

/7358
CSO: 3542/38

NATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL POLL: FREITAS DO AMARAL AHEAD

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 7 Dec 85 p 64

[Text] According to a nationwide poll conducted by the NORMA firm between 25 and 30 November, Freitas do Amaral firmly stays in first place following Salgado Zenha's entrance into the presidential race.

According to the results of this poll, which was commissioned by the Freitas do Amaral candidacy office, vote distribution in the first round would be the following: Freitas do Amaral, 30 percent; Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, 20 percent; Salgado Zenha, 20 percent; Mario Soares, 18 percent; others, 0.3 percent; undecided or not responding, 20 percent. Compared with the results of another poll conducted in October, the present poll's results show that Zenha stole votes from Mario Soares (about 4 percent), from Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo (7 percent), and from the undecided (5 percent), besides having received votes that would have gone to other candidates (2 percent).

In the first round, Zenha would receive 43 percent of the communist vote. If eligible for the second round, this candidate could receive more than 80 percent of the votes of the Communist Party. The rest of those voting for Zenha would come mainly from the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] which, together with the PCP, constitutes almost the totality of his electorate.

The votes of the PRD and the APU are divided between Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo and Salgado Zenha. These two parties constitute, once again, almost the totality of these candidates' potential electorate in the first round.

The PS electorate is the main support of Mario Soares' candidacy, remaining faithful to its historic leader. Some of the undecided may join the PS voters.

Compared to previous polls, Freitas do Amaral's vote coming from the PRD, the PS, and those abstaining has risen, even though the largest numbers of his potential voters come from the PSD and the CDS electorate. Thus, this candidate seems to be sure of a significant number of votes throughout the democratic electorate.

Following the demonstrations of support in this pre-campaign phase, especially among university students, more than 30 percent of the voters between 18 and 34 years of age have already stated they would vote for Freitas do Amaral. In regional terms, Salgado Zenha and Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo are the main beneficiaries of the vote in the southern part of the country, where the PCP electorate comes first in the first round.

The distribution of the vote is balanced in the city of Porto in regard to the four main candidates, even though Freitas do Amaral would receive more than one-third of the vote.

In this same poll, conducted among 1,000 individuals 18 or over throughout the mainland, the majority of the voters stated they intend to exercise their prerogative. Only about 7 percent have no intention of voting, while 10 percent are still undecided, and 3 percent did not respond. The tendency to abstain is higher in the northern part of the country and in the less developed regions. The same is true among voters 55 or over who are illiterate or have only an elementary education.

/6091
CSO: 3542/49

INTRIGUING POSSIBILITY OF CAVACO-SOARES ALLIANCE ANALYZED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 30 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "The Cavaco-Soares Alliance"]

[Text] Six weeks ago, the resurgence of the AD seemed inevitable.

Cavaco Silva had won the parliamentary elections and was preparing to support Freitas do Amaral, who made no secret of the fact that he intended to reunite the two parties of the right.

On the other hand, the CDS, having lost at the polls, seemingly had no other alternative than to join the PSD in order to attempt a return to government.

Six weeks later, the situation appears significantly changed; not many people seem to have understood this.

The issue is that Adriano Moreira has become the CDS leader; and Adriano Moreira is not Lucas Pires, and not even Freitas do Amaral.

With Freitas do Amaral, Francisco Sa Carneiro was able to establish the Democratic Alliance.

It would have been possible for Cavaco Silva to found a "new Democratic Alliance" with Lucas Pires.

But can Cavaco resurrect the AD with Adriano Moreira?

It is very doubtful.

The PSD leader has insisted on stating at various times that he bears no similarity to Dr Oliveira Salazar. Under these circumstances, it is not very probable that he would feel at ease to form a government with a former minister of the Coimbra professor.

What will he then do?

There are various hypotheses, but there is a particular one that merits attention at this time.

Let us suppose that Francisco Salgado Zenha wins the presidential elections, defeating, besides Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, both Mario Soares and Freitas do Amaral. Should this come to pass, Cavaco's minoritarian government would immediately be threatened.

Naturally, the PRD and the PCP would begin talking of early elections, in an attempt to take advantage of the victory in the presidential elections in order to modify in their favor the balance of forces in Parliament.

And here is where the following question must be asked: To whom would Cavaco Silva and Mario Soares turn in order to face the assault of the communists and the "renewers"?

To whom would the present leader of the PSD turn if, as is probable, he would refuse to tie his fate to that of Prof Adriano Moreira?

The answer does not seem too difficult.

Thus, we are facing a situation in which Salgado Zenha's candidacy (which creates a "new majority of the left") and Adriano Moreira's elevation to the Christian Democrats' leadership (which contributes to making the CDS the "party of the right") have created a possibility that was unthinkable 6 weeks ago: The hypothesis of an alliance between Prof Cavaco Silva and Dr Mario Soares, as the sole way to resist the storm.

/6091
CSO: 3542/49

POLITICAL PORTUGAL

UNDERMINING TACTICS SEEN OPENING WAY FOR 'POPULAR FRONT'

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 28 Nov 85 p 8

[Article by Antonio Marques Bessa: "The Preparation of the 'Popular Front'"]

[Text] A well-known technique of contemporary political action has been applied to Portugal for a long time. This technique comprises the selective attack on certain institutions considered important in the plan for the defense of society. This is an intelligent, subtle, well-orchestrated attack in the various mass media which slowly wears down the efficacy of the institution.

False news is circulated, unfounded accusations proliferate, the institution is accused of being dangerous, of harboring dubious intentions, and its modification, its transformation is demanded. Normally, the change of its cadre is demanded so that they can be replaced by others who are more "attuned" to the wave length of the attackers.

This maneuvering was established by an Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, who pondered deeply over the conditions in Italian society. He thought that communism was not advancing fast enough, and that this was due to the resistance of society's key institutions. He therefore believed that the best way was to attack and disorient these institutions, so as to leave defenseless both society and the state.

In Western societies, the state is defended by a series of powerful institutions possessing their own vitality and their own ends, which are genuine trenches. Gramsci thought that it was urgent to capture these trenches and use them as the basis for the assault on the state. He entrusted this task on the organization he called "the new prince," that is, the total of the new forces bent on conquering the state. As is obvious, this new prince is the Communist Party, a new master of souls and mental goods, hopes and paradises.

Change the Beliefs

Within this plan, it is most important to possess the foundations on which are built the mass media, in order to change the main orientations

of the national culture, casting doubt on, or doing away with, values, principles and ethics, as well as their representatives: the saints, the heroes, the good men.

Once culture has been weakened and replaced by other principles, people no longer have reasons to fight: they do not believe in the homeland, in God, in the value of life, in property, in fatherhood, in the common heritage. They believe in other things, that have been slowly infiltrating their consciousness through the schools and the mass media, things that do not justify fights, struggles and death in combat. This new culture is that of the pacifist movements, of the homosexuals, of the procurers, of marginalism and of a permissive internationalism that does not have friends or enemies.

The key institutions thus become ripe for the attack. The main target is the Army. Lenin taught that without it nothing can be achieved. The leadership must be attacked and mastered, the intelligent and healthy chiefs who refuse to collaborate in such a campaign must be resented and eliminated and, finally, operational points and some bases must be obtained. If the army cannot be controlled, it must at least be made inoperative or neutral.

This leaves the University and the Church. Each one, in its own way, organizes knowledge and morals and deeply ties itself to the roots of society. Under assault, the University becomes factious because it is infiltrated. It starts teaching new myths and becomes a powerful instrument for the destruction of the old forms of society. As the center of knowledge, its function is to create and disseminate the new ideas and to abolish the old ones. Thus the training of cadres destined to fill important positions in the bureaucracy and the parties is ensured.

For the same reasons, the Church must lose its influence aimed at resisting the invasion of materialism and totalitarianism by the new prince. Either through infiltration or the effect of new ideas, many of which were obtained through the adroit manipulation of the Vatican Council of 20 years ago, the Church becomes less able to defend Catholic morality and even itself. The faithful and society thus are more vulnerable to the attraction presented by the new prince's ideology, which promises abundance, peace and equality, right here in this world. Abortion, drugs and the sects are all elements of this plan of action.

The Inevitable Defense

Institutions must defend themselves from this attack, preserving their traditional objectives and understanding the nature of the attack. It is important to understand the attempt at domination canalized through the mass media, an attempt which assumes new and attractive models aimed at replacing the old ones, which are also important defense trenches.

The new prince is a black prince and his strategy of pseudo-progressivism is, in reality, a mere establishment of Slav concentrationism in the forms

most repugnant to European individualism, to the respect for others' life and to the basic rights on which it is founded. This prince has found vassals and collaborators everywhere and in every milieu, but he has also come across the resistance of the institutions and the people. Meanwhile, today, following an intense Gramsci-style preparation, the black prince already finds the political society prepared for a "frontist" rehearsal, with a presidential candidacy used as the pole of attraction. This political rehearsal follows the task of weakening the civil society through its economic and moral proletarization.

Obviously, results do not depend exclusively on the technique, and both institutions and voters are still in time to understand that the "popular front," allied to and supported by a bloc of national salvation, never saved anyone. Historically, it has been the prelude of civil war and of dangerous confrontation.

/9604
CSO: 3542/43

POLITICAL SPAIN

GONZALEZ LOSES POPULARITY AMONG VOTERS

Madrid EPOCA in Spanish 28 Oct 85 pp 14, 15

[Text] The personal image of Felipe Gonzalez (which is, by far, PSOE's [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] best electoral asset) is in jeopardy. A poll taken by the Gallup Institute for our magazine reveals that nearly half the voters are of the opinion that this image "has deteriorated," while only 16 percent think that it has improved and 34 percent believe that it has remained unchanged.

The question asked of those polled linked the change in the prime minister's personal image with the fulfillment of the electoral promises. The answers show that the majority of the citizens, including those who voted Socialist in 1982, think that the deterioration in the image has exceeded the improvement.

In the most favorable group, that of the ones who voted for the "change," 37 percent think that Felipe Gonzalez' image has deteriorated; as opposed to 23 percent who believe that it has improved, 37 percent who do not hold the one view or the other and 3 percent who made no statement.

The percentages are far more adverse for the prime minister among the other groups of voters. The most critical group is that of the Basque nationalists, among whom there are 66 percent noting a deterioration in the prime minister's image, followed by those who voted for UCD [Democratic Center Union] (61 percent), PCE [Spanish Communist Party]-PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (57 percent) and the Popular Coalition and CiU [Convergence and Unity], whose percentage (55) is the same. The disenchantment is shared by both the right, the center and the left. Only Adolfo Suarez' CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] disagrees, although the number in that group who think that there has been a deterioration in the image exceeds the average.

The Center's Annoyance

When the replies are grouped according to current voting intention, one can observe some surprises: among them, the change of attitude with respect to the group backing CDS.

Although Suarez' 1982 voters constitute the opposition group regarding Prime Minister Gonzalez' image with less apathy, Adolfo Suarez/ current "resources"

appear to be the group indicating a greater deterioration of the Socialist leader. This position coincides with the severe annoyance among center voters noted in the foregoing group, exceeding the displeasure that Felipe Gonzalez has evoked among the right wing voters. According to the poll, therefore, it was Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo who connected best with the opinion of the more moderate fringe of the electorate, upon dealing Gonzalez a harsh, brilliant dialectical chastisement. Suarez, on the other hand, repeated the harmony that he programmed at the beginning of this legislature, which by now has probably become obsolete for him.

After Suarez centrists, there is a very similar percentage associated with the observation of a deterioration in the prime minister on the part of the other opposition groups. Communists, left wing nationalists, Popular Coalition members, Reformists and right wing nationalists stand between 55 and 57 percent.

Even among those who intend to vote for PSOE in the next elections, there are 29 percent in whose view Felipe Gonzalez' image has deteriorated. Hence, his will be a vote "holding noses," as was recommended 10 years ago by Indro Montanelli with respect to the Italian Christian Democratic Party. That percentage exceeds the one of the Spaniards intending to vote Socialist who observe an improvement in the prime minister's image (27 percent); although the bulk of the future PSOE voters is found among those who note no change of image.

The Youth Are Not For Felipe

The group of responses based on work occupation shows that it is those working independently who most intensely detect a deterioration in Felipe Gonzalez. No fewer than 70 percent subscribe to that opinion.

Intermediate managers and business owners (the vast majority of the latter being small business owners, because they constitute 12.4 percent of those interviewed) are also very critical of the prime minister, who received appreciable support only among those categorized as "proletarians" (26.7 percent) among the individuals polled; in other words, in the least enlightened social group.

The analysis of the poll results based on age is most noteworthy. In a percentage considerably higher than that of the preceding generation, young Spaniards observe a deterioration in Felipe Gonzalez' image.

Among the men, that opinion is shared by 57 percent of single persons aged between 15 and 29 years; whereas only 42 percent of married persons 30 years old and over agree.

As for the women, 48 percent of the single ones between 15 and 29 years of age agree that Gonzalez has lost image; while only 39 percent of the married ones 30 years old and over agree with that view.

This particularly critical position on the part of the youth is confirmed when the responses of those polled (5.8 percent) who did not vote in 1982 because they had not reached the age of 18 are combined. In this group of new voters between ages 18 and 20 there are 49 percent who think that the prime minister of the government has lost image; as opposed to an average of 44 percent. Similarly, only 12 percent think that his image has improved, whereas the poll average is 16 percent.

Just as has occurred in France, the left has lost its attraction among the younger generation.

Technical Record

Sample: 1,036 individuals; environment: peninsular and Baleares Islands; universe: Spaniards aged 15 and over; interviews: personal, in the domiciles of those interviewed; selection: random, using the "random-route" method for selection of the household and the "Kish" method for that of the person interviewed; sampling points: 114 localities, distributed randomly after sampling stratification based on regions and habitat; field work: from 19 to 30 September 1985; margin of error: ± 3.2 percent, for a confidence level of 95.4 percent, and p = q = 50 percent; institution responsible for the resarch: Gallup, Inc, Spanish member of the Gallup International Organization.

Key to Chart

1. The Figures on the Disenchantment
2. Between the period when Felipe Gonzalez made electoral promises and the period of his performance as prime minister of the government, how do you think his personal image has changed: has it deteriorated, has it improved, or neither the one nor the other?
3. Total sample
4. It has deteriorated
5. Very much
6. Much
7. Not very much
8. Don't know/no answer
9. It has improved
10. Neither the one nor the other
11. Voting intention
12. Will not vote
13. Communists
14. PSOE[Spanish Socialist Workers Party]
15. CDS[Social Democratic Center Party]
16. PRD-CG-UM [Democratic Reformist Party-Galician Coalition-(expansion unknown)]
17. Right wing nationalists
18. AP-PDP-PL [Popular Democratic Party-Liberal Party]
19. Others
20. No answer
21. Did not vote
22. Because of age

23. For other reasons
24. Party voted for in 1982
25. AP-PDP [Popular Democratic Party]
26. UCD [Democratic Center Union]
27. PCE-PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia]
28. Catalonian nationalists
29. Basque nationalists
30. Occupation
31. Proletarian
32. Middle managers
33. Business owner
34. Independently employed
35. Subordinate
36. Men
37. Single
38. Married
39. From 15 to 29
40. 30 and over
41. Women

(1) LAS CIFRAS DEL DESENCANTO

(2)

Entre la etapa de formulación de promesas electorales por parte de Felipe González y la etapa de actuación como presidente del Gobierno, ¿cómo cree usted que ha evolucionado su imagen personal: se ha deteriorado, ha mejorado, o ni una cosa ni otra?		(4) Se ha deteriorado	(5) Muy fuerte	(6) Fuerte	(7) Poco fuerte	(8) N.S./N.C.	(9) Ha mejorado	(5) Muy fuerte	(6) Fuerte	(7) Poco fuerte	(8) N.S./N.C.	(10) Ni uno ni otro	(8) N.S./N.C.
(3) TOTAL MUESTRA	%	14	10	16	16	1	16	3	8	6	1	34	6
(11) INTENCIÓN DE VOTO	No votara (12)	53	13	21	18	1	7	2	2	2	1	31	9
	Comunistas (13)	57	29	13	12	4	10	2	2	6	—	32	1
	Nacionalistas Izquierda	56	19	19	18	—	11	4	7	—	—	30	3
	PSOE (14)	29	2	8	19	—	27	6	11	10	—	40	4
	CDS (15)	63	15	26	21	1	11	1	8	2	—	25	1
	PRD-CG-UM (16)	55	8	19	28	—	9	—	4	5	—	36	—
	Nacionalistas Derecha (17)	57	11	21	25	—	8	—	5	3	—	29	6
	AP-PDP-PL (18)	55	16	24	12	3	13	2	5	6	—	25	7
	Otros (19)	59	7	15	37	—	—	—	—	—	—	41	—
	N. C. (20)	35	9	16	8	2	14	2	5	6	1	38	13
(24) PARTIDO VOTADO 1982 (21)	NO VOTO Por edad (22)	49	9	24	14	2	12	3	2	7	—	32	7
	NO VOTO Por otras causas (23)	46	12	19	13	2	12	5	2	4	1	32	10
	TOTAL	47	11	21	13	2	12	4	2	5	1	32	9
	PSOE	37	6	12	19	—	23	5	10	7	1	37	3
	AP-PDP (25)	55	16	28	10	3	16	3	4	9	—	20	9
	UCD (26)	61	7	39	11	4	7	3	4	—	—	20	12
	CDS	46	9	10	27	—	18	—	13	5	—	27	9
	PCE-PSUC (27)	57	28	15	10	4	8	—	4	4	—	35	—
	Nacionalistas Cataluña (28)	55	16	22	17	—	6	3	—	3	—	32	7
	Nacionalistas Vascos (29)	66	5	30	31	—	19	—	16	—	3	18	—
	Otros	89	41	26	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—
(30) PROFESION	Proletario (31)	34	8	12	13	1	20	3	9	7	1	40	6
	C. Medio (32)	51	7	18	26	—	17	6	6	5	—	28	4
	Propietario (33)	47	12	18	16	1	19	5	7	6	1	25	9
	P. Liberal (34)	70	16	23	31	—	15	—	4	11	—	15	—
	Dependiente (35)	44	10	17	15	2	13	2	6	4	1	36	7
	N. C. (20)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100	—
(36) HOMBRES	(37) TOTAL	% 46	10	17	18	1	18	4	7	6	1	31	5
	SOLTEROS De 15 a 29 años (39)	57	13	23	21	—	11	3	4	4	—	28	4
	SOLTEROS De 30 y más años (40)	47	8	18	23	—	13	—	10	—	3	32	8
	CASADOS De 15 a 29 años (39)	41	15	18	8	—	29	9	5	15	1	24	6
	CASADOS (38) De 30 y más años (40)	52	8	15	17	1	20	4	8	7	1	33	5
(41) MUJERES	(37) TOTAL	% 41	9	15	15	2	14	2	6	5	1	37	8
	SOLTERAS De 15 a 29 años (39)	48	13	19	14	2	10	2	5	3	—	39	3
	SOLTERAS (38) De 30 y más años (40)	34	8	10	16	—	24	—	12	9	3	32	6
	CASADAS De 15 a 29 años (39)	45	8	18	17	2	10	1	2	7	—	40	2
	CASADAS De 30 y más años (40)	38	8	17	14	[illegible]	16	4	7	5	[illegible]	36	10

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

GALICIA'S AP MILITANTS DISAFFECTED FROM FRAGA

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Oct 85 pp 47, 48

[Text] When Jose Maria Gallardon arrived in Lugo, he was so dazed that he did not wish to see anyone. He refused several dining invitations and asked for a break to rest in his hotel room, in order to meditate on what had happened to him with the appointment as the one to prepare a record to explain the liability for the switch in AP's [Popular Alliance] provincial ticket. The rank and file in Lugo do not tolerate the coalition pacts planned by Fraga, Alzaga and Segurado. Before starting to question the instigators of the incident, he could not overcome the weakness of admitting: "I have no very clear idea of what is going on."

Nevertheless, many militants in his party had striven to warn the executive body of what was being plotted, and that the level of internal tension in the party was reaching a critical point.

Fraga sees his great opportunity in the Galician elections. The polls predict an absolute majority for Popular Coalition, and he wants to turn Galicia into his launching platform for the generals again. But his advisers complain that, with this obsession, he may only be concerned with developing his "loafing tactic," shaking hands and visiting towns, without heeding the grievances of extensive party sectors.

Manuel Fraga has complaints as well. He grumbles in private of how difficult it is to arrange candidacies in Galicia. "This is the only place where someone comes to see me and tells me: it doesn't matter to me if I am eighth, but just so long as so-and-so doesn't go ahead of me." These are the protests of local political bosses who want a share of power and greater representation than that of their immediate rivals. But now, the problem is more deep-seated.

AP's rank and file in Galicia do not understand the generosity of their party when it is time to give positions to its associates in the Popular Coalition candidacies, because they know that they are the ones with more money and more votes.

In the 1983 municipal elections, there had already been some complaints from AP members in La Coruna, who considered the concessions to the Christian

Democrats in the candidacies to have been excessive. Again, during recent months, protests were heard in various provinces, and were especially strong in Orense, where the inclusion of Victorino Nunez' followers, cut off from the Galician Coalition, occurred, as usual, at the cost of AP members' giving up positions on the tickets.

Fraga's personal intervention was required, and he publicly warned that "no one must attempt to look back, nor prevent the advancement toward the natural majority." The complaints were silenced, but the problem was not solved; and many identified Jose Luis Barreiro Rivas (the man who has accumulated the most power in Galicia) as the one really responsible. And the crisis was triggered against him.

Jose Luis Barreiro is a unique individual in Galician politics. In 1976, he had just finished political science and sociology courses in Madrid when, through an ad in the press, he attended a test to select personnel for an enterprise, which turned out to be AP. He joined as an Alliance employee in Vigo, and his promotion was impossible to deter. Today, at the age of 36, that unemployed man who had been seeking a job is the vice president of the Galician government, secretary general of the party and electoral proxy. He has some confidantes in the Galician executive branch (such as the members of the Councils on Territorial Organization and Labor), and he participates in all the major decisions of the Xunta of Galicia; while the president, Gerardo Fernandez Albor, confines himself to playing the role of institutional representative.

He has also achieved complete control of the AP organization in the province of Pontevedra. For all these reasons, for months important local leaders from the other three provinces have had one common goal: to clip his wings.

In the municipal elections, Barreiro had been AP's ruthless guardian. Marfany, PDP's [Popular Democratic Party] top-ranking leader in the province, had to rely on the then provincial head of the party, Maria Victoria Fernandez Espana, to obtain the advantageous pact which gave the Popular Democratic Party the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and over half of the mayor's offices gained in the province by Popular Coalition.

Nevertheless, it was now AP-Galicia's secretary general who requested generosity of the party's provincial organizations in the granting of seats for consolidating the "new right."

Fraga wanted it that way, and AP granted its members nearly half of all the seats that the coalition would gain, including the heads of the list representing Lugo (for the independent, Antonio Roson) and Orense (for Victorino Nunez president of the Chamber of Deputies and leader of the Galicia centrists ejected by the Galician Coalition).

Starting then, the situation became very dangerous for the AP old guard. How could Barreiro be eliminated if his followers, along with those of PDP and CG, could create a new parliamentary majority after the elections?

The Chambers of Deputies allocate a large budget for the construction of runways, rural electrification and agricultural modernization; which turns them into the key agency for the consolidation of a network of power and influence in rural provinces which are disseminated as the Galician ones are. In Lugo, Francisco Cacharro Pardo had taken advantage of his 2 years as president to become the province's strong man, and he thought that, "anyone who goes beyond his limits, like Barreiro, must be put in his place."

The anger at Barreiro Rivas was widespread in the entire provincial Alliance apparatus, but in Villalba, the inclusion of Jose Maria Pardo Montero as a candidate, despite his having had the daring to militate in UCD [Democratic Center Union], and later in the Liberal Party, having been born in Fraga's town, was especially serious. Barreiro suffered a standing-up in Lugo. After waiting several hours, he had to continue traveling to Orense, fearing the worst. In Orense, after having been pushed around and booed, he managed to have the official ticket submitted, but the next day he had breakfast with the news that they had taken a shot at him by exchanging Pardo Montero for another member of the Liberal Party in Lugo.

The last day of the period for submitting candidacies, while Ruiz Gallardon was meditating in Lugo on how to begin an impossible record, he managed to see AP's staff in the province of Lugo, accompanied by the Agricultural Council member, smiling, along with the court, ready to submit an independent candidacy backed by 6,000 signatures, in the event that, at the last minute, Barreiro might succeed in nullifying the previous one.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

FRAGA, SENSING PSOE VULNERABILITY, APPEALS TO CENTER

Madrid EPOCA in Spanish 28 Oct 85 pp 12-18

[Text] Fraga learned about it a few days before the debate: Spanish bankers were looking for a Spanish-style Cavaco to dynamite Felipist Socialism. The conditions were present. The prime minister has been dropped to the lowest levels of popularity since he moved to La Moncloa, and Portugal has proven that 3 months suffice to contrive a winning "poster." This is certain: he must emerge from the center. The left is not vulnerable to the right alone.

Then the agitation was organized. Very few persons had access to the head of the opposition while the weapons of the debate were concealed. The tactic was devised in front of a blackboard. First point: the AP [Popular Alliance] polls predict that the Socialists will suffer a loss of nearly 3 million votes. Use this as a slogan. Second point: the 5.5 million Fraga voters will not change their support in the next elections. Third point: the disappearance of UCD [Democratic Center Union] has released 1.5 million committed to the former center. Corollary: gain a million former UCD votes and half a million repentant instigators of change, and the tie with Felipe will have been won; and exceeding him in the number of seats. End of reasoning, end of predictions and, theoretically, end of PSOE's supremacy.

The Center's Search

This time, the prime minister fared badly. It was an imitation of the strategy which, in the last state of the nation debate, had brought him such great benefit: a first weak, feeble speech, so as to gore Fraga in the rebuttal. That is what happened last year. The opposition leader "thought" that Felipe was "groggy," and leaped out of his seat like a howitzer, ready to put him out of action. That overwhelming Fraga, on the attack, enraged, was later overturned, with a beating, by a suddenly recovered head of government. Once again, moderation gracefully prevailed over fury. And, in the end, that was the image which became known.

This year, however, Fraga was on the alert. At the last minute, Guerra arranged for television to rerun the debate directly, so that Fraga's unbecoming demeanor would again inundate Spanish households with the anticipated vehemence. But no. As Don Manuel's discourse was based on moderation, inside and out, the

vice prime minister's face became more pale. It was inevitable. Guerra shrouded himself in the nervous habit of looking sideways at the cameras, frightened by the unintended favor which he had, without wishing to, paid to his adversaries.

Victory in the Points

Fraga was approaching the center, ready to occupy it and to defend it by dint of Versailles-like restraint. And judging from the comments from some leading Socialists, he succeeded in doing so. The radar detected particularly significant long faces (at times accompanied by vague comments about Felipe's parliamentary role), on men such as Fernandez Marugan, Martin Toval, Miguel Angel Martinez, Enrique Baron or Nicolas Redondo. Except for the latter, none of the others would have dared, a few months ago, to criticize the (now declining) aplomb of the government's prime minister. Apparently, things have changed.

However, Fraga's outstanding achievement did not consist of defeating his adversary on points (something that he achieved by a tight margin); but rather, primarily, moving his political message toward the center. He thereby succeeded with the arguments which, quite logically, would later be used by Roca or Suarez and, abruptly, sent an unequivocal message to the bankers: "I am the center; I am in the center; and I shall win in the center." In short: "I am Cavaco." Galicia could prove him right.

Felipe, Without Reflexes

Further evidence that Felipe was not expecting this reaction(and, moreover, further evidence of the very bad state of his reflexes), was shown when no change was made, immediately, in the intention of playing the "simultaneous game" with the other spokesmen. It was a logical decision if the right had behaved as such. In that case, depriving the centrist options of favorable treatment would have been consistent. It is not in his interest to "give an advantage" to moderate politicians, because he knows that, sooner or later, defeat will come to him from that area. Nevertheless, he allowed Fraga to take over the center and, instead of reinforcing all those vying to control the same enclave (so as to divide votes and sympathies), he made a hasty effort of vague, overall sprucing up : bad business.

Hence, it is obvious that the polite staging of the debate was not based (as had been claimed) on the pact signed a few days before by Fraga and Felipe. They didn't go that far. The "bittersweet perfume of consensus" was reflected in something else: NATO. It is (how did they define it?) an "implicit pact." That was the exact comment: "off the record," of course; and yet it was revealing. Felipe wants to escape from the referendum, but he knows that in order to achieve this, he needs the strategic backing of the opposition. If they provoke him, if they hurl constant challenges at him, the convocation of the referendum will be unavoidable; and hence the end result will be left in the air, without any possible guarantee. Fraga realizes this, and for that reason he has at all times avoided any reference to the popular consultation. That

was the pact: ignore it, forget that a formal promise from the prime minister exists; go on tiptoe, without making noise, until Felipe eventually hits upon a convincing method for avoiding the danger. And, for the present, he has only two: either early elections or dissolution of the Canaries Parliament (the situation with Pujol seems to have been rejected although, if they try him, there might be a sudden surprise).

Goal: To Renegotiate

Furthermore, the NATO pact could have an extension that has not been confirmed. The conditions under which Spain has signed for its entry into the European Economic Community can obviously, most likely, be improved. It is virtually certain that they can. But they can be renegotiated; and that is the key point. Fraga does not disapprove of the government's prime minister using the trick of not calling for the referendum in dealing with the European governments, if, in return, he procures better terms at the time of joining. Nevertheless, there is no indication that the Socialists have accepted the help offered by the right. In any event, there are only a few signs.

For days, AP has had a bulging portfolio containing documentation regarding the Community terms negotiated by the government. There is sufficient material to use as a weapon to be hurled at the government. Nevertheless, despite the virtually unanimous advice from his aides, Fraga refused to be severe about this point in the parliamentary debate. It may possibly be a sign. Some deputies from the Popular Coalition itself insist upon interpreting that sign as a tactical move to withhold those arguments until later, when it is time to submit the motion for censure. It is possible, but it doesn't seem likely. On the other hand, Fraga appears determined to prevent the motion. He has already ignored the siren songs advising him to submit it shortly before Holy Week, when the conditions seemed to be propitious. Events proved him to be right. PSOE has grown in the face of adversity. After that date, a certain revival started to be detected in the popularity curve of the government and the prime minister. They managed to emerge unscathed, and even reinforced, from the Flick scandal, the offensive against the judges and the difficulties in joining the Common Market (three of the major conflicts which,at that time, appeared to have taken Felipe to the ropes).

The Referendum Is Still Possible

Today, the situation is different, Felipe Gonzalez is undergoing some low periods and he is facing the enormous challenge of resolving the difficult matter of the referendum.

It is true that his image will suffer in any event. Upon calling for it, he has the obligation of appearing as an Atlantist convert, and requesting the vote to remain: a very high price. The votes from the left could lead a stampede (Adolfo Suarez knows this, and wishes it). On the other hand, not calling for it would extend the list of unkept promises: in any case, a lesser evil; but it is not certain, and the right knows that.

The theory is very clearcut: If Fraga engages in a campaign favoring abstention, he will succeed, with the aid of the general apathy, in making participation ridiculous. So the referendum (as Felipe himself has taken the trouble to remind people) would not be binding. And yet it is not that simple. New information: The European governments are pressuring Fraga. Leaving the referendum in the hands of the left would be tantamount to losing it and, under those conditions, the alibi of meager participation, it loses value. NATO (and the threat has been heard already in certain European dispatches) could even reject Spain's continuation in the Alliance. Hence, it is virtually certain that Fraga would have no recourse other than to engage in the campaign along with the prime minister. And, in that case, there would be a maximum danger. The right could ensure a high degree of participation, but not victory. The damage would be serious. It is in these terms that "the implicit pact" between the government and the opposition has been developed. No one wants the referendum and, in the long run, that is the best guarantee for wagering in favor of its not being convoked.

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POLITICAL TURKEY

EGYPTAIR HIJACKING LINKED TO U.S. POLICY

HC020740 Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 26 Nov 85 p 3

[Editorial: "What Business Have You There?"]

[Text] Egypt has now become involved in the terrorist activities that derive from the strained relations in the Middle East. The Egyptians, who lost their importance in the Arab world after signing a bilateral peace accord with Israel, are now suffering from an "identity crisis". They see their country as a "U.S. colony." It is only natural that such a situation would give birth to an organization known as the "Egyptian revolution."

The U.S. "peace policy" in the Middle East is gradually leading to a "crisis policy." It is quite logical that the Egyptian guerrillas' bloody aggression should be linked to this crisis policy.

What business has the United States in the Middle East? Its entire policy is based upon support for Israel's state terrorism and upon its desire to uphold Israel. All of the Middle East might be in flames, but this wouldn't worry it provided that nothing happened to Israel.

Turkey has the right to have a say in the Middle East. Our country has historical ties with the region, and obtains its oil there.

France, Germany and even Japan might have relations with the Middle East, because they, too, depend on the region for their oil. But the United States has no connection with Middle East oil. By poking its nose in Middle Eastern affairs from thousands of kilometers away, it simply creates danger, not only for Turkey and states in the region, but for all of Europe.

The United States is not a part of the region, in any event. It is far from the scene of disaster; the conflagration does not affect it.

As long as the present situation prevails in the Middle East and as long as the United States is a source of provocation, many more planes will be hijacked and many more innocent men, women and children will perish.

/6662
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TCP PROTESTS COOPERATION WITH U.S.

TA091220 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish 1800 GMT 8 Dec 85

[Appeal to the people by the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee: "The United States and the Dictatorship Must Be Stopped"]

[Text] Citizens, as the Evren-Ozal dictatorship is weakening and losing control of the reins, it is complying with all the wishes of the U.S. imperialists in order to remain standing and prolong its life. Just like the nouveau riche millionaires on the verge of bankruptcy, it is mortgaging everything our country still owns to the United States. Now, if the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement [DECA], on which talks are continuing with the United States, is extended, the entire future of our country will be abandoned to the mercy of the Reagan administration.

What does the United States want? What is it seeking? Its attention is focused on the Middle East, where our country is situated. The Reagan administration is trying to increase its military and political presence in the Middle East. In this way it aims at controlling the rich oil reserves in the area and obtaining new bases to be used in an attack against the Soviet Union. To achieve these aims, the United States is continuously escalating tension in our region and engaging in warmongering.

What is Turkey's position in U.S. eyes? Our people must know the answer to this question well. The Reagan administration wants to cast Turkey in a much more dangerous role than the one accorded to Iran under the shah's rule. It wants Turkey to be its protecting gendarme and outpost in the region. It is not even satisfied with this. In U.S. eyes, Turkey is an arena to be used to launch a first strike in a limited or general nuclear war. In other words, a nuclear war will begin in our country [words indistinct] the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, Turkey will be the first country to be annihilated in a nuclear hell. The other leading NATO countries have agreed with the United States on the annihilation of Turkey in order to keep the first strike out of their countries. Even the U.S. press openly states this fact. Furthermore, the Ozal government was forced to admit this. The government discloses that the U.S. and NATO bases on our soil and the nuclear weapons on these bases endanger Turkey--for the sake of a few more dollars from the United States--and in

proportion to this risk, the United States should extend more money and armament to Turkey. This is an open admission of the circle of fire our country is being dragged into. It is also an open declaration of the country's betrayal by the Evren-Ozal regime. Every patriot must ask this regime, this government, which is willing to sell our people's right to live for a few dollars, to account for this admission. Our people's lives cannot be sold for money.

What does the Evren-Ozal dictatorship want? What is it striving for? It wants to remain in power until at least 1988. Our people, on the other hand, are becoming increasingly discontent and want to attain democracy as soon as possible. The democratic opposition is expanding and becoming more active. The economic situation is rapidly deteriorating. Under these circumstances, there is only one way for the dictatorship to achieve its goal. This consists of guaranteeing that a handful of rich monopolists, profiteers, and plunderers who are the chief domestic supporters of the dictatorship, makes even larger profits. To achieve this, the dictatorship must find enough foreign loans to ensure the functioning of the economy. This can be done by complying with all the wishes of the United States. Even if the new loans secured through high interest rates increase the burden of the foreign debt on our people to a point where it cannot be repaid, this is of no concern for the dictatorship, because it is the people's enemy.

Who do our people want? Unemployment and dismissals are rapidly increasing, the cost of living is rising continuously, the peasants are suffering, infectious diseases are spreading, and people are hungry. All this is driving our people to desperation. What do we need most, bread or weapons? If you heed Reagan, Evren, or Ozal, we need more and more weapons. To this end, they want to deploy new U.S. missiles and NATO weapons on our soil.

Country-wide efforts are being made to set up arms factories rather than installations that will produce the necessary equipment and machinery and will provide new jobs. The exploitative foreign arms monopolies are making preparations to settle in Turkey in a bid to establish weapons assembly lines. The Koc, Profilo, and other such holding companies, attracted by prospective profits, are making the necessary arrangements in order to cooperate with these merchants of death. Numerous generals and high officials are already dreaming of new payoffs and commissions to be realized from this.

In line with these preparations, last efforts are being made in order to transfer the KIT's [Public Economic Enterprises] to foreign monopolies. Trampling upon the principle of press ethics, newspapers owned by various monopolies, are trying to present these treacherous steps in a positive light in a bid to deceive our people.

The planned arms industry is not aimed at national interests or the modernization of the armed forces. As if all this were not enough, taxes paid by the rich are being reduced while new taxes are levied to establish a fund for the arms industry on our people, who are afflicted by continual price rises and heavy taxes.

Citizens, it must be realized that the situation has reached untolerable dimensions. Another regressive step means falling into an abyss. Either the U.S. interference in our economic, political, and military affairs will be eliminated, its increasing presence in various areas of our country stopped, and an end put to the U.S. and dictatorial reign in our country, or we will all fall into the abyss. All other possibilities have been exhausted.

The first mission to be accomplished is to prevent the extension of the DCA. This is the urgent task of all national and patriotic forces, except for a handful of collaborators. Contrary to the rumors that the DCA has been automatically extended for another year, it is most probable that it will be dissolved. We, as the Turkish Communist Party [TCP], are convinced that those who undersign for the extension of the DCA will in the end be tried for treachery.

Progressive policies aside, today there is not even a sign of the foreign policies pursued during the Ataturk period. Currently, Turkey has no national security policy based on national interests for safeguarding national sovereignty. Instead of following a policy which safeguards the people's security, the regime in power in our country is pursuing the policies of assisting U.S. imperialist interests, becoming its gendarme in the area, and serving its aspirations of establishing a global hegemony. Together with its domestic and foreign policies as well as its armed forces, the country has been transformed into a U.S. satellite.

The United States is able to overthrow any government if it so desires and to use our soil as an aggressive base against other countries without the knowledge of the governments and Turkish officers. The United States used the Incirlik airbase in Adana for an aggression against Iran in 1980 and against Lebanon in 1983. The example of the U-2 [U.S. spy plane shot down by the Soviet Union] incident is still recalled.

Turkey's foreign policies must be modified fundamentally. A dignified, peaceful, and stable foreign policy based on good-neighborly relations is what our people and every citizen who sees his future in this land aspires to. Every effort must be exerted to achieve this aspiration. Turkey must discard its subservient, uniform, and subdued foreign policies and must take its equitable and dignified place among the peoples of the world. If this is not achieved Turkey cannot have a place in world trade relations based on equal rights in order that it might attain economic independence and liberate itself from the exploitation of the foreign monopolies and IMF directives.

A fascist regime which does not safeguard its own national interests and which subjects its own population to heavy exploitation and oppression will never attract the respect and friendship of the world countries. A country where the peace committee members, trade union officials, and communist party members are prosecuted will never have a respectable place among the world nations.

Citizens, it is no easy task to put an end to U.S. imperialism under the conditions of dictatorship. No decisive and lasting result can be attained until all national and democratic forces are united and our people are mobilized against the United States and the dictatorship reigning in the country. The hesitations and uncertainties among the democratic opposition will only serve the dictatorship's interests.

From their viewpoint the legal opposition parties may be right in waiting for the Ozal Government to get weaker. However, it is the people who are getting weaker. Our country has no time to waste. The will to end the dictatorship, to topple this government, and to establish democracy should be expressed jointly and with determination. Our people will support the forces that express this will with determination.

The chances of realizing a turn for the better on the international scene have increased with the Soviet-U.S. summit held in Geneva as a result of the continuous peace efforts exerted by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries throughout the world. If the opposition in our country adopts a determined and joint stand in favor of peace and democracy then our people can also benefit from these possibilities. The dictatorship has resorted to the myth of a Soviet threat and the dangers of communism, scessionism, and fanaticism in a bid to divide the forces of democracy, to sow the seeds of dissent between the leftist forces and the other forces of opposition, and to cause hesitation in the ranks of the democratic opposition. The forces of the opposition should not heed these lies. An end should be put to these myths. We do not ask anyone to change their views. We maintain that policies based on realities and not demagogy are necessary. Only realistic policies can put an end to the dictatorship and permit the establishment of a democracy. If the future democracy is based on the expression of differing political views in accordance with the realities and the interests of our people and our country then it can fulfill our expectations.

Democracy, peace, and tranquility cannot reign in our country so long as the communists, socialists, progressives, patriots, and Kurdish democrats are being prosecuted and are rotting in prisons. Nor can national security be ensured. Because without the contribution of these forces the U.S. hegemony and the dictatorship cannot be eradicated. Therefore, all the forces in favor of democracy should adopt a determined stand for a general, unlimited, and unconditional amnesty which will secure the release of all political prisoners. Such a stand will also foil the dictatorship's maneuvers to divide the democratic opposition.

Workers; peasants; Turkish and Kurdish toilers; patriotic intellectuals; youths; women; unemployed citizens; progressive and patriotic officers and soldiers; progressive political prisoners; political refugees; our brethren who have been forced to work abroad; everyone who is in favor of peace, democracy, and the independence of our country: We have never been closer to danger. The future of our country and our people is being threatened. We are losing time. We should waste no more time. The extension of the defense cooperation agreement, which is our death sentence, should be prevented. An end should be put to U.S. interference in our domestic affairs. Our people and not the United States should be the masters of our country. We should determine our own future. Our people need work, bread and freedom instead of arms. All the forces should mobilize for a general political amnesty and against unemployment, lay offs, and the high cost of living. Factories, unions, schools, work sites, coffee houses, mosques, and the barracks should become the centers of this mobilization. Honest intellectuals and journalists should increase their efforts to inform the people of the realities. There is a lot that can be accomplished by every individual. The United States and the dictatorship should be stopped. The enemies of the people should be defeated. The communists will risk every sacrifice to this end.

[Signed] The Turkish Communist Party Central Committee

/9738
CSO: 3554/23

POLITICAL TURKEY

TURKISH COMMUNISTS CALL FOR SOLIDARITY WITH PALESTINIANS

TA291121 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish 0500 GMT 29 Nov 85

[Appeal by Turkish Communist Party Central Committee on 28 November]

[Text] Let us heighten our solidarity with the Palestinian people. Citizens, while the Evren-Ozal dictatorship is developing its military ties with reactionary Arab regimes in the Near and Middle East, and while intensive activities are under way to expand the relations between Turkey and Israel, the Israeli Administration is conducting a massive massacre operation against the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories. Hundreds of Palestinians were arrested and 36 persons were tortured to death as a result of this operation, called the iron-fist operation, and collective punishments are still continuing. Moreover, distinguished persons, including doctors and various other professionals educated by the Palestinians are being demolished and Palestinians are being hunted on the streets.

The Turkish Communist Party [TCP] vehemently condemns this iron-fist operation. These massive pressures, massacres, and acts of terror directed by Israel against the Palestinian people living in the occupied territories must be stopped immediately. On 29 November, the international day of solidarity with the Palestinian people, the TCP calls on all patriotic, democratic, and peace-loving forces to enhance their solidarity with the Palestinian people through the following demands: Israel's bloody operations and acts of terror must be stopped; arbitrary detentions, tortures, and deportations must end; massive pressures, collective punishments, murders, and demolition of houses must cease; Turkish-Israeli relations must be severed until Israel withdraws from the Arab territories it occupied in 1967; and the support accorded by the Evren-Ozal dictatorship to the talks which exclude the Palestinians and disregard the Palestinian people's right to establish a state and their other legitimate rights must be withdrawn.

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CSO: 3554/23

SWISS, SWEDISH ARMED NEUTRALITY COMPARED

Stockholm CONTRA in Swedish No 3, 1985 p 21

[Article by Bjorn Arrhen: "Neutrality Defense"]

[Text] No word has been more misused than the word neutrality. A neutralized state is a state which obligates itself by binding treaties with other states to take a neutral position in the event of war and which has had this permanent neutrality recognized by other treaty states. Switzerland is such a state. The little Confederation republic obtained already at the Congress of Vienna "sacred guarantees" from the participating states in regard to permanent neutrality.

Belgium and Luxemburg were guaranteed permanent neutrality by Europe's great powers by international treaty (1831, 1867 and later). The German Empire was one of these powers. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914 Germany brutually violated Belgium's and Luxemburg's neutrality by militarily occupying the two states. The German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, stated cynically that the guarantee of Belgian neutrality was merely a scrap of paper.

World War II dealt the coup de grace to the concept of neutrality. The warring great powers, Hitler Germany and the Soviet Union, disregarded all the treaties to which they were a part--Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway and the three Baltic countries were conquered and occupied by hostile armies. Six states succeeded in maintaining neutrality--Sweden, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Turkey and Switzerland. Spain and POrtugal were successful because of their geographic situation. Finland escaped Soviet domination by heroic defense of its territory. Sweden and Switzerland were regarded by the warring powers as without strategic value.

Plans to Attack Sweden and Switzerland

Plans to occupy Sweden and Switzerland were part of the strategy of the German general staff. The code name for Switzerland was "Operation Tannenbaum" and for Sweden "Operation Nord". A number of circumstances spared the two states from military action.

The Allies also had plans to attack the two neutral states. Great Britain was ready to occupy North Norway and to annex the Swedish iron ore area and to establish lines of communications through Sweden to help the Soviet Union via

Finland. Already at the beginning of the war England occupied the Danish island Iceland. Defense of the important, strategic island was later taken over by the United States. After the landing on the Italian mainland the Allies were ready to march north to attack Germany through neutral Switzerland. The operation was never carried out since Switzerland declared that any attempts by an aggressor to enter the country would be met with military force. After the fall of Paris the Germans came across a plan to attack neutral Switzerland. The objective was to occupy quickly the southwest portion of the country including Basel and to open up a new front against Germany. Neither did this plan came to fruition.

Will neutrality be respected in a coming war? The experiences from the two world wars are negative. The Swiss know that the only thing which can deter a foreign power from attacking and occupying the country is a strong defense. We Swedes don't understand this.

Swiss Defense

Already at the beginning of the century the Swiss Confederation began to build up its defenses. Tunnels and bunkers are to be found today spread around the Alps. The underground defense system consists of over 6,000 fortified entities, which cost 30 billion francs to build. Strengthening the defense lines goes on unceasingly.

Every Swiss man between 20 and 50 is liable for military service. An indication of the people's love of country and loyalty is that each conscript has his uniform and weapons in his home. The country can mobilize 650,000 men in 48 hours. The whole country stands united behind the armed forces. Semi-military organizations and civil defense stand ready to fulfill their duties within the framework of total defense.

The armed forces cost 3 billion francs a year. The army has 2,000 heavy and light tanks, 1,500 pieces of artillery guns and guided missile batteries, and 2,000 antitank weapons. The air force consists of 200 attack planes (Hawker), 70 fighters (Mirage III), 80 Northrop F-5E and 75 F-SE. In addition there are about 100 American fighter helicopters.

The technical equipment is first class. Electronic weapon systems are manufactured in the country which has a well-developed weapons industry.

"Our defense strategy is a determined and long defensive struggle against any enemy which violates our neutrality. We shall fight for each meter of our country, and we do not count on outside help. The whole people stand united when our freedom is at stake."

Defense is not a party question in Switzerland, as it is in our country where disagreement is characteristic. Not even the serious violations by Soviet submarines have succeeded in uniting the socialist and nonsocialist parties in the defense question. The Social Democratic party with support from the Communists is deliberately trying to cut defense expenditures in opposition to the argument of the command-in-chief and against the will of the majority of the Swedish people.

In contrast to Sweden, where the responsible authorities, the mass media and a large portion of the people naively rely upon Swedish neutrality, Switzerland has another view. "We belong to the West. We don't believe we can maintain our neutrality in a new war. We are not defenseless in an international crisis, and in good time we shall be on the right side."

The Swedish people are poorly informed as to how bad the situation is in the defense setup, where successive disarmament has gone on for a long time--the fleet has been scraped (there are not enough ships today to guard our coast). The air force will lose several wings in a few years, the army is being forced to cancel refresher courses because of the lack of money. It is being proposed that compulsory military service be reduced from 47 to 40 years, according to a proposal by the defense minister who has also hinted at further limitations of regiments in the peacetime organization.

One cannot rely upon neutrality. It is no longer "sacred."

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CSO: 8150/0278

MILITARY FINLAND

FIRST MODERN SEA RESCUE HELICOPTER ACQUIRED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Nov 85 p 13

[Article: "Turku's Border Patrol Flight Squadron Gets a New Rescue Helicopter"]

[Text] The Turku border patrol flight squadron of the Border Guard is the first in Finland to receive for its use a new type of rescue helicopter. The helicopter, named Augusta Bell, is especially equipped for sea rescue missions. It has, for example, up-to-date locator systems. The pilots say they have now acquired for their use "the first modern rescue helicopter."

The new helicopter finally raises the flight squadron's departure readiness to the level required by the rescue tasks. In addition to the rescue tasks the machine will be used for the usual scouting flights and the transportation of the ill as well as for training pilots.

"We now have the departure readiness appropriate for different situations. Depending on the task we could leave for the task either with the large Mi-8 or with this lighter Augusta Bell," says the patrol flight squadron chief, major Raimo Munukka.

The Finnish rescue helicopters are concentrated in Turku. The patrol flight squadron has used three large Soviet Mi-8 helicopters, plus a small five seat Jet Ranger copter for its various rescue tasks. In addition the squadron has two airplanes.

The small copter, however, is not adequate for more demanding rescue tasks than transporting the sick and thus the new Augusta Bell 412-type helicopter acquired from Italy improves considerably the possibilities for action during rescue tasks.

Machine Has an Excellent Guidance System

The new helicopter transports easily, in addition to its four man crew, seven persons on a rescue flight. The machine alternately has room for three stretcher patients.

The helicopter has a good color radar outfit, three separate locator systems, and, if required, one can also always take along an infrared camera. The two engine helicopter can also fly and hover with only one engine. Attached to the machine's tubular landing gear are floats that are triggered automatically in emergency landings. "With them," according to major Munukka, "this kind of helicopter once floated on the Gulf of Bothnia for seven days."

Wheeled landing gear are, according to the pilots, better than the tubular ones in turning on land; also the new helicopter does not have ice prevention equipment, nor automatic hovering devices. But the men end their discussion of these faults by saying that "the world's best helicopter has not even been built yet." The new machine type, however, does not replace the middle-weight Mi-8, precisely because of its lack of ice prevention equipment.

In place of that the machine has a complete flight instrument package and can thus fly over the open sea even under bad conditions as well as the larger Mi-8.

The leaders of the squadron are pleased with the newcomer; a small one-engine copter had been a shaky contraption on the open sea, but on the other hand the heavy 15-seat Mi-8 is an unnecessarily clumsy vehicle when the task is the fishing of only one or two people out of the sea. The small copter will remain in use, for example for ordinary patient transportation.

New Helicopters Will Be Ordered Soon

The Turku border patrol flight squadron operates in sea rescue tasks throughout the nation's maritime areas. The new helicopter can reach from Turku half way to Visby, Merikarvia or east of Porvoo in 1 hour. The travel speed of the machine is 210 kilometers per hour and operating time is 3 hours.

The helicopter cost nearly 15 million. The Border Guard still has the authority to order 100 million markkas worth of new helicopters for this year. The older Mi-8 rescue helicopter will be completely overhauled in little over a year, after which it will be transferred to the defensive forces.

The Mi-8's will be replaced by the new medium weight rescue helicopters. The chief of the Border Guard's flight office, lieutenant colonel Martti Pakarinen, estimated that the decision to order would be made in mid-December.

At this juncture three machines will be ordered; two medium heavy ones and one Augusta Bell. The machine is intended to be placed in Helsinki. Turku will get another similar one later.

According to Pakarinen Finnish sea rescue readiness requires three medium heavy and three lighter rescue helicopters. As possible replacements for the Mi-8's some medium weight helicopters now being considered include the English Sea King, the Italian Sikorsky and the French Super Puma.

12989/12379
CSO: 3617/37

BRIEFS

NEW MILITARY APPOINTMENTS--There have been changes to the composition of the head of the Italian Amred Forces. The new Chief of Staff is General Riccardo Bisogniero who replaces Gen Lamberto Bartolucci. The new general commander of the Carabinieri is Gen Roberto Jucci. The new commander-in-chief of the naval squadron is Sergio Majoli. The appointments were made at today's cabinet meeting. [Excerpt] [Rome International Service in Italian 1555 GMT 29 Nov LD] 12624

CSO: 3528/37

MILITARY SWEDEN

NAVAL OFFICERS RETAIN VIEW ON INADEQUACY OF ANTISUB EFFORT

Navy's Commander 'Understands Frustration'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Lars Christiansson: "Critics Stand Fast"]

[Text] Following a conversation he and Captain Goran Frisk had recently with Naval Commandant Bengt Schuback, Captain Hans von Hofsten maintains his negative opinion of the willingness of the politicians to evaluate accurately the submarine threat in the Baltic.

Von Hofsten has not changed his opinion since the conversation he and Goran Frisk had with the naval commandant, who summoned them both to his office. Goran Frisk declined to make any statements following his meeting with the naval commandant. Frisk said that he had already said everything that he had to say. Von Hofsten, who declined to remark on the actual conversation with Schuback, did consent to make the following comments to SVENSKA DAGBLADET:

"The government's statements give one the impression that they do not quite know how substantial the various submarine violation reports are. Another interpretation would be that the government is taking the reports very casually.

"How else can we interpret the fact that the Prime Minister did not bother to inform himself of the current state of the situation before he formulated his remarks in his government report?

"Several of the reports on foreign submarines were already months old by 1 October," von Hofsten said.

No Reprimands

Naval Commandant Bengt Schuback stated to SVENSKA DAGBLADET before the talk with the two captains that he did not intend to issue them any kind of formal reprimand:

"The basis for my view of the situation is that it affects freedom of speech. Put that way, it becomes acceptable. I think that it is good if Swedish

officers, from a professional point of view, have thoughts and make statements on the tactical and strategic issues connected with maneuvers in the Baltic. "On the other hand, I am definitely opposed to having officers make statements which touch upon our relations with foreign powers. There is a difference between mentioning our relations with a foreign power and talking about matters which lie within the area of their professional competence. There I would definitely draw the line. I will explain that to them. On the other hand, I will grant them the freedom to criticize me if, for example, they think there have been too many delays in getting reinforcements for our antisubmarine efforts."

"Has Gone On For Too Long"

Schuback emphasized to SVENSKA DAGBLADET that he thinks that the two naval officers have gone too far in their statements when they expressed their opinions in an area which the naval commandant thinks should be handled by the politicians and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He further explained that his intention in summoning the two officer was to "have a conversation with them" and explain how he himself saw the situation and the consequences of what they had said. They might not be fully aware of the great work that is being done in the navy to reinforce our antisubmarine efforts.

Understands Frustration

At the same time, Schuback said that he understands the frustration the naval officers feel at the fact that we have yet to successfully force a submarine up to the surface, and that this hard labor that they do without any "recognizable result" can lead to carelessness.

The naval commandant's conception of the specific question which brought the argument into existence, namely, the reason behind the US and NATO maneuvers in the Baltic, involving, among other things, the battleship "Iowa," is that this is a part of an activity that both superpowers are carrying out in the Baltic in order to demonstrate the strategic importance of northern Europe. He thinks that the submarine violations against Sweden and the Swedish incapacity to stop them has no special significance for the increased naval activity in the area.

At the same time, he emphasizes that it is "definitely in our Swedish interest to maintain the Baltic as a free sea, and it is good to have as many nations as possible show their presence in the Baltic, in order to demonstrate that the Baltic is in actuality a free sea."

PHOTO CAPTION [photo not reproduced]

Captain Hans von Hofsten arrives at the naval office. Together with Captain Goran Frisk, he was summoned to have a "talk" with Naval Commandant Bengt Schuback.

Parliamentary Representatives Surprised

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Erik Liden: "Interrogation Was an Overreaction"]

[Text] The general reaction to Naval Commandant Bengt Schuback's "talk" with Captains Goran Frisk and Hans von Hofsten, among members of the Riksdag at all levels, as well as in the Defense Department as well, has been one of surprise.

"It was clearly an overreaction, to call in two junior officers for a conversation which will be seen as an interrogation," said Carl Bildt (Conservative). "The defense chief of staff, Bror Stefenson, also reacted too strongly, when he published in a SVENSKA DAGBLADET insert his private opinions of Captain Frisk's statement on the 'Iowa' shooting. I consider Frisk a highly competent naval officer."

In the Defense Department, many think that the argument among the military leaders, over the naval officers' conception of the significance to our security policy of the "Iowa" maneuvers in the Baltic, is a tempest in a teapot. Freedom of speech, even in sensitive matters, is the rule in Sweden.

"I will not make any detailed comments," said Secretary of State Per Borg. "The military leadership ought to handle, and can handle, these questions, without our getting involved."

The accusations by Captain von Hofsten, that Prime Minister Olof Palme stated lies in his governmental statement to the Riksdag on 1 October, were repudiated by the cabinet ministers.

"Olof Palme did not know the content of the Military High Command report on violations, which was delivered to the government on 17 October. Nor can one interpret the government statement as saying that all violations have stopped," said Olof Palme's press secretary, Soren Thunell. "No nation in the world can promise to provide complete border control."

Marine Commandant Bengt Schuback supported, with emphasis, the freedom of speech of individual officers, but stressed that statements of political import could damage Sweden's security policy. He declined to comment officially on the exchange of opinions with Captains von Hofsten and Frisk, but did say that the conversation was carried out in a friendly atmosphere.

'Chasing' Versus 'Defending Against' Submarines

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Navy Men Murmur"]

[Text] In all organizations, you hear murmurings about the boss and complaints about poor equipment. In that regard, the skirmishes between a couple of Navy men and their bosses concerning the continued submarine violations are not

particularly noteworthy. But this current exchange of opinions does bring some important questions to the forefront.

The first has to do with freedom of speech. Is it reasonable that a pair of naval officers in the field, in their capacity as professionals, should air their thoughts on how the superpowers see our strategic position? In several of their statements, it has been said that the Swedish bastion has begun to crumble, and that NATO cannot remain sitting with its arms folded, or else it will wake up one morning and find that the Soviet base in Kaliningrad has been moved west to Karlskrona!

No, it will not come to that, says Naval Commandant Bengt Schuback, and calls in the officers "for a conversation." He thinks that our relationship to foreign powers is "none of your business, as professional officers," while saying in the next moment that he himself is highly responsible for what is said in the navy; and then he insists that we have freedom of speech here in Sweden.

That means: the officers can talk, but should not do it in certain specific contexts. The situation is hardly unequivocal. Government officials do have their freedom to express themselves, but they should consider the demands of security, just as others must. Rules of "discretion" can be found, for example, in collective contracts on the private market. The problem seldom results in crisis; people discuss the matter instead of pursuing it more formally--perhaps in the courts.

Spokesman for the opposition Carl Bildt calls the boss's attack an overreaction. JK [Attorney-General] is worried. There ought to be some discipline in the military, after all!

Our understanding of the military leaders' need to react to far-out accusations from the ranks certainly does not make it any easier to support unequivocally the hobbling of free speech privileges. In addition, one of the officers accuses the prime minister of stating "conscious lies" in his autumn speech to the government, in which he said that "we have earned respect for our decisiveness in defending our country's territorial integrity."

This statement was made before the Supreme Command's most recent report concerning five violations occurring between July and September, according to the military chiefs of staff. The Government Office states the same, also adding that Palme's statement should not be interpreted as meaning that all submarine violations are a thing of the past. A non-involved interested party such as HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, moreover, guesses that this means that "the Swedish government will meet with challenges and trials, when it must defend its security policy against the opinion of the Swedish public and the rest of the world."

Very significant is the military leadership's admittance that the men in the field are "frustrated." The naval commandant sees this as an information problem. In the military, the idea is supposed to be that Sweden does not have or will not get the resources for "submarine chasing" that the officers would like to see. Instead, we have to be content with "defense against submarines," which would normally be considered a different concept altogether. Please, someone, explain the difference to the Swedish people!

9584
CSO: 3650/47

BRIEFS

OCTOBER TRADE FIGURES--Imports for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus increased by 100.1 percent in October compared to the same period last year, while exports rose by 26.3 percent for the same months. This was announced by the Commerce, Industry, and Energy Ministry Statistics Department. The foreign trade deficit stood at 7,687,700,000 Turkish liras as of October 1984. [Summary] [(Clandestine) Bayrak Radio in Turkish to Cyprus 2030 GMT 11 Dec 85 TA] /6662

FOREIGN DEBT STATISTICS--"The foreign public debt in 1985 is expected to remain, as it did in 1984, around 330 million pounds, while Cyprus' overall foreign debt (including the private sector) will increase slightly, from 534 million pounds to about 550 millions pounds." This information was provided by Minister of Economy Khristos Mavrellis in a statement on the country's economic affairs and in answer to questions by Mr Diglis of AKEL and Mr Zakhariadis of DISY /Democractic Rally/. With regard to the growth rate, he stated that "in 1985 it is expected to be about 3 percent, about the same as the average growth rate expected to be shown by the international economy." The minister added that "our financial deficit, using the international accepted rate as a basis, is expected to amount to 80 million pounds in 1985 or 5.9 percent of the gross national product. This percentage is the same as that in 1984 but significantly lower than in 1983 when it reached 7.1 percent. It is also lower than in 1979 (a year that both Mr Diglis and Mr Zakhariadis use for comparison purposes) when it was 6.7 percent." /Excerpt/ /Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 12 Nov 85 pp 1, 3/ 5671

CSO: 3521/49

SOVIET COOPERATION PROJECTS ASSESSED, NEGOTIATED

Kola-Lapland Mining Proposal

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 5 Nov 85 p 6

[Article: "Lapland on the Move for the Kola Venture"]

[Text] "Finland must soon make a decision as to what extent it will participate in the Kola venture. The direction of Finnish economic policies will also be decided in this matter: will it be tied to the West or will it be ready to expand trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union," said a member of the parliament, Esko Juhani Tennila during an occasion in Kemi in which the 'Lapland Work for All'-Committee treated unemployment and the Kola venture.

A decision was made during the occasion to send a large provincial delegation to speak to parliamentary groups and other decision makers in December. Municipal and trade union representatives will be invited to the delegation and at the same time they will be encouraged to discuss and take sides for the Kola venture.

According to Tennila the good relations between the countries create a foundation for favorable Soviet trade. "Soviet trade at the moment employs 150,000 Finns. The trade should be even more extensive because it affects employment directly. For example, Finland is funding the purchase of every Soviet automobile with its own work," Tennila confirmed.

In Tennila's opinion we have only recently begun to understand the scope and significance of the Kola venture for Finland. "The Soviet Union has decided to start the comprehensive development of the mineral resources of the Kola region, which will get under way as part of a five year plan beginning at the outset of next year. In practice this means, among other things, starting the refinement of the 400 million tons of complex ore now being stored in the Kipin area. The ore contains many valuable metals, which have gone unrefined thus far."

In regard to the Kola venture thus far the representatives of the Finnish mining industry and political groups have visited the Soviet Union. On the basis of his own visit Tennila sees the Kola venture to include, in practice, the cooperative development of complicated refinement technology for complex ore with equipment from Finland and cooperatively built production units on both

sides of the boundary. "Cooperatively opening the Sokli mine on the Finnish side is one natural objective of the venture. The need for new railroad connections on the Finnish side is also going to surface," says Tennila.

On the official level the Kola venture will advance next when the Soviet experts arrive to negotiate with the Finnish industrial leaders in the near future about the matter. At the end of the year an extensive seminar will be organized in Moscow.

Provincial Union Supports Kola Venture

"We in the Provincial Union have pondered the Kola venture and we see that it would be a great benefit for Lapland," confirmed Timo Hannula, the operations director for the Lapland Provincial Union during his turn to speak.

According to Hannula the prospects for employment in Lapland are dim in both the short and the long run. Even the most optimistic forecast of the ministries promises Lapland 10 to 15 percent unemployment within 10 years.

"The government promises of reducing the regional unemployment differences have not been carried out. The situation is quite the opposite, the regional differences in unemployment have increased. In Lapland there are only very few municipalities where unemployment stays below the 10 percent figure set by the government," says Hannula.

According to Hannula the unemployment is not being taken seriously, it's accepted. "Although men from different parties have served as labor ministers, it seems not to have helped. The people of Lapland will have to continue to rely on themselves and work against unemployment by themselves," Hannula recommends.

"Threshold of Apathy Must be Overcome"

"The youth have experience in ruffling the decisionmakers," says Tarja Kemppainen, who functions actively in the 'Sokli Now'-movement in Lapland.

"Activities and their content must be developed so that the decisionmakers are forced to give real answers," she says. According to Kemppainen the Sokli delegations in Helsinki have too often received answers to their demands which they had already known.

"The threshold of apathy in the movement against unemployment must be overcome. We have to reach the level of action. It is possible to find radicalism in the youth of Lapland, because we spend a longer time here than others and because we do not want to be party to the gloomy predictions about future unemployment," says Kemppanien.

15 Years of Agricultural Cooperation

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Nov 85 p 51

[Article: "Agricultural Cooperation Between Finland and the Soviet Union Reaches the 15 Year Mark"]

[Text] Official agricultural cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union has been conducted for 15 years. The agricultural task forces of the two nations met for the first time in Moscow in February of 1970.

At present Helsinki is hosting the task force's 15th anniversary. A report concerning cooperation for the next year will be undersigned Saturday.

Cooperation has consisted primarily of the exchange of experts and the organization of meetings of experts and cooperative research. During this decade cooperation has become more and more economic in nature.

The focus of activities has been on livestock production and especially on feed production. Feed enterprises have been especially active. Enterprises producing feed preservatives have already achieved good commercial trade results with the aid of their cooperation. Commercial cooperation has also been reached with concentrated feeds, we are told by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

The experimentation on vegetable, berry bush, and fruit tree varieties in both countries belongs in the area of cooperation in horticultural production. Finnish varieties are already being cultivated, for example in Estonia.

In the area of machinery, cooperation has also gone forward. Finnish preservative spreaders, potato picking machines, plant spraying equipment, sowing fertilizer machines, as well as combines have been tested in the Soviet Union. Combines have also been purchased after the testing.

Agricultural cooperation has concentrated on areas whose climatic and soil conditions resemble Finland. Such are, for example, the Estonian and Leningrad regions.

The office chief of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Reino Uronen functions as the chairman of the Finnish half of the task force. The Soviet side is led by Y. V. Vsevolodskiy, the chief of the agricultural ministry's college and mid-level education department.

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SPECIAL PLANT PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES HARD ON STATE ECONOMY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Nov 85 p 33

[Article: "Special Plant Production Is Becoming Too Expensive for the State"]

[Text] Neither national nor state economic reasons hardly favor the extension of special plant production. It is becoming quite a burden for the state. This year starch production will be supported at 200 million markkas over that which the industry pays for potatoes. In malt production a ton of raw material is 1,000 markkas more expensive than, for example, in Denmark.

So says research specialist Gunnar Niemi from the Ministry of Trade and Industry. He is the ministry representative on the special plant board which intends to make a report on special plant policies early next year.

Niemi has set himself in opposition to the stand presented by the Ministry of Agriculture's counselor Ilkka Ruska and the department head of the Agricultural Producers Association, Markku Suojanen at the conference of the Agronomers' League. According to them the production of special plants in Finland should be increased. On the other hand, according to Ruska, as little as possible of the state funds should be used for special plant production.

Included among special plants are, in addition to oil plants and sugar beets, potatoes and malt barley. Refined products of special plants are also imported into Finland. Starch is made from potatoes and malts from malt barley. From the oil plants, margarine, for example, is made. The ground roughage being produced as by-products is used in the feed industry.

Niemi says that in certain quarters an attempt has bee made to transfer land into production for which there is a sufficient demand--in other words, to replace imports. Domestic replacement production is not competitive with imports. Consumers have to be asked to pay more than they are paying now or, as an alternative, the state will have to support domestic production strongly.

Expensive Price for Barley Malts

The price of malt barley, the raw material for beer, has been 2,110 markkas per ton in Finland. In Denmark malts are made from ordinary barley, which costs 1,070 markkas per ton. In Finland the price of ordinary barley is 1,600 markkas per ton.

Niemi observes that one kilo of malts requires 1.33 kilos of malt barley and the raw material costs of the Finnish plant reach 2,381 markkas per ton whereas the cost of the Danish plant are 1,434 markkas per malt ton. When we add the refining costs to the plant's costs for raw materials we end with the cost of 3,300 markkas per ton of malts in Finland, whereas Denmark gets by with 1,742 markkas per ton.

"If the Finnish brewery could get its malts for the same price as the Danish brewer, the state could get 75 million markkas more than now from its beer sales per year."

Niemi confirms that demands have been made even for exporting malt barley. Every exported ton would require at least 1,500 markkas in public subsidy. The increased domestic consumption of malt barley is questionable when the relative prices are so far out of kilter.

"Why can't malts be prepared from completely ordinary Finnish barley?" asks specialist Niemi. In that case the domestic price of malts would be only 780 markkas over the Danish level.

Malts Stored for Crisis Situations

Malt barley is refined into malts by Raisio and Lahden Polttimo (Lahti's Distillery). Niemi confirms that the rise in the cost of raw materials or in refinement, naturally raises the cost of beer production. As the price of beer is set on the basis of alcohol-policy considerations, much room is left between the sale price and production costs of beer.

The state gets 1,200 million markkas from the sale of beer in taxes and 200 million in other earnings. Thus the price of malt barley and malts can rise invisibly.

As a curiosity we could consider the fact that precautions have been taken for quenching our thirst for beer in case of a crisis situation. "The state's money mill, Alko, has quietly agreed to pay for the security storage of malt barley, thereby reducing the state's burden by about 8 million markkas. The state eliminated this support from its budget estimates at the end of the 1970's," says Niemi.

Expensive Domestic Starch Glue

Raisio bought Hameen Peruna and the "net purchase price" has publicly rumored to be about 150 million markkas. "If the purchaser did not close the deal only for tax purposes, we should expect that the investment made would produce an annual profit of 20 percent, or approximately 30 million markkas" says specialist Niemi.

The starch is produced for use in high priced food products and for technical use in the wood processing industry. The starch produced for technical use has to be strongly subsidized by the state so that it can stay competitive with imported starches.

According to the starch legislation this year's subsidy is given for the production of 16 million tons, but since we have again had a good harvest a decision was made to support the production of an additional 5 million kilos.

Technical starch production gets 63.1 million markkas in support altogether when the cost of raw materials is 43.6 million markkas. In practise the industry receives as subsidy free raw materials and some 20 million to boot.

Niemi says that it would be more advantageous to distribute the 44 million markkas "belonging" to the growers and use the 20 million saved on more productive targets.

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INFLATION CONTINUES ABATING AS ANTICIPATED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Nov 85 p 38

[Article: "Prices at Nearly the Same Level as Before"]

[Text] The Statistical Center has measured the annual rise in consumer prices at a record low of 4.9 percent. The last time lower figures had been reached was in 1979.

In October the prices remained pretty much on the same level, the rise was only 0.1 percent. Clothing and shoes rose in price but gasoline and package tours fell.

The rate of inflation is going to remain around 5 percent for the remainder of the year. At least a decrease in the price of long distance telephone calls and imported fruits is expected.

On the other hand inflation is expected to continue to abate soon after New Year. At the end of next year we should be able to reach the 4-percent rate aimed at by the government; some now consider that also an unnecessarily easy objective.

By hindsight this year's objective, or the 5-percent rate, could also be classified as being too modest, since apparently it has now been reached.

The drop in inflation to the vicinity of 5 percent for real has caused the official forecaster, i.e. the finance ministry, to lower its own price estimate only this fall from 5.5 percent to 5 percent.

However, the people are apparently that much more thickheaded than the official trend watchers in that they don't believe, even now, in the actual slowdown of the inflation. At least these kinds of thoughts are unnecessarily often interjected into the conversations of both the wage earners and wage payers.

OECD Average at 4.3 Percent

Finns need not unnecessarily puff themselves up about taming inflation. At most we have followed in the wake of western industrial nations toward the lower percentages.

The rate of inflation in the OECD countries decreased also in September and remained at mere 4.3 percent. However, prices were also being raised in one country or another already in September.

The inflation rate in the most important member nation, the United States, dropped to a 3.2 percent. The inflation of the European OECD countries for the same period was measured at 6.4 percent.

Higher figures than in Finland continue to be reported by England (5.9 percent), Sweden (6.7 percent), and Norway (5.8 percent). Sweden, however, has spent the last half of the year more moderately than we have.

The land of the measured mark, the Federal Republic of Germany, has kept its prices at the same level for half a year and even its annual rise was only a modest 2.2 percent.



Key: (1) Inflation
(2) Percentage change in twelve months
(3) Finland

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ECONOMIC

FINLAND

ARCTIC DATA BANK TO BE LOCATED IN FINLAND

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Nov 85 p 51

[Article: "Arctic Data Bank Founded in Finland"]

[Text] A data bank serving offshore and structural engineering concerns is being developed in Finland. A preliminary report to be made on the possibilities of establishing the data bank is one of the research projects initiated by the Center for the Advancement of Technology (TEKES), which are used to support the strengthening of offshore and structural engineering stations.

"The bulk of the studies is associated with ice technology which is studied in the VTT [National Technical Research Center] Laboratories of naval technology and structural engineering as well as for the development of Oulu University concrete technologies," we were told by TEKES Friday.

The technology project proposals have been made by the technology project taskforce set up by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. TEKES coordinates and funds the projects and is responsible for planning their realization and follow-up. This year it funds arctic research and product development with 2.9 million markkas. Whether the funding will be continued will be decided next spring, when efforts will also be made to initiate new projects.

The arctic technology project, funded from TEKES's research funds is one of extensive and nationally significant research projects that aim at raising the technological level in industrial areas and are deemed important.

The ventures already under way have received project proposals from research institutions and industry and the funded projects strengthen that expertise which the Finnish enterprises and research institutions already have.

The results of the research are disseminated to industry and the research institutions at special research seminars which each research project is expected to hold.

"We consider the achievement of good and trusting cooperation among the research institutions and enterprises functioning in the area of arctic technology especially important so that the small resources of our country can be utilized as efficiently as possible," TEKES attested.

Keen international competition also makes cooperation necessary among the enterprises, for example in trying to join projects which seek solutions for the development of the sizable arctic gas and oil reserves of the Soviet Union.

12989/12859
CSO: 3617/29

BRIEFS

HEAT INSULATION TECHNOLOGY TO POLAND--During the next year Partek Co will provide Poland with an automatic production line for the manufacture of heating pipe insulation. The agreement is worth about 6 million markkas and its execution will be financed from the surplus in the trade exchange budget between Poland and Finland. In addition the Polish Building Ministry is interested in acquiring five additional similar apparatus sets from Finland, the deputy minister Zdislaw Kuhn told the HELSINGIN SANOMAT while visiting Finland at the invitation of the Ministry of the Environment. Partek also has an opportunity for the renovation of a rock wool factory that has become dated in its production technology. The Polish Building Ministry is attempting to double the factory's productivity and to raise the quality of its products to the same level that Partek now represents in Finland, said Deputy Minister Kuhn. A large window and door factory is presently being built in Poland; its machinery will come partly from the Soviet Union and partly from the other socialist countries. The Building Ministry is interested in getting a part of the factory equipment from Finland. The first prerequisite for the improvement of housing conditions in Poland is the improvement of its heat insulation technology. The stone houses built in the cities after the war were left, for all practical purposes, without insulation. Now there is an urgency for their basic renovation. The houses must be insulated henceforth because of the rising cost of energy. The cost of heating poorly insulated houses has risen decisively also because coal now has to be mined from the depth of 1 kilometer. Polish insulation technology, however, is poorly developed compared to the Finnish and requires, compared to the Partek production technology, ten times the labor. According to Deputy Minister Kuhn the production of dwellings must be speeded up and that is impossible without the multifaceted development of building technology. In addition to insulation technology the deputy minister told of admiring the level of finishing in Finnish dwelling production technology and the speed reached by the element technique: a multistoried element building is completed in only 9 months. Expert task forces are now studying how the Finnish knowhow in the field of heat insulation could be exported for the Polish construction industry and what the Finnish enterprises could import as counterpurchases for the equipment sent to Poland. "Finns could buy marble, for example, from Poland rather than from Italy. Our marble is at least as good as the Italian and importing it, because of the shorter distance, would be cheaper from Poland," said Kuhn. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Nov p 41] 12989/12859

MITSUBISHI OFFICE TO HELSINKI--The Japanese Mitsubishi company belonging to one of the largest mercantile houses in the world is planning to open an office in Helsinki. The director general of the enterprise, Yohei Mimura, discussed the matter as he visited Helsinki Monday on his European trip. Mitsubishi handles trade with a business volume four times the size of the Finnish state budget. The nearest office of the enterprise is in Stockholm. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 12 Nov 85 p 51] 12989/12859

CSO: 3617/29

KKE'S PROPOSAL FOR FOREIGN DEBT RESCHEDULING APPLAUDED

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 31 Oct 85 p 6

/Text/ The country's foreign debt--the amounts of money owed to creditors whether they are individual banks or a consortium of banks--is extremely heavy and creates tremendous difficulties in meeting the interest and redemption annuity installments to the lenders. This problem, which does not involve only our country--there are other countries with more burdensome foreign debts--is becoming more critical at this time given that our economy is at a dangerous junction and that efforts are made to check inflation and develop conditions for coping with the crisis.

Greece, which among 160 debtor countries holds 15th position, is, of course, far beyond those Latin American and African countries which are virtually overburdened by their foreign debts and for this reason have decided to suspend payments to their creditors, to renegotiate the conditions of their loans, and to seek economic assistance from international organizations.

However, the burden of the 14 billion dollars we owe to foreigners is becoming oppressive if we consider the fact that the annual debt service obligations amount to about 2.5 billion dollars. And while frantic efforts are being exerted to decrease imports and thoughtless consumption in order to save precious dollars; while public expenditures and social subsidies are reduced; while the working people are asked to undergo sacrifices for a period of at least 2 years, the obligation of our country toward its creditors remains unchanged and extremely demanding as concerns installment payments. The 2.5 billion dollars we are obligated to pay are but an additional nightmare which in any case impedes the progress toward economic revival.

To be able to free itself from its immediate and heavy obligations, our economy needs to have a grace period during which the payments should stop. This does not mean, of course, refusal to pay off the debt but to simply secure a grace period during which the government's economic and developmental measures are expected to be productive.

This measure of stopping payments, to which countries overburdened with debts have resorted, was proposed by the KKE representative during his TV press conference 2 days ago. The proposal, which somehow falls within the

measures being sought for alleviating the crisis, is noteworthy as well as worthy of consideration since it is feasible. This, of course, does not mean that our country should be burdened with other types of obligations in different areas.

The postponement of payments for 2 years is indeed possible. The countries where our creditors are and which have given guarantees for granting the loans can intervene and positively influence our lenders to accept a renegotiation of our foreign debt. This does not mean--and this must be underlined--that the international organizations which have a decisive control over the granting of loans on an international level should be kept appraised, in the meantime, on the status of our economy.

The KKE proposal has greater possibilities of success in those cases where the lenders belong to countries-members of EEC. Article 108 of the Rome Agreement, if interpreted broadly, considers as assistance also postponement of payments of a country's debts. It is understood, of course, that this preassumes a proper handling on the part of the government agencies.

For all these reasons, we think the KKE proposal for a 2-year "moratorium" on debt payments to our creditors is both worth noting and worth considering and, if accepted, we believe it will assist to a considerable degree the government's economic and developmental effort.

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CSO: 3521/35

ECONOMIC

GREECE

STATISTICS ON LOSSES SUSTAINED FROM STRIKE ACTIVITIES

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 6

/Article by D. Stamboglis: "The Strikes Are Destroying Us"/

/Text/ From 1980 till September 1985 more than 3,000 strikes with the participation of 2,683,906 working people took place in the private and public sectors. No data exist as yet for October 1985, but it appears the month will be the worst in recent years as far as striker participation is concerned.

The loss of work hours during the past 69 months (since January 1980) was estimated at 44,866,075. As a result the Greek economy's "lost profit" can be measured only in 11 figures. The billions of drachmas the strikes cost to the economy are definitely lost while it is generally accepted that most of the strikes were unjustifiable since they were brought about by "pressure groups" of working people who are compensated well.

It should be noted that the number of strikes and of lost hours would have been higher if other syndicates too had the same possibilities of resorting to the "last weapon of working people against the employers." Thus, we have the following paradox: certain branches of working people which have reasons to strike in order to secure better working conditions do not have the power to do so while others do so for unrelated reasons. Finally, certain strikes could be avoided if both concerned parties (employers and working people) were willing to hold prolonged dialogues.

Whether justified or not, the strikes do harm the country's economy. Naturally, such harm cannot be restored since the hours lost cannot be recovered. Most of the strikes occurred in 1982 while most of the hours were lost in 1980. The following table shows the number of strikes, strikers, and hours lost (the figures for 1985 cover the first 9 months):

Year	No. of Strikes	No. of Strikers	Lost Hours
1980	729	1,407,799	20,933,501
1981	466	401,757	5,690,988
1982	968	354,489	9,745,965
1983	361	174,000	2,986,957
1984	268	107,957	2,690,789
1985	276	239,904	2,817,875
Total	3,059	2,685,906	44,866,075

According to more detailed data, during the May-July 3-month period of 1982 alone--the year most of the strikes took place--a total of 288 strikes were declared with a total loss of 5,807,824 hours--more hours, that is, than those lost during the whole of 1983 and 1984.

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CSO: 3521/35

BRIEFS

DISAPPOINTING AGREEMENT WITH LIBYA--Despite the 1 billion dollar "historic agreement" Premier Papandreou signed with Colonel Qudhafi a year ago this year's Greek exports to Libya shrank considerably. A report by the Greek commercial attache in Libya shows that the exports to Libya during the first 7 months of 1985 were minimal and it is possible that this year's exports may drop to one fifth of those in 1984. More specifically, the attache's report to the National Economy Ministry states the following: Until the middle of July 1985 exports to Libya from Greece as well as from other countries were limited. It appears that in the post-petrol history of Libya, the year 1985 will mark a record as far as exports to that country are concerned. The orders for goods given earlier to Greek exporters were not yet realized and cannot be realized if Libya does not accept the guarantee letters. Any other manner of payment or condition for sending goods is no longer acceptable. We, thus, face the risk of losing a large percentage of our exports if the situation of the guarantee letters is not improved. Otherwise, our exports may drop to one fifth of those in 1984. Naturally, Libya is pressed by all concerned countries to increase its imports. As concerns the Greek exports the commercial attache's office has exhausted every limit and possibility to promote our exports and to solve the technical difficulties for improving the balance-of-trade conditions. However, no substantial results are possible. /Text/
/Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 13 Nov 85 p 7/ 7520

CSO: 3521/35

PROBLEMS IN LOWERING UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES

Lubbers: 100,000 New Jobs

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 17 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by socioeconomic editorial staff: "Prime Minister: 100,000 New Jobs Annually Possible"]

[Text] The Hague, 17 Oct--Prime Minister Lubbers thinks it possible that, little by little, every year 100,000 more people will get a job. That is 30,000 more than the number taken by the Central Planning Bureau.

According to Lubbers, next year an average work week shortening of 2 percent should be striven for, which is a doubling with respect to the estimates of the Planning Bureau.

Lubbers said yesterday during the General Debate in the Second Chamber that the 100,000 new jobs can be created for one third through expansion of job opportunity and for the rest through a redistribution of labor. He emphasized, however, that the redistribution of labor is primarily a responsibility of employers and employees. The cabinet is not interested in a "guided redistribution policy." The prime minister acknowledged, however, that an average work week shortening of 1 percent, as the Planning Bureau predicts for 1986, is "too lean."

In the fall, a consultation of a cabinet delegation with representatives of employers and workers will deal with the manner in which the redistribution process should be carried out. Lubbers said yesterday that the cabinet has created the financial leeway for it by lowering the social premiums. For workers in private industry that will lead to an improvement in purchasing power of 1.5 to 2.5 percent in 1986. "This creates commitments on the part of the employed toward the unemployed," said Lubber . The prime minister is not interested in applying a general work week shortening across the board.

Yesterday he dealt at great length with the unemployment figures and the development of work opportunity. According to Lubbers it is a "misunderstanding" that unemployment can decrease no further. He referred, amongst other things, to the increase of the number of unfillable vacancies by 13,000 to a total of 30,000. Further the prime minister opposed the idea that

the long-time unemployed can never get started again. Of those who last year had been registered with an employment bureau for 2 to 3 years, 34 percent got a job.

Besides going ahead with redistribution of work, the education element will also have to be strengthened according to Lubbers. The doubling of the student body which had been agreed upon previously with the social partners is proceeding more slowly than expected, he said. He reacted positively to the plan of VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] member De Korte to train the long-time unemployed in companies, [each] guided by a mentor, although the form must still be discussed. The plan--which annually is to provide a job for 10,000 long-time unemployed--will cost 100 million guilders after the initial phase. Lubbers suggested that the plan might perhaps be joined with, or included in, already existing projects. With that he made it clear that he was not terribly happy about withdrawing an additional 100 million guilders especially for this plan.

Economize

Also after 1986 "a very sound expenditures policy and unavoidable cutbacks on the state budget will be needed," according to Lubbers. He repeated the plea he made last year in the First Chamber to keep the purchasing power of the minimum wage earners and the further benefits merely at the existing level and not to adjust it further to the general wage increase. "It is going one step too far to recover the normal coupling mechanisms," he said. Minister Ruding (of Finance) last night once again spoke in favor of pushing back the financing deficit by 1 percent per year in the coming cabinet period. This would mean an economization of 16 billion guilders total: an amount labeled "a minimum" by Ruding. Moreover, it was assumed in that figure that there would be no new items of expense and that existing items of expense would not be exceeded.

In 1987 more than the average (thus over 4 billion guilders) would have to be cut back because in that year the natural gas income will decrease greatly. Ruding said that further cutbacks are needed in social security, amongst other things, whereupon CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] Parliamentary Group Leader De Vries rushed to the floor microphone to state that Ruding was speaking here as the minister of finance, and not as the defender of the CDA election program. The CDA happens to think that after the change in the social security system no further economizations can be made in this sector.

As announced earlier, the cabinet is prepared to change the draft bills in which the change of the social security is stipulated. If a majority in the Second Chamber want that, the cabinet will no longer stick to the plan to reduce the new unemployment benefits in bi-annual steps from 70 percent of the last-earned wage to 70 percent of the minimum wage. On the other hand, the duration of the benefit with respect to the original plans would be shortened by 1/2 year. But even than a gap of 545 billion guilders remains, compared to the original plans. Lubbers said yesterday that this means that the possibilities for other potential improvements are hereby exhausted. People to 35 years of age with a WAO [Law on Labor Disability] benefit year will be re-examined in order to determine for which part they are unable to work due

to labor disability and to what extent it should be ascribed to the labor market situation. With respect to the "unemployment part," the person involved will then fall back upon the--less advantageous--unemployment benefit. Previously it was the intention to re-examine people to 30 years of age and to make a decision at a later stage on the group between 30 and 50 years old. The disabled of 34 and older now have the assurance that they will retain their old WAO regulation.

Commentator Cites Difficulties

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 18 Oct 85 p 3

[Commentary by Mark Kranenburg: "Lubbers' 100,000 Jobs Canceled Out by Labor Market Paradox"]

[Text] The Hague, 18 Oct--Almost unanimously, the Second Chamber appealed to employers and employees to use a greater part of wages next year for training measures and redistribution of work. That happened last night at the end of the general and political debate through the adoption of a motion submitted by the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]. Opposing votes came only from the small christian groups SGP [Political Reformed Party] and RPF [Reformatory Political Federation], and the small leftist groups CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands] and PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party]. The Dutch multi-party system now and then yields fascinating combinations.

The expression of unanimity by the remaining groups once again made it clear that the fighting of unemployment is not a political issue, as long as one sticks to generalities. And the appeal to employers and employees falls under that denominator. However, as soon as it is a matter of pursuing a policy to fight unemployment, little remains of that unanimity. The cabinet and a majority in the Chamber want nothing to do with a "systematic approach" to unemployment, as repeatedly pleaded in the Second Chamber the past days by PvdA [Labor Party] Leader Den Uyl, amongst others.

Hand in Hand

The government is at most allowed to create the conditions; the actual execution is a matter for the social partners. "We don't want a guided wage policy nor do we want a guided redistribution policy," according to Prime Minister Lubbers last Wednesday. Thereby he swept away both the PvdA plan to arrive at a 32-hour work week for everyone in 1990 and the similar idea of women's organizations of almost all the political parties (from CPN to VVD).

Lubbers credo is: searching for elements through which redistribution of labor and economic growth can go hand in hand and strengthen each other. According to him it must be possible in the coming period to give every year 100,000 more people a job. That is 30,000 more than the number taken by the Central Planning Bureau.

The extra jobs could be realized for one third by expanding job opportunity and for the rest through redistribution of labor. At first sight that is an

ambitious goal, but the question is whether with this growth Lubbers' previous prediction of a decrease to 500,000 unemployed in 1990 can actually be achieved.

One of the most important causes of the high unemployment figure in the Netherlands is the enormous labor supply, which is due in great part to the wave of emancipation. If the female labor force had not risen so explosively during the past 12 years, but had increased at the same rate as the male force, there would now be 750,000 people less in the labor market according to Lubbers this week. This year an additional 45,000 people registered for a job, while this number will have increased to 75,000 next year. In other words: just because of the growing number of high school graduates and the fact that more and more married women register for a job, already 75,000 additional jobs are needed next year.

Smattering

In reality the group potentially looking for a job is even larger, namely 95,000 according to the figures of the Central Planning Bureau. But because there isn't a chance for a job anyway, about 20,000 people simply abandon the trip to the employment bureau. This so-called "cyclical withdrawal" decreases as the chance for a job increases. That development has--now that the economic climate is improving--indeed started rolling, for this year the "hidden labor supply" is about 45,000 persons.

The more jobs are available, the more people register. Thus Lubbers' 100,000 jobs will be only just enough to take care of the additional labor supply. With them, a further increase in unemployment can be prevented, but a real decrease can at most be called a smattering. Let alone push unemployment back to 500,000. That will certainly be true if the number of shared jobs keeps increasing. That development also brings forth more labor supply which currently isn't even being included in the "cyclical withdrawal". That includes, for example, people who cannot combine a full-time job with family obligations (mainly married women with children) for whom a shared job is a solution.

"We must not give in to doomsaying and the idea that nothing will come of it," said Lubbers yesterday in the Second Chamber. But, in fact, he didn't have to offer much hope to the unemployed this week. Hundreds of thousands of additional jobs per year sounds like a lot, but it is not sufficient. Unemployment will, in Minister De Koning's words, continue to decrease "irritatingly slowly." Even a VVD job opportunity plan for the long-time unemployed, supported by all parties, will not make a big change in that. With it, 10,000 long-time unemployed could be "helped" each year. Doomsaying or not, the fact is that another 240,000 long-time unemployed will remain.

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CSO: 3614/19

ECONOMIC SPAIN

BUSINESSMEN'S ASSOCIATION TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 28 Oct 85 pp 58, 59

[Interview with Juan Jimenez Aguilar, secretary general of the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations], by Jesus Rivases; date and place not specified]

[Text] On 15 and 16 November, meeting in Madrid, the CEOE is planning to bring together over 10,000 businessmen, who will be coming to take part in the First National Congress of Businessmen on the first Day of Business. They want to demonstrate that businessmen are here, that they are important, and that attention must be paid to them. Juan Jimenez Aguilar, the CEOE's secretary general, is now organizing this meeting.

Question: What is the CEOE hoping to accomplish by holding a businessmen's congress?

Answer: Now that the CEOE has been in existence for 8 years, I believe it is time to call a halt, to think about the past, to see what has been done. We have had some major achievements, such as the strengthening of the business association movement and its unity. But facing the initial stages of integration in Europe, we have to create stronger, more organized, more united businessmen's organizations that will portray the image of a living social body, one which also has the obligation to fight back, to respond to the challenge to Spain contained in the date of 1 January 1986.

Question: Will this also be an action taken to put pressure on the government?

Answer: No. It will be strictly a businessmen's meeting. It isn't against anyone, but rather in favor of Spanish business. We want to analyze the current situation and look toward the future rather than the past. Undoubtedly, our reflections will contain political elements, because the economy and business are shaped by politics. But it isn't an attempt to move against anyone. It would be absurd to organize a businessmen's congress in opposition to the government.

Question: Are you trying to tell the government: here we are, you can't forget us...?

Answer: Certainly. There isn't any doubt about that. We have to tell the government, in case it may have forgotten, that businessmen are part of society, and that if they don't pay any attention to us, they are making an extremely serious mistake.

Question: What message do you want to send?

Answer: The message of the congress will be whatever comes out of the debates on each point of the agenda. However, on the following day the Day of Business will be held, in which about 10,000 businessmen from all over Spain are expected to take part. The objective is to convey the idea that business is here to serve society, progress, and development. Business is a source of wealth, a creator of jobs; it makes economic activity possible and promotes development. This is the message we are going to send to Spanish society as a whole. We also want to emphasize the idea that Spanish business has many problems, and that its existence is necessary and vital for Spain.

Question: Does this suppose a change in the CEOE's attitude toward the government, after a summer in which both parties traded many harsh criticisms and accusations?

Answer: No. What we want is for Spanish society to get to know business better. For that reason, everything we are doing will still be very little. We are going to try to get Spanish society to understand the difficulties facing businessmen, the reasons why they take action or don't, why we are asking for labor flexibility and a social security system similar to what exists in the EEC.

Question: And will Spanish society be receptive to that message?

Answer: I believe that if a society isn't receptive to such a message, it may be for one of two reasons: either because those of us who have the obligation to send the message don't know how to communicate it properly, or because we haven't been able to make public opinion sensitive enough, so that people will realize the importance of business in a modern and young society.

When a country doesn't look at or listen to its businesses, then the business leaders have to make a great effort to make themselves heard and properly appreciated.

Question: The government doesn't seem to be listening very much. At least, it routinely criticizes the CEOE.

Answer: The government is entitled to criticize us, just as we also have a legitimate right to criticize the government when it acts improperly. The

disturbing thing is that the government criticizes Spanish business without any valid reason. Governments must see business for what it is: the factor capable of creating the conditions to get our country moving out of the situation we are now in. Only business can get the country out of the current crisis.

Question: And does the government criticize business with reason or without reason?

Answer: We can't take an exaggerated position here. The government may be right at times, but we also have to admit that the prime minister and some of his ministers talk a great deal about the fact that it is going to be the private sector, private enterprise, that will get the country out of the crisis.

Question: How much is it going to cost the CEOE to bring to Madrid the more than 10,000 businessmen who are expected to attend the Day of Business?

Answer: You'll have to ask each businessman that, because each one is going to pay the cost out of his own pocket. Obviously, it doesn't cost the same amount to come from Toledo, as to come from Malaga, the Balearic Islands, or the Canaries. A charter flight has already been arranged from the Balearic Islands, and that, plus the cost of staying here, will certainly be much more than coming from Toledo.

Question: Is it going to be very hard for the CEOE to bring together the number of businessmen that you say are going to congregate in Madrid?

Answer: I don't think so. I am convinced that businessmen are going to come pouring into Madrid. Perhaps at some given moment, we may not know whether the business community is prepared to make an appropriate response to a demonstration of the type that the CEOE is calling for. We don't have to make a great effort; we just have to let people know when and where it is going to be held.

Question: Isn't the timing just perfect--holding these meetings now, right before the Galician elections, and almost in a pre-election period before the general elections in 1986?

Answer: No, these meetings had been planned since the CEOE's general assembly, which was held on 13 February. Also, if we accept what the prime minister says--and he seems to be the one who has the power to dissolve parliament and call new elections--the elections will be held in October of the coming year. So we aren't in a pre-election phase at all... Those who look at these meetings from a totally political viewpoint are mistaken. What is happening is that politics is getting mixed in with the economy and with the life of business.

Question: Does the CEOE now think that the AES [Economic and Social Agreement] is totally dead?

Answer: We would like the AES to start to show some fresh signs of life. But it isn't up to us to take the initiative to revive it; rather, it is up to the government to convene the AES Application Commission. It seems to me that now, from one moment to the next, time is running out for the government to convene the Application Commission. If it doesn't convene the commission, it will in essence be making a decision, moving in the direction of burying the AES. But we in the CEOE will take no part in the burial of the Economic and Social Agreement.

7679
CSO: 3548/17

ECONOMIC SPAIN

COST OF LIVING RAISES FOR 1986 PEGGED TO INFLATION

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Oct 85 pp 60-63

[Article by Cruz Sierra]

[Text] The Spanish people's standard of living will not improve in 1986. It is going to be the same as this year's. This will be true at least for the 7 million wage earners--and their families--whose pay is worked out through collective bargaining.

The major unions and management organizations have already prepared instructions for their affiliates for the renewal of the 1986 contracts. And all of them, except for the CO [Workers Committees], have agreed that the wage increases will equal the inflation rate predicted for the end of next year: 8 percent. This means the government is achieving its objective of freezing the people's purchasing power as part of its austerity policy.

The worst thing for people on salaries is that this austerity is still going to be around for a few more years. President Felipe Gonzalez was quite definite in announcing "austerity for the rest of this decade." And the new economic policy objectives have included this factor, announcing zero growth in real salaries over the next 4 years.

The AES [Economic and Social Agreement] has kept salaries well tied down for 1986. According to the agreement, salaries will go up at a rate ranging from 90 to 107 percent of the inflation rate predicted for the year. In the beginning, the government set expected price increases for 1986 at 6 percent. However, it later had to correct its calculations, increasing them by 2 points to absorb the price increase that will be triggered by the IVA [Value Added Tax]. So in the end, it came to 8 percent for prices and another 8 percent for salaries.

Nevertheless, these calculations do not include what are called salary slippages. These are small increases in salaries--generally, 1 point--that are not controled in the negotiations between management and workers, and which come as supplements and bonuses in most payrolls: transportation allowances, allowances for children, for length of service, etc. Because of these slippages, real salaries for the coming year may show a slight gain in purchasing power.

The government has managed to almost entirely eliminate labor conflicts from the agenda for the coming spring. Contract negotiations will not disrupt the series of election campaigns: the general elections, the NATO election, the Andalusian elections, European Parliament elections, and union elections.

But some points of conflict may yet arise, primarily on the part of the CO. They have calculated a 9 percent average price increase for the entire year, to which they add 2 points for inflation caused by the IVA. Therefore, the 800,000 CO affiliates will be demanding an 11 percent wage hike in their contracts. However, the experience of the past few years has shown that CO demands have taken on an almost ritual character, and that later the union leaders fall back to more moderate positions.

In any event, the CO insists that inflation is going to be much higher than the government is predicting: "We are basing this on the forecasts that the ministry of industry sent to the electricity sector. These forecasts set the expected price increase at 12 percent, as a point of reference for the rise in electricity rates," commented Agustin Moreno, the CO's secretary for union action. He added that, even though they may not get salary revisions of this magnitude, at least they will put an upward pressure on salaries. The CO is also going to apply pressure to shorten the working day, in order to make the 39-hour workweek more widespread.

There are also going to be some difficulties in contracts with public enterprises. The administration has already announced that there will be austerity in the public sector (starting with officials, who will only get an increase of 7.2 percent). And the UGT [General Union of Workers] has made it very clear that it is not going to accept salary increases below the range set in the AES. "There are going to be serious problems if the government tries to negotiate below the AES. I also foresee problems with the pension supplements in some public enterprises," warned Anton Saracibar, the UGT's secretary for union action.

Without denying or confirming anything, the personnel director for the entire INI [National Institute of Industry], Miguel Cuenca, said that the Institute intends to apply the principles set forth in the AES: "But the AES ranges from 0 to 8 percent, and we can use the release clause in business that are having economic problems. We are studying this," said Miguel Cuenca. Still, an idea of what is going to happen in the public sector negotiations this year reminds us that in 1986 the contracts for the companies with the biggest losses in the INI are going to be up for renewal: ENSIDESA [National Iron and Steel Enterprise, Inc], AHM, pegaso, Iberia, Astilleros, etc. The "healthy" companies signed 2-year contracts in 1985.

Nor do the businessmen foresee any special complications in the coming negotiations. They understand very clearly that they are not going to grant

the slightest fraction above 8 percent in salary increases, and also that no one is going to ask them to do so. But there are still some clouds on the horizon. For example, management's payment of the salary revision for 1985: 82 percent of the contracts signed this year contained revision clauses. As inflation will very probably exceed the 7.38 percent average salary increase agreed upon in the contracts, the businessmen will have to pay their employees the difference between what was agreed and the IPC [Consumer Price Index]. The CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] has calculated what this is going to cost them. A one-point salary increase represents an average of 18,000 pesetas per worker per year. In all, the approximately 6 million workers covered by the salary revision clause will cost their employers slightly more than 100 billion pesetas.

The CEOE is concerned about the situation of some businesses that will have to pay the revision (in March) and at the same time, the salary increase for 1986. They are also concerned about the CO's demands for a revision of the salaries of 1 million workers who this year signed 2-year agreements, setting their salary increase for 1986 at 6 percent. This was what the government had initially calculated as the inflation forecast for 1986, which was later revised upward to 8 percent.

The CO has been saying that "acting both morally and as a union," it has the right to tear up those contracts and demand a bigger increase, while the UGT and CEOE are opposed to this, arguing that the contracts signed can not be broken at the whim of one of the parties. "Let them keep their promises. We won't change a single comma," stated Fabian Marquez, the CEOE's labor adviser.

In general, the effect of such wage austerity on the country (Spain and Denmark are the only European countries with their real salaries frozen) will be a greater recovery of business surpluses and profits and better prospects for investment. The government wants to draw some advantage from the salary sacrifices of past years and is keeping on with the salary freeze, in the hope that buisnessmen who have enough money will decide to invest and create new jobs. Their idea is to expand the increase in consumption, not through boosting the purchasing power of wage earners, but rather through an increase in the number of salaried workers (new jobs resulting from investment).

But things are not all that simple. The CEOE and the businessmen are preparing to hold a meeting in November to show their strength and the importance of business: the First Congress of Businessmen. There they are going to demand--once again, but this time more strongly--freedom to fire and increased flexibility in dealing with their employees. This old demand of Spain's business community is what is now souring relations between the CEOE, the UGT, and the government, to the point of actually destroying the AES.

The future of the agreement depends on whether or not Joaquin Almunia, the minister of labor, convenes the upcoming meeting of the AES Application Commission, scheduled to be held in November, and on whether the CEOE will agree to take part in it, or will just stand aside, as it did the last time, when it demanded that the president appear. On the other hand, the UGT would prefer to consider the AES dead and just keep one of its clauses on the CEOE-UGT confederation agreement, related solely to collective bargaining for 1986. Or what amounts to the same thing--have their formal group photo taken together with the businessmen, leaving the government on the sidelines.

People in the ministry of labor are barely concerned at all about problems related to the AES, though ("80 percent of its commitments have been met and are now in operation"). Nor are they worried about salaries, strikes, or collective bargaining. There, attention is focussed almost exclusively on Spain's entry in the EEC. "Our challenge for 1986 will be the European Community. Learning how to use all the advantages offered us by these social funds in order to develop jobs, to promote job training, retraining, etc.," says Alvaro Espina, secretary general for employment and labor relations. And he warns that, if in 10 years workers' skills have not been upgraded, then the EEC will come to have a strong negative impact on jobs.

Salaried Workers Are Losing Ground

Last year the percentage of wages and salaries in our national income was the lowest it had been since 1971, and all the indicators suggest that this year it will continue to decline.

Arithmetically, when salaries decline in relation to the total income, there is another item that increases.

This is non-salary income, that is, all other incomes, ranging from business profits to the earnings of self-employed workers.

In the past 2 decades, trends in wages and salaries have shown three very distinct periods. Between 1964 and 1976 wages and salaries rose from 53.2 percent ot the total to 64.8 percent. Then they began to decline slowly, until reaching 64.1 percent in 1981. Since that time, salaries have dropped sharply, slipping to 59.5 percent last year.

Two simultaneously occurring phenomena, viewed in a purely descriptive and mechanical way, reflect the decline in the proportion of wages and salaries in national income: the deceleration of personal salaries and the change in employment from a positive to a negative sign.

Real wages, which had grown at a rate above 6 percent a year between 1964 and 1976, halved their rate of growth in 1976-1981, and were down to 0.6

percent in 1981-1984. Job growth switched from increasing at a rate of 1.5 percent a year between 1964-1976 to declining at a rate of 2.5 percent a year in 1976-1984. The simultaneous decline in job creation and in the growth of real wages and salaries is related to other factors. One cause has been Spain's impoverishment in a series of worldwide economic crises,



Percentage of salaries in national income

Key:
1. Non-salary incomes
2. Salary incomes

Another factor, paradoxically, has been the salary increases themselves, which have encouraged businesses to replace labor by increasing their reliance on other factors of production, such as investment or a more intensive use of materials.

It does not seem likely that the trend will change in the short term. The percentage of salaries in national income can be expected to stabilize at levels even lower than the present level. But more than the relative percentage of the various groups of workers in our national income, what is important is that the income should increase for all.

The shrinking size of salaried incomes does have some quite varied consequences, though. For unions, it means a loss of influence and power. For the treasury, the shrinkage of an important tax base. And for young people, a search for independent occupations.

7679
CSO: 3548/17

ENERGY NORWAY

OIL COMPANIES PLAN RECORD INVESTMENTS IN RESEARCH

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Nov 85 p 45

[Article by Morten Woldsdal]

[Text] Stavanger, 20 Nov--The three biggest Norwegian oil companies--Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga Petroleum--will spend a total of 800 million kroner in 1986 on research and development in the area of new technology. The companies have never spent so much money in this area before. The work will be carried out in close cooperation with Norwegian firms and research institutions. According to Statoil press spokesman Hakon Lavik Norway is becoming a world leader in the development of oil technology for use at great ocean depths.

The research and development investments of the three Norwegian oil companies will be considerably higher next year compared to this year. And the companies anticipate continued growth in subsequent years. In 1986 Statoil will account for about half of the 800 million kroner, Norsk Hydro will invest a little under 300 million kroner and Saga Petroleum will spend a little over 100 million kroner on research and development into new technology.

Saga press spokesman Vibjorn Madsen told AFTENPOSTEN that his company's research and development investments have been increased substantially in recent years. The company anticipates continued strong growth in this area.

Much of Saga's investment is connected with development of the Snorre field in the North Sea, according to Madsen. Saga is the operator for this development project and Esso is the technical assistant. Snorre is located in fairly deep water and there is a need for new construction solutions to make the project profitable.

"Among other things we have developed two platform ideas that can be used for Snorre," said Vibjorn Madsen. These platforms use steel construction and Saga's eventual aim is to have them built by Norwegian shipyards. In addition to working on new platform solutions the company is also doing a lot of work on oil technology for underwater use at great ocean depths.

"Saga is in a strong building phase as an oil company. Our research and development investments will form our technological platform in the years to come," said Vibjorn Madsen. "Much of Saga's effort in this area occurs in close cooperation with Norwegian firms and research centers."

Norsk Hydro's information chief Tor Steinum said that about half the company's research and development efforts next year will occur within Hydro's own system--in Bergen and Heroya, among other places. The rest--about 150 million kroner--will be used for "outside" assignments.

Norsk Hydro is the operator for the Oseberg development and a great deal of the company's technological development is closely related to this project. However Norsk Hydro also plays a central role in developing the Troll field in the North Sea--along with Shell, Statoil and Saga Petroleum.

"About half of our research and technological development is connected with Oseberg and Troll, while the rest is not directed at specific projects. This involves research connected with earth sciences, drilling, new platform solutions, diving technology, underwater technology, knowledge concerning metals, the environment and safety, and so on," said Tor Steinum.

Statoil--the largest of the three companies--is also the Norwegian oil company that spends the most money on research and technological development. Press spokesman Hakon Lavik said that a lot of this work is directed toward the development of Gullfaks and Troll as well as the possibilities of future development projects off the coast of central and northern Norway.

"New methods for cooling and transporting liquefied gas (LNG), underwater production systems and platform solutions for deep water are central elements in our work. We also do a lot of work on so-called multiphase transport in pipelines. This involves the possibilities of transporting oil and gas in the same pipeline. Today we have to have separate pipelines for oil and gas. If we could use the same pipeline system we could save an enormous amount of money," said Hakon Lavik.

Statoil also has a very close relationship with Norwegian firms and research centers. Most of the research and development work that is not done inside the company is assigned on a commission basis to Norwegian firms and research workers.

"The Troll project is the big driving force in the development of underwater technology today. This is the biggest ocean gas field in the world and it lies in very deep water. Here Norway has a unique opportunity to become a world technology leader--nowhere else in the world is this kind of field being developed at the present time," the Statoil press spokesman pointed out.

According to him in the next 10 years the Troll project could give the Norwegian oil companies, Norwegian industry and Norwegian researchers technological superiority on an international scale.

"And the technology that is developed for Troll can be used in other fields at comparable ocean depths all over the world. This could be very important for Norwegian firms and research institutions in the future," Hakon Lavik of Statoil said.



The challenges involved in developing the Troll field could enable Norway to become a technological leader in this area. The sketch illustrates the dimensions of the project.

Key:

1. Eiffel Tower

6578
CSO: 3639/41

ENERGY ICELAND

ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION EXPECTED TO DOUBLE BY 2015

Reykjavik FRJALS VERZLUN in Icelandic No 7, Oct 85 p 10

[Text] The Icelandic Energy Projection Committee has recently issued its new projection up to the year 2015. The projection assumes that public electrical power consumption will increase by almost 70 percent from 1984 until the end of the century and will nearly double by the year 2015. The new power projection foresees 1,200 gigawatt less electrical energy consumption than did the committee's 1981 energy forecast. It may in fact be mentioned that the projections of the committee during the 10 years that it has been making projections have fallen consistently short. The Icelandic Energy Projection Committee is a cooperative venture for making energy projections between the largest companies, institutions and associations in the energy industry here in Iceland. The committee has produced three energy projections during its period of existence, that is, in 1977, 1978 and 1981. According to the new projection, public electrical energy consumption will increase by 4.2 percent a year during the period 1984 to 1990 and by 2.7 percent a year from 1990 to 2000. Provision is made for an annual rate of growth of 1.8 percent between the year 2000 and 2015. It should also be mentioned that electrical energy consumption has grown far more in past decades, on the average, than the new projection has made provisions for. During the last ten years, electrical energy consumption has grown an average of 6 percent a year, during the last 5 years, on the other hand, by 4.7 percent a year.

9857
CSO: 3626/11

PROBLEM WASTE COLLECTION NEGLECTED BY MOST MUNICIPALITIES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Nov 85 p 6

[Article: "Most Municipalities Have Neglected Problem Waste Collection"]

[Text] Most of the municipalities have neglected the proper collection of problem wastes. The provincial governments are presently preparing an extensive report on the problems of the municipalities in regard to problem waste management for further consideration.

According to the legislation on waste management it is the responsibility of the municipalities to arrange for the reception of problem wastes and oil residues, unless an unreasonable amount of waste is in question.

The central organizations of the municipalities mailed, already in 1980, to the municipalities guidelines for the planning of reception sites, their founding and management. In spite of this only every fifth municipality has organized the collection of its problem wastes.

The Municipalities Have Been Reminded

The provincial government's environmental protection officials wonder at the laxity of the municipalities. The municipalities have already been reminded several times about defects in waste management. "These matters should have been put in order already last year. In one municipality we asked where the directions and orders we had sent were. The answer was that they were on the waste management map, but they could not be found there either" reported inspector Mikko Lukkarinen from the provincial government of Oulu.

The municipalities should now finally arrange proper collection stations for the problem wastes. The collection site does not require the processing of the problem wastes as presumed by the waste management legislation. For example, a movable container that could be placed even at the municipal center can serve as a collection site, says Lukkarinen.

According to Lukkarinen there is no point in situating the collection site far away at the dump sites, since no one will bother carrying old medicine bottles or a small waste oil can long distances. Besides the dump sites of small municipalities are open only sporadically.

"Liquid Wastes Worth Collecting"

The municipalities are not obligated to receive unreasonably large quantities of problem wastes. "The municipality should, however, receive the liquid wastes of small enterprises even though not specifically obligated to do so. The wastes of small enterprises are easily transported, along with other wastes, to the dump site" says the sales manager, Markku Aaltonen of Ekokem Co.

According to Aaltonen 70 percent of Finland's problem wastes are generated south of the Pori-Lappeenranta boundary.

"Unfortunately an even greater percentage is transported to the Riihimaki problem waste processing plant south of this line. In other words the collection of problem wastes in the more sparsely settled parts of Finland is not in order," says Aaltonen.

Distances Does Not Increase Costs

According to Aaltonen transportation distance is not an obstacle as the problem wastes that come from a distance of over 120 kilometers are transported on the state railroad at the same rate because of a shipping subsidy.

Rautaruukki and GWS Finncont have developed a simple solution for the regional collection and storage of problem wastes. A steel container, inside of which are placed smaller storage containers for, for example cotton waste, medicine bottles and filters, as well as for waste oil, functions as the collection station. As needed the smaller containers, or the entire large container, can be sent to Riihimaki by rail.

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West Europe Report

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POLITICAL AUSTRIA

PROSPECTS, STRATEGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PARTIES

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 23/24 Nov 85 p 5

[Article by Hubert Margl: "Greens: "Rustling of Leaves or Free Fall? As a Party They Are Undergoing a Crisis, as a Movement They Still Have Chances"]

[Text] The Austrian Greens continue to enjoy much sympathy among the people but the confidence in their competence to act is declining. The splinter groups are too much at variance with one another, their functionaries too far removed from the centers of decision-making. While perplexity is spreading even among the most loyal followers, Voggenhuber of the Salzburg Citizens Initiative comes forward with fundamental criticism. He says it is not the idea that is done for but the present policy and only a movement of the Solidarnosc type can revive society. The manner in which Guenther Nenning was kicked out of the labor union only sharpens the distrust against big organizations and their methods. A great moment for Greens? First they would have to agree among themselves.

"People are afraid of any political change because they think it's going to be worse." (Heinrich Boell)

As recently as 10 months ago there prevailed a euphoric mood in the camp of Austria's "Greens": Not only had a handful of insurgents forced the government in Lower Austria to its knees, the public opinion poll also confirmed to the two strongest Green parties a maximum of voter approval and sympathy from the people. More than 7 percent of the persons entitled to vote at that time were prepared to bring the "United Greens" into parliament at the next possible Sunday. At any rate even more than 2 percent had voted for the "Alternative List." Today, a few weeks after the provincial elections in Upper Austria, there are only long faces in this respect in VGOe (United Greens of Austria) and ALOe (Alternative List of Austria). The middle class "National" Greens dropped to the absolute low point of 3 percent, the leftist left Alternatives also to their minimum thus far of 1.7 percent. This even though the sensitizing of the Austrians as regards "environmental protection" has not yet reached its climax. After a 6-year "party history," the Green parties appear to have already reached the end, but in the minds of the citizens the Green movement is not yet at its end by a long shot.

In 1979 the first party of ecologists was founded in Austria, today more than 60 are officially registered with the ministry of the interior. The two most promising because they were the strongest factions were found to be some time before the date of the 1983 National Council elections: Around the antinuclear fighter Alexander Tollmann and the Salzburg bogeyman of the middle classes Herbert Fux crystallized the "United Greens of Austria," who are now led by Deputy Mayor Josef Buchner of Steyregg, the neighboring municipality of Linz. The "Alternative List of Austria," however, was welded together from a bunch of leftist intellectuals who did not see all problems solved after Zwentendorf; no leadership figure has as yet emerged from this group, in fact, according to Alternative ideology, no such figure is permitted to emerge.

Nearly Every Second Person a "Sympathizer"

At a time when the FRG Greens, united from middle class and leftists, had already entered some provincial parliaments, the split and the quarrel for predominance started here in Austria among the Greens. And there the German "comrades" have been opposition members of the Bundestag for three years and in Hesse are even permitted to perform government work for environmental protection, here in Austria with one exception (Vorarlberg) not even a common election platform has been achieved on provincial level, not to speak of the federal level. This in the face of the fact that the squabblers for the "ecological cake" were aware of an ever stronger protest potential in the population with a steadily growing awareness for the ecological problems: up to 15 percent of the voters can be mobilized for them, up to 40 percent of the Austrians can be gained as sympathizers, it was predicted to them. However, the protest of the voters against the so-called "establishment policy" grew more quickly than the ecological movement wanted to unite. The Alternatives could not get past the traditional bourgeois party structure and the one-sided nationally conscious emphasis of the key factor of environmental protection, the Greens--in phases violently at variance within themselves--could not get past the dogmatic social change programs and the basic-democratic structure of the Alternatives.

Even the citizen favoring the Greens saw, heard and read it almost daily and did not quite understand it. Thus in final analysis it was not surprising that both squabblers--the VGOe relatively barely—failed to get into parliament. But they had not learned anything from that. In the provincial elections in Lower Austria they also marched their separate ways and were unable to even endanger the established rivals. The same picture was offered in Kaernten where once again neither of the two Green groups wanted to change its position and enter into an alliance. Only in Vorarlberg at the provincial elections a year ago a success "crept in," when Greens and Alternatives united and under the leadership of the figurehead Kaspanaze Simma considerably bled the other lists competing in the elections.

But today it appears to be not only the end to the earthy alpine farmer from Vorarlberg. While in Salzburg and in Upper Austria, it was the quarrels of the Green parties and the competition for voters fatal to both which permitted the traditional parties to heave a sigh of relief, a beginning change in attitude towards the organized Greens can be noted lately in the population: In the

past the party followers of the Greens were welcomed while they are now only tolerated. But nobody would like to deny them the political right to exist.

Information on the above is provided among others by those pollsters whose results until a short time ago had made the mouths of those in the Greens parties water with voter potentials, made the mouth water so that Josef Buchner in Upper Austria believed that he would be able to enter the provincial parliament by going it alone, a possibility at which the ALOe trembled. But the pollsters noted even before the provincial elections that the people did not believe that the Greens could cope with the problems criticized by them. And this applies not only to economic or social challenges for the solution of which only marginal segments of the voters consider the Greens-Alternatives competent, but also to the very own field of these parties--the field of environmental protection. While after Hainburg 30 percent of the Austrians still believed the Greens best able to cope with ecological problems, today the figure is only 18 percent. The parliamentary parties none of which attained the 25-percent mark at the start of the year, however added quite well to the confidence. No less than 43 percent of the Austrians agree with the statement that "the Green parties only scold and criticize without showing how to do it better."

According to the opinions expressed in the polls, the Greens even in the eyes of the sympathizing voters are generally regarded as having little impact, as idealists who are quite good to enliven the political landscape without the voters voting for them for this reason. The feeling does prevail in the population that a "fourth force" would be quite good, but the role of the "pike in the fishpond" obviously is no longer taken away from the Greens. The trend seems to emerge that in a time of so many virulent fears the connection to "experienced politicians" is sought once again.

Observers are baffled by the fact that the Green groups have been unable to gain any profit for the advance of Green ideas from the still growing fear of people of an ecological disaster. The caution of the pollsters also results from this fact. The protest potential, which has no political home, roams a great deal and therefore is very difficult to catch at all. And, in final analysis, the Greens are not the cause of the latent protest but only a symptom of a "restless society." The higher educational level, the improved professional qualification, the constant demand for more codetermination and participation and the courting of the mature, upright and critical citizen in the party programs has a different effect on the traditional parties than they thought. The claims for participation grow more strongly than the possibilities as well as the capabilities. In the "restless society" without a new pattern of order, an observable decline of authority occurs everywhere; whether science, educational system or justice are involved, hardly any authority is accepted today without questioning.

It is true, the confidence of the people in the Green parties is also shaken, but the pollsters warn against completely writing them off. The new groups have not yet declined in voter favor below the figures for the 1983 pre-election period and also not below those of the FPOe. In case of a merger of the Green factions, there are probably more votes obtainable than the sum of

the individual results that can be achieved by these parties. And as long as the genuine environmental problems but also economic and social bottlenecks have not been solved, the Greens cannot simply be thrown overboard, in no case by purely symbolic and statement policy.

A Long List of Tasks That Have Not Been Mastered

And the so-called establishment parties continue to face a tremendous packet of real environmental problems to be solved which are closely linked to economic and social challenges--the everyday destruction of the landscape, the decline of the forest, the pollution of the soil, safeguarding the supply with clean water and clean air, the garbage dump, the traffic avalanche....

Here in Austria, 35 hectares of mostly fertile agricultural land disappears every day under asphalt or concrete, thus every day an area as big as 35 soccer fields is "sealed." With all that Austria as sole highly industrialized country has the dubious fame of not having any national park.

Despite increasing financial expenditures, a solution of the problem of water pollution is not in sight. Groundwater and rivers in Austria for years have remained so heavily polluted as if 28 million people lived in the Danube Alp republic. But a significant reduction of water pollution is not to be expected before 1995.

While the Austrian barely 15 years ago produced 180 kg of garbage on an annual average, today he discards already close to 220 kg into the garbage cans.

As regards forest dying, the official government figures of 360,000 hectares of damaged forest and the estimates of scientists of one million hectares continue to be far apart. Thus far, a reduction of sulfur dioxide discharge into the air by one third has been achieved, while the quantity of other "forest killers" such as nitric oxides or hydrocarbons has even increased.

Contrary to official government campaigns which represent Austria as an "environmental pioneer" in Europe, compared on an international level the country is only among the leaders as regards reduction of sulfur pollution of the air and keeping the lakes clean; as regards all other environmental protection requirements, it ranks only under "the also rans."

That is precisely where those affected, the Green parties, hook in: Even if they were to fail, the protest against the policy as it is pursued today will not cease unless the environmental, economic and social problems are truly solved. VGOe chairman Buchner, even after the election defeat in his home territory, shows himself as aggressive: "We are going to invite the establishment not to a wake but to a celebration. The splintering of the most varied Green groups, he said, did not do any good to the cause because the voter does not differentiate between the individual camps. But serious attempts will now be made to get countermechanisms going to finally achieve unity of the Green camp. "We are not dead, they only wish we were dead."

The wording by Ali Gronner, one of the three ALOe federal executive secretaries, is somewhat more precise and at the same time more self-critical: Undoubtedly

a setback has been suffered by the Greens as an organized political force and it is quite possible that the form of the Alternatives-Greens will be replaced by another form in the political spectrum. The next, truly last opportunity for the aspired entry into the National Council consists in the unification of the movement of the Greens.

But without a popular program which extends beyond purely economic questions the possible fourth force at any rate will admittedly remain weak. Therefore the various Green factions are already refining appropriate campaign platforms. The VGOe stresses a tax reform commanding broad approval which is to completely eliminate among other things the wage tax for monthly incomes of less than 16,000 schillings and presents as an alternative the introduction of product taxes for "useless" products that pollute the environment. The ALOe can largely endorse such demands and would even keep extreme demands such as strict reduction of the workweek or strong support for social fringe groups out of the election campaign.

However, the most startling recent event is an attempt to unite all important Green factions. A concrete measure to be mentioned in this respect is the founding of a "Citizens Initiative Parliament" which starts to crystallize around the figureheads of the anti-Hainburg movement and successful individual Greens. In the minds of well known persons, such as Guenther Nenning, Bernd Loetsch or Johannes Voggenhuber, the consideration plays a decisive role in this connection that a latently awakening Green movement which mobilizes around factual issues and exerts pressure on the established parties can be more successful than a special Green party. The events connected with Hainburg are taken as evidence in this respect.

Author of the idea and driving force behind the "Citizens Initiative Parliament," whose early establishment is being vehemently negotiated back and forth behind the scene, is Salzburg city councilor Voggenhuber of the Citizens Lists. With the help of well known and "meritorious" personalities from all Green camps he wants to help strengthen once again Austria's "environmental and civil rights movement." He says that this Citizens Initiative Parliament corresponds to the protest potential within the population far more than the Green "old parties" which are rigid in their structures. The present state of affairs of how policy is made in Austria to Voggenhuber is simply a "disgrace" and against that he would now like to fight with a kind of "Super Citizens Initiative."

The city councilor who is controversial but effective in the "Mozart city," who comes from the same Citizens List with Herbert Fux, would like to see the political structure organized according to the model of the banned Polish labor union "Solidarnosc." Around the circle of candidates of the prominent Green fighters, an advisory circle of scientists and other experts is to be formed and in the third circle liaison people are to maintain contact with the big factions (Green parties, citizens initiatives...).

The campaign program of the parliamentary "Citizens Initiative" is already sketched in rough outlines by "civil rights advocate" Voggenhuber: An absolute key factor in this connection is a profound reform of democracy that is to

free the citizen of any "repression." Freedom of information, involvement of parties in administrative proceedings, the possibility for class action suits by citizens groups against undesired projects or strict control of all decision-makers are only a few of the civil rights that are to be enacted in parliament. Environmental protection ranks only second but a frontal attack is to be launched here, too, within a few weeks. Among other things, Voggenhuber plans to demonstrate that no proceedings have been instituted in Austria according to the forest law to save the forests and so-to-speak wants to pillory one district government after another.

Voggenhuber's initiative has set itself a truly high goal by declaring total war on the present politics. "When we enter parliament, that will be an entirely new parliament. Everything is covered up by day-to-day politics and there is no qualified debate on Austria's future. The biggest ecological catastrophe is in truth the political paralysis of this country," rails the eloquent city councilor, who, according to his own words, under no circumstances wants to enter parliament. On the other hand, the "Citizens Initiative Parliament" already has a "Lech Walesa" at its disposal, for the dismissed labor unionist Nenning is ready to be a candidate. At any rate, the heads of the Initiative hope for 12 to 15 percent of the votes.

VGOe and ALOe leaders have been pretty much taken by surprise and now must seriously think about this juicy nut. Even now there are indications that this nut could choke the Green movement: The mutual warnings of the Green warriors if necessary to want to go it alone once again cannot be ignored. One side says that the Green parties should have realized that they would be unable to enter parliament by themselves. The other side says the organizers of the Hainburg resistance were not enormously successful with their Konrad Lorenz plebiscite.

And discord is already being sowed once again: Voggenhuber would like for the Green "old parties" to dissolve after merging in his Citizens Initiative. ALOe executive secretary Gronner can agree with that, his colleague in the federal leadership, Eisenriegler, however attacked the personnel committee on the Voggenhuber idea with extreme sharpness. VGOe chief Buchner sharply rejects the city councilor's idea and calls the venture as a whole into question as a high altitude flight with a possibly deep drop....

Among the Greens, so it seems, there continues to exist the cold war that started in the preelection period of 1983. What at that time was Fux versus Tollmann is now perhaps Voggenhuber versus Buchner. The names have changed but the constant verbal exchange has remained the same. If peace treaties were to be concluded, the next elections could already be over, namely again without the Greens entering parliament. Looking at it with dark glasses, what could be left over would be merely the gray environmental protection paper on which all once so effectively acting ideas were printed.

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POLITICAL DENMARK

LOCAL ELECTIONS: SF GAINS GROUND, PROGRESS PARTY DISAPPEARS

PM211403 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Nov 85 p 1

[Report by Carl Otto Brix, Ole Dall, and Kim Barren: "SF Gains Ground and Progress Party Disappears"]

[Excerpts] The mid-term [local authority] election yesterday was to some extent a confirmation of the countless opinion polls that have been taken in the last few weeks.

Advances were made by the Socialist People's Party [SF] and the Conservative People's Party--mostly by the SF but not on the scale expected. The explanation must be that "Green lists" have made inroads on the SF flank and one party that has suffered significant losses--the Radical Liberals--probably has to put all its losses down to the environmentalists.

Another loser in the election is the Liberal Party which lost one to two seats in one local council after another.

The election's biggest loser was the Progress Party as expected. It has now ceased to be one of the parties represented on local councils.

The Social Democrats seem to have done tolerably well throughout the country, but in Copenhagen things did not go well for the country's largest party. Clear losses have been noted and party chairman Anker Jorgensen told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE yesterday evening that this is probably due to the fact that the Social Democrats did not succeed in making the economic situation clear enough to the voters.

Both Anker Jorgensen and Prime Minister Poul Schleuter (Conservative) were cautious about proclaiming winners and losers but the prime minister did say that he thinks that "things look reasonable" and these modest words obscure the fact that in many local councils the Conservatives succeed the Liberals as the biggest or second biggest party.

Chairman of the losing Liberals, Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen consoled himself with the fact that his party's losses are modest. Ellemann-Jensen pointed out that the "mayor effect" [the popularity of the mayor in a particular council] is reflected in the number of votes cast, either for the Conservatives or the Liberals.

The evaluation that should now be made of the results is that they will not lead to any changes in government cooperation or in the relationship between government and opposition. Gains and losses are not significant enough for this.

But it is very possible that the Conservatives will have some things to discuss with the other three government parties and the Radical Liberals. Even though the Center Democrats and the Christian People's Party have not played an important part in local politics hitherto they cannot be satisfied with the results of yesterday's elections.

These could point to how things will go in the Folketing election which will come within 2 years.

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POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STUDY REVEALS VARIED ATTITUDES TOWARD GUESTWORKERS

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 7 Dec 85 p 3

[Article by ban: "Germans Don't Consider Themselves Xenophobes--Only Their Countrymen: Surprising Poll Results / Almost Half of Green Voters in Favor of Restricting Family Immigration"]

[Text] Do Germans have an unfriendly attitude toward the 4.3 million foreigners living in the FRG? How do they rate the difficulties of different cultures meeting? What is their attitude vis-a-vis the federal government's policy toward foreigners? To find the answers, the Ministry of the Interior gave a substantial order to the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy, the results of which are now available. The data contradict the slogan of "growing xenophobia" in the FRG. The climate of opinion is actually somewhat xenophile, although the picture also shows some contradictions. Contrary to their own views, 72 percent of those polled believe that most Germans are against foreigners. At the same time, those "against foreigners" are rejected more by the population than those who are "pro-foreigners." The federal government's policy toward foreigners was approved by 36 percent, and rejected by 35 percent of those polled; 20 percent were undecided.

Compared to other policy areas, such as fighting unemployment, environmental protection, and security policy, the "question of foreigners" is not considered urgent by the populace and is ranked in 29th place. This may be due to the fact that over 50 percent of the 2,257 people polled are of the opinion that practically no foreigners live in their area. Forty-six percent of those polled claimed not to know how many foreigners live in the FRG. About 15 percent were familiar with the number of foreigners (3.5 to less than 4.5 million), 27 percent thought that there were fewer, and only 12 percent believed that there were more. Three-fourths of the adult population have some kind of contact with foreigners, and a large part is played by patronizing restaurants managed by foreigners.

One-third of the population believes that there exist great difficulties in foreigners living together with Germans. But in areas with especially high ratios of foreigners, 42 percent are of this opinion. Through various questions, the pollsters found out that there exists a phenomenon "which could be called the Turkish problem." Although there are also more

"tolerant attributions" than "intolerant attributions" toward Turks--at a ratio of 38 to 34--, there are more "intolerant attributions" vis-a-vis Turks than toward other foreigners. In addition, their poor knowledge of German and their lack of contact with Germans were pointed out, and the poll result, that Turkish children born in the FRG were conceded the right of German citizenship by fewer interviewees than were children of other foreigners, also points in that direction.

Three-fourths of those polled expressed the opinion that the federal government should pay attention that in future, fewer foreigners move to the FRG. Even 45 percent of Green adherents are of that opinion. Ideas of the CDU/CSU, that immigration of children should be limited to the age of 6, get support from fewer than 30 percent of those polled. Forty-six percent rejected this demand. It is noteworthy that the 6-year restriction finds the approval of 36 percent of FDP voters, although the proposals failed mainly because of the FDP. But 19 percent of Green voters also favor such a restriction on immigration. Almost half of those polled thought that children of foreigners ought to acquire German citizenship. Eighteen percent were of the opinion that they ought to return to their own countries. Voting rights for foreigners were rejected by 52 percent and supported by 25 percent. The remark that foreigners take jobs away from Germans finds little response among the population. Only 5 percent of those who know foreigners believe it, and only 26 percent of people who do not personally know foreigners. Even among those who were classified as "anti-foreigners," far less than half claimed that foreigners took jobs away from Germans. Among trained workers, however, this catchword was endorsed by 37 percent.

Demonstrations by foreigners against political conditions in their homeland were objected to by 56 percent of those polled, and were approved by only 28 percent. As for deportation of foreigners, there was great differentiation according to the seriousness of the offense. Twenty percent demand that foreigners be deported in case of theft; 60 percent reject it. In case of drug dealing, 70 percent demand deportation, and 57 percent demand it for political extremism.

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POLITICAL FINLAND

CENTER PARTY ASSESSES ELECTORAL STRATEGIES, COLLABORATION

Center Party's New Calculations

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Nov 85 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] When the Liberal Party (LKP), which over 3 years ago had drifted into a blind alley, sought and got a political sanctuary from the Center Party (KEPU), the decision was the best of the alternatives then open to it, all of which were poor. The time has now come for a reappraisal of the situation. The KEPU is giving up its role of political day-care nurse and the LKP is once again leaving to strike out on its own. It has practically speaking two election terms' time to show whether it will succeed in returning to the national political scene.

Leaders' conclusions reported by both the KEPU and the LKP as to their experiences with the alliance engaged in these past few years give the impression of being frank and honest. The Liberals' small constituency has felt overly uncomfortable with the KEPU which, aside from that, has recently been reacquiring its old cachet of an agrarian party. The KEPU-LKP alliance has also kept several potential groups from joining the LKP because they would have had to espouse the thinking of two parties.

The negative experiences it had in the alliance were the price the LKP paid in order to gain 3 years time to think in a time of need. The next question that arises is, of course, whether it will succeed in making a comeback under its own banner. Neither the LKP nor its predecessor have succeeded in creating a Liberal platform that is sufficiently clear, appeals to citizens and would work in today's political circumstances. With a few exception the problem is one that is familiar to many other of the country's liberal factions as well. So we know that the LKP has its work cut out for it and, in addition, it absolutely needs charismatic leaders to succeed.

Liberalism occupied an important place during our country's political phases, especially during the early days of our independence. In principle it would appear to be clear that, with the state's increasin caretaker hold on the country and the tightening of its grip on the different special interest groups, courageous liberalism and tolerance would be received with

well-deserved sympathy among citizens and especially young people. For the time being, however, it is premature to judge whether the LKP will be able to find the ball that has been lost for a long time now.

The center parties have for a long time now tried to form common election coalitions to overcome those problems that stem from difficult election mathematics. Now an effort to form a centrist election coalition is again being made. As an election strategy move this is only natural. The Center will in any event have to compete for its place between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats and the number of lost votes will only be minimized with the aid of election coalitions.

To the surprise of many people, the Finnish Christian League (SKL), which is completely superfluous as a political phenomenon but which is in this way trying to rid itself of the ultraconservative label it has acquired, has also joined the Center. A centrist election coalition would shape up considerably better for the voter if it were composed of only the three original parties, the KESU, the LKP and the Swedish People's Party (RKP).

Center's Ambition for Great Electoral Alliance

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Nov 85 pp 3,12

[Articles by Anneli Sundberg et al]

[Text] KESU Already Preparing for New Government

The Center is striving for a broad election coalition the size of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and bigger than the Conservative Party. The coalition recommendation made public by the four parties of the Center on Friday will strengthen the political Center and have a significant effect on Finland's political life. With the aid of a broad election coalition the Center plans to get its share of those seats in Parliament that proportionately belong to it in the next parliamentary elections and a Center united in this way will compete with the SDP in place of a bigger party.

This is how KESU chairman Paavo Vayrynen described the effects and objectives of the coalition agreement drawn up by the leaders of the KESU, the Liberals, the RKP and the SKL on Friday.

The diverse composition of the center parties coalition quite obviously has many other objectives as well.

The KESU is trying to gather round itself so much political power, seats in Parliament, that it can aim for the status of a leading government party in the postelection government negotiations and through that the prime minister's portfolio.

The Liberals are aiming at getting into the public eye, on television and radio election programs again, through these channels back into Parliament and a new political ascent. The LKP dropped out of election programs when it

joined the KEPU as a member of the latter and now it is correcting that mistake.

The Christian Leaguers can probably assure their political existence through a coalition with the Center and election coalitions and perhaps add seats in Parliament to the three they now have. Then a coalition with the Center would put the Christian Leaguers into the public eye and even bring them ministerial portfolios too.

The RKP was the most close-mouthed of the coalition partners on Friday. A concentrating coalition does not promise it any especially new benefit.

Vayrynen's Initiative

The plan for a coalition of the KEPU, the RKP, the Liberals and the Christian Leaguers that was publicly announced on Friday goes back to last August. The initiative came from Paavo Vayrynen and at first Vayrynen only discussed the dissolution of the KEPU-LKP alliance with LKP chairman Kyosti Lallukka.

As the fall wore on, the structuring of electoral configurations broadened and finally ended in a broad, multigenerational recommendation by party leaders and party secretaries for the KEPU, the RKP, the LKP and the SKL to try to agree on a joint election coalition in the next parliamentary elections in as many election districts as possible, to bring the Christian Leaguers into a centrist delegation and for the four parties to discuss a postelection government coalition in that delegation.

The KEPU, the LKP and the Christian Leaguers carried their coalition plan even further than that. The leaders of these parties agreed that three parties would appear closely united in the negotiations over the government. If the bloc of three decides to enter a new government, the ministerial posts will be divided in proportion to where each party has gotten its parliamentary representatives into Parliament. The agreement furthermore includes an addendum to the effect that, if any one of these three parties does not obtain any ministerial posts at all because of the small number of its parliamentary representatives, that party will "in other respects participate in the government coalition."

A party without ministers would thus, nevertheless, be a government party, would appear in a united government front in Parliament and would obviously participate in centrist ministerial discussions.

The RKP did not consent to appending its name to such a government negotiation recommendation. The RKP will otherwise participate in centrist election coalitions and the coalition, but will negotiate independently for ministerial posts.

The RKP's own policy became apparent on Friday in, among other things, the fact that party chairman Christoffer Taxell was not at the sides of Paavo Vayrynen, Kyosti Lallukka and SKL chairman Esko Almgren reporting on the new plans at a press conference.

KEPU's Guarantee

Linked with the centrist plan for an election coalition, the three-party agreement on a united appearance in government negotiations is some sort of political guarantee for the KEPU. While the election coalitions will cause the small parties, the Liberals and Christian Leaguers, to acquire seats in Parliament at the expense of the KEPU, the KEPU will, nevertheless, retain its political strength in government negotiations.

In negotiations with the Conservative Party of the SDP Paavo Vayrynen can use the mandates of all three parties, draw on the parties' combined number of seats when they decide on prime ministers and each party's number of ministerial portfolios.

The RKP apparently calculated that the KEPU's guarantee may take ministerial posts away from it and that is why the party excluded itself from this section of the agreement.

"The only difference in comparison with the present situation is that we urge that the Christian Leaguers be included in the centrist delegation. Otherwise, we want to preserve our position as a fully independent party," LKP party secretary Peter Stenlund said on Friday.

LKP Changes Product Image

On Friday chairman Lallukka explained the Liberals' withdrawal from the KEPU primarily on the grounds of merely technical factors having to do with the elections. LKP activity is reviving and the liberals have been quite successfull abroad in the West German, Portuguese and Swedish elections. The wave of conservatism has been halted in West Europe and in Finland too the Liberals could have support, but their KEPU membership prevents them from obtaining it.

Since joining the KEPU, the LKP has not appeared on Yleisradio [Finnish Broadcasting Corporation]. The party has not received any publicity and it is estimated that television has had a great effect on electioneering for the votes of mobile voters in particular. They are now removing the obstacle to publicity by dissolving the party alliance. An independent, registered party gets onto Yleisradio election programs.

Since the party alliance, the LKP has lost its last parliamentary representative. Voters have become estranged from an LKP that is perceived as lacking independence. Three years after the alliance, they intend to correct the mistake at the LKP party congress next June. The KEPU will reach a similar decision at its own party congress in June.

The KEPU and the LKP have figured out that the Liberals can only get into Parliament as a clearly independent party. As many as six parliamentary representatives are gleaming in the eyes of the Liberals.

"In a changed market situation you have to quickly change your product image," Lallukka explained. He thinks that withdrawal from the KEPU will not be

opposed in the LKP. The matter is being discussed this fall in the party cells and next spring in the districts. According to Lallukka, the Espoo Liberals' departure from the KEPU was their own solo action.

In Esko Almgren's opinion, the Christian Leaguers have not been invited to join the centrist coalition, but "we will join it." Almgren feels that this is only natural since the SKL got its first parliamentary representative in an election coalition with the KEPU.

The LKP's withdrawal from the KEPU suits Almgren to a tee. Otherwise, it would have seemed as if the Christian Leaguers were going under the KEPU's other wing.

Dissolution Elections Will Speed Things Up

Right now, the election composition of the centrist parties is a recommendation by the party leaders, one that will be discussed during the fall and the spring in each party's party organs.

The recommendation was very quickly mutilated for a couple of reasons. In several KEPU districts there were meetings on the weekend and at them they made decisions on the election coalitions. On the other hand, the suspicion has spread in the KEPU that the present government is disintegrating and that there will be dissolution elections this winter. Bearing these in mind, they have had to quickly put together a centrist bloc that is as strong as possible. The Center has taken note of the fact that the SDP blocked the reform of the electoral laws under consideration in the government last summer when the Communist split became obvious. The SDP plans to take over the Communist seats for itself. The KEPU, the RKP, the LKP and the SKL are also now aiming for the same seats with the aid of broad election coalitions.

They are already counting on difficulties with election coalitions in the KEPU party bureau. According to one estimate, all four centrist parties together will get 56 parliamentary representatives, about the same as the SDP, in the next elections. That estimate shows 49 seats for the Conservative Party. Another estimate shows 55 for the Center and 58 for the SDP.

On Friday Vayrynen, Almgren and Lallukka strongly denied conjectures that the Center coalition plan is also a broad front configuration to get Vayrynen elected president in the 1988 presidential elections. The RKP party secretary was absolutely mum with regard to such predictions.

SDP Party Secretary Liikanen

SDP party secretary Liikanen recently labeled the new Center coalition agreement an uncommonly naked power play.

"I would not have believed that even KEPU leaders could be guilty of such gross dishonesty with respect to voters. I wonder how far Left the Conservative Party is, in the opinion of the KEPU, since the latter maintains that the Christian Leaguers belong to the Center."

In party secretary Liikanen's opinion, the KEPU has unscrupulously made use of obsolete electoral laws for its own benefit.

"Election coalitions are relics of the past. They confuse voters. It would be much more honest for each to compete on his own terms."

Liikanen remarked that in politics we should observe somewhat different kinds of rules than in the monopolization of the meat industry.

In Liikanen's opinion, the KEPU, which has always played in terms of a mathematical power play, is benefiting at the expense of others.

Conservative party secretary Jussi Isotalo felt that the coalition plans made public by the Center on Friday are typical of the KEPU.

"The KEPU approach is after all: Eat the party during the election term and spit the peel out."

In Isotalo's opinion, separating from the KEPU will give the Liberals some sort of chance to survive. Under the wing of the KEPU death would have been inevitable, Isotalo thought.

He noted that the small parties are in such a precarious situation that they have no alternatives, since the Conservative Party has closed its doors to them.

The only coalition course open to them is the KEPU and, according to Isotalo, it does nothing for nothing.

As it is, in Isotalo's opinion, there is nothing but good to be said of the centrist alliance because it will stabilize the party rank and file.

Former Liberal Leader

"We must admit that joining the KEPU as a member organization was a mistake," former LKP chairman Arne Berner said.

Berner was elected to head the party in 1982 when the Liberals had already associated themselves with the KEPU. In the 1970's he was also on two occasions a minister.

"Developments have shown that existing as a member organization of the KEPU has satisfied neither all of our members nor the voters. This is why it is only natural for us to change the bases of coalition.

"An independent party is after all a better alternative."

Berner believes in the Center parties coalition that has just been announced. "I believe that voters' confidence in it will increase too." Berner does not himself any longer intend to return to politics.

Nikula Will Not Return to the Ranks

A former justice minister and conspicuous Liberal politician, government advisor Paavo Nikula at the time opposed to the bitter end his party's allying itself with the KEPU. He is not enthusiastic about the new decision.

"From the start I was of the opinion that allying ourselves with it would in no way promote a centrist coalition. I cannot say how this new decision might correct the mistake made at that time," Nikula evaluated the Friday news item.

"The voters will decide whether support for the Liberals begins to grow now."

Nikula does not himself intend to return to the ranks of the Liberals. "I have now been serving in the Green movement. It has afforded me a suitable opportunity and I am content with it."

Former LKP chairman Jaakko Itala, during whose term the Liberals threw themselves into the arms of the KEPU, could not be reached on Friday. On Thursday, when current chairman Kyosti Lallukka told him the news, Itala commented: "A courageous deed."

Defeats and Debts Drove Them into the Arms of the KEPU

In June 1982 the LKP party congress decided that the LKP would become a member organization of the KEPU. Party chairman Jaakko Itala had agreed on the matter with the KEPU leaders earlier in the spring.

A painful 10-year stretch, during which time the LKP went from one misfortune to another, preceded the decision to join the KEPU. Voters disappeared and support declined from one election to the next. Only their debts increased. In the end debts amounting to a couple of million markkas drove the LKP into the arms of the KEPU.

Having fostered its principles for 100 years, the LKP was ready for it after the 1982 presidential elections. In the Koivisto elections LKP leaders presented Helvi Sipila as their candidate for president. The result was 1.8 percent of the vote and a single elector's seat.

For a long time the LKP continued to be a 5 or 6-percent party. In the 1975 parliamentary elections the Liberals amassed 4.3 percent of the vote. In the next parliamentary elections, in 1979, their share of the vote dropped to 3.7 percent and the 9-man parliamentary delegation shrank to four parliamentary representatives.

They were driven down to their lowest figures in the 1983 parliamentary elections engaged in after the alliance with the KEPU. Voters penalized the KEPU member organization, which got only 1 percent of the vote and was left entirely without parliamentary representatives.

This hopeless course continued in the 1984 municipal elections. The LKP lost half of its some 200 municipal council seats. Its share of the vote was 1.3 percent.

The LKP was founded in 1965. Its ancestors were the Finnish Youth Party (1894), the National Progress Party (1918), the Finnish People's Party and the Liberal League (1951).

During the Finnish Youth years the guardians of liberal principles obtained a support figure of over 10 percent and were represented by nearly 30 members of Parliament.

Vayrynen's Day as King

Party leaders can seldom in good faith admire their own genius.

On Friday Paavo Vayrynen had a chance to do so. For the first time in his political career, he succeeded in serving himself so skilfully that it did not seem that he was trampling other people underfoot.

On Friday three satisfied-looking men presented the Center's new plans for a coalition. On Vayrynen's right Christian Leaguer Esko Almgren beamed as though he were saved from perdition. On his left Liberal Kyosti Lallukka was as close to smiling as he ever generally has a chance to be.

Both of them obviously felt that they had made fair deals with Vayrynen.

There remained, however, absolutely no doubt as to who was the undisputed kind og the day.

Esko Almgren has scarcely ever dared to dream of anything more than the post of defense minister at the most -- Kyosti Lallukka hardly even that.

We suspect that Paavo Vayrynen has even dared to imagine himself in the presidential palace, not to mention the prime minister's post.

The creation of a new centrist alliance will merely work to benefit both goals. If the parliamentary elections go as the KEPU imagines they will, Vayrynen may well have behind him sufficient strength to raise him to the position of prime minister -- in either a popular front government or a nonsocialist government.

A prime minister, on the other hand, may easily get to be the father of the country. In Finnish politics this is more the rule than the exception.

His little election partners, the Lallukkas and Almgrens, have scarcely advanced that far in their political calculations. And the Liberals did not even themselves hit upon the expedient of withdrawing from the KEPU; Vayrynen had to advise them to do so.

Perhaps he will have to advise even smaller presidential candidates in their choices as well.

Almgren and Lallukka have in any event committed themselves so solidly to the KEPU that they just do not have a chance of refusing the honor when Vayrynen needs them.

On Friday KEPU members advertised how ingenious in every respect their latest political gamble is; no one has anything to lose.

Judging from their behavior, one might think that the Conservative Party is already crushed and the Social Democrats half crushed as well.

However, not even the cleverest gambler is capable of drafting a perfect election tactic.

The KEPU too may yet have to realize this.

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CSO: 3617/32

POLITICAL FRANCE

EFFECTS OF PRE-ELECTION POLLS ON VOTING BEHAVIOR EXAMINED

Paris LIBERATION in French 28 Nov 85 pp 10-12

[Article: "The Disease of Popularity Polls"]

[Text] In 1984, 460 polls were published. France is a prey to poll mania. Politicians are the most frequent consumers. But although they may never ignore it, not all submit to the dictatorship of opinion curves.

It is a great season for pollsters. Their turnovers are swelling. With the legislative elections a few months off, all the parties are multiplying their orders for them. They are testing their campaign pitches. They size up their candidates for nomination where there are internal rivalries. And the media are proving to be even greater consumers of opinion polls than usual.

This is to say that the times move one to look more closely at the effects of this poll mania on the political chessboard. For the disease is definitely a French one. "The number of political opinion polls published and their place in the public debate in France are much greater than what they are in the FRG, Italy, or Great Britain," Alain Duhamel observed. Admittedly, a lot of opinion polls are taken in the United States but these surveys are mainly carried out privately. In France, the invasion by the media is substantial. About 460 polls were published by the press in 1984.[1]

Where Does Poll Mania Come From?

First of all, it is General de Gaulle's fault. The appetite for political polls is in the first place the result of the presidentialization of the system. Who will be the next president of the republic? This is the general obsession. "Polls reflect the rivalry which exists in each camp among the claimants," an opinion poll adviser remarked. "One spends one's time wondering who is in the running," Duhamel added. This Elysee imperialism increases the personalization of political life that is already being promoted by television. And of course, polls are never so spectacular and appealing as when they place leaders in competition with each other. They participate in this "horse race" which Michel Rocard likes to criticize.

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[1]Review POUVOIRS No. 33, 1985, "Opinion Polls," PUF

The second guilty party is of course the press. "Opinion polls mean sales," Alain Lancelot asserted. Obviously, people always like to know what others are thinking. But many newspapers also publish polls for publicity. The goal sought after then is to be quoted on the radio and on television. This does not count publications which get started or launch a new format with a poll. LE MONDE's late conversion to opinion polls should also be noted. Apart from LE CANARD ENCHAINE, no one can get away with ignoring them any more.

There must surely be a demand for them somewhere. Some are severe in their judgment. "The proliferation of opinion polls is the by-product of the superficiality of political debate," Pierre Zemor, Rocard's adviser, declared. He denounced "the organized complicity between politicians, the media, and pollsters who go along with the current and promote a simplistic approach." Poll mania encourages the tyranny of appearance which empties public debate of all content. It provides a convenient alibi for those who want to gloss over the problems: there is no point in discussing them because a majority thinks this way.

Another school has developed a much more optimistic analysis of poll mania. "It is movement towards direct democracy which is completely sound," Jean Serise, an adviser to Valery Giscard d'Estaing, maintained. "Polls are worth more than the statements of eminent people," he added. "Opinion polls allow the voter to escape the straightjacket of the election process," Lancelot stated. One no longer chooses among various pre-established slates but can express oneself as one pleases. The communist voter who favors the death penalty, for example, can finally make his voice heard.

However, Joseph Daniel, an adviser to Laurent Fabius, sees in poll mania "a French hankering for referendums and a sort of substitute for them given the fact that we no longer have them." Beyond the "political spectacle," the phenomenon is an indication that the French "like to express their opinions" and it functions as a palliative for "the absence of other means of expression." Bernard Rideau, a former adviser to Giscard at the Elysee, goes even further. In his view, surveys "finally promote the establishemnt of a modern democracy" because when there are no elections being held, they organize the only "face to face encounters" between rulers and public opinion.[2] Polls are so numerous and diverse that by turns they can bear out the proponents of each of these views.

What is the Impact of Opinion Polls on the Political Climate?

It is among politicians especially that surveys can wreak havoc. Public opinion, after all, does not go into ecstasies when Francois Leotard sees his popularity rating climb five points. All specialists agree in saying that opinion polls only have a measurable effect in the world of politics. All the same, they do at least have a noticeable effect on voters. "People vote with the probable results of the election in mind," Lancelot noted. At that point, "behavior is no longer blind but can be sophisticated." The "useful" vote is logically strengthened thereby. Beyond this, the debate concerning the

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[2]Bernard Rideau, "The Illusion of Power," LA TABLE RONDE

influence of pre-electoral surveys on results has never proved anything one way or the other.

The impact of opinion polls on the morale of politicians, on the other hand, is incontestable. "If there were no polls taken, Giscard and Chirac would function better whereas Barre would not function as well," Jean-Pierre Raffarin, a republican party adviser, maintained. For our politicians, it is very painful to be "blacklisted virtually every morning," Duhamel added. The SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] monthly "honor list" is awaited with as much fear as a common school report. The law of the hit parade is merciless. One has to be extremely hardbitten to endure an unpopularity which looks as if it will last forever. "Every government has the right to be unpopular," Daniel emphasized, "but it is much harder in a country which publishes 50 surveys a month." The current government endures this "constant belaboring" worse since the opposition press naturally delights in continually reminding it by this means that the real country is not in harmony with the legal country.

Opinion polls encourage opportunism. Imagine if they did not exist. Would Raymond Barre be such a center of attraction? "The delegates who joined him did not all do it because they were against forming coalitions," Raffarin pointed out. "They are also playing the winning horse." "When a politician is successful in the polls, it is amazing how many phone calls and dinner invitations he receives," an adviser to a successful leader confirmed. The political world is literally magnetized by those with good popularity ratings. Would Laurent Fabius be unanimously considered a credible presidential candidate if opinion polls did not exist?

The impact of these ratings, moreover, is compounded by the media. "They reinforce the trend of the polls," Duhamel believes. Real snowball effects can follow. A politician rises in the polls. The press gives him more attention and commentaries on him become more favorable. Radio stations extend him more frequent invitations. Then there is the much coveted transition to prime time television. All this maintains our man's high ratings. "An appearance on Antenne 2's Hour of Truth is worth three points, Serise smiled. Thus the political market can experience fad phenomena and speculative movement. Polls sometimes blow "soap bubbles," cautioned a specialist who warned against "panic movements which, as on the stock market, can temporarily destabilize the market."

This does not mean that opinion polls are responsible for inventing opportunism. Jean-Luc Parodi, an adviser to the IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute], even thinks that "surveys serve as a thermostat" by relativizing the swings of public opinion: "Politicians have always searched for climate indicators; before there were polls, there were partial elections, public meetings, the reactions of their supporters, and the impressions of the press." At that time, they were obsessed with "revealing details" and announced that "public opinion was veering" for no reason at all. According to Parodi, "spontaneously, politicians greatly magnify trends in public opinion." Polls have therefore had a settling effect on the game, at the same time giving more assurance concerning the reality of changes in public opinion.

They constitute a formidable "destroyer of ivory towers," as PS adviser Gerard Le Gall emphasized. "No leader now says: in my branch, my associates think that ...," he stated. Leaders are less influenced by the impressions of their supporters. To begin with, the changes recorded by the polls had their origin in public opinion. Now public preferences constantly come into the political game as the decisive factor.

The very strategy of the various actors is thus influenced by this awareness of the balance of power. As if by chance, Rocard resigned from the government at the time he was passed by Fabius in the SOFRES survey. The relative weakness of the prime minister last spring also played a part in the quarrel which set him against Lionel Jospin. On both left and right, the expectation of a victory by the right in the legislative elections speeds up presidential strategies and sharpens rivalries.

And on Politicians?

Polls are especially important for young people. "Their role is decisive in the victory stage but not in the administrative stage," Raffarin maintained. The politician who is making a name for himself has a vital need for a good popularity rating. This is what establishes his reputation and opens to him the door of the media, particularly television. This is why opinion surveys "give special attention to the second fiddles," a specialist noted. The big game "can get away with a year of unpopularity," Duhamel declared. Even if they suffer as a result, they are no longer prisoners of opinion polls.

While it is advisable to be popular, it is not absolutely essential for success. Mitterrand hit the Elysee jackpot without ever having really won the enthusiasm of public opinion. And no one is wagering a nickel on Simone Veil despite her repeated performance in the polls. Not everyone is in the same position. "Some politicians follow a long distance strategy whereas others take a rendezvous approach," Raffarin stated. Francois Leotard, for example, has a distance to cover which presupposes a rise in the polls, whereas Giscard is hoping above all for a rendezvous with public opinion, which helps him to put up with his present ratings.

Then there is more than one kind of popularity. One has to distinguish between the "image assets" a leader may have and the results in the elections he may draw from it. Simone Veil is favored by a strong current of sympathy but its translation into votes is doubtful. For a long time, Rocard has been in the same position. "There is an enormous discrepancy between indications of sympathy and image, and voter intentions," a specialist warned. Jaffre also makes a distinction between "position in public opinion," measured by popularity polls, and "political position" which introduces a lot of other criteria: the party strategy, the topographical situation on the political chessboard etc. And he warns those who, like Rocard, tend to give more consideration to gaining points in public opinion to the neglect of political details. It is often more important to be in a good position at the crucial moment than to be constantly applauded by those polled.

What is Their Influence on Political Decisions?

Would they make a decision based on the polls? Never! All the leaders' advisers vigorously reject such a proposal. At the most, they grant their decisive role during election campaigns. First of all, to find out whether they should run. In 1969, it was the polls which finally convinced Alain Poher to enter as a candidate in the presidential elections. In 1974, Edgar Faure withdrew from the race when his ratings in the polls proved disastrous. But, Daniel points out, there are contrasting examples. "In making major decisions, top officials sometimes know enough to shake off the influence of opinion polls that all point in one direction." Thus Giscard ran in 1974 when the opinion surveys indicated that the race would be between Chaban and Mitterrand in the second round. And Mitterrand ran again in 1981 despite a poor showing in the polls.

Surveys enter the picture also where coalition strategy is concerned. But there too, their real influence varies considerably. The clearest example is that of the PS attitude towards the PC in the 1983 municipal elections. The socialists had had surveys carried out in communist municipalities where their influence had increased to measure their chances if there were leftwing primaries. The verdict was that in the large majority of cases, the communist slate would still come out ahead of that of the PS. This information contributed substantially to the socialist decision not to contest these municipalities.

Another example, certainly more ambigous: again in the 1983 municipal elections, the UDF and the RPR were arguing as to who should head the opposition ticket in Poitiers. The staffs of the two parties decided to settle the dispute by having SOFRES carry out a survey. But in actual fact, the survey was meant to achieve a specific goal, namely, to give the RPR a reason for persuading its local troops to accept the decision to allow the UDF to head up the ticket. A poll is often used as a means of pressure in favor of a decision already made, or to give assurance that it was well-founded.

There are even more ludicrous situations. In 1984, the UDF had SOFRES carry out a survey to find out whether or not it should form a joint ticket with the RPR in the European elections. Its leaders drew opposite conclusions. One group maintained that their electorate wanted a union. The other emphasized that the survey proved that separate tickets would lead to better election results. Finally, the UDF decided to go with the single ticket, and that odd survey served no particular purpose.

Moreover, "the survey method of making decisions is not a good one," Raffarin stated, inasmuch as it claims to replace "a political struggle with a pseudo-scientific one." He stressed that "the idea of the predictive survey is erroneous because in marketing no product has ever been launched on the basis of consumer intentions." In politics, furthermore, things are even more complicated. Even a few months away from the elections, opinion polls cannot take into account the effects of the campaign, which are sometimes decisive. All the specialists agree with him in saying that "surveys determine the form of the address but do not put a policy together."

It is in the orchestration of political propaganda that they play a primary role. In the choice of campaign themes: in the 1984 European elections, the PS

talked a great deal about Europe partly because the polls indicated that the topic went across well. In the choice of slogans: for a recent campaign by Leotard, surveys resulted in the adoption of the slogan "a passion for your freedoms" whereas the majority of his advisers preferred "frankly liberal." In the choice of arguments to use: before any reform of some importance, the government has a survey carried out so as to present it in the best light to public opinion. In the choice of spokesmen to favor in a campaign: Jack Lang is put forward by the socialists because of his good ratings in the polls.

When it comes to the content of political strategy, opinion polls are not of much help. Politicians who suffer from a continuing lack of popularity often wrongly treat it as an image and communication problem. All the polls in the world are of no use at all in showing how to make a comeback. Pollsters are not "gurus," Jaffre declared. Their role is limited to "describing the state of affairs." After that, it is up to the politicans to decide.

Does Public Opinion Rule?

Is the Fabius government ruled by opinion polls? "On the basis of what they indicate, an intelligent person could reach the same political convictions," Duhamel remarked. Fabius's comments are strongly influenced by the state of mind of public opinion revealed by the polls. But this "government by image" is no doubt a temporary state of affairs, a by-product of the low ideological profile assumed by the government.

Moreover, the theory of government by opinion polls is destroyed by an examination of recent political history. It was not them but the RPR which was behind the conservative swing of Giscard's 7-year term. In business, Barre symbolized opposition to government by opinion polls. In their turn, the socialists have sometimes seriously neglected the lessons of opinion surveys.

The most striking example is that of the education quarrel. Up to 1982, the polls indicated that the majority of French people favored National Education's time-honored unified state public service. But public opinion changed quickly as soon as the reform was presented. "I remember having put a file together on the subject and stressing that, even among the socialist electorate, the project was a poorly conceived one," Le Gall said bitterly. The administration turned a deaf ear to the polls.

The government of France is not determined by pollsters' computers. It is mainly the nature of the public debate that polling mania influences: by allowing citizen X to throw his two cents worth into these oratorical contests, thus breaking some of the rules of the seraglio. Polls also have the felicitous effect of encouraging the renewal of political circles which greatly need it. But at the same time, polling mania is symptomatic of a degree of superficiality in the public debate where the spectacle of rivalries hides the weakness of propositions. Perhaps it is the offspring of the crisis in ideologies. For lack of master thinkers, the man in the street is questioned.

Francois Mitterrand no doubt is one of those whom polls annoy the most. His popularity, which has always gone through striking ups and downs, is too low at the moment for him not to be somewhat bitter about it. Besides, Mitterrand

has never become reconciled to the wave of 1980 polls favorable to Rocard. He is not far from thinking that they contributed to that odious campaign intended to force him into retirement.

At the Elysee, Mitterrand is advised in this matter by Charles Salzmann, an information specialist who is also an old friend of the president. When a question interests the latter, it is introduced into the periodic survey by the SID (Decision and Information Service, placed under the authority of the prime minister). The televised appearances of the president espcially are covered by polls. After nearly every one of them, the ESTEL polling institute receives a telephone order for an immediate survey of 200 people. To measure perceptions of the presidential message, the Elysee followed the impact of the televised Mitterrand-Mourousi show by means of a BVA poll. According to several sources, moreover, it seems that the Elysee has been commissioning more surveys since 1981. Rideau, Giscard's former adviser, even thinks that there is now an unhealthy "polling mania." He added severely: "In President Carter's team at the White House in 1980, I observed the same obsession and the same voracity."

The least one can say is that his predecessor, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, was not indifferent to the polls; to the point that he would have the results of popularity polls communicated to him by telephone when he was overseas. As a polytechnic graduate, Giscard likes figures and is very familiar with polling techniques. His adviser had added to the standard repertoire the formation of a "pilot group" of French people questioned immediately after every press conference, major address, or statement. The idea was to feel the pulse of public opinion as quickly as possible but also, Rideau added, to "get a head start on commentators' analyses and to be able to give them a favorable briefing before their papers appeared."

Today, however, Giscard is a bit annoyed with the polls. Disappointed with quantitative polls, Giscard is turning towards qualitative surveys. He avidly devours studies by COFREMCA, since he is eager to be guided by "social-cultural currents."

Raymond Barre is having the opposite experience with the polls. Before, he was miserly with them, but now champions them. "He is one of those who is best able to resist the polls," Duhamel affirmed, because he is "able to discern their seasonal variations." The former prime minister studies the opinion polls himself. His adviser declares that he familiarizes himself with them "with great equanimity" since "his training makes him a good reader." Nevertheless, Barre is not indifferent to them even though he refuses to adapt his statements to the desires of public opinion, for example on the formation of coalitions. His adviser noted, moreover, that his example shows that constancy can pay off in the long term. The faults for which Barre was once criticized (stubbornness, arrogance) have miraculously been tranformed into assets (tenacity, lofty perspective), without the person in question having changed in character.

Jacques Chirac is less at ease with the polls. His supporters are suspicious of quantitative studies, which are admittedly hard on him. Every 6 months, a large meeting is organized around him to consider image and communication

problems. On Chirac's side, they say they commission few quantitative studies but these are preceded by qualitative studies (CCA, COFREMCA, and in depth interviews with small groups). On topics in current affairs, they carry out quick surveys by telephone in order to get an idea of the awareness of public opinion.

Michel Rocard's supporters show the same preference for qualitative and long term studies. Pierre Zemor too is attentive to "the analysis of the social-cultural currents" to which COFREMCA pays particular attention. His main concern is that Rocard prove himself to be truly in step with "the deep-seated expectations of public opinion." Notwithstanding, Rocard also is an avid consumer of standard surveys, and often in reading them finds a precious source of encouragement.

Laurent Fabius is another opinion polls enthusiast. He analyzes the institute reports himself. Joseph Daniel systematically sends him all the surveys that appear. The prime minister sometimes asks him for additional explanations by sending him back the document with a question mark. The government chief also has available periodic surveys carried out by the SID, administered by Daniel. First of all, there is a monthly survey carried out by BVA. Those polled are questioned concerning the importance they attach to the different areas of governmental action and the assessment they place on these various domains. There are also questions on current affairs, such as immigration. A given reform might also be checked out with the vocational category concerned. The results of this study enable the government to put up a better resistance to the pressure of a trade organization which does not seem to reflect the views of its grassroots membership.

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POLITICAL GREECE

KYP DELEGATION REPORTEDLY QUESTIONS KGB DEFECTOR

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 29 Nov-5 Dec 85 p 13

/Text/ We have reliable information that a team of the Greek KYP /Central Intelligence Service/ has been in the United States for a week now to "interrogate" former Soviet diplomat Sergey Bokhan about what the latter had revealed on the secret espionage service of his country in Greece.

According to information of POLITIKA THEMATA, a 5-man KYP team, reportedly headed by the KYP director and deputy director, was sent to the United States by the A. Papandreou government to learn "firsthand" what Bokhan really knows about persons and affairs in Greece. The team is expected to return to Athens in a few days.

Bokhan's "interrogation" took place in the presence of CIA and DIA experts since the former first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Athens had responsibility for matters related to defense and the war industry.

According to estimates of Western diplomats in Athens, the Greek Government and the prime minister personally have already been officially briefed, at least along general lines, about what Bokhan had admitted on the activities of Soviet and other agents in our country.

According to related information, the Americans expressed strong dissatisfaction when they learned that Mr Papandreou was preparing his trusted and good friend Brig Gen I. Alexakis (known as the superior to Dan. Krystallis) to head the KYP team. This displeaure on the part of the Americans obliged the government to finally replace I. Alexakis with a high-ranking KYP official.

As noted by political observers, the KYP team in the United States (1) is following talks between Mr Karlos Papoulias and Mr George Schulz in Washington and Mr A. Papandreou and Michael Armacost in Kastri and (2) coincides with the "freeze" on the sale of 80 American-built F-16 aircraft to Greece even though the agreement for obtaining high electronic technology aircraft and other secret things was initialed in Washington a month ago.

It is to be noted that Mr Mitsotakis, leader of the government opposition, had previously declared after Bokhan's flight that according to his information espionage activities in Greece had infiltrated high government ranks at the adviser level.

5571
CSO: 3521/60

POLITICAL GREECE

RESPONSIBILITIES SOUGHT IN 'ANARCHISTS' PHENOMENON

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 22 Nov 85 p 9

/Article by Thanasis Mitsopoulos/

/Text/ The death of the unfortunate youngster in the tumult of the grievous and unsettling events of the night of 17-18 November, beyond its political implications and a search for specific responsibility, I believe has left untouched the big social problem that lies behind these events.

According to newspaper information, among the youth whom we call either "anarchists" or "independent anarchists" are a large number, perhaps a majority, of 15-20 year olds and the remainder a little over 20.

As we saw them on television erecting street barricades and fighting and destroying and finally being arrested and being packed into police cages we were seized with sorrow while looking at their dirty faces, their unruly long hair and their "wild" beards.

In their expression you could see on the one hand malice and hatred at society as a whole and not only at the police "guardians" of society. You could also discern a tendency toward evil and violence, toward destruction and by extension to crime.

On the other hand, you could see in these youngsters a tendency and longing for popular recognition, their being looked upon as "heros," while they raised their hands in the victory sign when the police were leading them to the cages.

And the question to be asked is the following:

For what "victory" are these youngsters fighting, what "ideals" and what "goals" lead them to the Exarkheia and to other "posts" and what is it that propels them to violence and the manifestation of such destructive mania with its conquests. etc.?

From what homes do these youngsters come every night? Who are their parents and what have they done and what are they doing so that their children might not have reached this irresponsible permissiveness?

From what schools have they graduated, who were their teachers and what was the educational system and what were the ideals it offered them?

In what social environment do they live, move and nourished spiritually, morally and intellectually?

What was lacking and what is lacking in these youthful beings, boys and girls, who grow wild and run amuck in the streets?

Who is behind or to whose interest is it to strengthen and to foment these demonstrations?

What is possibly hidden behind this situation?

So, this is the big social problem that all of us together must see and confront. Unfortunately, however, either we do not see it or --even worse-- see it and let it continue and grow.

The pronouncements and positions taken by all, or almost all, political parties and youth organizations are centered exclusively on the responsibilities and on the omissions of the government and its corresponding offices. And their intention to put the political cost of these events on the government alone is evident.

Not one word about their own responsibility, about the more general social responsibility, about this dangerously ugly situation. To the contrary, and unfortunately, in the way the pronouncements are made and positions taken a tendency and an attempt to strengthen and foster such demonstrations appears, placing responsibility exclusively and solely on the government. They do not see any responsibility on their part. To the contrary, their intention to appear as critics of the government shows up clearly and --even worse-- to gain party benefits.

Of course, no one can maintain that the government does not have responsibility and no one can maintain that the strongest criticism over its omissions, errors, etc. cannot be exercised. This is one side of the matter. But --and here is the problem-- if each of us does not see his own responsibility we will not be able to get to the root of the evil and move forward toward confronting it and solving it.

The phenomenon is a social one; it was not created by the government. We will judge the government on how it confronts it within the context, generally and specifically, of its jurisdictions. However, its being confronted on a more general basis is a duty of us all, parties, youth organizations and other social and other groups and individuals.

It is this responsibility that I wish to stress in this memorandum of mine.

5671
CSO: 3521/60

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEF

SOVIET TECHNICIANS PRESENCE--Six Soviet "technicians" provide services to MOMA /Joint Reconstruction Equipment Units/ only when there is need! This was revealed in a written answer by Deputy Minister of National Defense T. Sekhiotis to ND Deputy Vas. Papageorgopoulos who had made note of the presence of Soviets in the armed forces. Mr Sekhiotis, admitting the presence of the Soviets, added that "they work with MOMA's technical personeel and are included in the agreement to repair equipment." The Soviet "technicians" are Vladimir Novikov, Vladimir Lesun, Vladimir Veliko, Vladimir Stanov, Mikhail Pirogov and Anatoliy Bogdan. /Text/ /Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 27 Nov 85 p 9/ 5671

ALLEGED POLL: PASOK WEAKENS--The government indirectly but clearly admitted yesterday that the recent poll conducted by the KYP /Central Intelligence Service/ (according to newspaper information) for Andr. Papandreou, showed that in the first 5 months after the elections, PASOK lost 30 percent of its strength, dropping from 46 percent to 32 percent. As was to be expected, the results of this poll, that neither A. Papandreou nor the government dared make public (but was at the same time revealed by two pro-government newspapers on Sunday), were not denied yesterday by the government spokesman. The poll has, nevertheless, caused panic in Kastri and its close entourage. According to all indications, panic and fear has reached such a point over the impending speedy collapse that A. Papandreou has accepted suggestions from his "men" to make use of the most ineffective weapon: high-handedness and authoritarianism in a series of issues concerning which he has in the long run been obliged to back off completely because of the way they had developed (problems dealing with information, threats against police because they are carrying out their duties, etc.). /Text/ /AthensI VRADYNI in Greek 3 Dec 85 pp 1, 3/ 5671

CSO: 3521/60

POLITICAL ITALY

STUDENTS PROTEST SCHOOL CONDITIONS, POOR JOB PROSPECTS

National Demonstrations: Student Viewpoint

[Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 3 Nov 85 pp 28-31]

[Article by Gad Lerner with Carlo Gallucci, Fulvio Milone and Martin Trapper]

> [Text] Suspicious about the meetings of political parties with the FGCI [expansion unknown] students from Milan to Naples are taking to the streets to demand new classrooms, laboratories and buildings so they can "study better." Is this 1968 all over again? The students give their opinions.

Is it true that a new youth revolt is taking place, notwithstanding all the sociologists' and "studentologists'" predictions and the mood of Europe itself? Italian students have been taking to the streets with cries of "we want to learn." Is it arbitrary to lump them together with their British and German "rabble-rousing" counterparts, who have been wreaking havoc on campuses in their respective countries these past weeks?

If we move beyond official and academic circles, we find people who are willing to make that claim, although they reject the ritualistic references to 1968. Rather they say there is a generation gap that is less innovative but more traumatic: that of 1977. For some time now, the 24-year old Gomma, leader of the anarchistic punks of Milan who go by the name of "Virus," has been telling his friends, "Trust the proof by nines and the underground signals that have been electrifying the univertiy: '68 plus 9 makes 77, and 77 plus 9 is, no doubt about it, 86.'"

Less symbolically and more scientifically, Biagio Longo, director of the People's Radio, the Milan broadcasting station that acts as a coordinating center for the schools involved in the campaign, says, "The idea that something is stirring came to me as I traveled through Spain, France, Germany and southern Italy. I found out that there are hitherto unknown foreign youth grapevines and previously unknown links in the rebellion. I say to the sociologists who are dumbfounded by these new outbreaks of conflict among the youth, 'You should have been surprised earlier, when nothing was happening.' Biagio Longo concludes,

"Indeed, how was it possible--with economies that have been leaving a million people unemployed and an Italian educational system that has been literally falling apart--that some form of organized protest would not break out among the youth at some time?"

The Reformers

All this is true, but it is also true that the Milanese students who have taken to the streets call each other "guys" rather than "comrades." They wave signs saying, "We are desperately looking for schools" rather than "No to the bosses' schools." They chant, "The budget isn't fair. Schools now or revolution" instead of the mythical "The proletariat has no nation: internationalism, revolution." In a word, they seem to be good, reform-minded students, and although they wear the "kefiyah" (the scarf of the fedayeen) around their collers, they do so because it is in style or, at most, to say that they have been shuttled from one crumbling structure to another so much that they feel a bit like Palestinians, without a country of their own.

The list of street demonstrations has lengthened since 20,000 students paraded in Milan on 16 October, and 10,000 university students did so in Naples the next day. On 29 October it was the turn of the night schools, and, on 7 November, the Milan university students (who were protesting the high tuition increases provided for in the budget). Then on 9 November it was the turn of the students in Rome, while in Naples there was talk of a national demonstration on 3 December. Not to mention the predictable contagion on many other campuses, such as Genoa (where abolition of the high-school exit exam was demanded) or Bari (where the university residence halls were occupied). It does not seem to be a flash in the pan, especially since for the first time in 10 years independent student coordinating groups have been appearing on campus, and they have been suspicious or even hostile to organized political groups.

The Girls of '85

They are Julia and Gaia of the Second High School of Arts; Viola, from Itsus; Maristella, from Caterina da Siena; and Pierpaola, from Vespucci. They are all between 16 and 18 and have started a new student movement. They are more pragmatic and concrete than their male comrades, perhaps because they say they have a more urgent need for the school to help them somehow make a place for themselves in society. The girls have taken charge of the meetings, put school administrators on notice that students have a "right to learn," and filled the demonstrations with color and "creative" slogans.

"We don't really know why, but this year we attracted 600 students to an unscheduled meeting, while last year there were only a dozen," says 16-year old Viola Vitali. She says she sympathizes with the punks and independents "because political parties like the FGCI and Proletarian Democrats remain outside of our spontaneous movement." She also says, "I do not support the various autonomous grouplets that have nostalgic illusions about the 1970's and would like to make the same mistakes all over again, beginning with violence." How come the students have suddenly

begun to fill the groups and meeting halls that were so recently deserted? "Because the odyssey of the 1,200 students without a school in the Second High School of Arts has made people aware of the poor conditions we have to work in and have created solidarity," Viola answers.

A School in Pieces

The case of the Second High School of Arts, which has been without a usable home for 4 years, has become known to all of Italy (and it is the only case that has been resolved, thanks to emergency aid from the Tognolo union). It must be admitted that it has acted in an unusual way to stir public opinion. It has been a beacon to other teenagers, who ask such questions as: "Why should it be the norm for us to have a schoolroom in a basement, to have to use a wall full of holes for a chalkboard, never to have a chemistry lab or a gymnasium for our exercise classes?" At a time of budget cuts, these questions are liable to be explosive.

Extreme cases are hardly lacking. In the center of Milan on Friday 25 October, young people gathered to shout "We want to cook!" They were students from the Vespucci hotel school, and they did not have the kitchens necessary for their lessons. The main gym is a safety hazard; the one in their annex is too small and "unsuitable for physical education." It is not possible to transfer even a few of the extra classes to a neighboring elementary school because the child-size fixtures would have to be replaced (estimated expense: 35 million lire for 6 toilets). If this is happening in a school built no more than 25 years ago, you can imagine what the others are like. Triple shifts are the norm in Naples, and three-fourths of the buildings in which the 120,000 high-school students attend classes were not constructed for that purpose. In Rome, 25 schools have already gone on strike this year because of structural problems.

The Area of the Rabble-Rousers

But the problem of the "good guys" and "bad guys" appears even in Italy. The movement had been growing gradually, arousing curiosity in various quarters and gaining sympathy even in the most moderate public opinion when demonstrations began to be invaded by "skinheads," punks or black-jacketed youth wearing kefiyahs to disguise their faces. In Milan, there were attempts to occupy the buildings on Via Prinetti, where the students of the Second High School of Arts want to be located. There was a battle with the militants of the Proletarian Democracy in the courtyard of the Statale, which was played up in the media as nothing less than the Autonomy groups all over again, and they were accused of "infiltrating" the demonstrating students.

Actually, the matter is more complicated than that (otherwise how could even the nonviolent female students of the Second High School of Arts have any sympathy for these so-called "autonomists" when the students were already confronting the "politicians"?). The "Arabizers" and "hards" who want to put the movement on a confrontational basis have not just sprung

up out of the ground, and they should remind us of the experiences of other European countries. A short summary is in order; in recent weeks the police implemented the protective procedures ordered by the new police chief Antonio Fariello and arrested more than 1,000 young people in their traditional Milan meeting places on Via Torino, Piazza Leonardo, and Lambro park. They took away 400 at a time, and another 400 young people escaped. leaving behind a total of a few ounces of light drugs on the ground. Is it any surprise that thousands of students seeking solidarity, whether disorganized or organized in small groups, should also be found in school? It is a fact that at least a quarter of the teenagers in the demonstration were wearing the "alternative" look, especially the casually-dressed art students. Some of them may frequent meetings places such as the Leoncavallo, the club on the Via dei Transiti (which publishes the student newspaper ANTIVENTO), or the house on Piazza Bonomelli occupied by the punks of "Virus." A few, at the moment, are shouting the slogan "Out of the ghetto, out of the cage, make it or break it, let's show them our rage." But the independent organizations of the occupied schools have discussed the police raid at length, and it is not important that the school's student coordinating committee met in the "autonomous" headquarters on the Via Leoncavallo in its initial stages.

Not all the Italian "rabble-rousing" students are average students, but this does not mean much. Let us listen to Davide, at the Leoncavallo, who recently returned from a year among the "alternatives" of Berlin: "We felt we were a part of the same movement with the black youth of Brixton, Liverpool, and Birmingham, with the Dutch "krakers" who protested the pope's visit, with the "Autonomen" who confronted the police in 20 German cities. It is no coincidence that we have adopted the same symbol throughout Europe:a lightning bolt through a circle." It is true that these northern European youth movements have little to do with schools, but it is also true that in no other European country is secondary and higher education in such disarray and ridden with social conflict as in Italy. How will it be resolved? Will the "good guys" or the "bad guys" win? The answer will come soon. Meanwhile, it can be predicted that the children of '85 will become even more numerous on Italian streets. They are waiting for reinforcements from the universities. In the universities of Rome, Milan and Naples, they can be counted in the thousands.

Goodbye to the Backslide: an Interview with Mario Capanna

In these days of unexpected student activism, it seems almost obligatory to question an "expert" such as Mario Capanna, a leader of the 1968 student movement. He is now a deputy and secretary of the Proletarian Democracy.

[Question] They say that the pragmatic students of '85 are a lot different from you. They also say that theirs is a reform movement.

[Answer] I think that definition is ridiculous. In 1967, on 17 November to be exact, we occupied the Catholic University of Milan for the first

time in history. We weren't asking for the moon or even revolution, just that they not raise registration fees. Every movement is born and develops from the real contradictions it perceives. It would be stupid to claim the opposite.

[Question] So, do you foresee a new 1968?

[Answer] I would like to, and I see a healthy fear in many of my opponents. I think it's terrific that Montanelli's got the shakes. But I don't think we're in for a battle of that size. At least two conditions are lacking: international events of earthshaking proportions and competition with other movements for growth, especially among the workers. True, though, there are positive signs. I am very pleased at the students' ability to be surprised.

[Question] Ability to be surprised? What does that mean?

[Answer] It is a great thing to consider the potential value of their sincere surprise at a democracy that shows it is so weak and decadent that it can't even give them a classroom. It shows how false and artificial it is to think of young people as just bakers or rock fans. It's not true. Now that the student ferment in Milan has spread to other cities, this recurrence of youth activism shows that there are live coals under the ashes, and they are coming to the surface. It's the beginning of the end of a long backslide into apathy.

FGCI's Objectives

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 2 Nov 85 p 2

[Interview with Pietro Folena, national secretary of the FGCI, by Romeo Bassoli: "The Students of '85? They Have a Lot at Stake"; in Rome, date of interview not given]

[Text] The Milan movement has been echoed in dozens of schools with concurrent protests in Bari, Palermo, Cagliari, Undine and 40-odd middle-sized and small towns all over Italy. There have been TV debates and whole newspaper sections devoted to the issue. What has become of a generation that was going to be remembered only for the make of its shoes and jackets?

"The actions taken this week," says Pietro Folena, national secretary of the FGCI, "can be compared in breadth only to the pacifist movement. However, it is surprising that the strongest push for classrooms comes from Milan, although there as elsewhere there have been outbursts against the budget allocations. The reason for that is quite understandable; the budget shows that schools are considered a superfluous service. It is a symbol of injustice; if it is worth anything, it is worth more than what is being paid."

[Question] A lot has been said about the organization of these student demonstrations and their relationship to political parties.

[Answer] The initiatives of this week have been strong despite the people who organized them, whether they were individual coordinators, small committees or, in many cases, the League of Secondary-School Students federated with the FGCI.

[Question] The FGCI is a new presence.

[Answer] Yes, but be careful. The League of Secondary and University Students has recently been experimenting with a truly new structure. It is no longer a traditional political organization--such as the FGCI--but a component of student mobilization. The student organization has been a guiding light in the FGCI, not the other way around.

[Question] Would it be very difficult to join this movement with all those young people who have a completely new relationship with politics?

[Answer] These students reject politics as the reason for mobilizing and as the purpose of demonstrating. Rather, they are using politics as a means of achieving their objectives, however large or small they may be. It is up to political organizations to change the students' "I'll use you as long as you serve me" attitude into a more lasting relationship.

[Question] But the students are not optimistic. Problems arose with the pacifist movement in recent years.

[Answer] Yes, because political organizations imposed themselves on the movement and frustrated its larger possibilities. The students know that, That is why they kept the DP [Proletarian Democracy] and its banners out of their procession. It would obviously be proper to exclude the FGCI, if it wanted to do the same thing.

[Question] What about violence?

[Answer] This is a practical-minded generation that is asking the politicians to help them achieve some objectives. Do the students see the PCI, a unified national political force, as being sensitive to their needs? The PCI can "serve" like any other party that may make itself available. But it must respect the students' absolute independence (and the League of Secondary School Students is watchfully jealous of that independence.)

[Question] It has been said that even you have insisted more than once that the "sign" of this readiness to take part in the campaign cannot be fixed once and for all. In short, are the youth leftists or not?

[Answer] I think the students are not ready for adventures of any sort. But wrong answers may be given to the students' demands. Take CL [expansion unknown], with its Parsifal, its private religious schools and culturally homogeneous classes. Or take an individualistic response: "Don't worry about your friend, just think about yourself."

[Question] But these children hope for a form of individual education for the future, and they are concerned not about selection but about having the means necessary to achieve success as men and women who have a good education.

[Answer] These youth are the children of the third industrial revolution. They know that information and knowledge are decisive and that new forms of independent work are emerging. However, an individualistic response would cut out 90 percent of these children. What I would like to see, rather, is increased awareness that school conditions, the increase in university fees, the study of outmoded ideas, and the absence of reform are obstacles to everybody's individual achievement. This is what is at stake in these demonstrations: achieving a transformation of education so that everyone is guaranteed the right to learn and at the same time receives an education tailored to his personal needs.

[Question] Let's look closer to home. How great is the risk that this movement may fold in 6 weeks?

[Answer] I think the national strike of 9 November and the demonstration in Rome on 16 November were correct options and will help the movement grow, because they are moments in a campaign that is going from school to school and town to town and growing into a nationwide movement. Even in the recent past, national objectives were superimposed upon the original motives of the protest movement and canceled them out. Now, on the other hand, the struggle is continuing with concrete targets like local and provincial governments and the national budget. Of course there is also the need for an initial political breakthrough. A struggle must be made for new investment in schools, and fee increases will have to be blocked. The date of 16 November saw the opening of talks with the ministry on this subject. But we must be watchful. Woe betide anyone, the FGCI for example, who wants to force the struggle into a narrow opposition to financing, as though that would decide the fate of the Italian secondary school and university system. That would be a political mistake. I think it is much more important, rather, that the present movement organize the spread of its new ideas and that it tie in with initiatives for youth employment, which is a large labor market, as Torre Annunciata used to be.

[Question] What can the PCI contribute?

[Answer] I think the whole Left must respond politically. The first response should be on high-school reform. Events are making breakthroughs possible. As for the PCI, I think this new movement needs to feel that the party is open to it and is ready to sustain the present campaign.

Student Demands

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 2 Nov 85 p 2

[Interview with Giancarlo Testini by Dino Tieri: "But This is Not a New 1968"; place and date of interview not given]

> [Text] According to the DC political official for education, today's youth are making concrete demands, and the ideological component is relatively less "worrisome." Their parents have voted in smaller numbers. Politicians must respond adequately to expectations.

Given the data on the increase in the student vote (based on temporary figures released by the PI [Ministry of Education] 5 percent more students than last year participated in student organization elections), claims of "victory" are beginning to emerge. The main candidates in the contest were the Catholics and the Left. On Thursday, the Communist youth maintained there are "clear signs" that the candidates of the "Left and progress" were the winners.

The Catholics of the Popular Movement yesterday declared the success of their coalition, citing in particular a "significant victory" in Milan (where, according to MP [expansion unknown] the Catholics won 45.5 percent; the Left, 35 percent; the lay group, 8.7 percent; the "spontaneous" candidates, 7.5 percent; and the Right, 1.3 percent).

It may never really be possible to know for sure who won and lost, because there are a lot of lists of candidates that cannot be assigned to one area of the spectrum or another, and there are just as many cases of crossover tendencies within lists.

All that is certain is that the increase in youth participation is rivaled by a decrease in their parents' participation. This is particularly significant considering that student demonstrations have taken place in many towns in recent days and that, with the support of the PCI and the DP [Proletarian Democracy], a school strike is planned for 9 December and a "march on Rome" for the 16 December.

We asked the official in charge of education policy for the DC, Giancarlo Tesini, the following questions on the significance of the vote for the school organizations.

[Question] How can the increase in student voting participation be viewed in the context of the themes of the protests of a few days ago?

[Answer] The students' great interest in their schools and studies is not new. It means that the students are confronting the educational system, especially the high school system, with the knowledge that the future is uncertain and with the hope that they can become competitive in the labor market. The students are asking more of the schools in terms of teacher qualifications than structure.

[Question] Are the recent demonstrations comparable to those of 1968 or not?

[Answer] The protests to date are not as ideological as they were then. I think they are dealing with concrete issues. They are not demonstrating against the institutions but for their improvement; the increased participation in student organizations is evidence of this. This confirms the validity of the response that the politicians made to the "old" protest by creating participation within the institutions.

[Question] Along with the increase in student participation, how can the decrease in parent participation be interpreted?

[Answer] One of the motives for the parents' initially massive vote was the need to do everything possible to reestablish their role with respect to their children at a time when many elements of the youth seemed to be turning away not only from the institutions but also from their families. They did so by being closer to them and by contributing to their education by participating in the school system. From the parents' point of view, the situation is not as difficult as it was then, and they obviously feel this need much less. As it happens, they are less worried about this aspect.

[Question] Do you think the present situation is a positive one?

[Answer] Aside from the very serious employment problem, of course, the present situation is positive because the attitude of young people is not to reject the institution as such, and politicians ought to realize the constructive aspects of this. The students' motivation is therefore much more of a challenge to politicians than confrontation was. It would be unpardonable to fail to respond adequately to the students.

[Question] You recently said that the political parties should engage in severe self-criticism. What did you mean?

[Answer] Speaking for my party and the great responsibility it has held and still holds for the school system, I first want to mention the historically great progress that education has made in recent years, but I also want to warn people that we must hasten to overhaul the system. We are now paying the bill for delays, however justified, in solving problems such as the reform of high-school education. We must forcefully pursue necessary innovations, and the other political parties realize this, too. However, it will not suffice to legislate reform; for it to be effective, we will also have to consider the present system of administration.

[Question] You have always stressed reforming educational administration. Why?

[Answer] The administration should make the institution function effectively, and if the present system fails to meet present needs, all the less will it be able to meet those of the future, when the school system

will have to be much more adaptable and dynamic with respect to cultural and educational demands. It is vital that educational administration be made fully functional, and, in the final analysis, that is precisely what student demands center on. Just think of the organizational demands created by raising mandatory schooling to 10 years. We will have a new expansion of the number of students in the upper grades, and with the present problems we will certainly not be able to deal with it in as timely or flexible a manner as we ought to.

[Question] What do you think of other motives for the protest and the increase in fees?

[Answer] High school reform will incur a financial cost that everybody will have to help pay for. If families are called upon to make greater sacrifices for high schools, then the national government ought to guarantee that this does not compromise the students' right to learn. A popular party like the DC cannot ignore the risk that the burden on families might compromise the right to an education. It is therefore necessary that merit rules be adequate to maintain the school as a social achievement. A policy of indiscriminate increases could cause us to take a step backwards instead of the step forwards that we want to accomplish.

8782
CSO: 3528/15

POLITICAL NORWAY

WILLOCH IN TROUBLE OVER SECRET MEETINGS WITH PROGRESSIVES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Nov 85 p 5

[Article by Margit Silberstein: "Secret Conversation with Hagen Gives Willoch New Problems"]

> [Text] The sigh of relief at having averted a government crisis only managed to be a slight inhalation for Norwegian Prime Minister Kare Willoch, because when he maneuvered himself out of one situation dangerous to the government, the next one was waiting in line.

So far, however, the prime minister has shown good survivability.

There is turbulence in the Norwegian Storting. It is directed against Prime Minister Kare Willoch's Conservative Party from all quarters, from both inside and outside the party. Following the election in September the non-socialist block had 78 seats in the Storting. The socialist block had 77, and the party in the balance position, as they call it in Norway, meaning the weighing-master position, is again the Progressive Party.

The parliamentary situation is undesirable for the government, which must guide its bills through the Storting. In the first place there is the budget. But for the person in the balance position the parliamentary situation can be a pure blessing. The weighing-master in the Norwegian Storting is Carl I. Hagen. His Progressive Party was cut in half in the election, down to two seats, but his influence increased and Hagen can now wave his baton with renewed frankness and self-confidence.

In matters of tax policy the Progressive Party can be compared somewhat with the Conservative Party in Sweden. There are also certain similarities with the Sweden's Center Democrats and Progressive Party.

Not Acceptable

Carl I. Hagen and his party are not considered acceptable in polite society,and none of the other party leaders really want to be seen in Hagen's

company. On election night Kare Willoch announced in the most definite terms that he had no intention of cooperating with Hagen. But the principled prime minister was inexorably confronted with another reality in the Storting. He did not want to, but he had to in order to survive.

And so far it seems that the Willoch government has not found a proper strategy for dealing with this. That was indicated a few days ago when Willoch was strongly criticized by his coalition partners in the Christian People's Party and the Center Party for having dealt under cover with Carl I. Hagen, because the middle parties want even less to do with Carl I. Hagen than the Conservatives.

53 Wishes

Therefore they did not appreciate it when they found out that Willoch had quietly discussed Hagen's list of 53 wishes. Hagen has 53 wishes, more or less, that he wants to sell to the government. The list varies from prohibition against furloughs for rapists to abolition of the prohibition against purchasing parabolic antennas.

In exchange Hagen promised to see to it that the government's budget bill goes relatively unscathed through the autumn budget hearings. And thereby Prime Minister Kare Willoch would avoid advancing so-called cabinet questions when the budget is finally dealt with in the Storting in December.

Willoch has actually announced his departure if he does not get a majority with him on his budget bill in December. A new election could never take place in Norway because the country does not have the right of dissolution of parliament. But the prime minister can naturally threaten to resign if he does not have sufficient support on decisive questions such as the budget. But even if Hagen insists strongly, it is most unlikely that he would go against the government, and thereby help the socialists to attain government power.

So far Willoch has managed with the tip of his nose above water. He passed the first obstacle in the finance debate when his tax and fees proposals were approved by the Storting.

Expensive Arrangement

And the other day the government reached an agreement with the Labor Party, after much toil and effort, on pensions. But it is expensive to get the opposition on your side. The agreement was 500 million more expensive than what the government said that it could accept from the beginning.

It is not only the budget which makes life dangerous for Willoch and his government. Capitulation was a word which was used when the Conservatives

gradually agreed to vote for a Swedish-Mexican proposal in the UN about freezing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. Before a decision was reached the disagreements within the government were great and many feared a government crisis.

And now there are newspapers which are speculating whether Willoch will call a cabinet question over where our income from the lottery should go. The socialist opposition, in an unholy alliance with the Progressive Party has decided that a certain amount should go to the sports movement. The Conservatives, led by Willoch, believe that the opposition is too generous to sports, and demand a lesser amount.

Sanctions against South Africa are another area in which Willoch and the Conservatives are divided, not only from the opposition but also from their government partners. Willoch does not agree with public registration of ships which sail to South Africa. His reasoning is that it would hurt Norwegian shipping more than South Africa.

Replacement

If it is any consolation for Kare Willoch, his forced partner in cooperation, Carl I. Hagen, also has problems on his side. Apart from internal criticism against the party leader, Hagen was recently forced to replace two of his members in the Oslo Municipal Council. That drastic action was taken after the two party colleagues threatened to vote in a socialist chairman in the council if they did not get better and more highly paid positions in the party.

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CSO:3650/76

POLITICAL PORTUGAL

PCP'S [illegible]VOR[illegible]ALLIANCE WITH PRD

[illegible]von [illegible]RIO DE NOTICIAS in [illegible]guese 14 Nov 85 p 32

[Text] [illegible]e secret[illegible]-gen[illegible]al o[illegible]ne PCP, [illegible]aro Cu[illegible]al, said that he was willing to fo[illegible] a[illegible] li[illegible]nce with the new part[illegible]ich h[illegible]ways calls "President Eanes's party.

During the press conference that he gave yesterday in Rome, Cunhal said that "to be called pro-Soviet is more than offensive, it is even abusive since it is judgmental. The Portuguese communist party has full sovereignty and it is not fair to make such a judgment, especially where it is a question of a need to clarify," he stated, answering a question concerning whether or not his visit to the Italian communists might mean a change in the PCP's pro-Soviet line toward becoming more Europeanist.

Cunhal pictured the visit as an exchange between two Western communist parties whose positions differ on most questions, both domestic and foreign policy, but for which it is essential to exchange ideas, especially at a moment in which the international situation is full of new situations.

"When we are asked if we are becoming more Europeanist and less pro-Soviet, I think that that is a reference to Portugal's joining the EEC, a matter on which the PCI has a position very different from ours. We continue to oppose it, we are familiar with all the agreements signed on fishing, services, agriculture, etc., and we consider that it will be a real disaster," he stressed.

Opening the meeting--the longest by a political leader with journalists in the Italian capital--which lasted more than two hours, Cunhal, weighing the Portuguese political scene, took delight in the latest electoral results and, referring to the PSD, stressed the fact that this party has been capable of criticizing its errors of alliances with the socialists and its capacity for renewal by presenting a new candidate, Cavaco Silva.

Reaffirming the PCP's opposition to the new government, Cunhal went on to say that it ws necessary to make President Eanes's new party viable for the stabilization of the Executive, recognizing nevertheless that for the new party that would be very risky.

Admitting the eventuality of new elections as a consequence of unusual and particular circumstances which will take shape in Portugal after the presidential

elections, Cunhal stressed: "It is still too early to be talking about alliances, but if I have to make a judgment on the new party, I think that it is exxentially democratic and has possibilities of making its mark on national politics. I think that its participation in the last elections was positive, but it may not be in the regional elections.

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

REVIEW OF 1976-1985 GOVERNMENTS, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Nov 85 pp 20-21-R

PARTY COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1976-1985)

Parties / Assemblies	With More Than 10 Deputies					With Fewer Than 10 Deputies*						Total Deputies
	PS	PSD	PCP APU	CDS	PRD	MDP	UEDS	ASDI	PPM	UDP	Greens	
Constituent (1975-1976)	116	81	30	16	-	5	-	-	-	1	-	250
1st Natl. Assm. (1976-1979)	107	73	40	42	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	263
2nd Natl. Assm (1979-1980)	74	80	44	43	-	3	-	-	5	1	-	250
3rd Natl. Assm (1980-1983)	66	82	39	46	-	2	4	4	6	1	-	250
4th Natl. Assm (1983-1985)	94	75	40	30	-	3	4	3	-	-	1	250
5th Natl. Assm (1985-)	57	88	38	22	45	3	-	-	-	-	1	250

Source: National Assembly Record, 1985

*Appearing here are only the elected party representations with their own acronym or through coalitions (APU, FRS, AD). Total deputies of the PCP/APU in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th National Assemblies encompass those from the MDP and the deputy from the Greens; the result of the PS in the 3rd national Assembly likewise encompasses the deputies of the UEDS and the ASDI, elected through a coalition (the FRS).

Rise and Fall of Constitutional Governments (1976-1985)

Govt.	Prime Minister	Type	Parliamentary Support	Reason for End	Duration
I	Mario Soares (PS)	one-party	minority (PS)	Removed by Natl. Assm (lost vote of confidence)	7-23-76 to 12-7-77
II	Mario Soares (PS)	coalition (PS/CDS)	majority (PS/CDS)	Dismissed by PR	1-30-78 to 7-28-78
III	Nobre da Costa (Ind.)	Presidential Initiative	-	Removed by Natl. Assm (Rejection of Govt. Program)	8-29-78 to 9-14-78
IV	Mota Pinto (Ind.)	"	-	Dismissed by PR at request of the PM	11-22-78 to 6-11-79
V	Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo (Ind.)	"	-	Dissolution of Natl. Assm and Elections	8-1-79 to 12-27-79
VI	Sa Carneiro (PSD)	Pre-Electoral Coalition (PSD/CDS/PPM)	majority (PSD/CDS/PPM)	legislative term	1-3-80 to 10-14-80
VI[sic]	Sa Carneiro (PSD)	"	"	death of the PM	10-15-80 to 12-4-80
VII	Pinto Balsemao (PSD)	"	"	Dismissed by the PR at request of the PM	1-9-81 to 8-14-81
VIII	"	"	"	"	9-4-81 to 11-23-82
IX	Mario Soares (PS)	Post-Electoral Coalition (PS/PSD)	majority (PS/PSD)	Dismissed by the PR	6-9-83 to 7-12-85
X	Cavaco Silva (PSD)	one-party	minority (PSD)	-	11-6-85 to - - -

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BRIEFS

LIBYA DENIES MADEIRA INVOLVEMENT--The Libyan ambassador to Portugal, Nuri Mohamed Betalmal, denied the existence of "any link between Libya and the FP-25," adding that "the Libyan people have great admiration and esteem for the Portuguese people and would never get involved in adventurist projects." Nuri Betelmal, who was speaking to journalists on board the Libyan ship "Toletera," which is to be repaired in Lisnave, likewise stated "the news reports to be untrue concerning Libya's involvement in a plan of independence for Madeira." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Nov 85 p 19] 9895/7051

CSO: 3542/35

POLITICAL SPAIN

ALZAGA COMMENTS ON NEWLY-FORMED POPULAR COALITION

Madrid EPOCA in Spanish 7 Oct 85 pp 16-21

[Interview with PDP leader Oscar Alzaga by Pilar Urbano; date and location not specified]

[Text] Simultaneously entering the baggage of the top-of-the-line politician, whether he likes it or not, are the academic record, the tensions, the brilliant or incisive speech and the dominant physical defect... If we talk about Fraga, mention must be made of his erudition, his corpulence and his nostalgic gaze. In describing Pujol, one must cite his undaunted fortitude, his constant colds and his habit of loosening his shirt collar. So too, in the case of Oscar Alzaga, I must say that he is from Madrid, born in 1942, with a degree in political law, president of the PDP [Popular Democratic Party], a Christian Democrat, an eminent jurist, and a cautious, balanced man; he is shy, colorless and non-magnetic; a little known political expert; an intense young man daring to deal with lofty affairs; and, at the same time, a dense mature man climbing those heights unhurriedly and without panting. I also have to say that he is a leader without an image, and he knows it: "I am not a charismatic leader... and there are individuals in my party who are more brilliant than I."

And, completing his baggage, there is a well-modulated, low-key voice, an exquisite "politesse" of the kind that is no longer observed...and two looks: the one of the eye-which-gazes, and the one of the eye-which-gazes-and-sees. If it is a defect, it is perfectly controlled: one look which is attentive, keen, warm and scrutinizing; and another look which is haughty, unpleasant, disdainful and aloof. Both are very blue, like his shirt and tie this morning. We converse in his lawyer's office, which he shares with Gregorio Maranon and Salvador Sanchez Teran. He has requested "coffee and don't turn any calls over to me."

[Question] "Being of the center and excluding oneself from the center is, dictionary in hand, an eccentricity." Do you recognize this sentence?

[Answer] Ugh,...at best, it is even my own!

[Question] Yours, yes. I picked it up in 1977. You are of the center; you are in a rightwing coalition. Isn't that something "eccentric"?

[Answer] In the electoral pacts that have just been signed, it is said that the Popular Coalition aspires to constitute a balanced right of center offer to be directed toward both electorates. And I have always stressed the need for expanding that coalition toward the center. I am not of the right, nor a convert to the right; nor will PDP become diluted in the right.

'Let AP Allow Us To Be As We Are'

[Question] So you are with the right in order to center it....

[Answer] I have never talked about centering the right, only the joint offer. The right is the right, and it has no reason to move to the center; and the center is the center, and it has no reason to become the right. Both AP [Popular Alliance] and PDP must maintain their own convictions, without an embarrassed feeling. I would ask AP to allow us to be as we are, with the assurance that we shall not attempt to change either its beliefs or its positions. We must flee from one danger: that the Popular Coalition formula may be left colored by one of the ingredients, to the detriment of the other and of the whole group.

[Question] Avoid having Fragism dominate....

[Answer] Avoid having the rightwing color dominate, and letting that prevent the attraction of the center voters. Because the electoral victory is staked on the center. Whoever dominates the center of the field, wins the soccer match. Popular Coalition can win the elections (I am not saying that it is going to win them, I say that it can), on the condition that we contact and also persuade Spaniards who, at the time, voted for UCD [Democratic Center Union], later voted for PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and now have no objective reason to extend their confidence in socialism.

[Question] But how will a gentleman admit that he was mistaken in 1982 and, furthermore, make the acrobatic somersault from left to right? That is very difficult!

[Answer] Truly, it is not easy; but no one has a right to become head of a political force if he is only capable of coping with easy tasks. And it is not impossible, not by a long shot! Look: 1977 and 1979. What? There was no natural Socialist majority; nor is there today. What happened in 1982, and this must not be overlooked, was that millions of citizens found a way to give up the offer, UCD, and make the "acrobatic somersault" to the other, PSOE. If it was done then, why not now?

[Question] In other words,your target is the undecided, migrating vote.

[Answer] In Spain, because the memberships are small, the loyal votes are few; there is a high percentage of shifting, of electoral migration. This has also been observed in the autonomous elections in Catalonia, where nearly half the voters changed the direction of their vote. I am not boasting by saying "we

are going to win," "we are going to sweep"; nor do I soothe my spirit listening only to my fellow party members, no. First, we must deploy the antennas; second, we must perceive the feelings on the street; third, we must accept their positions and demands;fourth, we must argue why it would be bad for the nation if PSOE were to win again; and, fifth, we must offer guarantees in order to gain confidence. Elections are not won like a competitive examination in a notary's office; rather, with a far more subtle popular examination: contact-guarantees-confidence. If we in CP do that, we shall win.

'PDP Is the Major Center Party'

[Question] PDP is serving as the "unshameful door" through which many former UCD members enter the coalition. Ultimately, you may have achieved the great invention of reviving UCD, but without Suarez....

[Answer] I shall not hide the fact that there are many UCD people in our party, and strong political figures. For example, from memory, there are over a dozen former Centrist ministers, a little over 70 members of Parliament who were representing UCD; a very large number of former high-ranking administrative officials from the previous democratic governments...Yes, PDP is now, potentially, the major center party in this country. But, with regard to your question, we are very careful not to make mistakes already suffered and well known. We are inoculated and on guard against opportunists and "clever" tactics.

[Question] I don't know whether that proselytism among "VIPs" will bring you votes, but it does give you a good "staff" for serving Fraga a good government. Is that the goal?

[Answer] In any event, it would be a logical goal. A party that does not aspire to being a government party is not a serious party.

[Question] Of course...but the fact is that, day by day, PDP has to go arm in arm with AP, in a coalition, or in a marriage of convenience. And that, of itself alone, entails admitting that, alone, your force would be insufficient. Or is that not so?

[Answer] Obviously, the key to a coalition, when an electoral system such as ours prevails, lies in the fact that, before the voting, two plus two makes four; and after the voting, it makes five or six or seven. And the attempt to combine different electorates is legitimate.

'I Shall Not Air Internal Problems'

[Question] Legitimate, as usual. The bad part about marriages of convenience is reaching agreement. An understanding between Fraga, Segurado and you, Alzaga, is difficult, extremely difficult, when it is time to establish a common program, a joint strategy, a distribution of seats, isn't it? Because every rumor circulates!

[Answer] That, the fact that rumors circulate, is the worst thing. I can assure you that PSOE's internal consensus,with so much contradiction to bear, is far more troubled than that of CP. But they achieve it by hermetically stifling the outside echoes of the internal debate. So, I shall not air our internal problems. We are drafting a joint, summarized program, which we can all sign, as a serious, durable commitment, not as an arrangement based upon circumstances.

[Question] We shall read it with interest. I have noticed that there are fewer "squabbles" and more cohesion among you since the Socialist leaders jolted you with a "beating" of insults. The PSOE people are a little nervous, don't you think? Even Txiki Benegas, as good and sweet as "Saint Louis," is becoming vitriolic. What is going on?

[Answer] Hmmm! That kind of "street fighting" will have to stop. Calmness must be restored. We must discard the scrapping Spaniard, and accept the coexisting Spaniard that we carry within us: the one who made possible a Toledo with harmony among Jews, Moors and Christians; the one who managed to coexist in the Americas; the one who made our admirable democratic transition. I appeal for that good sense. Besides...personal attacks in politics are despicable acts which harm the one attacked, discredit the attacker and debase the political atmosphere of coexistence inspired by the mutual respect of the contenders.

[Question] Contenders, a nice little word. Do you reject the distinction made by Schmitt between adversary and enemy, "hostis" [enemy] and "inimicus" [unfriendly]?

[Answer] That distinction lay at the root of National Socialist totalitarianism; but, in democracy, there can be no enemies, but only adversaries. It is strange, and dangerous, that, from that time to this, some have forgotten that and are beginning to treat those who do not think as they do as "enemies."

[Question] Does that apply to PSOE?

[Answer] Yes, but all that one need do is forget one, and he ends up forgetting all of them. The differences have to be conveyed, without offense, much less destruction of the adversary and what the latter represents; because both the one and the other represent a part of the system as well. Under democracy, respect for pluralism is basic, and the first one obligated is the one who has the expedients of power in his hands.

'PSOE Is Injecting the Virus of Conformity'

[Question] Well, that "first one obligated," namely, Don Felipe Gonzalez, recently, and before the foreign press, discredited the whole opposition with one fell swoop, claiming that "it is a disaster." That was rude, don't you think?

[Answer] That was a major, repeated, inexplicable mistake; because it is as destabilizing for the opposition to say that there is no government worthy of the name as for the head of the government to discredit the opposition en masse. And the fact is that, without these two groups, no democratic system can exist. Were you asking me whether they were nervous? I'm afraid that PSOE is bent on conveying as a key notion the message that what the government does is not only good, but also the only thing possible. And it clinches this odd theory of "the inevitable" by adding that there is neither any other alternative policy nor any other politicians capable of materializng it properly. That kind of talk, which PSOE reiterates, is not only incompatible with a pluralistic democratic system but, in addition, and would that this were the most serious aspect!, it injects the social virus of conformity, following our Andalusian-Muslim tradition of "everything is written." And we thereby embark upon the easy lapse into collective pessimism, when we should be spurred on in the search for solution

[Question] For you, no; but for Fraga, losing again in 1986 would mean missing the train forever. However, which is worse, for Popular Coalition to lose again or for PSOE to win again? There is a shade of difference....

[Answer] I grasp the shade. It is worse for PSOE to win again; and not because, in theory, the democratic system would collapse if the Socialists govern again. But there is actually a tremendous reason for alarm: their excessive concentration of power which reminds one more of the Mexican PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party], or the Congress Party of India, than of a modern European social democracy.

[Question] Would it be important to you to open that powder-keg of "concentrated power"?

[Answer] It would be a very long list; but we have some rather visible examples: the determination to hold improper portions of the career civil service; the limits imposed on the Judicial Branch's independence; the control of private educational centers; the partisan politicization of the universities; the use of the state news media as the private property of the party in the government... these are dismal things which prompt reflection on what the holding of more and more areas of social power might turn out to be in the state and for PSOE, in another 4 years of a term in office. That is the "national danger" if they win again. And we have already suffered the experience of their hegemony: Parliament has ceased to be a chamber for control, and has become an organ to endorse decisions made elsewhere in the government. This risk becomes more serious in a country such as ours, where the civic culture of Francoism still carries a great deal of weight. If not, how would the fact that so many Socialist leaders are behaving like nouveaux riches be tolerated?

'The Socialists Have No Political Plan'

[Question] But the fact is that this is tolerated; furthermore, they are praised for it. And many Spaniards feel comforted by a government which "gives orders."

[Answer] Everything doesn't consist of telling the people: "we know how to give orders, and we give orders." The great weakness of PSOE is that it has no political plan.

[Question] You don't say!

[Answer] I do say.They have exhausted the goals which they inherited, which were in progress under the previous Centrist governments: for example, the Common Market, NATO, Israel.... And since then, the Socialist government has appeared to us as being incapable of devising a concrete, inspiring target period, a great national plan that the people would approve, giving it their vote for another 4 years. This is disturbing: PSOE knows how to execute, but it doesn't know how to plan. They are talking now about "modernization." I would adopt that cause; but that entails facing the challenge of what is new. When "modernization" is offered, a series of unknown quantities must be resolved for the country: the new industrial model, the competitive sectors in the Common Market, the revamping of the universities in which our youth are being trained for that stiff competition in science and technology...And so on. If not, "modernization" is nothing more than a shell, an empty word.

[Question] I shall now query the theoretician, the professor of political law. What significance does it hold for a Socialist Party that its head, Gonzalez, on a trip to the Far East, should bury Marx and liquidate Marxism as old merchandise?

[Answer] Scrapping Marxism seems fine to me, I hail it. It is rather inoperative baggage in these times and with our problems. The major question lies in whether they are moving at maximum speed from Marxism to opportunism....

[Question] To the ideology of non-ideology?

[Answer] Exactly. I don't believe in the death of ideologies; they are the driving force. A party without a consistent ideology, even if it is that nonsense of social democracy, is a hyperrealistic party marked by unpredictable behavior. And that, which may now soothe certain sectors of the economic and political right, might in the future give a shock, insofar as PSOE is concerned, due to circumstantial opportunism, and take an "x" step in a different, unanticipated direction. PSOE has given up the ideological debate, and that cannot be maintained for long, unless they now attempt to construct another "national movement," in which everthing fits, as in a hodgepodge.

Since Alzaga speaks interspersing his remarks with long intervals of silence, "pauses with fermata," as a musician would call them, when he reached this "period-and new paragraph," I thought he had finished his comments. But he started up again, and with a look of someone setting out to shoot a blowgun filled with fire at a target of ice.

[Answer] It must be agreed that, in a European democracy, the Socialist ingredient is necessary, just as a rightwing exists. It doesn't make sense to conceive

of a democracy without either of those two opposing forces. And I say this because there are in the rightwing some who, with very good intentions, have the abolishment of PSOE as virtually their only ideal. It is one thing that we must defeat them in the elections, but getting off the track, pursuing an impossible model of democracy: non-pluralistic and without a left, is something else.

[Question] While I am with you, I don't know whether I am facing an intellectual involved in politics or a politician who, because he is an intellectual, covers himself with the protective garb of theory without "diving" into the complicated river of politics....

[Answer] Man, I think that I have dived in up to my eyebrows! I have contracted a serious, tangible, political commitment. The dichotomy between the man of action and the man of reflection is spurious. For a politician it is just as necessary to have good sense, opportunity and firmness in acting as it is to have depth and profusion in thinking. In Spain, our political class suffers (it is an epidemic!) from the malady of superficiality in ideas and poverty in concepts....and that is alarming, because the national problems require better prescriptions than those of a witch-doctor.

[Question] All that is very fine but what do you want me to tell you? I don't know whether it is because you accompany Fraga, who is just a hyper-active person in a state of upheaval, but the image that you convey, Mr Alzaga, is that of a "politician-in vitro," a gray eminence behind a barrier of papers and large books.

'I Am Not a Charismatic Leader'

[Answer] That unfortunate image is the one that others, as far as I know, are concerned with fabricating for me. I am not a charismatic leader, nor do I enjoy crowded beaches, nor do I believe very much in the mouth-to-mouth meeting. But, believe me, I "dive in among people" out of the party's needs, without stopping. (He opens his memorandum book and reads at random.) "Weekend, 28-29, Cercedilla-Sevilla-Cuenca-Toledo." That's not bad, is it? We have managed to create, and without outside money, without sponsors or patrons!, a party with 3,000 or 4,000 members and 160 open headquarters. With the attainment of the first phase, a "party of cadres," we are heading toward the second, "popular party"; building from top to bottom, without attaching the "invention" to a leader, but rather to a "team."

That is Oscar Alzaga's clever key: that "certificate of duration" of his party: no one is necessary.

[Question] Insofar as I know, you have been offered five ministry portfolios, which you have not accepted...why? Don't you like governing?

[Answer] Yes. With Adolfo Suarez, I could have been minister of education and of territorial administration; and with Calvo Sotelo, minister of public works,

justice and culture. Each time, there was a different reason for saying "no." When in doubt, good judgment advises one not to take on certain types of contention. With the passage of time, I can tell you that, under the same circumstances, I would say "no" again. But that doesn't mean that it is my ambition in politics to work on the opposition to achieve a government and, when the time comes, say that "I don't want to govern." That would mean needing psychoanalysis!

[Question] So, with Suarez, no; with Calvo Sotelo, also no; but with Fraga, yes....

[Answer] The problem was not one of being a Suarez minister or a Calvo Sotelo minister. I would accept a portfolio with Fraga or with any other head of the government, provided I could do what I thought had to be done; without creating differences and without entering the government merely to save a precarious balance of votes in Parliament. Furthermore, I view myself, without disgust, as a minister in a cabinet headed by another politician, even from PDP, who is less endowed or less brilliant than I. That is almost the "calling" of European Christian Democrats when forming government coalitions. For example, you have Andreotti, under orders from Craxi, and Tindemans, under orders from Martens.

'Neither Allergy Nor Fear of Power'

[Question] Then isn't it true that, when it is time to see the bull's horns close by, you fear power?

[Answer] I do not fear power, nor do I have an allergy with regard to it. Power is a means, not an end, necessary for "beging able to do" what one deems feasible for the people. To improve the society, we need to dipose of that extremely tiresome newspaper called BOE [Official State Gazette]. But, just as I have no allergy to "getting wet" by governing, I don't succumb to the erotic desire for power either. You see, Pilar, there are politicians who strive for power-for-power's-sake, and they accept whatever it is, so long as they are promoted. Hence, unfailingingly one reaches two points: acting with little ethics, and showing one's behind from a rather high branch...by means of "climbing."

[Question] Nevertheless, those who know you say about you, "Oscar, either Caesar or nothing; he is an ambitious person who knows how to wait."

[Answer] Those who really know me scold me for the opposite: my lack of ambition. As for "Caesar or nothing," I would tell you one thing: There are more than enough candidates for head of government here. I don't intend to create the problem of throwing another candidacy on the table: my own; at least before....

[Question] I grasp the shade of difference.

2909
CSO: 3548/12

POLITICAL SPAIN

CESID REORGANIZED TO INCLUDE MORE CIVILIANS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 7 Oct 85 pp 46-47

[Article by Miguel Angel Liso and Jose Diaz Herrera]

[Text] Over 100 Spanish business firms in the public and private sectors have reached agreements with the Higher Center for Defense Information (CESID) to protect the technological information on which they are working. In these firms, most of which are devoted to the manufacture of electronic components for civilian and military use, high security restricted areas are being created to which most of the company's workers are denied access. At the same time, board members of these firms voluntarily subject themselves to checking by the secret services, although this entails a limitation on their individual rights. Refusal to submit to this surveillance could prevent them from having access to information of a confidential nature.

To carry out this activity, which was stepped up after Spain's entry into COCOM [East-West Trade Coordination Committee], an organization which regulates exports of Western technology to the Eastern countries, and the signing of an agreement for cooperation between the Telephone Company and the American multinational AT&T, CESID has created a division to prevent industrial espionage. An official from the intelligence services told CAMBIO 16: "There are no friendly countries in the area of industrial espionage. We try to prevent any foreign power, whether it is an ally or not, from gaining access to the technological innovations developed in Spain."

The creation of this division, called economy and technology, is one of the most prominent innovations of CESID's new internal restructuring, and CAMBIO 16 has had access to its internal documentation.

Nevertheless, this is not the only change. During recent months, CESID has undertaken a total internal restructuring, creating five more divisions which are responsible for foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence, internal intelligence, administration and services, and personnel.

According to sources in the Ministry of Defense, all these changes represent a strong reinforcement of CESID, which has been set up as the leading state service in the area of espionage and counterespionage, with extensive authority in these areas, and with complete supremacy over the intelligence services, the Civil Guard and the Armed Forces.

The same sources claim that the current renovation is the most extensive carried out since January 1984, the date on which, based on a royal decree, CESID became the intelligence organ of the head of the government, to defend the interests of the state, although it continued to be subordinate to the defense minister in the area of military policy and national defense. Owing to this dual subordination, only two persons have direct access to the work being done by CESID: Felipe Gonzalez and Narciso Serra. The other authorities, whether they be civilian or military, require permission from the prime minister or the defense minister to obtain information about it, except for the king, Don Juan Carlos, who, because of his role as moderator of the democratic institutions, is excluded from this regulation.

CESID which, until 1981, was a definitely military intelligence service, has also carried out a major internal restructuring, bringing in civilians, who are recruited in the universities. After the coup d'etat of 23-F, Gen Emilio Alonso Manglano, of a liberal nature, took over the service, attempting to gear this intelligence service to the needs of the democratic system. This new style forced a sector of military assigned to CESID, of extremist ideology, to request their resignation, and many of these vacancies started to be filled with civilian personnel. At the present time, according to CESID sources, 30 percent of the staff is comprised of lawyers, economists, architects, sociologists, physicians, etc., who have not received military training.

According to the document of the new organizational chart, one of the divisions that has been most reinforced is the Foreign Intelligence Division, whose goal is "to procure, evaluate and disseminate the information obtained outside of Spain, for the purpose of averting a threat or an attack against Spain." For this purpose, that division is expending all its efforts on setting up CESID "stations" in foreign countries, in order to obtain economic, political and military information on matters affecting Spain.

The deployment abroad is being made essentially in the Arab countries, North Africa, Europe and America, and CESID's "antennas" are operating in cooperation with our embassies abroad; although an attempt has been made, for the safety of many spies, not to allow them to have any connection with the diplomatic missions.

Another division that has been reinforced is that of internal intelligence, with two essential branches: involution and revolution; engaged in the surveillance of coup-associated groups and revolutionary parties intending to make assaults upon democracy.

Spain's entry into NATO and the recurrence of the "cold war" between the two blocs have prompted CESID to expand its Counterintelligence Division, the purpose of which is to discover, neutralize and provide false information to the spy networks of foreign countries.

Another new mission of CESID is, on the other hand, to protect all the secret information that NATO provides to Spain, which is kept in very well protected installations of the Defense Ministry.

The renovation and expansion of functions and personnel have forced CESID to seek a new building, since the facilities that it has at number 5 Paseo de la Castellana are too small. At the present time, a new building is under construction at kilometer 8,800 of the La Coruna highway, which will house all the central services of this intelligence center.

In these new facilities, CESID will train its cadres, from the auxiliary agent to the intelligence officer or board member, responsible for planning, directing and coordinating the work to acquire and evaluate information. CESID sources claim that the center's officials are selected from the "creme de la creme" of all government departments, systematically rejecting individuals who offer to work in the service voluntarily.

According to sources from this intelligence service, only two types of professionals are not hired to increase CESID's staff: priests and journalists; although it is admitted that, on some occasions, the latter cooperate with the institution, "but without receiving any pay."

(1) **Estructura básica del CESID**



Key to Diagram:

1. Basic Structure of CESID
2. Prime minister of the government
3. Minister of defense
4. General director of CESID
5. Foreign Intelligence Division
6. Arab countries
7. Latin America
8. Western Europe
9. Eastern Europe
10. Counterintelligence Division
11. East
12. Cubans
13. U.S.A.
14. People's Republic of China
15. Internal Intelligence Division
16. Involution
17. Revolution
18. Economy and Technology Division
19. Administration and Services
20. Operational backup
21. Covers
22. Identities
23. Personnel Division
24. Training
25. Management
26. Legal consultant's office

2909
CSO: 3548/12

POLITICAL SWEDEN

CENTER PARTY FACES LACK OF PLATFORM AFTER ELECTIONS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Nov 85 p 9

[Article by correspondent Arve Hoff: "Center Party Seeking a Policy"]

[Text] Stockholm, 28 Nov--This weekend the Swedish Center Party celebrates its 75th anniversary. It is unlikely to be a purely festive occasion. "Deep crisis" is an apt description of the condition of the party following the parliamentary election in September.

The crisis was apparent in a crude debate on former Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin's leadership that was at times conducted in full view of the public. It was pointed out by many people that under Falldin's leadership the party has gone from one election defeat to another and that Falldin has to take the blame for this. His day is over.

But far more important than the personal issue is the fact that the Center is a party that is falling apart in the sense that it is far from having a clear profile. What does the party really stand for? What are its key issues? The Center Party was called a party in search of a policy this fall and this description hits the mark.

Green Wave

The party's problems on that score are not new but they have increased steadily in recent years. Part of the explanation lies in what happened to the "green wave." When this wave became a real factor in the early 1970's the Center Party was its political driving force, reaping increased voter support due to the popularity of environmental issues. The green wave was particularly effective in giving the party a foothold in urban areas. But today environmental issues do not have the same kind of impact and the Center Party is no longer alone in the environmental arena. It has lost its platform.

Contradiction

This has not prevented a faction of the party from feeling that the salvation of the Center Party lies in a renewed and reinforced emphasis on environmental protection. But here one encounters an example of a deeper problem--a contradiction that illustrates in a nutshell the fact that the party seems to be groping along and is in constant danger of falling between two stools.

The problem lies in environmental considerations on the one hand and economic profitability in the agricultural sector on the other. The use of chemicals in agriculture is an increasingly prominent element in the Swedish environmental debate. And how is the Center Party, as an environmental party, to deal with the problem of these chemicals without coming in conflict with the group from which the party originally sprang, namely the farmers?

The same conflict--though not as simple in form or as acute--becomes apparent when other elements in the party advocate winning back voters among salaried employees and city dwellers after the Center Party was almost wiped out in the cities in the fall election. Any costly "overtures" in that direction contain within them the seeds of internal party conflict. For although it is many years since the party changed its name from the Farmers' Union to the Center Party, farmers still make up the hard core of the party and farmers in Sweden today complain as much about economic problems as other people do. They may have a stronger need than they have had for a long time for a political party that represents their own interests.

Social Democrats

Behind the scenes there is probably also a lot of disagreement over where the party should be placed on the right-left spectrum of the political scene. The idea of cooperating with the Social Democrats instead of with the Conservatives and the Liberals does not seem to be unattractive to everyone in the party rank and file.

On this point at least Thorbjorn Falldin appears to stand as a guarantee of the party's course. As long as he is at the helm the party is unlikely to abandon the nonsocialist line.

But aside from that Falldin has been keeping as low a profile as possible for a political leader since the election in September. It is true that he has expressed a wish to continue as party chairman but otherwise he has remained silent in all debates on the future course of the Center Party.

"The entire party organization is involved in a postelection analysis. If I step out and take the lead in the debate there is a danger that many people will feel bound by personal considerations. I feel it is very important to have a discussion at the grassroots level," he said at a press conference several weeks ago.

Hibernation

That is certainly an admirable standpoint. But many people find it strange that the party's undisputed leader and figure head for many years has gone into hibernation in a manner of speaking in this critical period for the party. Unless this means that Falldin is already prepared in reality to step down, whether he wants to or not.

A few figures show how drastic the Center Party's decline has been. In the 1973 parliamentary election the party received 25.1 percent of the votes. In this year's election it was down to 12.5 percent--including around 2.5 percent cast for the party's technical election partner, the Christian Democratic Party. And in an opinion poll a month ago the Center Party had a rating of only 6.5 percent.

6578
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POLITICAL TURKEY

MINISTER'S REMARKS ON 'SYRIAN THREAT' DISPUTED IN ANKARA

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Nov 85 p 13

[Report by Sedat Ergin]

[Text] Ankara--National Defense Minister Zeki Yavuzturk's remarks regarding the arming of Syria before the National Assembly's Budget Planning Commission two days ago, gave rise to broad repercussions among diplomatic circles in Ankara yesterday. With reference to Yavuzturk's remarks that "declaring Syria a threat to NATO depends on the work of the Foreign Ministry," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated yesterday that "the evaluation of a threat" is not the ministry's job and that "such an evaluation can be made by the pertinent authorities."

Responding to the questions of commission members, Yavuzturk had said in a veiled warning to Syria that that country is arming "beyond its capabilities" and that the Turkish Armed Forces are very sensitive on this issue. The part that was found "interesting" in Yavuzturk's remarks was that he spoke about the possibility that this Middle Eastern country "may be declared a threat to NATO."

Yavuzturk's remarks about such a possibility created an interesting situation with respect to the NATO doctrine and Turkey's Middle East policy and caused the following repercussions:

1) The Foreign Ministry made no comment on Yavuzturk's remarks on Syria. However, in response to the Defense Minister's statement that "the evaluation of a threat can be made by the Foreign Ministry," the ministry implied using a diplomatic phrase that this is not their job. In response to a question from us, a senior Foreign Ministry official said: "If there is a threat against Turkey, the evaluation of such a threat can be made by the pertinent authorities." It is believed that by the term "pertinent authorities" the Foreign Ministry meant the Chairmanship of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense.

General Staff's View

2) An official of the Chairmanship of the General Staff said on this issue: "Activities in Syria are being monitored just as military activities are monitored in all other countries." The military official added: "This is a routine task performed all the time by the Turkish Armed Forces."

3) It was learned that after Yavuzturk's remarks were reported in the press the Syrian embassy contacted the Defense Ministry and requested the full text of his statement. Syrian Charge d'Affaires Tawfiq Salloum said: "I can express a view only after reading the full text of the minister's statement." He declined further comment at this stage.

4) Former Minister of Defense Hasan Esat Isik said: "While we may not like militarization it is not hard to understand the desire to arm by a country in Syria's position and with Syria's problems." Isik noted that "Israel, too, is arming beyond its capabilities and on a much greater scale." Stating that Turkey has to watch the arming of Syria like that of any other country, Isik added: "However, I have not seen any indication that Syria is arming itself against Turkey."

NATO Doctrine Contradicted

5) Yavuzturk's remarks to the effect that Syria may be declared a "threat" to NATO, was found "debatable" from a perspective of NATO doctrine even though it was mentioned only as a possibility. Noting that NATO, in its doctrine, is a defense organization formed against the Warsaw Pact, experts said that it is not unusual for NATO to make a threat evaluation with respect to Syria, but added that declaring Syria as a "threatening country" is impossible theoretically and practically in view of the NATO doctrine.

NATO Drawn into Middle East?

6) Yavuzturk's remarks have created "drawbacks" for the policies pursued by Turkish diplomacy which has been working to prevent wrong interpretations of Turkey's NATO membership among Middle Eastern countries and which has been particularly insistent on not taking any part in the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force plans. Commenting on this issue, Hasan Esat Isik said: "Turkey must avoid creating the impression that it is drawing NATO into the problems of the Middle East."

Syria's Response

7) Yavuzturk's remarks came at a time of noticeable relaxation in Turkish-Syrian relations which have remained considerably cool in recent years. It had recently been announced that both Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu's meeting with his Syrian counterpart at the United Nations last September and Minister of State Mustafa Tinaz Titiz's recent visit to Syria went on smoothly and that Syria has adopted a more careful approach toward Turkey including its stance on terrorist activities. For the moment it is not known how Yavuzturk's remarks and its timing will be interpreted by the Ba'ath regime in Damascus.

Is Turkey Targeted?

In the past Syrian leaders reassured Ankara that their arming activities are not aimed at Turkey but directly against Israel. About 3 years ago, then Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen announced that he was notified by Syrian authorities that Syria's Soviet-made SAM missiles are not aimed at Turkey.

9588
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POLITICAL TURKEY

MILITARY SUPREME COURT TO HEAR PEACE ASSOCIATION CASE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 28 Nov 85 pp 1,11

[Text] Ankara--Today the Departments Council of the Military Supreme Court of Appeals will review the Peace Association trial which has been going on for 5 years including the interrogation of the defendants. It has been learned that the court's deliberations will end tomorrow the latest. The verdict handed down by the "Departments Council" will be final and cannot be appealed. The Departments Council of the Military Supreme Court of Appeals consists of two members from each department and the heads of each department. The hearing will be chaired by the Chief Justice of the Military Supreme Court, Maj Gen Hikmet Tavukcuoglu. A report prepared by the general council reporter, Justice Col Ilhan Senel, will be discussed at the hearing. Senel is also a member of the 2nd Department. Senel's report is an account of developments since the trial began but contains no views of Senel's own.

Most recently in the trial of the Peace Association leaders, the 2nd Military Court of the Istanbul Martial Law Command maintained its original verdict and freed defendants Orhan Apaydin, Niyazi Dalyanci, Ismail Hakki Oztorun, Melih Tuner, Dogan Gorsev and Mahmut Dikerdem, who had all been sentenced to 5 years in prison. By maintaining its original verdict, the 2nd Military Court refused to comply with the ruling of the Third Department of the Military Supreme Court of Appeals which had struck down the 2nd Military Court's decision. Defendants who are still under detention are:

Reha Isvan, Erdal Atabek, Aykut Goker, Tahsin Usluoglu, Haluk Tosun, Sefik Asan, Aybars Ungan, Ali Taygun, Metin Ozek, Ataol Behramoglu (overseas), Ali Sirmen, Gencay Saylan, Ergun Elgin, Orhan Taylan.

The Departments Council will examine the Third Deparment's reversal ruling and the decisions of the court which did not comply with the reversal decision and will seek why the original court did not comply with the higher court's verdict. In accordance with the rules, members of the Third Department which handed down the reversal ruling are not participating in this hearing.

If the Departments Council upholds the ruling of the Third Department and reverses the 2nd Military Court's decision to stand on its own ruling on grounds of "deficient interrogation," the case may be retried in the original court. In the meantime, defendants under detention may be released.

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POLITICAL TURKEY

TWO DSP FOUNDERS RESIGN; SHP OFFICIAL CALLS DSP 'UNNECESSARY'

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 28 Nov 85 p 13

[Text] Two founding members of the Democratic Left Party [DSP] have resigned charging that the party has been founded by "one person" rather than the "grassroots." While Mehmet Yolcu, a barber from Esme, and Suleyman Hus, a pastry maker--both DSP founding members from Usak--reportedly sent their letters of resignation to the DSP general headquarters, officials and founding members at the party headquarters left questions on this issue unanswered and said: "We know nothing." Meanwhile, in a statement on the resignation of DSP founders from Esme, Social Democratic Populist Party [SHP] District President Nihat Gunduz said: "The left's most sincere wish is to see all social democrats united under a single roof."

DSP founder Suleyman Hus' letter of resignation sent to the party general headquarters reads as follows:

"I am a founding member of the DSP. I entered the DSP because I was led to believe that the party was being established by the grassroots. However, subsequent developments have shown that the party has been established by one person and not the grassroots. I have found out that the establishment of the party by the grassroots is a deception. For this reason I am resigning from the party as a founding member."

In his letter of resignation, Mehmet Yolcu expresses his disapproval of DSP's opposition to the union of social democrats and says:

"I joined the work to found the DSP because of my respect for Ecevit. I was highly effective in the organization of the party in Esme. I learned from the press that as a result of my work I was elected as a founding member. In the course of my work I observed that the people want unity more than a new party. Given these facts, I request that my resignation be accepted."

SHP District President Nihat Gunduz said that the resignation of two founding members proves that the establishment of DSP was unnecessary and called on all social democrats to support unity. DSP officials, on the other hand, made no comment on the resignations.

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POLITICAL TURKEY

SHP LEADERS VISIT PEACE ASSOCIATION DEFENDANTS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 28 Nov 85 pp 1,11

[Text] Social Democratic Populist Party [SHP] leader Aydin Guven Gurkan who visited the Peace Association defendants at the Bayrampasa Prison together with Erdal Inonu said in a statement after the 1-hour visit: "Some of the Peace Association defendants are my colleagues, some of them are my friends and some are people I know and sympathize with for their work. We conveyed to them our sincere wishes for their welfare and acquittal."

Gurkan said: "As a result of a narrow-minded and unclear piece of legislation which seeks and finds criminality in thought, people in Turkey are occasionally charged with crimes. We hope for the speedy establishment and the perpetuation of a Turkey which has insured the security of its society and which is not afraid of thinkers, writers and painters."

Gurkan arrived at the Bayrampasa Prison at 10:00 am yesterday accompanied by a delegation comprised of Erdal Inonu, SHP Istanbul provincial leader Hasan Fehmi Gunes, former Populist Party Istanbul provincial leader Turgut Sarica, former Social Democracy Party Istanbul provincial leader Sadullah Usumi and SHP Executive Council members Rafet Tuzun and Fermani Altun. After a 1-hour meeting where reporters were not admitted, Gurkan and Inonu replied to journalists' questions. Gurkan said: "Some of the Peace Association defendants are my colleagues, some of them are my friends and some are people I know and sympathize with for their work. We conveyed to them our sincere wishes for their welfare and acquittal." When asked whether "the Peace Association defendants had any special requests from them," Gurkan replied: "No. We just had a very humane and friendly conversation and we expressed our wishes for their acquittal. They had no special requests." Gurkan then said: "Prison conditions are well-known. In order to improve these prison conditions it is first necessary to issue a broad-based amnesty." Gurkan continued:

"Any improvements in prisons under these conditions can only be superficial and temporary no matter what is done. Our impressions today do not apply to the Peace Asscciation defendants alone. Our knowledge of social affairs indicates that prisons and penitentiaries must be evacuated as soon as possible by a general amnesty, and human living conditions conditions must be created for those who remain in prison."

Stating that they "appreciate the efforts made to provide as human living conditions as possible for Peace Association defendants," Gurkan said: "I hope

that this humanist effort is made for every detainee and prison inmate. Then we would be proud of being a country which provides its people with human living conditions even if they are detainees or convicts."

Gurkan was asked: "Do you favor an amnesty within the framework of the Constitution or outside it?" Gurkan replied: "Naturally, within the framework of the Constitution." He then said with regard to amnesty:

"The Constitution cannot be changed, but in our opinion the pertinent clauses of the Constitution do not bar the pardon of crimes of thought and non-violent political crimes. This will be seen when we submit our amnesty bill to the Assembly. Even if the pertinent clauses of the Constitution remain in effect many people can be pardoned."

When asked "In conclusion did you find the Peace Association defendants to be living in good conditions?" Erdal Inonu replied:

"You asked about good conditions. Naturally, even under the best prison conditions it is better to be free. Let this not be misunderstood. The defendants spend their time writing, translating and painting. They write more than they read."

Relatives of political prisoners and detainees who had gathered before the prison having heard of Inonu's and Gurkan's visit, gave the two party leaders a petition carrying 170 signatures and asking them to visit their relatives at the 2nd Military Prison in Sagmalcilar. When told by detainee and convict relatives that conditions at the Sagmalcilar Prison are very bad and that they are very pleased with the visit paid to the Peace Association defendants, Inonu responded: "We will look into it." When asked whether they "know about the situation in [Sagmalcilar]," Gurkan said: "We know everything. We will look into it."

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MILITARY EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

KINNOCK: STRENGTHEN NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES, DROP SDI

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Siegfried Thielbeer: "Kinnock Calls for Strengthening Conventional NATO Forces--'Bilateral Nuclear Disarmament'/ a Talk with the Labor Leader"]

[Text] Duesseldorf, 22 Nov--"Almost nobody would dispute that ever since the discovery of the club there has been deterrence--and it has often worked. I am not against deterrence, I have never been a pacifist, but have always been only in favor of nuclear disarmament." Neil Kinnock, the 43-year-old leader of the British Labor Party, is taking advantage of his visit to the FRG in order to emphasize the professed loyalty of his party to the Western Alliance and to argue for a strengthening of the conventional forces--the navy, the air force, and the Army of the Rhine. He said that never before has a Labor Party conference declared its faith in NATO with such an impressive majority--namely, 7:1. "Our NATO obligations are unconditional." Under a Labor government as well, Great Britain would retain the central role that it plays in the Alliance. "We must make certain that our armed forces have the utmost effectiveness." Kinnock did not wish to commit himself to a certain number of frigates or submarines. There must be enough for the safeguarding of the North Atlantic. In any case, the modernization of the fleet and adequate training are at least as important as the number of ships, he said.

As for the strengthening of the Army of the Rhine, here again Kinnock-- who had just spoken with its commander, General Farndale, and as a Welshman himself had visited the Welsh Regiment at Lemgo--did not want to commit himself to numbers. A strengthening is again achieved through a greater effectiveness by way of better technology and through better equipping with ammunition supplies, he said. However, the Labor leader indicated that an analysis of the military tasks may definitely result in the conclusion that the number of soldiers in the Rhine Army must be raised also.

In contrast to some elements of German Social Democracy--Kinnock had just spoken with Lafontaine and had flown to London together with Rau--this political figure in the British opposition was cautious on the question of "alternative strategies." Thus, it is true that he argued that more consideration should be given to defensive technologies. Why should we not counter the expensive tank weapon system with a relatively cheap missile

and thus get "more bang for the buck"? Naturally, the structure of the Rhine Army must be examined within the framework of the NATO strategy. And this is happening on a continuing basis. But one cannot rely solely on mines and antitank rockets. It is never wise to put all one's eggs in one basket, he said.

Kinnock's arguments were similarly careful with respect to the air weapons. He said that it is true that he advocates not only procuring various bomber types in connection with aircraft, but also taking into account more the different versions of air defense. But he agrees here absolutely with the military, he said. Even if in the future many offensive tasks are fulfilled better by missiles, he recognizes that one needs fighter bombers for support on the battlefield.

Kinnock did not want to dismiss outright the contemplated plans of NATO's commander in chief in Europe, General Rogers, and his "Fofa" concept, even though he had doubts about some of the basic assumptions of this concept. Thus, he said, he considers it to be more important to be able first of all to repulse the first echelon of the aggressor. The speculating of Rogers--"and it is not yet anything more than a concept"--showed in any case that even the thinking of the military was further developing. He is in agreement on the effort to ensure the greatest military effect through utilization of modern technology, he said.

Kinnock was convinced that the abolition of all British nuclear weapons planned by the Labor Party and the withdrawal of such American weapons from Great Britain is entirely compatible with England's position in NATO. He referred to the parallel policy of Canada, Norway, Denmark, and now also Spain. From talks with NATO's commander in chief, General Rogers, and with British commanders he knows the mixed feelings with which the military has contemplated tactical nuclear weapons, he said. The threat of employing battlefield weapons is not very convincing. It is entirely unclear how the damage can be confined. In the hand-to-hand fighting situation on the battlefield, a differentiation between friend and foe will scarcely be possible. The weapons would be employed above all on our own territory--that is, Germany. How then does one intend confine their use? There is the danger of an undesired escalation, he said. Conventional weaknesses cannot be credibly offset by tactical nuclear weapons. Their use is always a political matter. How uneasy the military is can be seen by NATO'S resolutions about reductions. The main argument for the retention of a vestigial number of such weapons is really only that one must be able to conduct a counterstrike in order to restrain the opponent from their use, Kinnock said.

He said that in the case of Polaris, the argument against there being a separate British strategic nuclear power is the fact that this missile is obsolete. "You can see how ineffective and unreliable it has become by the fact that the conservative government wants to spend 11 billion pounds for the new Trident." However, even with the Trident no additional contribution to the Western deterrence potential is provided. So far, Great Britain has not even achieved an upgrading of its political role, a place at the negotiating table, he said.

But why then the unilateral path? Does not one-sided disarmament remove every incentive toward disarmament on the part of the other side? How can Labor answer for the weakening of the Western negotiational position in arms control talks? Kinnock pointed to the fact that disarmament too is an ongoing process. The weapons will not be removed all at once, but a start will be made in that direction, and this will be continued step by step. He is confident, he said, that Moscow will react positively. In talks with the Labor leadership, the Soviet leadership has committed itself to dismantling one Russian missile for each removed British rocket. The disarmament policy of the Labor Party is therefore not unilateral, but bilateral, he said.

If he and his party object to the offensive character of the nuclear deterrence, must not they find President Reagan's SDI attractive then? Kinnock's answer is coolly composed and seems to be fully based on expert experience, gained in his talks with the American administration, with scientists and military figures. He named five reasons for opposing SDI: "It will not work, therefore it convinces nobody; it has a destabilizing effect in the initial phase." America will be uncoupled from Europe by this; moreover, it jeopardizes the development of European technology and leads to a drain in its scientific capacity. We should not kid ourselves, he said. This is not the first weapon system about which its advocates have claimed that it made other weapons superfluous. But what developed was only another round of the arms race, he said.

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MILITARY FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NEW FAST MINE WARFARE BOATS INCORPORATE FALKLANDS EXPERIENCE

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Nov 85 pp 27-30

[Article by Juergen Rhades: "New Boats for Mine Countermeasures and Minehunting"]

[Text] Within the next 15 years the German Navy's mine countermeasure and mine laying capabilities will be greatly improved by the commissioning of new boats. The Class 343 mine warfare boat is in the construction stage; the Class 332 minehunter program is to follow on without interruption. This article highlights the present situation of the two programs and other mine countermeasure activities in the German Navy.

With the signing of the construction contract between the Federal Defense Materiel and Procurement Office and general contractor Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm on 3 July 1985, Project Class 343 Minewarfare Boat entered a decisive phase. At the end of August, MBB and "Working Group SM 343", which was constituted especially for this purpose, signed a contract for shipyard work. The working group consists in equal parts of three medium-sized shipyards, Abeking & Rasmussen. Fr. Luerssen and Kroeger. However, in actual work Luerssen performs the biggest share (43 percent); Abeking & Rasmussen and Kroeger are splitting the difference equally.

Of the 10 boats to be built under the contract, four are to be built by Fr. Luerssen and three each by Abeking & Rasmussen and by Kroeger. The boats are outfitted in the shipyards until the shipyard sea trials; after that they proceed under their own power and navigation by sea to the final assembly yards. For seven of the boats, the latter are Fr. Luerssen and for three, A&R. Under the supervision of the general contractor, this is where the boats are finally equipped with weapon and fire control systems. Operational certification is to take place in the Baltic.

Module construction is being used for the first time in that type of project. Every boat is divided into 25 modules, and every shipyard builds ten units of each section--the learning effect thus obtained had been determined previously. The modules are then transported to the assembly yards concerned.

The keel laying of the prototype boat at the Luerssen yard is planned for June 1986, with launch in the fourth quarter of 1987. The remaining nine boats will, in the flippant words of the general contractor, be "turned out like sausages."

The first boat is to be commissioned in December 1988; the others will be delivered during the period ending in early 1991. They will serve as replacements for the 21 Class 340/41 fast mine sweepers which will be retired. The SM 343s will enter service with the 5th Minesweeper Squadron at the Olpenitz/Baltic base. A system support group will be established for them at that location. The crews for the new boats will come from the old SM boats at Olpenitz and Flensburg; the remaining personnel from the SM 340/341 will also crew the new minehunters.

The new mine warfare boats represent a considerable improvement over their predecessors:

- they are equipped with two 40 mm Bofors guns of a more combat efficient version--two guns provide all-around defense; the WM 20 fire control system from the meanwhile retired Class 142 speed boats will be used;

- air defense will be provided by the STINGER 2 infra-red-guided man-portable antiaircraft missile;

- minesweeping will be more precise as a result of a more modern navigation system;

- they will be equipped with the PALIS passive/active LINK system, which will enable the boats to operate in unison with other navy units since they will receive the data automatically.

The use of 40 mm guns is a measure for standardization with other seagoing units; it provides considerable advantages as to training, maintenance, spare part availability etc. Another highly important factor is the raised minelaying capability compared with the old fast minesweepers; minelaying could be the initial task at the start of an armed conflict.

The boats are constructed from non-magnetic, rustfree steel from the Boehler firm in Duesseldorf, the German subsidiary of the Austrian United High-Grade Steel Works. For furnishing the steel, Krupp and Boehler have formed a consortium which shares steel deliveries at a 60:40 percent ratio. Forgoing of the sheet metal, which will go all the way down to a 4 mm thickness, will start in January 1986. It should be noted that the boats are entirely constructed of steel--aluminum construction, which had probably been intended, was abandoned after the Falklands experiences. Aluminum is more combustible than steel.

All these improvements permit the conclusion that the new boats represent greater combat efficiency for mine warfare by the German Navy, for minesweeping as well as for minelaying.

Minesweeping tasks are additionally performed by the German Navy with the TROIKA system, specifically as simulated sweeping with the unmanned SEEHUND solenoid sweep. Minesweeping will remain an essential activity in the future also, especially in the operating areas of the German Navy, since minehunting is hampered considerably by such impacts as strong currents, sharply varying temperatures between water layers (making sonar contact more difficult), rubble-filled sea bottoms (which make clear identification of mines difficult); muddy bottoms, in which mines can disappear completely and can no longer be spotted by TV or sonar. All this can lead to minehunting being less effective than minesweeping--thus minesweeping will continue in the future also.

The Class 332 Minehunter

Improvements are to take place with the German Navy's minehunters also. Twelve minehunters are active at present: two Class 331A and ten of the very similar, but more modern 331B. In 1992 these boats are to be replaced by a total of 20 minehunters; current plans call for initially for 10 Class 332 minehunters to be built, to replace the two old boats (additional personnel to come from the old fast minesweepers to be deactivated in Flensburg). The 10 MIJ-331Bs will be replaced not earlier than the end of the 1990s by possibly another 10 boats of the same class, possibly with even more modern equipment.

The Class 332 minehunters are based on the standard platform adapted from the 343 mine warfare boats. The concept stage, performed by the Marinetechnik-Gesellschaft (MTG) in Hamburg, has been completed; at present the next stage document is being finalized. The subsequent definition stage will probably be announced within the next few weeks; it is assumed tha the definition work for the SM 343 working group will be headed by a definition specialist. Perhaps the competition for the definition stage will be skipped and, with the general contractor (MBB) taking over direct from the SM 343 working group--however, mass production of the planned 10 boats will in any case again be subject to competitive bids.

Due to the difference in missions, the Class 332 boats will of course be somewhat different from the Class 343 ones. For instance, there will be a superstructure to store the drones and diving equipment. Since the boats will be deployed in the North Sea, installation of the RAM short-range missile defense system was omitted--cost factors were the deciding factor here. The assumption appears to be made that NATO will retain air superiority in the North Sea.

The Minehunters will have a so-called minehunting chain, consisting of the on-board minehunting sonar, the submersible drone, the mine clearance divers' gear and an improved fire control system. On the rear deck there will be a crane for the submersible drone, capable of launching and retrieving the drone without pendulum motion. This will provide an easier way of deploying the drone even in heavy seas.

The submersible drone to be introduced will probably be the PINGUIN B3, currently under development by MBB. This drone is capable of containing a TV camera as well as a short-range sonar (made by Krupp Atlas Elektronik) for exact determination of mine location. The presently used submersible drone is used by the 331 minehunters, the French-built PAP 104, accommodates either the TV or the sonar, but not both. The PINGUIN has greater operational flexibility; it can for instance be operated at any desired distance from the sea bottom. Guidance occurs via a cable with digital data transmission. The PINGUIN has two explosive charges, enabling it to destroy two mines in a single operation. Its endurance is greater and because of its greater speed the PINGUIN can operate in the presence of relatively strong currents.

In addition the minehunter is to be equipped with an auxiliary power plant, enabling it to conduct minehunting operations in the smallest area with a minimum of noise in slow-speed operations. The crew will number approximately 48. The instrumentation of the operations center has not yet been fully decided upon, but there are to be great improvements in the situation display.

Current plans call for construction of the 10 Class 332 boats to follow immediately upon that of the Class 343s--good news for the shipyards, since this will provide continuous operations; the same yards will no doubt build the 343s.

TROIKA Has Proven Its Value

The simulation minesweeping system TROIKA--the former LINDAU minesweeper reequipped as the HL351 solenoid sweep boat--is to be retained in service until about the end of the 1990s. Initial experience in operations to date have shown that this system works very well. Consideration for a replacement of whatever kind has been postponed. There are concepts for improving the old system, but no decision has been made as to whether or not simulated sweeping could be dispensed within years to come. This will be a deciding factor of how minehunting will evolve in the future--whether it will continue to be done with the solenoid sweep boat or with towed systems.

A Look Into the Future

Prospects for the navy in the new millenium are for it to have new mine warfare forces, whose boats, while smaller in number, will be more effective and will generally require smaller crews. The standardized platform for mine warfare boats and minehunters is considered to be most advantageous.

The race between enemy mine technology and friendly mine defense technology will continue unabated. It will endure and is like to keep generating imbalances. As a result, mine warfare forces will continue to be able to fulfill their mission only if even today the tactician as well as the operator, in this case the minehunter as well as the defense technologist, the engineer and the shipbuilder in industry, makes certain that technological progress in the minewarfare forces will be placed at the service of mines and mine countermeasures.



[p28] The drawing, by the SM 343 Working Group, demonstrates the division of labor among the shipyards, using as examples the hull (Abeking & Rasmussen), the superstructure (Luerssen) and the bow (Kroeger).



[p29] Design rendering of the present concept of the new Class 332 Minehunter, behind the mast and withour RAM. (Drawing: MBB)



[p30] In a new configuration, the PIGUIN B-3 is equipped with a TV camera and a short-range sonar. By digital data transmission via cable, the drone can be remote controlled at any desired distance from the sea bottom.

[Chart, p 30]

	Class 343 Fast Mine Warfare Boat SM-343	Class 332 Mine-hunter MIJ-332
General Contractor	MBB, Bremen	Undecided
Shipyards	Work Gp SM-343: Abeking & Rasm. 3 Fr. Luerssen 4 Kroeger 3	Undecided
Planned Construction	10 boats	10 boats
Launch	1st boat: Fall 87	
Commissioning	12/88 to 04/91	After 1992
Displacement	590 t	about 600 t
Length	54 m	54 m
Width	9 m	9 m
Armament	Two 40 mm Flieger-faust; mines	Fliegerfaust
Equipment	WM 20 Fire Control System; Mine-sweeping gear	Fire Control System; Minehunting Sonar; Submersible Drone; Mine clearance diver
Power Plant	2 Diesel engines MTU 16V 393 with 2x2 240 kW max performance; two variable pitch props	2 Diesel engines Slow movement engine 2 variable pitch propellers
Maximum Speed	About 18 knots	About 18 knots
Crew	37	About 48

9273/12951
CSO: 3620/140

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

END OF SHORT-SERVICE VOLUNTEER CRUNCH SEEN BY 1986

Bonn HEER in German Aug 85 p 4

[Interview with Col Juergen Natter, chief of army personnel planning in the Ministry of Defense, by Ernst-J. Kuenne: "It Is Easier To Be Z3--Shortage of Billets for Short-Service Volunteers Will Be Passe as of 1986"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Among the troops, there is once more confusion with regard to transferring to short-service volunteer status. How do you see the situation?

[Answer] Within the army, one can become a short-service volunteer the entire year through, that is to say, also during the second half of the year. But the need is not always the same at all posts. Applicants south of the River Main have an easier chance since the northern region has less difficulty, just like it did last year, in covering its manpower needs. In other words, whoever is mobile and does not make proximity to his home town a disqualifying condition has an easier time becoming a short-service volunteer.

[Question] High school graduates (abiturienten) like to use the possibility of becoming a category 2 short-service volunteer in order to bridge the waiting time between high school graduation and the beginning of university studies. Can they still do so?

[Answer] As long as basic military service lasts 15 months, the person who is drafted on 1 October will always have a problem. Things are easier for those who elect to sign up for 2 years. That is why we have a tremendous rush of applicants in this area. Basically: the category 2 short-service volunteer needs a billet like any other short-service volunteer--in other words, he costs exactly as much. Since we are short of noncommissioned officers, we must make priority use of positions for men who are prepared to become noncommissioned officers and, where possible, are willing to sign up for longer periods of time.

We have a certain need for reserve officers and this involves the high school graduate types. Approximately 2,000 per age class can sign up for category 2 short-service volunteer duty, provided that they are suitable and able to accept training as a reserve officer candidate. And there are not any more openings.

[Question] In other words, does the priority lie with the potential noncommissioned officer who is prepared to serve a longer period of time?

[Answer] Quite clearly: We want to utilize the applicant situation and the possibilities inherent in the high employment numbers of next year in order to finally bring order to the noncommissioned officer situation. For years we have been in the process of gradually dismantling the category 2 short-service volunteer positions and of increasing still further the number of billets for category 3 short-service volunteers. That is the man we are seeking and whom we need!

Currently, we still have around 17,000 category 2 short-service volunteers in the army and we are in the process of dismantling another 10,000 positions and replacing them with category 3 positions. That means: He who is perpared to become a category 3 short-service volunteer has the primary chance of being accepted.

[Question] What is the source of the uncertainty among troops with respect to acceptance applications?

[Answer] There are surely several reasons: First, the military has determined that despite available billets it cannot accept applicants on an unlimited basis--quite simply because fewer funds than planned billets are available. But perhaps the most significant reason is the fact that outside of the military, in schools and enterprises, there are far more applicants than had been expected. Furthermore, more short-service volunteers, primarily noncommissioned officers, whose service time was to have terminated by 31 December 1984, have reenlisted.

Our requirements for 1985 were 20,000 new short-service volunteers. We were able to fulfill this goal in May. However, because we must have a continuing personnel replacement pool in order to be able to take on those who conclude their apprenticeships in July or August and who report for duty in October or in order to be able to take on those performing basic military service as short-service volunteers in the following months, we have divided these 20,000 positions throughout the year. As far as the troops are concerned, this has the effect of being a constant brake.

[Question] And how do things look for 1986?

[Answer] At that time, the army will have a new requirement for 30,000 men. We will be able to make more positions available because the legislature will allocate more funds to us. If uncertainty has arisen now it is not transferable to 1986.

[Question] How many of the 30,000 can become noncommissioned officers and how large is the shortage?

[Answer] Today, we still have 5,000 noncommissioned officer positions unencumbered. Hwoever, this figure is small when one considers that 2 years ago this shortage was still at the 17,000 level. To answer the first portion of

your question: In principle, everyone who enters military service next year, if he has the appropriate suitability and performance, coupled with the appropriate length of service obligation, can become a noncommissioned officer since every quarter some depart and we still have to staff 5,000 positions.

[Question] We have thus far spoken of the W-15 type person [a soldier who has performed 15 months of basic military service] who wishes to become a short-service volunteer. But how do things look for an applicant with no prior service?

[Answer] There are basically two ways in which a person can become a short-service volunteer and no others. We take on W-15 types in the troop components as short-service volunteers, but we also get some people without prior military service through volunteer acceptance organizations. The numbers are roughly in balance with a slight advantage going to transfers from troop components.

[Question] What chances does the short-service volunteer have who merely wants to remain a private?

[Answer] If an absolute requirement for very definite specialists with highly qualified civilian professions--let us say, electronics maintenance--exists, then there are also possibilities for longer service as rank-and-file private. However, the rule is that those with longer service will become noncommissioned officers!

[Question] Could supply and demand lead to the elimination of the category 2 short-service volunteer?

[Answer] Even these days, perhaps precisely at this moment, soldiers are being accepted as category 2 short-service volunteers under very special conditions: If they have limited suitability for ROA [Reserve Officer Candidate] training, for certain bottleneck areas or as an entry level to the noncommissioned officer career where suitability has been recognized, because we expect those in this circle of individuals to subsequently reenlist. In other words, the category 2 short-service volunteer does exist and will continue to exist albeit at reduced volume.



Category 2 short-service volunteers are giving way to soldiers serving longer terms.

5911
CSO: 3620/123

AUSLAND ASSESSES COUNTRY'S DEFENSE CAPABILITY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by John C. Ausland]

[Text] In downtown Helsinki there is a monument to the Finnish statesman J. K. Paasikivi. A quotation in both Finnish and Swedish that Paasikivi was extremely fond of is engraved in the foot of the monument. The quotation reads: "Recognition of reality is the beginning of all wisdom."

What Paasikivi was referring to, primarily, was Finlands relations with its big-power neighbor. Initially, there was some resistance to his policy, which was based on friendly relations with the Soviet Union. As the years passed, however, more and more Finns accepted Paasikivi's line. Today it has achieved the same status as the Holy Scripture.

Finnish officials stress repeatedly Finland's need to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. They stress this so strongly that one must wonder if there is someone who doubts it. In any event, Finland's Nordic neighbors support this policy so totally that they carefully avoid any discussion of Finland's military.

In Common

Finland has much in common with Sweden. Both countries see themselves as neutral. As a result, their military preparedness appears to be directed both toward the East and toward the West. Nevertheless, both countries find it impossible to believe that NATO would ever attack them.

Both Swedes and Finns understand full well that, if anyone ever were to start a war with them, it would be the Soviet Union.

Defense Agreement

It is useless to discuss what would happen if the Soviet Union should invoke the Finnish-Russian Defense Agreement of 1948 and ask for consultations. What the Soviet demands would be and how Finland would approach them can only be a matter of speculation. Meanwhile, there are two things that are clear.

First of all, Soviet military commanders would like to have access to Finnish Lapland in the event of any war. Secondly, the Finns have no desire to see Soviet forces on Finnish soil.

There is no doubt that, if the Soviet Union should be dumb enough to attack Finland, the Finns would fight back.

The question is: "How effective would the Finnish forces be?" The answer to that question could be of vital importance to Norway.

Although the Finns have taken Paasikivi's advice with regard to relations with the Soviet Union, they are hardly willing to look reality in the eye with regard to their military forces.

Since they have fought against and stopped the Red Army two times, they may have an exaggerated confidence in their ability to repeat this feat.

Defects

Since the Finns are extremely secretive about their military forces, it is difficult to gain an independent idea as to how good they are. But this is unnecessary. In 1981 the Finnish Defense Commission published a report. It contained an impressive list of defects in the army, navy, and air force.

In its evaluation of the Finnish military, the report states the following: "The advance of an invading force can be delayed and losses can be inflicted on the intruder, but the army's capability has been reduced in such a way as to threaten our ability to intercept and strike down the attacker himself in the most vital areas."

The government has increased military spending to a certain extent since 1981 and the military is capable of correcting some of the shortcomings that were pointed out. Nevertheless, more money is needed if the military is to develop truly effective forces.

Limitations

The peace treaty of 1947 set certain limitations on the size and equipment of the Finnish forces. It set no limitations on the quality of equipment and training, however. For this reason, Finland could spend more on defense without being in violation of the defense treaty. (At present, the country spends between 1.5 and 2 percent of its gross national product on defense.)

In addition, considering its own trade balance, the Soviet Union would be happy to sell them more modern equipment, in my opinion.

Fragile Public Opinion

During a recent visit to Helsinki, I asked Finnish officials why they did not spend more on defense. The answers varied. The most convincing answer was that the public opinion that supported the present level of defense spending

was extremely fragile. If the government were to propose a higher defense budget, it would cause some political unrest, especially in the Social Democratic Party.

Perhaps it is understandable that Norwegian politicians and officials are careful in their public statements concerning Finland.

Nevertheless, this does not explain why the Norwegian mass media fail to inform the public of the poor state of the Finnish military.

9336
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MILITARY

FRANCE

BUDGET CRITICIZED AS INADEQUATE FOR MODERNIZATION

Paris LE FIGARO in French 2-3 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Pierre Darcourt]

[Text] 1986 budget omits funds needed for modernization of equipment.

The air force, as seen by visiting ministers, is running smoothly: bases protected, runways, security police, planes sleek as lances--everything seems to be sound, modern and operational. However, behind this facade there are many concerns and "missed boats."

First, the AWACS, the airborne radar. France, an independent nuclear power, cannot afford the moral luxury of not having an adequate early warning system which would enable it to use its strategic weapons. However, the actual range of the land-based radar, limited by the horizon and by the height of the antenna, is 20 to 30 kilometers. The airborne radar, alone, maneuvering at 4,000 to 10,000 meters, would not only cover the low-altitude "shadow areas," but would provide 20 times the surveilance of the land-based radar. Should one of our main radar ground stations be hit, the airborne radar would become operational immediately as air defense stations.

For several years experts in the Ministry of Defense held out hope for an "imminent" decision. There is no item in the 1986 budget for these airborne radar stations, which are indispensable in France and overseas, as well as on the oceans.

The 18 thermonuclear missiles on the Albion Palteau, although "hardened," are now vulnerable, since the coordinates are known, to massive salvos in case of a decisive attack.

The Mirage IV's, even if modernized, would have little chance of reaching a target in the USSR, even flying at low altitude.

To complete the missiles in permanent silos on the plateau, the army chief of staff under the previous administration had launched a plan for a new mobile, surface-to-surface weapons system known to experts in the field as the "SX." The studies were begun at the end of 1976, with deployment planned for 1985-1990.

This is a two-stage missile with a range of 3,500 kilometers, carrying three nuclear warheads "with staggered trajectory in space and time" (cluster firing). Several modes of deployment had been envisaged: semi-mobile deployment to various sites by rail, land vehicles or cargo planes. The most practical solution seemed to be the installation of the SX's on camouflaged weapons carriers, such as the BERLIET-TRAILER semi-trailers, more than a thousand of which are already used by the army. Equipped with an explosive propellant to permit "all-weather" use and takeoff, the SX was supersonic, the cruise missiles subsonic saturation weapons, considered too expensive for the French people.

Successor to TRANSALL

The SX's, deployed in several places throughout the country, were protected from the single strike, the best way to prevent the fatal surprise blow being to diversify the targets. To destroy the Albion Plateau and the SX's, the enemy would have been forced to raise the level of attack, with no protection from retaliation.

But even the SX has not been retained. And to allow all the credibility of deterrence to rest on the submarine component is not without the possibility of drowning its effectiveness.

After the advance air warning system and the SX were again brought under discussion, the problem of military air transport arose. Nothing is yet in view to replace the TRANSALL, a good sturdy cargo plane, when it becomes obsolete in 10 to 15 years. There is not even a study under way to define its successor, for which the air force has, however, set forth the specifications. We will need a transport capable of carrying a full load of 70 to 80 tons (freight or personnel) at 5,000 kilometers. This cargo plane should have the same simple features as the TRANSALL and be capable of landing on unimproved flat terrain.

Finally, to prolong the life of the TRANSALL, we should have a lighter military transport plane for so-called "short hauls." This aircraft could take care of the intermediate services now offered by the TRANSALL: transporting a single vehicle, or 30 men, or a reactor. We already have this type of plane, the equivalent of an outsized DAKOTA, but faster; it is the ATR 42, built by AEROSPATIALE and AERITALIA. It would be necessary only to install a loading-ramp door at the rear to enable it to carry Jeeps or eventually a SAGAIE armored vehicle aboard. It is one of the paradoxes of our aeronautical construction that a nationalized industry has been able to construct a plane of this quality for purely civilian use without taking into consideration the military needs it might fulfill.

The nation must be made aware that these needs and forecasts are urgent. We can never make up for missing the boat on a generation of weapons. In 1940 the Germans lost the battle of Britain because they had not taken into account the imminent arrival on the scene of radar, which took place in 2 years. In 1943 the Japanese, triumphant victors in the first stage of the war in the Pacific, were unaware that 2 years later the atomic bomb, constructed with great secrecy, would crush them under a gigantic fireball.

8735/7051
CSO: 3519/36

MILITARY ITALY

DEVELOPMENTS, PROBLEMS FACING NEW DEFENSE LEADERS

Rome INTERARMA in Italian 15 Sep 85 pp 452-455, 477

[Article by the Military Observer]

[Text] The article written by the Interarma Observer is entitled "Autumn Is Coming...Nominations and changes" and takes a look at the developments and appointments on the horizon in the Armed Forces and the tasks which will face a new defense chief of staff and a new secretary general-national director of armaments when Bartolucci and Piovano retire in October. The Military Observer outlines at length the problems of the Armed Forces and underlines the waste, the unrest among the men, the lack of mobility, useless associations, the rhetorical messages, gossip, etc. He examines all 3 branches and indicates the objectives that should be reached and ensured by the military hierarchy.

With this latest mass return from holiday, the summer has truly come to an end, at least the carefree schoolboy part of it.

Autumn is upon us, the season when, among other worries, the time for the government's call to accounts hangs over us: not first among the many such, but certainly not the last among them is the matter of appointments of the two top military officials. The current Chief of Defense General Staff Bartolucci, as well as the Secretary General and National Director for Armaments Piovano, will both be departing their posts in October.

That means that this will be a hot time, with the heat close to the boiling-point, if we bear in mind the fact that, on the basis of the 1985 White Paper and the subsequent publication of the government's latest bills introduced in parliament, these hitherto primarily "mediatory" and, in the main, powerless posts are to be endowed with primary responsibility for the nation's armed forces.

In our latest report (cfr INTERARMA No 14/85, p 413), we made a stab at forecasts, based on that "rotation logic" we persist in

branding "perverse" because it could very well bring about the sacrifice of a truly "outstanding" official, to use a term of which Cadorno is very fond, on behalf of somebody not quite so lofty but, at that point, a member of the "Square Squad." This was perverse, and also wasteful... of men, we mean.

In our forecasts we adopted the hypothesis that the defence general staff for ground forces (the E-MM-E-AM theory), and the secretary general of the Navy or, in second place, the ground forces. For aviation, with Bartolucci leaving that post now as a relatively recent newcomer after Cavalera's protracted reign, we predicted a "retirement tour."

In the wake of our note, certainly not owing to its merits, we witnessed the eruption of a rash of media coverage of the "race to prophesy": first in line was L'ESPRESSO (No 34, dated 25 August 1985), which, in a thoughtful and impartial article by Roberto Fabiani, "Waltz of the Generals," ventured to proffer a list of likely appointments. Fabiani, albeit in somewhat lofty rhetorical terms, described the emergence in the stagnant military constellation of the "summer breezes of Giovanni Spadolini"; there was a time when we had a Winter General: is this the time for a Summer General?

Spadolini will, accordingly, set out with full support and at full speed, with unanimously approved decrees to back him, to bring about the demise of the Air Force monopoly over "everything that flies," and wielding effective national military power at the two loftiest summits.

In truth, we would point out, Spadolini's blitz is nothing more than the application, after an 8-month hiatus, of what the White Paper had announced.

Fabiani singles out, for the defense general staff, a team to crouch at the starting-tape: two "senior" generals, meaning men who have very short tours to serve before retirement, Poli and Bisognero, and three "young"ones, with a lot more than 2 years of active duty ahead of them, De Martino, Gavazza, and Pellegrino: there you have what is basically a sound team. We agree, but if we had to bet, we should put an extra lira on Bisognero and De Martino, as "senior" and "junior" generals, respectively.

As for the secretary-general's seat, Fabiani "assigns" it to the Navy; his candidate is Admiral Mario Porta, who heads the dolphin [frogmen] squad at Marulli as chief of the general staff, but only for the time being, given the potential importance of the office, never before entrusted to the Navy, but would be sidetracked to allow the top job in the Navy, prestigious, of course, but certainly lesser in substance, to go to one of his seniors: Giasone Piccioni or Cesare Pellini.

There you have Roberto Fabiani's possible and probable picks on the summit tote-board. As for his article, though, we need must make another observation: we do so reluctantly and sadly, because it is indicative of the lack of understanding and of the suspicion that still hangs over the military.

Fabiani, a-propos of the General Secretary, writes: "when the current Secretary Giovanni Piovano retires (to a job waiting for him at OTO Melara)."

That was the final straw! Springing immediately to their feet were the two moralizers on permanent active-duty status: the ineffable ex-deputy and ex-commandant, Falco Accame, moored just off the beckoning shores of Proletarian Democracy, and the colorful current ecretary of the same party, Mario Capanna; they were followed by three more, voicing loud cries of indignation...

The defense minister, though, is ready and watchful; the Summer-General is not given to joking, and after 3 days, yes, we said 3 days, clearly and categorically, comes the denial.

It is indeed unthinkable that in a country where the party potentates are almost always surveyors or school-teachers and those of the USL tend to be attorneys, albeit invariably bearers of up-to-the-minute party cards, a 63-year-old general who has, on merit alone, reached the loftiest pinnacle in the military hierarchy, could be made the tool of an arms manufacturer and defense contractor. What a scandal that would cause!

The truly lovely part is that, a few days later, in an interview with Radio Radical , Fabiani, who is certainly not renowned for his pro-military views, while he confirmed having floated the idea so as to get it a hearing in serious and authoritative quarters, added that he considers the whole thing proper, logical, and natural.

And, in fact, who could be better than a general known for his competence, the former national armaments director, etc...? Every so often we see that even a Republican can be more of a royalist than the king!

The issue of appointments will be settled one way or another and, we believe, in the best possible way; above all else, by sheer good luck, the days of thuggery, of ferocious tribal struggles for a seat based on insinuations and anonymous memos are far behind us.

Who is there today who does not remember the Aloja-Di Lorenzo battle? Or the confusion compounded of the Torrisi-Bini flap, staged against a background with a little P2 highlighting, all to keep Monassi out of the loftier reaches of the Navy? No such thing would be possible today.

Something has changed, and certainly for the better! Even so, it leaves still standing and granite-firm the real and portentous problem facing the Armed Forces: the issue of their replacement. In an earlier note concerning the present overall state of readiness, we called our military decline inexorable unless drastic steps were taken, since the budget cannot, in any acceptable way, afford to maintain the Armed Forces we have today.

On this score, we got help, serious and persuasive help, from somebody who truly took us by surprise.

We have never had much fondness for the Radicals -- politically, of course; too many things, our long tours of military service, a point of view wholly at odds with that of civilians, a mindset and training that interdict any such leanings. We have been leery of their preconceived and occasionallally obtuse anti-militarism, of their Calvinist pacifism that lends itself so readily to exploitation and is widely exploited, but we must perforce admit their consistency and seriousness in documenting and stating their ideas, qualities that are highly respected and honored by the military. There are certainly enemies among them, often implacable or pig-headed, but at least they go to the roots of the problems; they are one political party that has an office of military studies; we are fonder of them, frankly, than of a lot of "friends" who at once applaud and ignore us, and who count for very little with the military. All the parties are full of just such friends, though maybe the majority parties have more of them!

We cite as a conspicuous example the latest interview printed in a weekly that is decidedly growing, EUROPEO, with Francesco Rutelli, Radical whip in the chamber, member of the defense commission, a conscientious objector, pacifist, and anti-militarist from day one, and also an attentive and careful student of military problems.

So what does Rutelli have to say that is so extraordinary? Only things that we should have wished to say ourselves with such clarity, and which we so yearn to hear from somebody in the upper reaches of the national defense establishment.

Simply this:

- as of now, our armed forces are made up of two "incestuously" superimposed "strata." Two layers, both of them extremely expensive, and absolutely incompatible.

The first: modernity, progress, efficiency. The CATRIN weapons system, the army's helicopters and missiles, the aircraft carriers, the modern, sophisticated frigates, the missile-firing speedboats, the MRCA, AMX, EFA aircraft, and so on!

The second: a beefy and colorful military machine with more than 500,000 employees.

Overstaffed, patronage-minded, politicized, scattered absent-mindedly across the country, immobile, supported by costly and often dilapidated works and structures, depots, magazines, barracks, solely for those 500,000, says Spadolini, with the "majority" consisting of "toy-soldier" draftees who, we would add, have no desire whatever to be soldiers, "toy" or otherwise, and do everything in their power to avoid the draft.

In 1972, Montanelli tells us in his brief article, "An Army of Objectors," there were 100 conscientious objectors in service: last year, there were 9,000! Pertini, whose performance as top man in the military we could never adequately castigate, exempted 3,000 of them in 7 years; more than one a day: by now, the word has got around!

- The two systems coexist and, in their absurd diversity, suck up thousands of billions: as so often happens here, we lack the strength to choose.

In talking about the first system, they refer to technical and scientific advances, the good rapport with allies, and the potential adversary, the pressures of science and industry. The politicians accept this, and often encourage it: they soothe the military by distracting them with their "war games," from harmful thoughts and temptations and provide fuel and work to so many sectors of industry and domestic labor: there can be no doubt as to their social value.

At the top of the second system are all those whose purposes it serves, and there is a mort of them: the same ones who encourage the first, the majority politicians as well as those in the opposition. The "People's Army" pleases and soothes citizens:

- it keeps alive, albeit purely artificially, those Garibaldian and partisan traditions that form one of the pillars of the republic.

- They fend off the tempting prospect of coups, to which they believe the military is over-prone and still a bit fascist around the edges.

- They wink at favoritism and electoral and patronage support of all stripes and the creation of countless little power plants, in a very profitable network.

- They provide short-term parking for thousands of youthful candidates for joblessness.

- Attract trade and traffic to small coastal vessels (suppliers, messes, lodgings trade, amusement, etc.), to what would otherwise be moribund towns and villages.

As a result, the great and the small like it; the Christian Democrats, perpetually on the prowl for "protectorates," the Socialists who have only just recently begin to take an interest in the problem and in the quest for meager slices of consensus and power, the communists who labor under a Pinochet complex and almost all of which, thanks to their overwhelming presence on the Base Representation Councils (COCER) and Base Councils (COBAR), the elected military committees, exercize exquisitely fine-tuned, absolute control.

They like it and consequently go along with it: there is only one major drawback: it is extremely expensive, not to mention useless.

Rutelli says as much, and so do we; Rutelli says it in his final description of Spadolini as "not the worst of the many defense ministers we have had," asserts that he is unable to solve the problem, though he has made some attempts to do so: the White Paper, the five lines for operative action, holding the two military summit juntas responsible, solving the Naval Air problem, and the recent introduction of significant pieces of legislation.

As for Naval Aviation, Rutelli is actually fiercely opposed to it, calling it nothing less than an assault on the "peaceable" or at least "defensive" intention of the constitution; we feel that this is the only proper attitude for a sincere adical, a man who is permanently and perilously poised and pulled between reality and utopia.

In concluding, Rutelli comes back round to being perfectly radical: he rules out practically everything, both the people's army and the other, small, select army of professionals and the weapons systems and the military industries and the military technologies: he comes down inevitably on the side of utopia and once again calls, we think without quite his quondam fire, for unilateral disarmament and sweet reason, cites reason as the one weapon to win the East over to a policy of peace and coexistence: for information and better acquaintance as weapons. These, Rutelli argues, are the weapons communism fears most.

In his conclusions and in his closing proposals our ideas and those of Rutelli drift apart from each other by 180° and at headlong speed, and that is obvious.

We firmly believe in a carefully thought-out defense, balanced, motivated, efficient, in keeping with our resources, dedicated to all-out defense, without hesitation or reservation, of the nation's freedom and independence.

And therefore we repeat yet again in closing that perhaps even we "utopians" may someday see:

- Armed Forces that are quick, flexible, cool, credible, and worth fearing, powerful in mobility and firepower.

Away with these patronage-riddled, politicized Armed Forces: with useless installations, with non-existent Commands, with their anti-"natural phenomena" bent, their obsolete and dilapidated infrastructures, the men who cannot be transferred -- all the Sardinians on Sardinia, the Marchigiani in the Marches, the Romans in Rome, and so on, the recommendations, the waste, the civilian hirelings who lounge idly through their days, the spineless "toy soldiers," the officials who draw pay for two jobs, the pointless associations, the windy messages, the gossip. Enough!

Upgrading the Armed Forces as far as the budget can stretch. The Navy and Air Force are in fairly good shape insofar as their operative alignment is concerned.

They have, or will shortly have, sound weapons capable of dealing with the threat: a good percentage of the ships are modern and have been updated with equipment, sensors, weapons systems, conventional weapons, on-board aircraft plus others that can be adapted for the purpose.

Their numbers are inadequate, but not altogether negligible. The same goes for the Air Force (AMI), particularly if you look at its aircraft programs now poised for implementation.

Both will have to take a hard look at the system of bases and infrastructures: the Navy will have most work to do, with an enormous number of bases by comparison with the number of ships, and a plethora of useless and costly "historic units" on its back.

The Army will have to go back and start over, practically speaking. Drop or at least cut back on the draft: 95 to 5 is our ratio of draftees to volunteers, as opposed to the European average which -- except for Spain and Portugal -- is 60 to 30.

Away with the 200,000 ground troops deployed clear across the three Venetias: we are thinking of the French Rapid Intervention Force, officially unveiled on 14 July last in the review marking the Bastille Day holiday; the mayor of Paris is not a veteran: 50,000 selected men, trained, adequately armed, motivated, and highly mobile in three dimensions.

Away with compulsory military service for show, with its "tin soldiers," its districts where the "conscription lists" are compiled and where mammas, bishops, deputies, retired generals, and mayors

besiege the "naja" office, raising every variety of unshirted hell to get their darlings an "exemption."

A new army: that's what we need. A quick, real, serious army. An army for the nineties.

These are the jobs the two new top military authorities should be called upon to perform. This, we think, and we are not alone, is what conscience and awareness should dictate to them. This is what we hope with all our hearts they will essay to do.

6182
CSO: 3528/22

MILITARY

ITALY

BRIEFS

PSI SENATOR ON NAVAL AVIATION-- Socialist Senator Renato Garibaldi, a member of the constitutional affairs commission, asked a question that set off a string of doubts and uncertainties in connection with two bills submitted to parliament by the Defense Ministry which called for the establishment of what is referred to as Naval Aviation. During the question period, the Socialist MP asked the minister whether he was familiar with a recent publication from the Air Force Association's center for military studies in which, referring to the introduction of the two bills, the association calls them "uneconomic," unsuitable from any point of view, and clearly in conflict with the thrusts of Italy's military policy. Again citing the publication introduced by the socialist senator during the question period, the government's move "does not meet the national air defense requirements, is based on outdated concepts, is patently designed solely to satisfy unfulfilled ambitions, and would drastically disrupt the basic ordering of the Armed Forces." [Text][Rome AVANTI! in Italian 8 Nov 85 p 5] 6182

CSO: 3528/22

INCREASING VOLUME OF ARMS SALES TO IRAN CRITICIZED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 8-14 Nov 85 p 35

[Text] While some countries even forbid the sale of weapons to Iran, Portugal, which curiously affirms its neutrality in the conflict which opposes the two neighboring countries, continues to sell more and more arms to the Khomeyni regime which everyone knows does not participate in dialog and peace nor in international mediation to put an end to the war.

Quite recently, some Portuguese and foreigners located in the United States were condemned in that country for trying to sell sophisticated arms to Iran. The United States forbade the sale of weapons to the regime of Khomeyni's Iran.

Also recently, the secret supplying of British arms to Iran was revealed in London, although it is known that Great Britain forbids such exports.

Nevertheless, in Portugal, the exporting of weapons and ammunition to Iran amounts to more than 10 million contos in 1985.

Portugal affirms its neutrality and gives its total official cover to the sale of weapons and ammunition to the tyrannical regime of Khomeyni to maintain and continue the war to which the United Nations is trying to put an end.

The cargo manifests are clear and testify to the truthfulness of the facts. The freighter "Atlas", commanded by Petros Psistakis, has been coming to load weapons and ammunitions with regularity at the Portuguese port of Setubal since March. These weapons and ammunitions are destined for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. Fundicao E Construcao Mecanicas and INDEP (Defense Industries) appear as exporters which have the respective banking guarantees from Iranian institutions.

Although the simultaneous Portuguese exports at times to the two countries involved in war may not have been a secret to anyone, Portugal and its weapons and ammunitions manufacturing firms have had no let-up in the manufacture and shipment of its deliveries now almost exclusively with fabulous--and duly authorized!--contracts for the Khomeyni regime.

What Neutrality?

Arms sales to countries at war should be banned, as is the case, for example, in Austria. And it is even worse to sell arms to a regime like that of Khomeyni which refuses peace and practices a ferocious domestic policy which moreover discredits the exporting country.

Whoever is permitting the continuation of exports of Portuguese arms and ammunition to Khomeyni's Iran must have very little sense.

If Portugal aspires to sell weapons, and it is natural for it to sell them, it has many normal countries and situations in which it can do so.

Portuguese Neutrality

The continuous and increased exports of Portuguese weapons this year to Iran obviously concern some Arab circles which are questioning Portugal's non-neutral neutrality in the face of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

And Portuguese arms exports to Khomeyni's Iran and also to Syria (which then supplies Iran) are so regular that the cargo manifests are no longer hidden and they are the target of jokes.

It seems that the offices of the Aeronautical Materiel of the Portuguese Air Force at Alverca have not yet been bribed by the agents of Khomeyni, Syrians and Iranians who travel to Portugal regularly. But other industrial units continue, as incredible as it may seem, to be sensitive to the appeals of Khomeyni's men and his embassy in Lisbon.

Official Portuguese neutrality should not permit the uncontrolled "about-face" of exports of arms and ammunition now massively headed for Iran's war against Iraq.

9895/7051
CSO: 3542/30

BARGAINING BEGINS ON TURKISH-U.S. DCA

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 30 Oct 85 pp 1, 13

[Text] Turkish Desires

Aid must increase and the 7/10 ratio with Greece must go. The Turkish army must be modernized. Trade must expand. Turkish exports should not be hampered. Stance on Armenian bills should be discussed.

U.S. Desires

Washington must be able to use bases for its own purposes. Must have a base for rapid deployment force. The Voice of America must be able to broadcast to the USSR from eastern Anatolia (Turkey opposes this).

--We are Determined, They Are Selfish: Turkey is determined to expand its rights in the Defense Cooperation Agreement [DCA] but America is avoiding compromise. Critical bargaining begins today.

--Intentions Clear: U.S. secretary of defense told Yavuzturk in Brussels, "Give up your demands. Extend the old agreement." NATO secretary general asked for transfer of Canakkale station.

--Athens Factor: American Under Secretary Armacost, who will participate in the talks, will meet with Papandreou in Athens today. The under secretary is happy with his contacts.

--What Will Happen? Turkey will put America's friendship on the line in defending its rights in the bargaining. "Uncle Sam's" idea of friendship will be spelled out. If they hold to a hard line, Turkey will be "offended." The outcome will be important to the Ozal government's prestige.

NEWS CENTER - Talks on renewal of the Turkish American Defense Cooperation Agreement begin today right on the heels of the three important messages which Prime Minister Turgut Ozal delivered to President Reagan through HURRIYET on his recent U.S. trip. The result of this grand bargaining session in Ankara will play a decisive role in the two countries' relations.

America had set out to pressure Turkey even before the talks began. U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger talked to National Defense Minister Zeki Yavuzturk during the NATO meeting in Brussels and asked that "Turkey stop asking for a new agreement." He offered as a rationale for this the "classic excuse" that "we cannot get a new Defense Cooperation Agreement through Congress" and said, "Let us extend the old agreement." Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington has requested that the NATO transmitter being built at Canakkale be moved somewhere else.

Also, U.S. State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs Armacost, who is to come tomorrow for the talks in Ankara, is reportedly "pleased" with his contacts in Athens. The under secretary is to meet with Greek Prime Minister Papandreou tomorrow.

Turkey's Demands

Turkey's views on the DCA, as Prime Minister Ozal stressed in his message to President Reagan, may be summed up as follows:

"This agreement is too much in America's favor. Turkey is not getting a fair return on its sacrifices. Turkey's responsibilities and obligations are very heavy, while the aid it receives from the United States is very little. Aid must increase. The United States must contribute more extensively to modernization of the Turkish army. The "7/10 ratio" of Greek to Turkish aid must be set aside."

Turkey holds the view that its economic relations with America are not going well. While aid is limited, the obstacles set up to Turkish exports to America, primarily textiles, are creating discontent. Turkey wants measures to be taken to expand trade between the two countries.

Economic topics are expected to be placed on the table by Turkey during the DCA talks. In addition, a more realistic attitude on the "Armenian bills," which are creating tensions in relations, will reportedly be requested from the United States.

Here is the answer given to the question "What if America will not entertain these requests?" "Relations may grow tense. Both America and NATO would be harmed by that negative effect." Prime Minister Ozal also has pointed out in messages appearing in HURRIYET that, if this were to be the case, Turkey would not willingly implement the agreement. "Turkey may raise difficulties as to the viability of the agreement. It would be offended by the United States," he said.

Political observers say that the attitude the Ozal government adopts in the talks, its bargaining power and the results obtained will be carefully dissected by the public in Turkey, especially the press, and they stress that the round of talks holds great importance for the Ozal government.

It is pointed out that the Ozal government's stress on how different the Turkey of 1985 is from the Turkey of 1980 will pressure Washington to make concessions in certain important matters. However, the question of how far Washington will go in concessions on these topics will depend on the course of the talks. The Turkish side will stress how, in practice, the cooperation envisaged in particular in the defense industry and economic matters in the current 5-year agreement has not reached the level desired. In addition to putting this cooperation on a firmer footing and increasing aid, it will request the lifting of barriers to Turkish exports.

Rapid Deployment Force and Radio Station

The American side is expected to present certain demands to counter Turkey's demands. The content of the Reagan administration demands in general is not fully known. However, among them is said to be the use of NATO bases for Washington's purposes "when necessary," providing a base for the rapid deployment force in this context and having the Voice of America broadcast into the Soviet Union from eastern Anatolia. Ankara, however, in a move reminescent of Turkey's traditional foreign policy, has said in a number of statements that it finds these desires of Washington's "unacceptable." Various circles are debating the future of the agreement if Washington rejects Turkey's requests or sets up unacceptable conditions in return during these talks, which reportedly will be "tough." However, observers do not expect the disagreements to go so far as to revoke the agreement.

Western Views

Meanwhile, foreign sources are saying that, in the Turkish-American Defense [and Economic] Cooperation Agreement (DECA) talks to begin today, Turkey will make initiatives aimed at procuring a great deal more aid from Washington and increasing its U.S. exports in exchange for bases on Turkish territory.

According to a REUTERS story with an Ankara dateline, Western diplomats claim that American delegation head Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe will not guarantee Turkey an increase in aid, but will provide military materiel under certain conditions.

REUTERS reported that Turgut Ozal had given no information on what kind of figure would be cited for defense aid by Turkish delegation head Selcuk Korkut, general director of joint defense affairs at the Foreign Ministry. Also, Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Yalim Eralp reiterated in a statement last week that at least $1 billion in aid would be requested.

Yavuzturk-Weinberger in Brussels

HURRIYET's Brussels correspondent Serif Sayin reported:

Defense Minister Zeki Yavuzturk, representing Turkey at the NATO meetings, held a bilateral meeting with Weinberger yesterday at the U.S. secretary of defense's request. At the meeting, held in conference hall no 7 at NATO,

Caspar Weinberger asked that "Turkey abandon the request for a new U.S.-Turkish defense and economic cooperation agreement" and said, "We cannot get such an agreement through Congress," it was learned. Reliable diplomatic sources reported that the U.S. secretary of defense insisted upon the extension of the old agreement which is due to expire.

Minister Yavuzturk did not announce his reply to these comments by Weinberger. However, sources close to Yavuzturk reported that the minister said, "We are not asking you for aid, but cooperation in the defense industry. Let us build our defense industry, and both you and we will gain."

Meanwhile, speaking with Turkish reporters after yesterday's meeting, Defense Minister Yavuzturk said that during his 25-minute talk with the U.S. secretary of defense they had discussed the defense industry and economic cooperation and that, in regard to defense industry cooperation, he had asked that American procurement authorities make opportunities available to Turkish firms also, enabling them to participate in contract bidding. "We could build many parts for F-16 aircraft, for example. We have the capability to manufacture a great deal more such military materiel. I asked that Turkey also be given the opportunity to procure them," he said. The minister said that a delegation of U.S. procurement officers were coming in late November and would hold a seminar for Turkish industrialists and businessmen to explain how military contracts are handled. The minister also pointed out that the U.S. secretary of defense had asked that preparations of the draft agreement on security of technological information be stepped up and said, "I told him this draft was being drawn up by a committee."

Yavuzturk will have bilateral talks today with Manfred Worner, West German minister of defense.

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington has asked for a change in the location of the transmitter for regulating traffic at sea which is under construction at Canakkale and is being paid for out of the NATO infrastructure budget, it was learned. The secretary general reportedly conveyed this request to Defense Minister Zeki Yavuzturk in a meeting day before yesterday.

According to what was learned, NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington said, in a bilateral meeting with Defense Minister Zeki Yavuzturk day before yesterday, that, if Turkey would lift its reserve on the 35th tranche and would change the location of the transmitter, Greece would also lift the reserve it had placed on spending in connection with this station, and he asked that the transmitter at Canakkale be moved from Turkey.

Reliable sources indicated that the portion in connection with the Canakkale transmitter on which Greece placed reserves was nearly $50 million.

American Under Secretary Arriving 'Satisfied' from Greece

HURRIYET's Athens correspondent Ziya Akcapar filed this report:

U.S. State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost, member of the "Foreign Relations Council," author of two books and winner of two awards for outstanding service to foreign policy and defense, will arrive in Ankara tomorrow with the "positive signals" he received in his initial contacts in Athens and after meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou today.

American sources in Ankara stress that, in accordance with foreign aid laws and the principles adopted by Congress in the latest aid program, there will be no question of altering the 7/10 ratio in military aid to Greece and Turkey.

Armacost, known at the U.S. State Department as a firm but likeable administrator, officially informed the Greek government that the administration would not permit the sale of the 40 F-16 aircraft it wants to buy without "adequate grarantees" on the future of U.S. bases in Greece.

Meanwhile, military aid to Turkey for 1986, which was discussed in the Senate Appropriationss Subcommittee, was approved in the amount of $714 million. The Ronald Reagan administration had proposed $785 million for this aid.

8349
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MILITARY TURKEY

EKSI ON DEFENSE-ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 3 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Oktay Eksi in the column "Article of the Day": "Sitting Down to Bargain"; passages enclosed in slantlines in boldface]

[Text] First, let us establish one fact: The Turkish people are not a society accustomed to worrying over agreements concluded with foreign countries. Or, to be more precise, "were not." For that reason, whoever was running the country could slap their signatures on anything and our people would comply to the letter without raising a single voice. "Our leaders know better than we," it was thought.

Too late, it is understood that what is inside the heads of our leaders are brains no bigger than those of our people. What one has, so has the other.

Of course, it is democracy that has revealed this fact. For that reason, interest in every agreement concluded with foreign countries has now grown. Talks which have become the focus of such interest are beginning today between Turkey and the United States. You know that the "Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement" (DECA) signed in 1980 expires on /18 December 1985/. If unity of view is not reached on changes in certain provisions of that agreement by that date, the legal basis for the /American/ bases in /Turkey/ will be gone.

But, everyone knows this is extremely unlikely. At any rate, neither /Turkey/ nor the /United States/ desires the complete elimination of the agreement, known for short as DECA. However, Turkey is complaining that the agreement has been implemented unilaterally for the past 5 years. That is, it is saying, "We are doing our part, but the United States is not keeping its promise, for instance, to develop our defense industry."

Turkey also wants a /commitment to be made in advance/ for the annual amount of "American aid" -- on condition, of course, that the present level of approximately /$700 million/ be raised to at least /$1.2 billion/.

The American administration, meanwhile, can find nothing to say about the "Defense Industry." But it says on the other topic: "Congress cannot commit itself to aid that would carry on to future years." Of course, neither can it answer the question: "Right, but didn't the U.S. administration make written commitments to Spain in 1976, to Greece in 1983 and also to the Philippines?"

Moreover, the /$1.2 billion/ that /Turkey/ wants annually in aid is the figure which U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle gave during hearings in Congress.

This picture, which we are trying to describe briefly, shows that the talks in Ankara will be pretty tough.

Actually, the reasons for the growing tension between the two countries are not all DECA-related. One example of what makes the Turkish public doubt U.S. sincerity is the way that country seems to want a "strong Turkey" on one hand and, on the other, refuses to buy our goods, such as textiles and steel -- even in amounts insignificant for the United States. Next, NATO Commander General Rogers is one whose word cannot be trusted as far as the Turkish public is concerned. Turkey accepted a plan that General Rogers introduced, providing for Greece's return to NATO. But, later, sections of the plan have still not been implemented. And worse yet, the United States has not felt the need to make an issue of this and protect the honor of its own general. This incident has perhaps generated the most important of Turkey's disappointments.

The fact is Turkey has now left behind the era of "unilateral sacrifice." The time has now come to explain this to the United States.

8349
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ECONOMIC AUSTRIA

HUGE LOSSES OF VOEST COMPANY CHRONICLED

Vienna PROFIL in German 18 Nov 85, pp 28-32

[Article by Christian S. Ortner and Liselotte Palme: "VOEST Flops"]

[Text] VOEST has become a modern enterprise. Its losses no longer come from ore and iron but from high and tech.]

The gentlemen retired deep into the mountains to obtain a better view of the future: Last Friday the board of directors of the VOEST-Alpine AG met in a secluded alpine hut in the vicinity of Eisenerz.

Topic of the rural retreat was, simply and touchingly, the future of the biggest Austrian industrial enterprise and its roughly 70,000 employees.

On the alpine pasture there was probably much talk of sin: of those sins which will bring the VOEST-Alpine group the biggest loss thus far since 1945.

Losses which next year really should lead to demise ahead of time in the board of directors of the corporation: Half of the participating members of the VOEST board of directors were dead people on vacation.

Heribert Apfalter, the otherwise very eloquent and talkative boss of the corporation, in answer to the question regarding the number of billions lost this year, only gets thin lips: "That one cannot yet say."

Small wonder. Like every other enterprise, VOEST makes regular projections concerning the probable year's result.

Early November the interesting set of accounts indicated an annual loss for 1985 of 3 billion--even more than the past record of 2.6 billion from 1981.

This worrisome number also causes increasing concern to Federal Minister Ferdinand Lacina, who is competent for the nationalized enterprises: "Unfortunately I cannot see any upward trend for VOEST-Alpine."

However, what can be seen is another trip begging for money of the VOEST management to the ministry of finance. Early next year the corporation once again will ask the taxpayer to pay up. And the addition will be generous--

supplying cover for the loss plus 800 million a year for the politically neccssary Donawitz plant and half a billion a year for additional capital resources--there is no end in sight for the subsidies.

Except for Heribert Apfalter. He insists on "being able to balance accounts without losses again in 1987."

These optimistic prognoses of VOEST's top man have a tradition. What has changed are merely the numerals of the years. For example, in 1982--VOEST had just had the year with its thus far heaviest losses--he already anticipated "achievement of the zero loss line for the current year." Just barely missed: The year ended with 1.2 billion on the negative side.

The year 1983 with a negative 2.5 billion was even twice as bad, which stimulated Apfalter to new optimism: Compared to that the 1984 result will be "considerably" improved. Actual 1984 business result: a negative 2.48 billion.

All that does not matter. Even last December Apfalter predicted profits "starting in 1986," two months later he revised the prediction to "starting in 1987" and made known for 1985 a "further improvement of the results in the order of magnitude of 500 million."

Reality corrects him once again.

Once again a plan is to help against this permanent plight. Minister Lacina has requested VOEST to clarify what its future should be and to submit a "VOEST-Alpine plan." (Main points should be: clearing up the future of Donawitz, of the Stahl- und Apparatebau in Linz--a new final plan in general.)

Based on this paper, VOEST is then to get the necessary funds--"the very last time as long as I am minister" (Lacina).

However, based on such a paper VOEST had received a 4 billion gift package in 1983.

In the meantime the money is gone down the drain, what has remained is a piece of paper according to which VOEST will have a loss of only 1.5 billion schillings this year.

The credibility of new plans is not exactly enhanced by this old paper.

For just as this year the management will probably also not be at a loss in the coming years for good reasons why dream and reality differ so greatly.

Which would not be half as bad if the worries were the same as always.

But the steel crisis today can no longer serve as an excuse for losses as was possible over the years.

The VOEST corporation--and it must be given credit for that--has been tremendously restructured in recent years. The one-time steel corporation

did what many others merely talked about: Today VOEST produces only one fifth of its sales in the traditional steel field.

However, the losses were also restructured--now the much praised new products show a deficit.

"Whatever VOEST has started in recent years has turned out badly," a member of the board of supervision said with annoyance.

Even though that is undoubtedly wrong in the general wording--whoever ventures a great deal almost always also produces flops--a seemingly perverse picture emerges. While, for example, the Linz plant, the traditional, steel core of the enterprise group, is exceedingly profitable--this year a profit of almost one billion--the AMI electronics plant costs VOEST a fortune.

While the basic materials field has developed quite well, VOEST produces one flop after the other in the much praised finished goods field.

Now VOEST primarily no longer has any steel problem--it has an electronics problem, a plastics problem, a problem with its trading firm, "VOEST Intertrading" which this year will sustain losses for the first time.

It has problems with Stahlbau in Linz, where aggregates for nuclear and hydroelectric power plants are produced and 1000 people are to be dismissed and it has a problem in machine building, where above all losses are produced. It has problems in the Roehrenwerk Krieglach, it has problems with plastic bottles from St. Aegyd.

A personal drama takes place against the background of these problems: In the board of directors of VOEST "catch as catch can" is played because, on the one hand, everybody wants to pass the buck to someone else, but, on the other hand, wants to gain authority.

Several men of the board of directors are requested by its chairman during increasingly shorter intervals not to await the end of their term of office but to resign immediately.

Sometimes with good reason. Heribert Apfalter, the forcibly integrative figure of this theater, is in a clinch with the owner, the OeIAG.

"You have never in your life sold a ton of steel, so please shut your trap," he usually tells his owner in response to overly pernickety questions, true to his fundamental attitude that the OeIAG brings above all "Russian bureaucracy."

He humiliates the "Russian bureaucracy" wherever he can. He arranged the press conference in the "Concordia," in which he presented the conclusion of the contract with the Japanese OKI managers, simultaneously with the session of the supervisory board in the OeIAG in which the latter had to vote on this very contract.

One of the members of the so derided supervisory board angrily said: "He might as well have taken his pants down in front of us."

But now where Apfalter's position is seriously damaged because of the record losses, the OeIAG strikes back: while the Holding managers advocate a "breakup of VOEST into separate enterprises," they want to get the eloquent corporation boss from his high horse.

Namely greater decentralization of the corporation will become part of the "VOEST plan."

In principle, Apfalter, too, regards this as correct: "Some fields of the enterprise must be removed from the corporation wherever that is sensible."

Semperit boss Leibenfrost, who transformed his ailing rubber syndicate into separate, directly responsible companies, demonstrated what such a model could look like. Within the nationalized enterprises this process has also been demonstrated in the past, namely by the Austria-Metall-AG, which so far has been very satisfied with this idea.

In the steel field there are also international precedents: The German Thyssen Group, e.g., which consists of a "Huetten-AG" and a number of independent subsidiaries.

In VOEST such a model will be difficult to achieve: The powerful works council big wheel Franz Ruhaltinger fears--not without reason--having to relinquish a part of his immense power. And also regional labor union and chamber of labor bosses, such as Upper Austria's Fritz Freyschlag, as a preventive measure are already intervening against ideas of separation.

Of more topical interest than new organizations under company law are therefore also the efforts for a general internal reorganization: The present configuration with five "divisions" with central purchasing is to give way to a new organization pattern of more than a dozen such "divisions," whereby also purchasing, enterprise control and research are to be partly to completely changed.

What is supposed to make the lumbering tanker VOEST quick and agile in the future makes it, however, even more immobile at the moment: The knowledge of the coming changes now paralyzes all VOEST offices. Secretaries are puzzled over who might be their boss tomorrow. Managers sell not products but rumors. And engineers construct not machines but their own career plans.

Most fascinating is, of course, the game of tag at the top.

Heribert Apfalter not only would like to send at least three (undisputed are only the contracts of Messrs. Apfalter, Koch, Czempirek and Zich) colleagues on the board of directors packing ahead of time, but would also like to see Peter Strahammer, the successor he favors who is now VOEST general secretary, on the board of directors at long last.

The representatives of the VOEST owner have been almost convinced by the bank that the board of directors ought to be changed: A new organizational pattern they say, can unfold its curative effect only if it is boldly supported by a true board of directors team.

To speak of a "team" in the case of the present board of directors is no longer possible.

Now the question is only: Where are the boy wonders who are worth getting rid of half of the VOEST leadership in an unprecedented show of strength ahead of time?

Here is where the action stops already: No name irresistibly suggests itself. Also the unresolved Streicher succession (Rudolf Streicher takes over the management of the Creditanstalt corporation in mid-1986) in the case of Austria-Metall shows: There are few personnel aces in the nationalized talon.

In VOEST it is confirmed once more that a complex with centralist management offers fewer opportunities for potential top personnel to make their mark than a conglomerate of autonomous subcontractors.

And embarrassingly it is not even the marked men in the board of directors who can be blamed for the really big flops of recent years. While they were conspicuous by complacent inactivity, Apfalter and the other activists on the board of directors can have names hurled at them such as "Bayou," "AMI," "Intertrading" and "Poels."

The oldest of these problem children, the VOEST steel mill at the Mississippi results from a false estimate of the steel markets of the mid-70's.

At first, Bayou meant for VOEST only the construction of a sample plant in the United States, moreover a relatively small plant. In the exuberance of optimistic predictions, the structure soon grew into a 700,000 tons per year complex, which VOEST was supposed to build but in which VOEST itself had only an infinitessimal share.

The disaster started very soon: the construction costs for the Linz people simply exploded. And the U.S. partners could not come up with anymore money. At this point what happened to VOEST is generally called the normative force of reality: The banks said stop.

If VOEST had abandoned Bayou at this point as an industrial ruin--VOEST believed--it would have lost face internationally as a steel mill builder.

At any rate in this situation VOEST felt compelled to purchase Bayou.

It saw itself justified in this decision by general optimism in the steel market forecasts.

But then it went in quick succession.

The optimistic forecasts soon were not worth the paper on which they had been written. The losses grew too far.

Thus far the Austrians have invested $380 million in the project, whose sale VOEST is now so strongly pushing.

At a highly unfortunate time by the way.

Even if a nice American were to be found who offers a good purchase price for the steel mill, the VOEST people are now also faced with the development on the foreign exchange markets: The value of the dollar has dropped.

While VOEST bought U.S. currency for years at a high price to then throw it into the Mississippi, it now tries to again extract a few of these dollars to convert it back into schillings at a much worse rate of exchange.

Bayou remains a classical profit and loss experience from beginning to end.

This business will cost VOEST all in all 5 billion schillings, approximately at least; four of them have already been written off and a remaining billion the P.T. taxpayer will find in the VOEST 1985 annual profit and loss statement.

On the other hand, Poels will not be included until the next balance sheets: The cellulose plant, too, is a so-called "sample plant,"--i.e. a demonstration project of VOEST by which it wants to make the choice of a VOEST design palatable to those who have cellulose plants built in the future (PROFIL, 45/85).

Heribert Apfalter avers at this time all over the country with great persuasiveness that the plant lives up to the claim made by VOEST. However, the Poels board of directors asks for 170 million in penalty from VOEST.

Only purposive optimists believe in an economic success.

The VOEST audacity in the case of Poels is the fact that the Linz people from the start knew very well that the Styrian cellulose plant would cost a great deal more than the originally planned 2.5 billion schillings but that they kept this knowledge very wisely to themselves. At any rate they did not tell it to any of the representatives of the OeIAG or of Styria province who got mixed up in the cellulose involvement after the withdrawal of the original Poels owner, Cartiere Burgo. Nor did they tell it to the finance minister who heartily supported it. (Cartiere Burgo from the start was more interested in favorable possibilities for delivery of cellulose to Italy than in an involvement as an owner. Cartiere Burgo immediately limited the own risk by removing from the enterprise forests which had belonged to the capital assets of the Poels enterprise at the start of construction of the new plant).

Heribert Apfalter's assertion is correct: Whatever installations VOEST offered to build at 2.5 billion were built by and large at 2.5 billion.

Only it did know from the start that this 2.5 billion investment was not sufficient for the construction of the Poels plant; that beyond that additional investments of several hundred million would be necessary to produce cellulose there in a nonpolluting manner and according to the latest technological findings.

While it was a question of marginal utility whether a 2.5 billion project would work out with the cellulose prices to be expected, then the 3.3 billion investment necessarily would need a great deal longer to become profitable:

Viewed realistically, that will never happen.

In truth, the project is plainly and simply a flop.

Now several paper industrialists are waiting for the final demise.

In the present ownership constellation (the financially weak Italian minority owner, Styria province, the OeIAG and VOEST), this thing will probably never function. Therefore part of the paper industry speculates that the plant, which in fact has long belonged to Franz Vranitzky (the state is liable via FGG for 1.9 billion spent for construction in Poels), is passed on to it some day and given as a present at the expense of the taxpayer. For profitable operation of a cellulose plant so relieved of the burden, which does not have to earn any writeoffs and interest, that would be really easy.

For diversification VOEST years ago had made another big and, as has emerged in the meantime, very risky jump: into electronics.

Ferdinand Lacina answers the question as to whether this step was prudent by pointing out that corporations such as Mannesmann or Japanese steel enterprises had taken the step in the same direction. But undoubtedly: This matter is "for many a nervous joy."

A particularly great deal of trembling and hardly any more joy is derived by VOEST from the cooperation with AMI, the U.S. semiconductor partner. Technologically high-grade, customized chips were on the menu of the cooperation but the knowhow kitchen of the Americans ran out of ideas. In VOEST nobody was able to fill this gap. To utilize the capacities of the Styrian plant halfway, production of mass-produced goods was started, where prices covering costs can no longer be achieved in the overcrowded market.

Result: Losses amounting to several hundred million.

Nobody knows what is to happen with the AMI plant in the future. (The latest idea was to install OKI in the AMI halls.) And nobody knows what happens in general with the U.S. cooperation partner.

When VOEST arranged for cooperation with AMI, AMI was an independent enterprise. Then it was purchased by the Gould corporation. Now great shifts in the property relationships again emerge whose consequences cannot as yet be foreseen.

In view of the AMI dilemma the VOEST owners and the state promoters have also become very cautious as regards the step into the next electronics cooperation: "The probability that there ever will be the much heralded OKI plant in Austria," one of the Austrian negotiators said, "is less than 50 percent."

The VOEST-OKI cooperation contract has been in existence for over half a year. On the basis of this cooperation contract--which was concluded subject to the state commitment of support amounting to 3 billion--negotiations are now being conducted with the republic for this very support.

And there is a quite considerable hitch: The Japanese are suspiciously reluctant with their promise that they want to build large research and development capacities in Austria.

However without such a firm commitment, OKI, too, would become a marginal case. "The OKI project," the electronics manager Otto Zich made known in a small circle, "perhaps does not compute in terms of operations but it does make economic sense."

If that were really so, Minister Lacina dryly commented, "then I would rather invest the money directly in the Federal Railroads."

A thesis that is well received also by the opposition: "Joint ventures in which nothing is ever earned probably cannot be the perfect solution" (OeVP economic expert Johannes Dietz).

Good earnings were achieved for a while by the VOEST trading firm Intertrading, which this year for the first time clearly records losses. Both big crude oil barters are now "hanging fire" on the import side of the partner countries: neither Iran nor Nigeria are very much ready to cooperate in accepting the goods for which Intertrading acts as a middleman as quid pro quo for the oil purchases. And also in the free oil transactions Intertrading--just as in the steel trade--has now and then miscalculated.

With a trade volume far above 100 billion schillings all this added together results in a --reported-- loss of roughly 100 million schillings this year.

But even these 3 billion, which operationally are represented as the biggest loss in VOEST history, politically can even be changed into profits. Thus at the end of last week the OeGB used the bad situation of VOEST as leverage to push through its interests.

If Hainburg and other power plants were not built, then VOEST Linz would simply have to discharge 1000 people, the OeGB disclosed through the well known economist Franz Ruhaltinger.

That's how simple it is.

12356
CSO: 3620/165

ECONOMIC DENMARK

LOWEST NORDIC INFLATION RATE ACHIEVED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Nov 85 Sec III, p 11

[Article by Vogg Lowe Nielsen and Kristian Hjulsager]

[Text] Inflation in Denmark is now lower than in any other Nordic country but it is still not as low as it is in the traditional low-inflation countries, Holland, West Germany and Japan.

In September Denmark had the fifth lowest inflation rate in comparison with our most important trade partners. Along with the United States (3.2 percent), Denmark (at 3.9 percent) had an inflation rate between 3 and 4 percent, while the three leading low-inflation countries had a rate of around 2 percent--a level many people expect Denmark to achieve next year.

Countries in the third category (Sweden, England, Norway and France) seem to have trouble pushing the inflation rate lower than the present level, which is around 6 percent.

Italy still has the highest inflation rate (8.7 percent) among these 10 nations. But the Italian inflation rate is substantially lower than it was at the beginning of 1984 when it was a good 12 percent and the trend in Italy is toward a slight moderation of inflation.

The improvement in the Danish inflation picture can be seen in the fact that we had a higher inflation rate in September 1984 than both England and Norway whereas now we are doing much better than they are.

Price Trend

While some of these countries are having a hard time reducing inflation there are indications that the Danish inflation rate will decline even more in the near future. The rate of increase for the Danish consumer price index has been leveling off since April when it was 5.8 percent compared to 3.9 percent in September. For 1985 as a whole the inflation rate is expected to be 4.7 percent compared to 6.3 percent in 1984 and 7.2 percent in 1983. The economic secretariat of the Ministry of Economic Affairs is predicting an

inflation rate of 1 1/2 percent in 1986 while other observers expect a somewhat higher rate although it will be under 4 percent.

The trend in wholesale and raw materials price indexes in recent months shows that very small price increases or even price declines are on the way for a number of product categories. This price trend has not yet achieved its full impact at the retail level but it is connected with the declining exchange rate of the dollar in recent months along with declining energy prices.

At the same time business wage costs will ease by about 1 1/2 percent at the beginning of the year. Part of the Folketing intervention in contract negotiations this spring was a reduction of company payments to several of the labor programs administered by ATP [General Supplemental Pension System] over a 2-year period starting on 1 October 1985. But in practice the effect will not be apparent before the beginning of the year when company bills from ATP for the fourth quarter will be reduced by the amount of the subsidy.

But the inflation trend could be negatively affected in the near future if the government decides to move against consumption. If the steps taken consist entirely or partially of increases in the value-added tax or specific item taxes, the consumer price index will rise accordingly.

Wage Trend

If we ignore the labor conflict months of March and April wages were between 4.4 and 5.9 percent higher than they were last year for industrial workers and between 4.6 and 5.5 percent higher for salaried employees in the same months. Both increases were higher than the government would have liked.

Only the low figures from March and April helped reduce the average for the year to around 4.5 and 5.5 percent for workers and salaried employees respectively. At the same time the rate of increase has gone up in recent months.

Since ATP payments and other employer contributions are not included in wage indexes, the reduction in 1986 will not tend to lower them. On the contrary several "bottleneck companies" could encounter higher wage demands because of the declining wage costs resulting from the lower employer payments.

Real Wages

With an estimated average increase in this year's industrial wage index of 4.5 and 5.5 percent and an inflation rate of 4.7 percent, real wages will remain virtually unchanged for workers and increase about 1 percent for salaried employees.

There are many indications at the moment that real wages for both groups will increase more than that in 1986 unless the government intervenes with measures that are aimed at restricting consumption.

6578
CSO: 3613/37

CANADIAN INVESTMENT RESCUES GREENLAND CRUDE ORE MINE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Nov 85 Sec III p 17

[Article by Jesper Elle: "Greenex to be Rescued"]

> [Text] The Greenland mining company Greenex will be saved as a result of drastic measures. The major stockholder, Cominco, Ltd. of Canada, has approved an investment of 35 million kroner and the authorities have granted permission for an increase in production.

The Greenland mining company Greenex, which mines crude ore in the Black Angel Mine in Marmorilik will now be rescued from serious economic difficulties by means of the investment of new capital. The major stockholder, Cominco, Ltd. of Canada, has approved a company investment of 35 million kroner. At the same time the authorities will allow increased production of crude ore in the current year.

The reason for Greenex's serious situation is that the prices of zinc on the world market fell 45 percent in the last half year. This means that Greenex can get only 6,000 kroner a ton today compared to 11,000 kroner in the spring.

"It will take a lot of stamina to withstand this and the company will now employ drastic remedies," director Erik Sprunk-Jansen told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. "We have received approval from our main company on the transfer of 35 million kroner and the authorities have given us permission to produce an additional 60,000 tons of crude ore so that we can keep the machines running until Christmas. We are also discussing additional credit opportunities with our bank contacts."

This means that the 350 Greenex workers will keep their jobs through Christmas. In early November there was talk of trimming the sails and the first step in this process would have been to send the workers on an extended Christmas vacation. At the same time the management decided to cancel further exploration in the Disko area until the firm regained its economic strength.

The infusion of capital also means that Greenex will continue to search for zinc, lead and copper in an area north of Marmorilik.

Environmental Requirements Need Definition

The Greenex contract on mining ore in Marmorilik contains a provision that when the mine is exhausted the company will clean things up. This requirement is expected to cost the company around 100 million kroner.

"This amount is included in our balance sheet, since of course we intend to fulfill this requirement," said Erik Sprunk-Jansen. "We will now discuss the requirement with the Greenland authorities because we would like to have a concrete definition of what the cleanup will involve."

6578
CSO: 3613/37

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

GROWTH OF TRADE WITH GDR TO CONTINUE THROUGH 1985

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 4 Sep 85 p 23

[Article by ur: "Indications are that the inner-German trade will continue in the second half of the year"]

[Text] For the business year 1985 a volume of DM 16 billion in goods exchange can be achieved, whereby the growing share of investment goods is especially attractive. The state secretary expects that, in the course of its efforts to modernize and economize, the GDR will fall back increasingly on FRG offers. At the present time there is a "demand volume" of from DM 1.5 to 2 billion. Although other international competitors will in the end also have a share in this order package, a "not inconsiderable part" should go to FRG firms. Von Wuerzen did not want to give out concrete details. He mentioned only that at the present time the GDR is very interested in two exhaust gases desulphurization plants.

In his talks with GDR Foreign Trade Minister Horst Soelle, von Wuerzen also discussed those aspects of inner-German trade that are at the present time of concern to the Federal Government. Among these items are cheap imports of furniture, home textiles and electric home appliances. Von Wuerzen said he received reassurances from Soelle who pointed out that there might possibly be changes in the GDR marketing system. No new basic regulations are planned that would become burdensome for FRG marketing intermediaries, but a few cancellations would have to be accepted if they are useful to the marketing system.

At this trade fair mutual business deals were again very important but reports about them were irregular. Von Wuerzen believes that on the whole there was a slight recession in GDR orders. For many FRG firms that made offers and have a strong market position counter-offers were still of no importance. But where they were accepted quotas--measured in supply volume--averaging 60 percent were achieved.

Bonn is also satisfied with the development of cooperation in third countries. At the present time, GDR and FRG firms are working on joint projects in Nigeria and

Tunisia (railroad cars in either case), in India and Greece plants are constructed. There are also joint activities in Venezuela (development of raw materials), Algeria (wire production plant) and Syria (construction project).

"Not A Bad Result"

Commenting on the recently concluded framework agreement on hard coal deliveries to the GDR, the state secretary said that the last agreement was not completely fulfilled from the point of view of volumes; but because steel could be delivered to the GDR instead of coal, a fulfillment quota of approximately 95 percent can now be seen. This is not a bad result for long-range agreements. The Bonn state secretary believes that the new agreement of services that is still under discussion will still take effect this year.

8889/12947
CSO: 3620/32

ECONOMIC FRANCE

FINANCE MINISTER ASSESSES NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 2 Dec 85 p 2

[Interview with Pierre Beregovoy, minister of economy and finance by Alain-Gerard Slama, date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] We have heard a lot of talk lately about the government's accomplishments and very little about the nationalizations, which the opposition sees as one of the major causes of our current difficulties. What lesson can you draw from this experiment, which has a total deficit surpassing 150 billion francs?

[Answer] Let me very rapidly summarize the economic accomplishments. In less than 5 years, we have almost cut inflation by three. Our balance of payments is once again balanced. Unemployment is unfortunately still at a very high level, but we can say that as of now it has stabilized. These are the real results of a policy of improvement and modernization, of which the nationalizations are an essential element.

Let's talk about the nationalizations from a political viewpoint before approaching the question from an economic viewpoint. You can be for or against nationalizations, depending on your beliefs. The Socialists, because they favor a free economy, have always thought that when monopolies exercise too great an influence on economic life the community cannot ignore this. I should add that in our country, public utilities are traditionally entrusted to national or local authorities. These are the principles involved.

As for the economic results of the nationalized firms, four were in the red and were undercapitalized. A fifth, the CGE [French General Electric Company] was in the black. These are the five that we must consider. We have rebuilt their capital, we asked them to enlarge their equity by turning to the capital market, which they have done, and they are now showing a profit. When the opposition talks about the deficit that you cited, they are adding up the total deficit of the nationalized sector of yesterday and today, and include the iron and steel industry, which was not nationalized before 1981 (although this did not prevent it from receiving a state subsidy of 56 billion [1985 francs] over a period of 15 years) whereas since the nationalizations its recovery has come about through a policy of reorganization that we are conducting by trying to offer a future to the employees involved.

It is true that Renault had a sizable deficit in 1984-1985. But what automobile firm in the world--including Peugeot-Citroen--has not had such a deficit at one time or another? We waited too long to turn the situation around, but so did our predecessors. Mr. Besse is acting intelligently and tenaciously. Denationalizations will not solve anything and I have noted that Barre has firmly dismissed the idea.

The battle of the numbers, as you see, does not prove much. However, nationalization has made possible investment, reorganizations and the penetration of foreign markets. (I am thinking of Thomson's RITA and of SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine Study and Manufacturing Company], but also of the remarkable results at CGE, Pechiney, Saint-Gobain and Rhone Poulenc, which have been vital to the recovery of our economy.)

[Question] Compared to our neighbors, however, the increase in investment seems quite inadequate...

[Answer] This is another subject that needs to be clarified. Investment is still inadequate in services and trade, despite an irrefutable recovery the past few months. Investment has been bad in agriculture for a simple reason: capital has declined in this sector because of the decrease in cattle, which resulted from the milk quotas. But industrial investment in 1984-1985 increased 16 percent, with the nationalized sector last year playing a prime role, which was taken over by the private sector this year. We are catching up to the FRG in this area and are surpassing several other countries in the EEC, which is all the more commendable because (and this was a secret to no one, especially not to the CNPF [National Council of French Employers]) the financial position of firms seriously deteriorated from 1974 to 1981.

[Question] Many people, even some of your friends, criticize you for having nationalized the banks. Isn't this really an insidious collectivization of the entire economy?

[Answer] No. We do not want to collectivize the economy. Before 1981 our banking system was a cartel and not very competitive. That is why I have devoted my time to breaking up the cartel and modernizing the capital market. We have decompartmentalized the money market of the traditional capital market, put new products at the disposal of businessmen (certificates of deposit last year, commercial paper, which we call a "treasury note" this December), all measures which will allow the price of money to fall. Another example is a large mortgage market which will place at the disposal of those who want to buy houses loans which will be about 1 to 2 percent less than current interest rates. My main objective is to obtain the lowest possible interest rates, in order to activate the economy and create jobs.

[Question] This is paradoxical, to say the least! In order to break up cartels, you nationalize!

[Answer] Paradox it may be, but industrial and banking agreements have existed since the origin of capitalism. And as long as there is competition, it doesn't matter much if the stockholder is public or private. I have the

same feeling, and I know that here I am going against current opinion, that competition does not really work unless a certain number of public firms can stimulate it. Nationalization allowed me to conquer a certain amount of bank resistance and to deregulate the financial market, whereas our predecessors were not able to do this before 1981.

[Question] One other problem. One issue cited in favor of nationalizations was the necessity of making enormous investments in huge firms. But won't the future be for smaller firms with high added value?

[Answer] It is true, at least since France built its canals in the time of Colbert, that, in a certain number of areas, only the state can gather together the necessary financing. But in many cases the response consists of mixing public and private capital; you see that that does not involve any dogmatism, as the German government recently illustrated when it agreed to provide public credits as a complement to private credits for the Eureka program. The world is heading toward firms with mixed economies and from this viewpoint the Socialists will have been, as they often have been in history, the pioneers.

As for medium-size firms, I think that we must do all we can to create an environment favorable to their development. Here again, it seems to me that our results have been positive, because we created risk capital, opened the second market and by nationalizing a portion of the major requesters of capital we gave the stock exchange a positive push that is denied by no one.

[Question] What do you think about the prospect of the people as stockholder, an idea contained in many denationalization plans?

[Answer] "The mine for the miners?" No, but we could consider increasing participation in public firms, in ways which must still be thought out. Employees are already electing the members of the board of directors. Thanks to the Auroux laws, they already have the ability to make themselves heard. They could be involved in the results in ways which could be determined with their consent.

[Question] What is your position on the plans to deregulate?

[Answer] I am against unchecked economic freedom not only because it is brutal, but also because its effectiveness is yet to be demonstrated. The major liberal countries which, with France, form the "Group of Five" have themselves noted that in the area of exchange rates the parity of money set by the market does not correspond to basic fundamental realities. I am also against a planned economy, which prevailed during our predecessor's time. My position is the following: let's get rid of regulation where it is useless and let's leave the state with the ability to look after the general good of the people.

In social policy, that means contract bargaining, which respects the basic guarantees of the worker, something the opposition wants to jeopardize. In economics, I will take a final example, that of prices. I am obviously in favor of the freedom of prices, but only as long as competition is allowed, and allowed everywhere. If we were to immediately free prices, in particular prices for services, inflation would increase by two points. However, as the president has said, the fight against inflation is the key to everything. So we must act gradually. Allow the minister of finance, who has had the opportunity to confront the public banks and the public and private oil firms, to tell you that competition is not yet engrained in all company officers as a primordial necessity...

9720
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ECONOMIC GREECE

BRIEFS

BULGARIAN TOURISM PROTOCOL SIGNED--The work of the 11th session of the Greek-Bulgarian Committee on Tourism ended in Athens with the signing of a protocol. The committee discussed the efforts being made to improve the services for training tourism officers, advertising, and expanding the tourist season. The Bulgarians stated that they will participate in Exhibition Hospitality 86 which will take place from 23 to 27 April in Thessaloniki. [Text] [Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1930 GMT 5 Dec 85 NC] /8309

CSO: 3521/57

ECONOMIC PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

CGTP-IN ON FOREIGN DEBT--The CGTP [General Confederation of Portuguese Workers] defends the fact that payment on the foreign debt should be limited annually so as not to sacrifice further the country's development and workers, said Eugenio Rosa. The ceiling on annual payments must be set as a percentage of exports or of the credit on the balance of current transactions, he added. Eugenio Rosa is going to defend this position at a meeting of the World Union Movement, which takes place in Moscow from 19 to 21 November, where the main topic of debate is to be the problem of foreign debt and its implications in the development of developing countries and in the standard of living of workers. This CGTP unionist stated that it would be necessary "to find a basis of agreement between the debtor nation, in this case Portugal, and the creditor nations. This is not a radical position like those who defend the position that one should purely and simply not pay, or those who maintain that what was agreed should be paid completely and on time." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 12 Nov 85 p 5] 9895/7051

CSO: 3542/35

ENERGY PORTUGAL

LACK OF INVESTMENTS PROHIBITS OIL EXPLORATION

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 15-21 Nov 85 p 40

[Article by Leonor Ribeiro: "There Is Oil, But..."]

[Text] Porto--There is oil, and of good quality, on the Portuguese coast. This information can be obtained from the office for petroleum research and exploration, which operates within the Ministry of Industry and Energy. This office is the only organization in Portugal that controls the activity of exploration companies and has access to their results. Last week, the office director, Jorge Faria, speaking at the Geographic Society, concluded that "the strategy of petroleum research in Portugal will have to be changed," for one decisive reason: conditions for investment are lacking.

In fact, indications are that the oil found is of good quality but nevertheless point toward small quantities. The investment-quantity ratio results, therefore, in minimal profitability.

In June of this year, Pecten-Portugal, a subsidiary of Shell from the United States which specializes in oil exploration and is highly regarded because it has already succeeded in discovering oil in several places in the world, erected a platform along the coast of Viana do Castelo. While in the Middle East "black gold" is pumped from about 300 meters below ground, the well drilled in Viana had to go beyond 3000 meters deep, from which comes the high cost of work of this type on our coast.

Texaco had already drilled in 1979 also along Esposende. After a few months, both firms ended up by removing their platforms.

Insofar as is known, no final report on the research carried out has been made public. Hence, the non-exploitation of the existence of crude on the Portuguese coast would seem to be due to a policy that is not conducive to investment finding favorable conditions, and it could continue.

9895/7051
CSO: 3542/35

ENERGY TURKEY

PRIVATE FIRMS TO BE ALLOWED TO GENERATE, SELL ELECTRICITY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 28 Nov 85 p 1

[Report by Enis Berberoglu]

[Text] Ankara--Thanks to new legislation the private sector will be able to sell the electricity it generates through its own distribution grid in areas where the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise [TEK] is unable to provide service. It is reported that leading private firms have proposed to take over incomplete dams in eastern and southeastern Anatolia. These dams are fully designed and scheduled but their construction could not be started because of inadequate resources.

Law No. 3096, enacted at the beginning of this year, allowed the private sector to generate electricity. A set of regulations published in September clarified the law. A new set of regulations currently under preparation at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources will specify the conditions under which the electricity generated by the private sector can be marketed. Noting that private firms have the right to sell the electricity they generate to TEK, a ministry official said: "The private firm will determine the selling price of its electricity by adding a specified profit to its cost." The same official said that the private firm will recover the investment cost of its generating plant plus "a reasonable earning" through the said profit margin over a period of 15 years. He added: "At the end of those 15 years, the keys of the plant will be handed over to TEK."

The set of regulations that will be published will also allow private firms to sell their electricity directly to the public in areas where TEK does not provide service. Ministry officials explained this implementation as follows:

"The sale of electricity generated by the private sector must not add new burdens on TEK. These firms must operate as TEK subcontractors."

It has been learned that leading holding companies of the business world have proposed to take over around 20 fully designed and scheduled dams in eastern and southeastern Anatolia whose construction could not begin because of resource shortages. If the bidders who have applied to the Ministry of Energy with their proposed projects are approved they will begin building the dams using foreign loans. In view of balance of payments difficulties, the bidders on the dams will be encouraged "to use as little foreign credit as possible." The sale of the electricity to be generated by the dams will be coordinated by a firm in which TEK will be a partner. In this new type of company, the first example of which was given by the Soyut Holding-TEK partnership, TEK will own no more than 30 percent of the stock.

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- END -

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West Europe Report

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POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

EGON BAHR ANALYZES SPD RELATIONSHIP WITH GDR'S SED

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 28 Sep 85 p 3

[Analysis by Egon Bahr: "Chances For A New Phase In German-German Relations. Taking Advantage Of The Opportunities"]

[Text] The first exchange of views between Willy Brandt and Erich Honecker has resulted in the two men finding a platform that, regardless of the burdens of the past, is geared completely toward moving ahead with future cooperation. The resulting possibilities are of interest for the relationship between the two German nations and on a broader scale.

It became clear during the exchange that formalization of relations between the SPD and SED is out of the question. The SPD has no need to a decision on the present situation. Of course, this does not impede exploratory contacts that have already been established.

The basic conceptual differences between the two parties have not changed. Neither side has held back its views. This also applies to our assessment of the forced merging of SPD and KPD, which will be 40 years ago this spring; there is nothing to be corrected. But the ideological differences must not obstruct the possible avenues for increasing cooperation on a German level as well as an international level if ensuring peace is involved.

In this area, the visit produced two discernible results that may have significant effects in the future.

First, Erich Honecker has adopted as his own the thoughts concerning common security via a security partnership. The similarity and, in part, identity of his ideas with those of Willy Brandt were astonishing. The reality of the matter is that we either live together or perish together. Nobody can get around this elementary fact, even if it is disputed verbally.

The SPD has campaigned for the concept of the security partnership. Just because the idea should receive support in the East is no reason for us to run away from it. A "community of responsibility" is a nice phrase for it. It would be an empty phrase if not followed up by practical action.

The second import result concerns the practical relationship between the two nations. In this regard, Willy Brandt has formulated an open-ended

phase of mutual activity to be embarked upon after the essentials of living side-by-side have been defined by means of the basic treaty.

More important than the fruitless argument over nation and unity (as it is, nothing more can be achieved with respect to convictions and differences in views than has already been established in the preamble of the basic treaty) is how far the common interest of the two states in security extends. There is no room for naivety here: The two alliance systems do exist. They will be around for a long time. Both nations are bound to them. No one can nor wants to break away. But there is a chance for Germans--a chance to develop joint initiatives which each side will discuss in his respective alliance in order to gain the ind spensable participation of his friends in the common interest of European stability.

We should be glad--after all we are all neighbors--that there is no German-German dispute to put an additional strain on East-West relations. It would be a blessing if the joint efforts of the two nations not only improved East-West relations but made peace in Europe more secure as well.

Whoever fails to avail himself of the opportunities here assumes a serious responsibility. Who knows how long these opportunities will last? The favorable situation can also change. If this happened, lamenting over lost chances could be a bitter truth. This does not suit the Union parties. But the earlier policies that led to the basic treaty did not suit them either. The basic treaty could not be reached today. The current Federal Government profits from what the Union parties were fighting at that time This could be repeated in the area of security.

Where security is concerned, parties can only fill in the gaps left by governments. This holds true for a zone free of chemical weapons. The Federal Government simply will not escape a decision of having to respond to the governments in East Berlin and Prague have given Bonn the alternative of accepting or rejecting the model worked out by a work group made up of the SPF parliamentary party and the SED.

In this case, it is a question of a negotiations proposal, not a signature. The Federal Government would be well advised to take advantage of the progress made at the work level. The Government is at liberty to improve upon this and would then stand to be congratulated. But the responsibility no longer lies with the parties. It lies where it belongs in the relationship between the two governments: with the governments themselves.

The governments cannot escape this responsibility, not even the Federal Government. If it refuses to accept it, a Federal Government led by the SPF would clearly use the model to its advantage.

Thus, the Federal Government should not overlook the fact that the idea of a zone free of chemical weapons is also finding increasing support in the West. This was demonstrated this past week-end in Brussels by all Social Democrat and Socialist parties of the Scandilux group: Norwegians

and Danes, Dutch, Luxembourgers and the two Belgian parties. They welcome the initiative for a zone free of chemical weapons even if they have no such weapons on their soil, because the removal of these weapons from Central Europe would also mean increased security for their countries. The last word has not been spoken on this matter.

The talks regarding a corridor free of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the Palme Commission, will begin at the same work level in November. Nothing can be said with regard to the prospects for success because the topic is far more difficult and complex. This area is also one in which the governments have so far left a gap. There are still no negotiations at any level regarding strategic nuclear weapons, although these represent the most immediate danger--and not just for Central Europe--in the event of a conflict. No amount of grumbling by the representatives of the Union parties will stop us from carrying out our responsibility of trying to do what we hold for proper and necessary.

Willy Brandt's visit has also revealed that there is a far-reaching concensus between the Federal Government and the Opposition with regard to all current problems and negotiations between the two nations.

Cultural agreements, environmental agreements, expanded youth exchange, more visits--these and more constitute a common matter of concern. The competition to see who achieves the most in this area will do nothing but benefit people. It is equally important that the coalition and opposition work toward the same end.

The Federal Government has reason to be indebted to Willy Brandt. The fact that his interpretative depictions of the humanitarian improvements, offered during the press conference following the talks, were printed in their entirety in the GDR newspapers is an additional confirmation. The Federal Government will certainly use this to its advantage. It must take measures to ensure that Erich Honecker's anticipated visit to the FRG is hampered this time not by Mr. Dregger, but by others.

Our understanding that the People's Chamber does not have the same powers as the lower house of the FRG Parliament is not new, but it has not prevented the delegation from the lower house from recognizing the delegation from the People's Chamber in the framework of the Interparliamentary Union nor from meeting in the People's Chamber.

Also, I cannot discern any differences in quality between the Supreme Soviet, the (Sejm) and the People's Chamber as far as the elections are concerned that produced these and other parliaments, with which the lower house has no problems. It is one of the last relics from the Hallstein era, which has meanwhile become ridiculous, to pose the question of the legitimization of the second man in the GDR while seeing no problems with the top man.

These comical scuffles of the Union parties as to whether there is not at least one niche in which the 1950s can be recreated will only damage the

Union, and perhaps the Federal Government, if Honecker's visit should fall through because of them.

On another level, the Federal Government must be careful. By considering participation in SDI, the Government could easily fall into a situation similar to the one that developed after missiles began to be stationed. At that time, it created the policy of loss limitation. That cannot be accomplished with money this time.

Owing to the basic treaty, owing to the expansion options introduced by Helmut Schmidt at Lake (Werbelin), and owing to the policy of continuity that the Federal Government has pursued, relations between the two German nations have remained undamaged by the deteriorations in the East-West situation. The fact that also the GDR was able and wanted to participate should not be overlooked. In this respect, all those involved have reason to be satisfied.

A new phase may be on the horizon, either less than before, further than before or more than before. The opportunities that Willy Brandt has made evident mean only one thing for us: more than before. It is up to the Federal Government to see that the opposite does not come true.

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POLITICAL FINLAND

BOOK REVIEWS 'LINES' OF PRESIDENTS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 4 Nov 85 p 15

[Review by Matti Haikio of book "Suomen presidentit valtiollisina johtajina K.J. Stahlbergista Mauno Koivistoon" [Finland's Presidents as Political Leaders from K.J. Stahlberg to Mauno Koivisto] by Jaakko Nousiainen; Werner Soderstrom, Inc., 304 pages]

[Text] This study by Professor Jaakko Nousiainen, author of our country's basic political-science textbook "Suomen poliittinen jarjestelma" [Finland's Political System], will disappoint those who are looking for a fresh or even an analytical interpretation of Mauno Koivisto's presidency. Nousiainen's appraisal is summed up in the statement:

"After the expansionary era of Kekkonen, the presidency has been retreating to the early positions of Paasikivi, but hardly much further back."

Nousiainen seeks a solution to the Koivisto enigma by asserting that the 1982 election represented a general period of transition for the West in which the old authoritarian structures gave way to a new style of participatory culture. This created expectations for a popular-leader president.

"In place of a distant authority, people are looking for a popular leader with an intimate awareness of social issues, and in place of a respected, external power figure, they seek a warm human being who is thought to have methods of procedure, interpretations of reality, and world views close to theirs."

Nousiainen claims, however, that the "full-scale exploitation of the suggested civic relationship to develop personal and charismatic control was alien to Koivisto's personality."

Koivisto has, accordingly, returned to the "traditional and constitutional exercise of power."

Kekkonen's "Enormous Power Potential"

Nousiainen's work is a depiction--one which gets its start from political-science theories--of Finland's presidents and prime ministers as persons who actually wield power, modify the Finnish constitution, and fulfill leadership standards.

Kekkonen's extraordinary use of power is emphasized in a historical perspective, and Nousiainen, a notoriously cautious man, is compelled to resort to qualifying statements such as "during the culmination period [there was] an enormous power potential which opened the door to dictates and familiarity with which influenced other functionaries."

Nousiainen nicely describes Kekkonen's personal network--untransferable to his successor--of contacts and power arrangements. Serving as a good example is the fate of the 1969 election law when Kekkonen went over the head of the prime minister, Koivisto, and took personal responsibility for burial of the project.

Before Kekkonen, presidential power formed a very fixed framework.

Nousiainen sees Paasikivi mostly as a clever political tactician who could get his wishes fulfilled even under difficult conditions. Ryti, on the other hand, was by force of circumstance the founder of foreign-policy leadership in the modern sense.

Relander Had "Concept Lines"

In Kallio's unfinished presidential term Nousiainen has found "scarcely a single instance in which the president took significant initiatives, forcefully saw his wishes carried out, or purposefully disentangled the internal conflicts of the government front."

On the other hand, Svinhufvud was an overseer who enjoyed broad support and who was above everyday politics. The culmination period of Svinhufvud's power actually occurred at the end of Relander's presidential term when "on his own authority and as the popular leader which the situation demanded, he took the reins into his own hands."

According to Nousiainen, Relander's "busy" presidency was the activity of an arbitrator and compromiser more than an actual leader. Striking is the perception that in the field of foreign policy Relander "had concept lines...but they did not acquire the concrete and stable form of a program of foreign-policy action for the government."

Nousiainen deals most thoroughly with Kekkonen and with K.J. Stahlberg, creator of the presidency. The latter was a man "who knew what he wanted," and he did not want to use all the presidential prerogatives of power. Stahlberg stressed a strong Parliament, but the "result was continuous changeability of leadership, balanced government policy, uncertainty, and a power struggle."

Prime Minister

The account of the development of the posts of president and prime minister turns out to be the most interesting of many topics. After all, formally and according to the Finnish constitution, the prime minister has no more than the role of technical chairman. On the other hand, strong prime ministers from Svinhufvud to Paasikivi and from Kekkonen to Sorsa are known who have sought solutions to political problems with the approval--or at least without the hindrance--of a president who remained in the background.

Nousiainen also thoroughly describes the circumstances in which the government form was born and the monarchist roots of the semipresidential system which was introduced into Finland. Although Nousiainen strives to make his presentation vivid and in places succeeds, a lot could have been done to improve the readability of the work. There are generally only two paragraphs per page, and there are not many subheads. There are no pictures or list of sources, though there are references to sources used and an index of persons.

As a political-science survey, Nousiainen's work supplements the juridical picture of Finnish presidents by Antero Jyranki and the more incident-centered portrait by historians, most recently Sakari Virkkunen. Nousiainen does not offer a strong personal interpretation but is content to explain that of others. The book will undoubtedly be used by our country's political-science students and enthusiasts for many editions to come.

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KOIVISTO, OTHER 1988 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS PROFILED

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 2 Nov 85 p 18

[Article by Martti Haikio: "Mauno Koivisto and His Challengers"]

[Text] In what sort of setting will Finland's 1988 presidential election take place? What are the different parties doing, and what kind of men are expected to challenge Mauno Koivisto?

Dr Martti Haikio, a special editor for UUSI SUOMI, discusses these questions in his article. The text is an excerpt from Haikio's soon-to-be-published book "Puolueeton Suomi puolueellisessa maailmassa" [Neutral Finland in an Unneutral World].

The political parties' influence on foreign policy is at its greatest when the president of the republic is being chosen. The nomination of candidates has practically been the exclusive right of parties during the entire period of independence. The great majority of elector candidates are persons who have participated in municipal and parliamentary elections on the parties' lists. Just as in other elections, managing and financing the presidential election campaigns are the responsibility of political parties.

Becoming the presidential candidate of a major party is the biggest obstacle in a politician's path to the presidency. The nomination of party candidates has been crucially significant, particularly in elections of recent decades. Once he becomes a candidate, the person in question can conduct a more or less independent campaign for election. In the presidential election campaigns of both Matti Virkkunen and Mauno Koivisto, there were a great many features independent of their own parties.

1982 Election Was Exception

In normal circumstances, no Finnish party comes close to having a simple majority. Even the two largest parties together do not command more than 50 percent support. The backing of three major parties is ordinarily needed to achieve a simple majority. In this regard, the election of Mauno Koivisto in 1982 formed an exception: in addition to his own Social Democratic electoral alliance, only the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] was needed to assure a majority

and an election victory on the first ballot. But this election took place in exceptional circumstances: what it boiled down to, after all, was the premature interruption of a longtime president's term of office due to illness.

The 1988 election will be different in several respects from the last presidential election. No longer will the battle be fought for Kekkonen's successor, nor will the Kekkonen legacy be discussed. No longer will power politics be dominated by the network of personal relationships fostered and maintained by Kekkonen. The biggest difference is that the main issue in the coming election will no longer be Kekkonen but Koivisto. People will ask whether Koivisto has been a successful president, whether he wants to pursue a second term of office, whether he has managed to preserve his personal popularity to such a degree that it enables him to bypass party advantages, whether he has a realistic chance to obtain the support of at least three major parties, and who his rival candidates will be.

An incumbent president does not generally like an election campaign. Its early beginning can strip him of the prestige and homefield advantage offered by the presidency, which is, of course, the most important trump card in the election itself.

Then again, from the challengers' point of view, a long election campaign is the only way to gather enough strength and credibility to topple an incumbent president.

Nowhere has Koivisto announced whether he could imagine a second term as president. It is useless to expect him to declare his eagerness for such until enough support emerges to conduct a successful campaign. It would be a major sensation if he did not announce his candidacy and if the Social Democratic Party did not back him from the outset. If Koivisto himself refused to continue, the party's candidate would most obviously be Kalevi Sorsa.

Kivisto and Karjalainen

It is likely that the SKDL will support Koivisto this time, too. It could have as a nominal candidate--the way it did last time--former SKDL chairman Kalevi Kivisto, who was appointed district governor by Koivisto.

The communists' choice could be rendered more difficult, however, by the desire of the so-called minority to support an individual which it finds more unmistakably pro-Soviet than Koivisto. The only suitable candidate may be Dr Ahti Karjalainen, who sought to be the Center Party's presidential candidate in the last election with the explicit help of his connections to the Soviet Union.

If Karjalainen was the minority's candidate, it would cause a crosscurrent in both the SKDL and the Center Party, but the transfer of votes would scarcely be noticeable.

Vayrynen Looks to Future

The Center Party has a very difficult choice before it with regard to nominating a candidate. It is quite unlikely that Johannes Virolainen, who has crushed the party leadership with his personality, or some other elder statesman of the Kekkonen era would be chosen as the party's candidate.

The real struggle in selecting a candidate may take place between Koivisto and Chairman Paavo Vayrynen.

The party and especially its chairman, Paavo Vayrynen, can assume that Vayrynen's candidacy in the 1988 election would lay a foundation for subsequent elections and would increase Vayrynen's credibility as a politician of presidential timber. On the other hand, Koivisto's support at this stage could assure the party a seat in the government for a long time to come.

The Conservative Party has three basic alternatives. It can go into the election with its own candidate, as happened last time, it can back a common nonsocialist candidate, or it can come out in favor of Koivisto's reelection.

Supporting Koivisto is hardly thinkable, because the Conservative Party's hopes of entering the government by backing an incumbent president have been thoroughly crushed. In addition, Koivisto's willingness and ability to influence the formation of governments in Finland can be somewhat limited.

Specifically in this regard, Koivisto's notion of bolstering Parliament's capacity to function--or reducing the power of the presidency--has come up on several occasions.

Taxell on the Rise

Swedish People's Party candidate Jan-Magnus Jansson sought the burdensome role of common candidate for the nonsocialist parties in the last election. Besides Jansson, the Swedish People's Party cannot offer a candidate of its own with longtime experience. Christoffer Taxell's continuation as minister increases his chances of overtaking former chairman Par Stenback and becoming the party's candidate but hardly a force for unifying the nonsocialist parties at the presidential level.

The Finnish Rural Party backed Koivisto in the last election, as did the Constitutional Right Party, but both parties were virtually insignificant in the election itself.

Conservative Party Has Several Alternatives

The Conservative Party's most natural choice for its candidate would be Harri Holkeri, who did quite well in the last election, party chairman Ilkka Suominen, parliamentary speaker Erkki Pystynen, or Helsinki mayor Raimo Ilaskivi. The party has also traditionally taken a look at broadly nonsocialist and sufficiently dynamic individuals who are close to the party. Such a person could be National Bank president Jaakko Lassila, for example, or Attorney General Kai Korte. Since a broad nonsocialist front will hardly develop behind the Center Party, it is very likely that the Conservative Party will come up with its own candidate.

Leadership in Foreign Policy

But does anyone have a chance of defeating Koivisto? That depends first on Koivisto's statecraft and secondly on the alternative offered to it. Leadership

in foreign policy will clearly be one issue in the next presidential election. Under Koivisto, the office of president has lost its credibility as a center of leadership in foreign policy. To be sure, this is not necessarily disastrous for Koivisto or for Finland. There are examples of Finnish presidents who did an excellent job--as father of the country--of uniting the people, even though they did not direct foreign or domestic policy at all.

Red Ocher Tradition

A second, perhaps more significant topic of the presidential election may be connected with the policy followed for forming governments. The popular front or red ocher [read: pro-Soviet] model followed with minor exceptions in Finland since the end of the 1930s ceased--in terms of both its support and its political meaning--to respond to Finnish society's range of viewpoints and demands for reform as early as the start of the 1970s. With respect to the policy followed for forming governments, the Koivisto presidency has been increasingly synonymous with retrospection, imprisonment in the past, and burial of future opportunities under the long-established policy of handing out jobs to members of the Center and Social Democratic parties.

If, in the next election, a rival of Koivisto can give Finns the feeling of vigorous leadership in foreign policy and get them to look toward the future and if he can demonstrate dynamic and innovative alternatives for domestic policy, he will have a good, even an excellent chance to be elected. Mauno Koivisto has honorably managed the smooth and sensitive transition from the Kekkonen era to the present day. But he has been unable to provide Finland and the Finns with a vision of the future and with hope for an even better Finland.

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FINNS VIEW U.S. LEAST, USSR MOST ACTIVE IN PEACE SEARCH

LD161616 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1030 GMT 14 Dec 85

[Text] According to the latest opinion poll, Finns believe that the United States is the state posing the greatest threat to world peace. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is seen as the state that most actively promotes world peace. This is clear from an opinion poll published today by ETELAE-SUOMEN SANOMAT.

Those interviewed, who supported the left, saw the Soviet Union as a stabilizing factor for world peace.

According to the Center Party and Coalition Party supporters, the Soviet Union and the United States are equally active in their actions for peace.

As far as culture is concerned, France came first, and, in the view of Finns, the United States was viewed as the poorest country in those terms. Sweden was seen as the most democratic of the six countries included in the poll. Some 500 Finns responded to the opinion poll conducted by the Market Data Center Ltd. in October-November.

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CSO: 3617/50

SWEDES BRIEFED ON KOIVISTO PERIOD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Nov 85 p 9

[Article by Kyosti Karnoven: "Great Discussion About Climate of Opinion"]

[Text] Expectation is in the air at the Hanasaari cultural center on a Wednesday morning. A significant group of Finnish opinion makers have gathered to instruct Swedish opinion makers about the Finnish climate of opinion.

Whom do we see at the site? At least Ralf Friberg, Stig Hasto, Bo Stenstrom, Klaus Tornudd, Kari Nars, Matti Klinge and Johannes Salminen. A discussion about the first half of the Koivisto era can begin, bara pa Svenska (only in Swedish).

Well, Osmo Apunen is present. But where are Max Jacobson, and Jan-Magnus Jansson? The relief is great when at least Jansson appears for the afternoon.

The topic chosen for the afternoon is Finnish freedom of speech. And whom do we see now as panel discussants? Per-Erik Lonnfors, Christoffer Taxell, Carl-Gustaf Lilius, Henrik Gronqvist and Leif Salmen. However, present on the site are at least Sakari Kiuru and Jouko Tyyri. But where are the women panelists and the large masses of the Finnish Finns as discussants.

Lilius Gets Nervous

The sculptor Lilius becomes nervous in the afternoon over the choice of panelists. He asks whether only men are able to discuss freedom of speech. He also sees a difference in whether one speaks of freedom of speech in Finnish or in Swedish -- his writings offered to the Finnish language papers had not been published. According to Lilius, dicussion about Finland in Swedish is more lively than in Finnish.

The discussion about the Koivisto period is started by Apunen, followed by Professor Toijala.

Apunen does not believe that we can speak of a Koivisto era. According to him it is too optimistic to say that we are yet half way through the Koivisto era; according to such a count Kekkonen's half-way mark would have been in 1959.

Mining counselor Hasto, considers Koivisto's most "speculative" act thus far to have been his acceding to be chosen for the presidency. He would also rather speak of Koivisto's period of activity rather than his era. He considers the Finnish political-commercial situation to be the result of the work of his predecessors.

Hasto had to answer the question why industry backed Ahti Karjalainen for the presidency in 1981. Hasto's standard reply is that no names had been mentioned in taking the stand and that the counselors had emphasized only continuity and the significance of trade politics as well as loyalty to party ties.

Manager Nars amused the seminar participants by telling a joke about what Koivisto had said in Uppsala.

Professor Klinge estimated that from the point of view of a historian the Finns have had it too good since they no longer have any external enemies and the economy grinds out high percentages.

Doctor Salminen sees the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line as having crystallized to where self-interests have become paramount. For this he uses as an example Matti Pulkkinen's new book, which hardly pats Finland on the back for its share in aiding developing countries. He has also noted that in Leningrad the toilets don't work any better than the ideology.

No Help From the Little Blue Book

Chief Editor Stenstrom, the conductor of the famous "lemming interview" accusses the press of "gyppo-journalism." According to him the Koivisto era is now undergoing a pause between the prologue and the first act, to which one cannot find counsel even from Kekkonen's "little blue" or Tamminiemi book.

The greetings of the foreign ministry are conveyed to the Swedes by the Assistant Secretary of State, Tornudd, who warns against comparing Koivisto's three years to Kekkonen's 25. We have not had nightime frosts, note crises nor the need for notable acts.

Tornudd rejects, without question, the contention that Finland is leaning toward the West in going for full membership in EFTA, for membership in ESA and becoming a participant in EUREKA. These enterprises just happen to be timely at the same time. Joining the European council, however, does not fit into the same time period.

According to Tornudd refugee politics involve more than just receiving refugees and besides, Finland doesn't really have the opportunity to receive refugees. First we had to take care of the resettling of the Karelians and also the emigration wave to Sweden caused problems... He promises, however, that the annual quota could even rise from the agreed-upon 100 refugees.

At the beginning of the afternoon the Chairman of the Public Word Council, Gronqvist, compares the legislation on the freedom of press between Finland and Sweden.

On his own behalf editor Salmen labels the morning discussion as typical of the Finnish level. He charges that the parties in power have intentionally left the new communication media at the mercy of market forces and economic interests.

Who Won the Civil War

The writer Tyyri argues that the world's best behaved opposition is to be found in Finland and that the true winner of the Civil War was the peasant.

The Chief Director of the State Radio, Kiuru, will not say directly whether the government has political purposes in delaying the decision to raise the Radio's appropriation. He does, however, support Salmen, who sees a clear connection between the delay and the dissatisfaction of top politicians with the State Radio.

Attorney General Taxell reasons that the new communication media will hardly add to the freedom of speech, but that their prohibition would restrict it. He considers decisionmakers and journalists to be the same kind of surface skimmers.

During the final phase the Swedish guests also woke up. One of them asked who was really behind the mysterious pseudonym "Yuriy Komissarov." After a long period of dribbling Lilius is persuaded to say that he is the ministerial Counselor Yuriy Deryabin of the Soviet Union's foreign ministry.

The clock has already passed the 16th hour. It is time to leave for coktails at the Swedish embassy. Even the Swedish guest who had slept the whole day in the back row wakes up.

The Finnish climate of opinion today is a fascinating subject. Would the Swedes have something to learn from it?

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POLITICIANS RECEIVED PURCHASE PRICE DISCOUNTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Nov 85 p 12

[Article by Jouko Heikura: "Title Puts You Behind a Wheel of a Discount Car"]

[Text] The Scan-Auto company sells Saabs at a "considerable discount" to highly paid individuals who have socially significant positions. Scan-Auto has noticed that a minister sitting at the wheel of a Saab is the best advertisement for the trademark.

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa and the Finance Minister Ahti Pekkala, who have bought discount cars that had been used as demonstrators, have thus become mannequins for the Saab company.

Ahti Pekkala, who is noted for his exceptional memory for figures, does not remember how much the discount was on the Saab he registered in March 1985. Prime Minister Sorsa announced through the mouth of his political secretary that he had no need to comment on the matter at all.

Manager Hugo Ahlberg admits that Scan-Auto gives the decisionmakers a discount on the cars precisely because of their social standing. "We consider it important that the governmental decisionmakers present an example and drive a domestic car," says Ahlberg.

The Saabs of Sorsa and Pekkala had been registered by the company for about four months for demonstration use before the ministers purchased them.

Many Desire But Few Receive

Scan-Auto sells about 25,000 cars altogether annually of which nearly 500 are demonstration models used for less than 6 months and thus registered under the firm's own name.

The new model, little used and advantageously sold demonstration cars are in demand and not nearly everyone who wants one can purchase one. The discounts of the demonstration cars vary according to the buyer and the model of the car; to ordinary citizens they are sold at about 10 percent discount compared to the original price.

"I myself would rather buy a car that has been used as a demonstrator rather than a completely unused one" says Ahlberg. "One can get a demonstration car for considerably less than a new one. And although many have driven it, it has been cared for like a flower."

The demonstration cars have been driven during their 4 to 6 months use period "only a few thousand kilometers" according to manager Ahlberg. All possible "new car problems" have been noticed in the little used demonstration car and fixed; also the stiffness caused by newness has disappeared.

Ahlberg admits that Scan-Auto has contacted many decisionmakers and offered them cars at a discount for advertising and marketing purposes. "Discounts are a natural part of the automobile business" Ahlberg instructs us. He admits that each customer has his own value -- and the discount varies accordingly. "If a minister drives a Saab it is good advertising for the trademark."

Half the Government Drives a Saab

Of the 17 ministers in the government, altogether 9 prefer the domestic Saabs in civilian use as well. It is not known whether Saab has favored other ministers, in addition to Sorsa and Pekkala, because the auto registration center of the tranpsortation ministry does not give information on the former registrants of the ministers' cars.

The name file of the auto registration center turned secret during the investigation; only the previous registrants of Sorsa's and Pekkala's Saabs had been revealed as Scan-Auto, when it was discovered that the card file was "for own use only." The auto registration center's card file would also reveal the previous registrants of the other ministers' Saabs. And pre-registration by Scan-Auto would tell of considerable discounts.

Cars bought new are always registered directly in the name of the purchaser.

Pekkala's Sedan and Sorsa's Multi Coupe

According to information from the auto registration center Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa registered a 5-door Saab Multi Coupe 900 GLS in his name on 9 September, 1982. Scan-Auto had registered the name Saab for its use on 12 May, 1982. The car's price then would have been 85.000 markkas new. Minister Ahti Pekkala registerd a 4-door Saab Sedan 900 in his name on 8 March, 1985. Scan-Auto had registered the car for its use a good 4 months earlier on 25 October, 1984. The car would then have cost 104.800 markkas new.

Pekkala's previous car was also a Saab.

Minister Pekkala confirms annoyed that yes he has acquired for himself a "Saappi-car" but wonders whether it could be a very important question from the viewpoint of state finances. "Nowadays, it's difficult to get by without a car," says Pekkala.

According to Pekkala the discount Saab had been driven before the deal "perhaps over 10,000 kilometers."

"Do you think Scan-Auto intended to influence your activities by offering you a car at a considerable discount, minister Pekkala?"

"I don't believe they had any intention of influencing me. And they did not offer it; a deal always starts from the fact, that the buyer asks around and reaches the conclusion that the time has come to change cars."

"Do you believe, that the discount was given to you because of your position?"

"I don't believe that. One argues over the price and the deal is made. I believe everyone gets this kind of discount from them," Pekkala surmises, but does not reveal the amount of the discount.

The cabinet ministers now have their use, along with chauffeurs, 16 cars, 10 of which are Saabs, 3 Volvos, 2 Chryslers and 1 Mercedes-Benz. The acquisition prices of the cars do not vary a lot, because the state can buy all its cars tax-free.

This year the state has about 50 million markkas for buying cars. According to the guidelines prepared by the state finance ministry for the purchase of automobiles intended for state use the recommendations for 5-person cars include Ladas, Talbots and Saabs. For the representatives' cars Volvos and Saabs are recommended. The state purchase directions are usually adhered to scrupulously.

At present, of the cars owned by the state, 1545 are Ladas, 1312 are Saabs and 302 are Volvos.

Even a Functionary Received a Discount Car

In addition to the ministers at least one functionary has been sold a discount Saab. The technical office chief of the Interior Ministry's police department, Jorma Nykanen, had been able to buy 5-door Saab 900 Turbo Multi Coupe, that had been in demonstration use, from Scan-Auto in June of 1980. The price of a new Turbo then would have been 112,000 markkas.

The police deparment's technical office, which Nykanen leads, answers, among other things for the automotive needs of the police. Chief Nykanen does not tell how much he paid for the car. Neither is Nykanen sure whether Scan-Auto offered the Saab to him, or whether he inquired about it himself.

Nykanen is of the opinion, that the discount he received could not have in any way influenced the fact that nearly all Finnish police drive Saabs with blue lights flashing on their roofs.

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POLITICAL FINLAND

VAYRYNEN ANTICIPATED FALL OF SDP GOVERNMENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Nov 85 p 7

[Article: "Vayrynen Suspected the Dissolution of the Government"]

[Text] The leadership of the Center Party suspected a few weeks ago that the Social Democrats were attempting to wreck governmental cooperation efforts, trying to dissolve the government. So explained the Center Party chairman, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen at the meeting of political commentators on Monday concerning the rumours about the threat of government break-up and the forthcoming elections for dissolution, that the representatives of the Center Party had spread so assiduously recently.

Vayrynen based his evaluation of the governmental crisis on the fact that the state's constitutional amendment--change in the way the president is elected--and the law about municipal pension payments did not advance in the parliament in the fashion proposed by the government.

"The chairman of the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) spoke of the constitutional amendment as if there were no government program at all," said Vayrynen.

Now the suspicions about the demise of the government have already been dispelled according to Vayrynen, since the constitutional amendment seems to be making headway in a satisfactory manner and "at least the assistant chairman of the SDP, Matti Ahde, has announced that the constitutional amendment will be implemented according to the agreement."

The Situation Has Clarified

The situation has clarified and the belief that governmental cooperation will continue until the normal parliamentary elections has strengthened, says Vayrynen.

Vayrynen did not want to explain just on what the rumours disseminated lately by the Center Party were based, that the dissolution of the government would also be followed by premature parliamentary elections, or that the President would dissolve the Parliament in the middle of the election period.

The power to dissolve the Parliament is one of the stronger ones that the President has and it was believed that Mauno Koivisto, who has been emphasizing the power of the Parliament, would not resort to it as a first measure. The normal parliamentary elections will be held in a little more than a year, in March, 1987.

Leaders and functionaries of the Center Party have hinted at the possiblity of governmental crisis often enough that also the Center Party was suspected of trying to break up the government. Vayrynen denied such conjectures by assuring that "We have always had the strong wish: Present government until the elections."

A couple of weeks ago in his All Saints' Day speech Vayrynen threatened that the Center Party would be forced to "throw a monkey wrench" in the way of governmental cooperation, unless the SDP would get its ranks in order.

On Monday Vayrynen said that "at the time of the speech I held it possible that the government situation would lead to a crisis."

The leader of the Center Party says that he believes now that the trust in governmental cooperation has grown we would also get through the winter's income decision. From the SDP's fateful question about the rules of the game for the labor market, the government could extricate itself with the help of director Matti Pekkanen; Pekkanen will either bring about a negotiated settlement between the organizations or bring his own rule proposal to the government. The Center Party is, according to Vayrynen, ready to approve Pekkanen's contribution. The party trusts that Pekkanen will produce a sufficiently impartial and implementable proposal.

The Interest Legislation Does Not Threaten Government

During the Monday meeting Vayryen sharply accused the Social Democrats of breaking last summer's capital city agreement, but that conflict over the interest legislation does not now seem to be threatening governmental stability. Center Party's ministerial group has seen that the matter cannot be made into a governmental issue.

According to Vayrynen the governmental parties broke the agreement, because it said nothing of the requirement of the day care and health center enterprises in the capital area to pay interest on the state aid received. The government, however, decided to propose by vote that any aid, subsequently received, would be subject to a 7 percent interest.

Vayrynen remarked that no other municipalities charge interest on such special aid packages. In regard to the capital city there is no question of any supplementary funding system for which interest would be charged.

In the capital city decision or the budget proposal of the government there is no concept of supplementary funding, but the Social Democrats have used that term since the summer.

Vayrynen said that the Center Party will oppose the collection of interest also in the parliament. What the Center Party will do if it ends up in the minority during the parliamentary voting has not been decided.

In government, according to Vayrynen, the Center Party would have been ready for a 3 percent interest charge, if Vantaa's carrying capacity classification would have been simultaneosuly raised. But the government parties did not agree to such a deal.

State Radio Appropriation to be Raised

At the meeting of the political commentators Vayrynen presented his viewpoint that the appropriation for the State Radio should be raised sufficiently so that the production of domestic programs would be assured.

"In relating to the State Radio all parties should be able to separate themselves from shortsighted tactics. The securing of the State Radio's position is an important national question," Vayrynen said.

This message was intended for the Prime Minister, Kalevi Sorsa, who, a few weeks ago, stopped the raise on the appropriation.

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MARCHAIS DISCUSSES ANTICIPATED PCF ELECTION PLANS

PM261147 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 18 Nov 85 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Every Communist Vote Will Count"]

[Excerpts] [PCF Secretary General] Georges Marchais was the guest on the Radio-Luxembourg-LE MONDE "Grand Jury" program yesterday evening, and he started by answering a question suggesting that the PCF is playing into the Right's hands as the parliamentary elections approach. "Nobody can honestly think that the PCF is joining forces with the Right," he stressed, adding: "We are the Right's resolute adversaries."

The issue of this election, he pointed out, will be to "judge the policy pursued by the government, the National Assembly majority, and the President of the Republic."

With regard to the danger of the PCF's being pushed to the fringes in the framework of what one journalist called the Right-Left split, he replied: "People often say that the PCF regards the PS and the Right as the same thing: I challenge you to find a single document or a single party saying that." He explained that the communists want to defeat the Right and prevent its return to office. "But we do not want an alliance between the PS and the Right either."

In the next part of the program, Georges Marchais stressed the coherence of the 12-point proposals of which the PCF has just printed 8 million copies and which PCF members are going to make known as a priority. "Three essential ideas" are likely to lead people to vote communist "on the basis of their own experience." First, the need "to be well defended." And then the fact that the communists are alone in proposing a different policy, which would make it possible to revive the French economy to create jobs and have modern social protection.

Summing up his remarks, Georges Marchais said: "People vote communist to defend themselves, to support serious proposals, to prevent the Right from returning to power and entering into cooperation with the PS." It is for all these reasons that the only useful vote in 1986 with proportional representation is a communist vote. "I believe that the voter who supports all or part of our policy can be certain that his vote will count this time."

Georges Marchais was then questioned on the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. With regard to relations between the PCF and the CPSU, he recalled that it had taken until 1980 for the CPSU to accept the notion of "differences of opinion." He stressed the "solidarity" which exists between the two parties, especially on the question of peace and disarmament, and recalled that there are differences of analysis and disagreements, like the one on democracy in building socialism--although, he noted, "progress has been made." He described Mikhail Gorbachev as a "very open man who, in my view, is well suited to the development requirements of contemporary Soviet society." I think, the PCF secretary general added, "that the changes which have come about in the USSR should enable that country to attain the ambitious objectives it has set itself for the future." Georges Marchais also stressed that Gorbachev is a man "who loves peace and practical results" on the disarmament question--a position which is, after all, "natural for a communist."

Finally, asked several questions about [PCF Central Committee member] Pierre Juquin, Georges Marchais said: "I do not believe that there is any Juquin affair." He expressed the view that his book was "way behind the progress made by the PCF" and regretted that it contained "obvious untruths." It was a "gift" to the PCF's enemies at a time when the party "is engaged in a difficult battle. I understand the discontent of some comrades," Georges Marchais added, and he concluded: The PCF is "strong enough to carry three dissenting comrades in the party leadership, including the Central Committee. They were elected by the congress...and they have been entrusted with tasks and responsibilities. I hope that they will work at them." There are no "sanctions," he said.

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POLITICAL FRANCE

DEMOGRAPHIC INSTITUTE RESPONDS TO DUFOIX IMMIGRATION REMARKS

Dumont Comments

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 pp 109-112

[Text] This issue contains the following articles on the following subjects: Gerard-Francois Dumont refutes point by point the criticisms made by Minister Dufoix. "Two Weeks of Calumnies: What They Dared to Say and What We Said in Reply." "These Countries Have Already Become Aware of the Danger": the United States, by Veronique Grousset; Germany, by Marc Kunstle; Switzerland, by Gabriel Veraldi. "A Taboo Has Been Demolished," by Jean Raspail. "The Manufacturers of Amalgam," by Henri Amouroux, of the institute. "There Are Humane Solutions," by Alain Griotteray. "And If the Risks Were Even Greater," by Pierre Chaunu, of the Institute of Political Demography.

The truth is often disturbing. The publication of our inquiry into the immigration question has "scandalized" Georgina Dufoix [minister of social affairs] and "traumatized" the Socialist Government. We asked: "Will we still be French 30 years from now?" (see our issue published on 26 October). However, this study cannot be refuted, given the present fertility rate of French women (1.7 percent), compared to that of non-European women resident in France (4.69 percent). This also calls for a projection of the trend into the future and an evaluation of the consequent danger for our national identity if appropriate measures are not urgently taken to remedy this situation.

First of all, we wanted to alert public opinion to the problems arising from the demographic difference between the Third World and the West. (The thousands of letters received over the past 2 weeks prove that this initial objective has been attained.) These are problems which

threaten to face our civilization during the next century. Another purpose of our inquiry was to draw the attention of the government to the dangers which our ostrich-like policy in this area is creating for us.

In fact, we have begun a national debate. No doubt it is the most important for the future of our country. The government has attempted to transform this national debate into a squalid quarrel, not shrinking from using the most disgraceful procedures to discredit us, such as calumny. They have publicly denounced the 6 months' study carried out by Gerard-Francois Dumont. They have challenged the work of Alfred Sauvy, a world renowned demographer. They have raised the issues of apartheid, racism, and nazism. They have even gone so far as to make a comparison between our inquiry and the work of the sinister Doctor Mengele. And only 4 days after the publication of our inquiry Minister Dufoix published hastily-gathered statistics on the same subject.

Was all of that necessary to try to cover up the approval expressed by Prime Minister Fabius of the views expressed by Jacques Chirac on the subject during the televised debate of 27 October?

To govern is to choose, but it also involves foreseeing emerging problems. And as Alfred Sauvy has said so well, regarding demography and immigration, it is better "to look ahead than not to see at all." That was our only objective. In the following series of articles we reply to all of the attacks directed against us. The national debate is now open.

In her press conference statement of 30 October, extracts of which appear below, Minister Dufoix violently attacked our newspaper, which is accused in particular of "manipulation of the statistics." She also urged journalists not to pay any attention to the work of the Institute of Political Demography, whose president is Gerard-Francois Dumont. Here is his reply to her charges.

[Minister Dufoix] The preparation of correct forecasts implies care in the use of the basic facts and credibility in the use of assumptions.

[Dumont] The use of the word "forecasts" is nonsense. I made no forecasts in our inquiry but simply presented projections or, in other words, an outline of what could happen under certain assumptions.

It is a particularly gross error for a cabinet minister, who has a battalion of specialists available to her to compare a scientific presentation of projections to forecasts of the future such as those that fortune tellers like Madame Soleil might make.

The use by Minister Dufoix of the term "forecast" instead of "projection," which is always used for this kind of study, shows that the minister refuses to understand the scientific logic of the work I prepared, thereby implicitly recognizing its scientific value.

The basic facts are correct, contrary to the doubts expressed by Minister Dufoix. I will show this below.

The assumptions I have used are credible, and even too conservative if France follows inappropriate family and immigration policies.

[Minister Dufoix] The article does not make clear the statistical sources which were used to recount the situation in 1985.

[Dumont] I wish to confirm, as Jean Raspail writes in general terms below, that the population projections on which the inquiry was based used official figures from the census taken at the beginning of 1982 and not the census estimates of 1985. The 1985 estimates were used as a 30 year reference point for the projected situation in the year 2015.

[Minister Dufoix] The inquiry indicates that there are 51,400,000 French and 2,600,000 non-European foreigners. The census of 1982 contradicts these indications, showing that there were then 50,600,000 French and 3,700,000 foreigners, 1,950,000 of whom were non-European.

[Dumont] There is no contradiction between these figures, apart from the difference of 4 years between the beginning of 1982, when the census was taken, and the end of 1985, the date of the study.

The minister quite simply forgets that in 4 years the population can change.

[Minister Dufoix] From the beginning the presentation of the situation is erroneous, since the number of non-Europen foreigners mentioned in the article (or 2,600,000) is one-third higher than the reality (2,600,000, compared to 1,950,000).

[Dumont] Once again, Minister Dufoix confuses the situation at the beginning of 1982 with that at the end of 1985. In 4 years the figures changed, as explained above.

[Minister Dufoix] Regarding the young, non-European foreigners under 15 years of age, there is a difference between the data in the article and census data of nearly 40 percent.

[Dumont] Once again, Minister Dufoix is comparing the figures at the beginni of 1982 with those which I have calculated for the end of 1985. In 4 years, quite evidently, a lot of water has flowed under the bridges of the Seine.

[Minister Dufoix] The point of departure was clearly overstated, regarding the number of non-European foreigners.

[Dumont] The point of departure was not overstated because the projections were made on the basis of figures from the census of 1982. The data for 1985 was simply used for comparison with the projection for the year 2015.

[Minister Dufoix] It is totally out of the question that in 3 years the number of non-European foreigners could have increased more rapidly than in the course of the 2 previous intercensus periods, each of which covered 7 years.

[Dumont] From the beginning of 1982 to the end of 1985 is 4 years, not 3. The last census was held during the first quarter of 1982 and not at the end of the year.

The estimate of the number of non-European foreigners at 2.6 million in 1985 is, in reality, an underevaluation. Every Frenchman and every specialist knows in his heart that there are more than 2.6 million non-Europeans in France today.

In fact, the last census gave the figure of 1,950,000 non-European foreigners in France in March 1982.

Now, even in a developed country like France, the margin for under registration of persons included in the census is substantial.

This margin is estimated at between 600,000 and 1 million for the whole population, or the equivalent of the population of a city like Marseille.

The figure of 2.6 million at the end of 1985 results from the following adjustments to the figure of 1,950,000 at the beginning of 1982:

--300,000 births in 4 years, which for the non-Europeans is equivalent to an annual increase of about 33 peracent;

--240,000 net immigrants in 4 years, particularly due to family reunification and requests for asylum;

--The mortality rate of non-European foreigners in France is low by reason of the youth of this population. Half of the non-European females were less than 20 years old, according to the census of 1982;

--Taking into account known under registration in the census of 1982, we made an adjustment of 5 percent. There is no doubt that this is less than the reality.

From this we obtained a reliable and very reasonable figure of 2,600,000 non-European foreigners as of the end of 1985.

That does not take into account the clandestine immigrants who cross our borders every day and who are therefore not included in the statistics, just as the black market economy does not appear in the statistics.

[Minister Dufoix] The supposed fertility indicator would change for each of the two groups involved [European and non-European].

[Dumont] I have never written that this indicator would change. I have set out various projections on the basis of various assumptions. To assist us in our consideration, Jean Raspail commented on one of the mathematical assumptions, which shows what could happen if France should adopt a Malthusian policy.

[Minister Dufoix] Using an assumption of 1.25 percent in 1992 corresponds to a real decline in the [European] birth rate. There is nothing on which to base this forecast.

[Dumont] If that were true, I would be happy to say so. However, that does not make such a decline totally impossible. The role of responsible political leaders is to consider the worst, for example in terms of defense, in order to take action to avoid the worst.

A decline in the fertility rate of French women from 1.7 to 1.25 children over a period of 7 years, or 0.45 percent, is quite foreseeable, unfortunately.

Perhaps this would already have occurred in the absence of reports and proposals for the life of the APRD, in particular with the assistance of Alfred Sauvy, Pierre Chaunu, and myself.

Those who consider this assumption dishonest remind me of whose who, in 1974, stated that fertility in France was not going down or those who, at the same time, assured us that the decline in the marriage rate was a myth.

Let us recall that the fertility rate of German women declined by 0.75 children per woman in the 7 years between 1974 and 1981. Let us also recall that the fertility rate of Spanish women declined by 0.93 percent in the 7 years between 1976 and 1983.

It was to avoid such a decline that I proposed, at the end of the national conference of the APRD in Melun on 19 October, 25 concrete measures to be part of a family policy for the future.

[Minister Dufoix] The alleged continuation of foreign fertility does not take into account the lessons of the past.

[Dumont] Once again, this is not a supposition but is a projection based on a calculated assumption.

It is correct to note that there has been a decline in the fertility of Algerian and Tunisian women in France. However, this ignores four other elements:

--This slight decline does not change, as of now, the nature of the fertility pattern of non-European foreign women. Despite this slight decline, the fertility rate of these women remains three times as high as that of French women.

--We should not forget that, even if there is a slight decline, non-European women continue to arrive in France with the fertility pattern of their countries of origin, which is more than six children per woman.

--Minister Dufoix omits mentioning, as if by accident, a figure which contradicts her position: the fertility rate of the Moroccans in France has increased in the following way:

(a) In 1968: 3.32 children per woman;

(b) In 1975: 4.68 children per woman;

(c) In 1982: 5.32 children per woman.

--Finally, referring to the decline in the fertility rate of non-European women in France as something which inevitably will occur involves supposing that the problems of integration have been resolved, which is precisely one of the questions raised by our inquiry.

[Minister Dufoix] The fertility of foreign women therefore does not increase the average fertility in France by more than a small proportion.

[Dumont] That is correct. However, the non-European foreign population is young. Therefore, the number of foreign women of childbearing age who live in France is going to increase. This could increase the role of foreign women in overall fertility.

[Minister Dufoix] The net balance of 59,000 immigrants is considered higher than the figure calculated by the INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] over the 10 year period from 1975 to 1984, which reflects an actual average of 33,600.

[Dumont] Here Minister Dufoix should remember that the official statistical office has honorably corrected an error it made.

Since 1975, under the pretext that the borders were officially closed to immigrants, official statistics pretended that the net increase in immigration had been brought down to zero.

It is only retrospectively that these figures have been corrected, raising net immigration figures from zero to 40,000 between 1975 and 1982.

Despite my requests, France does not have available a statistical procedure for indicating net immigration between national censuses. Therefore, we were forced to estimate them. Minister Dufoix has presented official figures showing the net immigration figure at 37,000 in 1982, 16,200 in 1983, and 14,000 in 1984. This was to prove the effectiveness of the immigration control policy of the government. I believe I am right in asking myself whether, as was the case during the years 1975-1982, the official estimates quite simply reflect the government's version and not the reality.

The methods used to determine the three figures for 1982, 1983, and 1984, given above, have never been explained. That reminds us of the way in which statistics are developed in certain totalitarian countries.

Beyond this basic debate there is an unquestionable reality: with the differences of demographic pressure which exist around the Mediterranean, with the present geopolitical changes, where old Europe has not succeeded in finding a way of reducing poverty sufficiently in the Third World, the assumption of a net immigration figure of 59,000 is a low assumption.

[Minister Dufoix] The most recent data published by the National Office of Immigration (ONI) show that there have been changes, which cannot be compared with the preceding suppositions.

[Dumont] Again, this is an erroneous statement.

In effect, Minister Dufoix forgets to tell the French people that the National Office of Immigration does not cover the movement of Algerians or Africans.

The official report published by the INSEE shows that in 1982 there were more than 140,000 permanent, salaried foreigners and their families who had been brought to France by the ONI. Half of them, or more than 70,000 people, came from Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

[Minister Dufoix] This is a situation which reportedly has been stabilized.

[Dumont] The method used necessarily describes a situation today which is considered durable and will remain so. I say this for the reason that it will not remain stabile.

The assumption of stability supposes that the people who live in this country will agree to live together, in the name of freedom, which is our basic heritage. This assumes a policy of providing ourselves with the means

of accelerating the integration of the foreigners who are to remain in France and who today are often left out of things.

Our inquiry was aimed only at making it possible for the citizens of a free country to think about the risks of unsuitable family and immigration policies.

Seeking to attack the information is an attack on democracy.

Minister Dufoix Applied a Measure Recommended by Gerard-Francois Dumont

The priority card for pregnant women is not issued until the fourth month of pregnancy and then only at the express request of the woman, thus excluding the first 18 weeks of pregnancy when the risks of spontaneous abortion are the greatest. Thus, for several years Gerard-Francois Dumont has urged, and particularly in his contacts with the office of Minister Dufoix, that these priority cards for pregnant women should be issued earlier in pregnancy.

In September 1985 Minister Dufoix finally adopted this measure on her own account and decided to issue pregnant women with a priority card on a systematic basis, at the same time as the maternity book.

Laurent Fabius Consulted Gerard-Francois Dumont

At the request of an important service in the office of the prime minister, in 1985 Gerard-Francois Dumont, in collaboration with Evelyne Sullerot, prepared a report for Prime Minister Fabius in which a revision of the Nationality Code was suggested.

Two Weeks of Exchanges

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 p 113

[Text]

What They Dared to Say	What We Say in Reply
(1) On 26 October, in a communique Minister of Social Affairs Dufoix stated: LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE is adopting the Le Pen method, which consists of issuing lying statistics, the grossest possible, in order to attempt to establish the worst case theory and incite to racial hatred. The procedure is simple. They take false figures on the death rate and the fertility rate of French and of "non European" women and the number of additional immigrants granted entry	(1) "You cannot seriously say that knowing how to count incites to racial hatred!" That is what Pierre Chaunu wrote on 31 October. He is known, among other things, for his ability to count. "The assumptions presented by Gerard-Francois Dumont are plausible and reasonable. The assumption on the flow of immigrants used by Dumont seems too optimistic to me. That is why my projections would be even more dramatic than those of Dumont's." (Published in LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE of 31 October)

into France. This scenario, which recalls the maddest theories of nazism, must be torn down and attacked."

(2) Also on 26 October, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the UNAF, Prime Minister Laurent Fabius issued "a very serious warning against those who, allegedly speaking in the name of French values, are today advocating the exclusion of foreigners, and are displaying egotism and advocating racism, and, finally, hatred."

(3) Monsignor Vilnet, president of the conference of Catholic bishops of France, also spoke on 26 October at Lourdes "of the unjustified fears," of "unacceptable attitudes of scorn" which prevent us from "building a common future for the immigrants and French citizens."

(4) On 28 October, in LE MATIN, Max Gallo asked himself: "Is this a mad vision? Is this an intentionally racist group or does it belong to the National Front? Is this the obsessive statement of a neo-nazi? Not at all, Louis Pauwels explains to us. No doubt, due to the importance and the circulation of the magazine which published it and the moment chosen, this is a document which will be remembered in the history of racism in postwar France. The figures, the tables, the rates of fertility or of mortality--interpreted as they should be, but that is not the essence of it--serve as a rational 'scientific' cover, leading to delirium, to anguish, to fear, to everything which feeds racism."

(2) Louis Pauwels had previously replied to Laurent Fabius in his editorial, quoting Claude Levi-Strauss: "It is in no sense wrong to value one way of life above all others. Certainly, this relative evaluation does not authorize anyone to oppress or destroy the values which one rejects. However, within such limits there is nothing revolting about it." (LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, 26 October)

(3) A common future? Jean Raspail was thinking of Monsignor Vilnet when he wrote: "I think that Christian charity does not require us to begin by betraying our values at the risk of no longer having anything true or profound to offer." (LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, 2 November)

(4) Such extravagance and such little control of himself is not even worth a suit for slander. Let us recall calmly the words of Louis Pauwels, "that we only had the explicit objecive of making our cultured readers consider, on the basis of French realities, that the problem of the demographic differences between the developed but infertile West and the hungry and prolific Third World will be the essential human problem of the early part of the 21st century." (LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, 2 November)

(5) In LE MONDE on 29 October Andre Fontaine explained that "Georgina Dufoix moved too quickly to denounce the 'Hitlerian' character, in her view, of this study."

(5) Thank you, Andre Fontaine. He was the first to underline the excesses in the words of Minister Dufoix.

(6) Philippe Seguin (RPR) [Rally of the French People] also commented on 29 October: "In the publication, LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, I only do the crossword puzzles and I don't read the reports on immigration. And if I had to make the problems of immigration into my religion, I wouldn't do it in the press but rather out of my personal experience and examples from abroad."

(6) What immigration reports is Philippe Seguin talking about? Apart from our study, there has been no other article published before the item written in haste by Georgina Dufoix on 30 October and which, in the same issue, G-F Dumont demolishes completely.

(7) On France-Inter [radio station] on the morning of 30 October Jack Lang [minister of culture] said: "When I saw a newspaper, which has now become a propaganda tract, LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE, in the same issue of 26 October, tell us that, on the one hand, in 20 years France would no longer be France, which is completely grotesque and ridiculous, and carry an article on scholars in South Africa proving that apartheid does not exist, as they told us in the 1940's that the crematorium ovens did not exist--I find that scandalous."

(8) On 30 October in the National Assembly Laurent Fabius mentioned the headline of our study: "Under this provocative headline, a newspaper with a large circulation did not hesitate a few days ago to incite us to exclude foreigners. To all of these false accountants who manipulate immigration figures I say that they are going against the interests of our country, because the immigrants have produced and are producing an

(7 and 8) On 2 November Louis Pauwels wrote in LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE: "It is only democratic for journalists to be opposed to a government, and we are not lacking in that respect, as we all know. But it is intolerable that people in government should try, in order to justify their views, to advocate that people pay no attention to a newspaper and to think that they have the right to take such unworthy and diffamatory action. In a free country we cannot tolerate that those in charge of the government should stoop to such terrorist actions. We cannot tolerate that people who are not capable, not only of resolving, but even of formulating a problem which silently absorbs our national conscience and, with it, the entire, traditionally Judaeo-Christian Western conscience, should be allowed to cast infamous discredit on writers, experts and journalists who raise the problem before public opinion."

important part of the wealth of France. To all of our compatriots who face difficulties or are concerned, I say that the connection too often made between unemployment and immigration is false and dangerous. And they should not believe those who invent scapegoats and simplistic solutions. I want France to remain a fraternal country. That is its honor. That is its wealth. That is its interest. That is its soul. France must refuse to adopt a policy of segregation."

Foreign Situations Viewed

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 pp 114-115

[Text] "In the United States Raising the Problem Is Not a Sin," by Veronique Grousset.

Alamo Bay is a small port on the Gulf of Mexico. For a long time the Americans living there--poor and white, for the most part--have fished for shrimp. An economic crisis occurred. Then there was the latest wave of Asian immigration, and a conflict arose, filmed by Louis Malle, the French movie director.

In France some people thought they saw in that situation evidence that the French problem did not amount to much, compared to what was happening elsewhere.

In effect, this is so. Particularly if you compare the figures. However, it still remains to be seen whether what people are comparing in fact is in any way comparable.

First of all, the statistics: of all the nations in the world, America is a nation of immigrants. It is made up only of immigrants. It has been built up by successive and increasingly larger waves of immigrants.

500,000 Every Year

The first wave of immigrants, who arrived in America between 1815 nd 1860, brought 2.5 million Irish and 1.5 million Germans to the country. The second wave arrived between 1860 and 1990, involving 10 million northern Europeans, essentially composed of British, Swedes, Dutch, and Norwegians. The last European wave of immigrants came from eastern and southern Europe between 1890 and 1914, bringing 16 million Sicilians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Russian Jews.

Today American immigration is essentially Hispanic and Asian, and two-thirds of the immigrants of the entire world are finally settled in the U. S. A.

However, the fact remains that the situation in Alamo Bay is the exception which in no way confirms the rule.

Because despite the large number of its new immigrants--about 500,000 per year, not including clandestine immigration--America does not suffer from the same problems as France.

Quite simply, this is because the immigration programs in the two countries are not based on the same criteria. Not anyone at all can enter the United States. Those who enter are those who have the primary intention of integrating themselves into the life of the country and finding a new fatherland. In short, and without renouncing their countries of origin and their customs entirely, they wish to become Americans.

Furthermore, America has no religious problems. Whatever the number and diversity of the imported religious faiths, none shows any desire to grow and none threatens to become the faith of the masses--or of becoming a fanatical creed.

Finally, integration seems to be easier in the United States. No doubt, this is because the desire to succeed is stronger there. Because the ethnic or racial obstacles are the same: each new wave of immigrants has encountered them. Today less than one-third of the American people (about 27 percent) favors the policy of the open door to immigration. The immigrant is not necessarily welcome. However, more than two-thirds (67 percent) of those polled nonetheless believe that integration is possible. The immigrant is not underestimated.

And this is only proper. For the American immigrant stands out for his desire to be integrated into American society which has little in common with the feelings of his European counterparts. He is willing to work hard--12 to 15 hours a day, on the average, during the first 10 years he spends in America. He studies, he takes any kind of job, even when his professional qualifications might have made it possible for him to consider himself ready to handle other positions.

An Ongoing Debate

As a result, the average income of Asian families in the U. S. A. by 1980 had already exceeded the national average income (including whites), amounting to $22,700 annually. Regarding blacks from the Caribbean, for a long time their average income has been 40 percent higher than that of American black families.

This is a phenomenon which clearly is the source of considerable jealousy. This is all the more so, since U. S. immigration is raising questions that

concern people as much as in Europe: worsening crime (Organized crime finds its recruits among the newly arrived. In times past it was the Irish. Today it is the Asians.), an economic crisis (In the U. S., as elsewhere, the struggle for jobs works to the detriment of the people who are least motivated. Often the American-born are less motivated than the immigrants.), and the cost to the nation (Certain communities such as the Hmong of Laos have not succeeded in integrating themselves and remain a burden on the taxpayers.).

However, the essential difference is that people talk about it.

In America there is an ongoing debate on immigration. The people are brought into the discussion. Their views are considered, and no one has the right to ignore them.

"Germany: Assistance for Returning to Their Countries (from 70,000 to 300,000 Francs) Has Persuaded Them to Leave," by Marc Kunstle

Neither is anything simple in Germany. At least for a long time they have moved ahead of France and, as in the case of the problems of the steel industry, in a better planned and more effective way. Here the demagogic laws passed by the German socialists under Willy Brandt created an unfortunate problem. Armed with official promises giving the Turks the same rights as Germans, particularly in terms of protection for their families, nearly 2 million "almancilar" (Germanicized people) as they are called East of the Rhine, arrived from Turkey in the course of a few years. Due to the economic recession and in view of the material and cultural deterioration of entire neighborhoods in the large German cities the German Parliament approved a law 3 years ago which was tempting enough to persuade 350,000 Turks to leave the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Ministry of Labor has also decided to repay in advance the retirement deductions paid during the entire time foreign workers were present in Germany. With everything added up, those who are prepared to leave who have worked 15 years or longer in Germany are offered between 77,500 and 310,000 francs! These statistics do not adequately explain the general outflow of foreigners from Germany. As a result of unemployment, their living conditions have become much more difficult and, above all, they have been faced with unyielding and discouraging checks by German officials.

These different circumstances have led to three consequences:

—In 1985 immigration fell to one-third of the level of the 1980's;

—Since 1982 net immigration into the Federal Republic of Germany has been negative: (net decline of 200,000 in 1984);

—Births of foreigners have decreased by half in 10 years. Moreover, the prospects of definitive integration into German society are particularly poor. In 1983 only 39,000 people acquired German citizenship, or less than 1 percent of the total number of foreigners.

These results have also made it possible for the federal government to make substantial savings. Although they were initially costly, the measures have saved the Federal Treasury more than the equivalent of 8 billion francs in terms of social security, unemployment insurance, and family allowances.

For all of that, in Germany as in the other countries of the European Community, the problem of the free circulation of persons living in the EEC has not been resolved. The agreements permitting such free movement, beginning on 1 December 1985, cover the Turks as well. To avoid returning to the previous situation, Bonn and Ankara are involved in major political and economic negotiations. The solution to the problem of immigration, at least for the Turkish community, which is the largest foreign group, followed by the Yugoslavs (600,000), involves significant trade advantages provided by Germany, an increase in its military assistance to Turkey, and the construction of major public works there (a bridge over the Bosphorus, the Istanbul subway, oil pipelines, and electricity generating plants). In fact, it is difficult to compare the immigration problems of France with those in Germany. To the problems of the different nationalities represented in France are added the specific problems of large communities, such as the North African group, which rejects any kind of integration other than economic.

"In Switzerland 'the Quiet Invasion' Is Not Acceptable," by Gabriel Veraldi

The immigration situation in Switzerland is particularly instructive. The immigrants as such do not present any problems, although 14.5 percent of the population is composed of foreigners--18 percent, including those living along the borders, seasonal residents, and refugees. That is because the errors made by France have not been repeated here. There is no disorderly immigration: a foreign worker receives authorization to come to a specific place to perform a definite function. Naturalization is a slow and very much controlled process. Above all, Switzerland has always prohibited the entry of any significant number of non-Europeans. There are also no ghettos, no foreign enclaves. If there were a single street where not only the police but the simplest citizen would not dare to go, the people themselves would reestablish order.

Berthier Perregaux, the director of immigration affairs in the Protestant Social Center, was only able to mention two problems to me: the children forget the language and culture of their countries of origin. They readapt themselves poorly if they return to their countries. In short, their assimilation in Switzerland is almost too perfect. It is just the opposite of what happens in France. This is because the responsible officials have taken sensible action in time. It should be said that the people, who are really "sovereign" in Switzerland, know how to control their leaders in case of need through the use of their "popular initiatives." Therefore, the question of immigration has not been publicly raised since 1980, until recently.

However, it has just arisen again, and brutally, in another form. In the Geneva elections of 13 October "Vigilance," a group opposed to an excessive

number of foreigners, has suddenly become the largest party in the Canton of Geneva, having the same strength as the liberals. The same change, at the expense of the parties of the Left and Center, took place in the Canton of Vaud on 27 October.

It is the people who reacted against "the quiet invasion," which Zinoviev, the exiled dissident, considers "as destructive as a war." By the thousands, in effect, Tamils, Zairians, Turks, etc, have come to claim political asylum, taking advantage of a longstanding tradition and extremely generous laws. A confidential federal report concluded: "It is enough to say the magic words: 'I request political asylum,' in order to enjoy total financial support for a long time, without having to work personally." For example, in Basel 40 persons requested asylum in 1980 and 3,400 in 1985. In Geneva four in 1981 and 441 in 1985! In seeking the resons for this sudden flood of those seeking asylum the police did not take long to discover that the traffic is organized by the intelligence services of Eastern Europe. The refugees are transported by the Soviet Aeroflot airline, the Rumanian Taroum airline, and the East German Interflug airline. A dispatching center at the Berlin-Schonfeld airport provides them with directions, addresses, and money.

Eric Bertinat, the young president of Vigilance, 29 years old and the third person elected out of 331 candidates in the elections of 13 October, said: "It seems that the operation has the objective of implanting destabilizing forces in the European countries which have no colonial past, such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Germany."

Edgar Fasel, personal adviser to the president of the Swiss Confederation and a philosopher of Swiss politics, considers that, "internally, it is a good lesson for the traditional parties, which have given in to the practice of doing nothing." He continued: "As to those who practice emotional blackmail and who insult the people, calling them racist and xenophobic, they are wasting the little credit which they still have."

In fact, the churches are discreetly taking their distance from the more extremist elements. Responsibility for immigration comes under the first Swiss woman to become a member of the Federal Council, the central government of the Swiss Confederation, Elisabeth Kopp, "minister" of justice and police. One of her close associates said: "She has taken the time to study the situation carefully." And the associate said, "Now she will act with humanity and firmness."

In effect you can be confident that Switzerland will act in its own national interests. Switzerland only fears that her example will not be followed by her neighbors.

Raspail Commentary

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 p 116

[Text] So our figures were right. Clearly, we knew this ahead of time. Could anyone believe for a second that we had so little sense of honor as to fake and manipulate the facts on so serious a subject? The support which we have received from people whose reputations cannot be questioned have swept away all of the accusations which have been made against us, often in unacceptable terms. And even our detractors have calmed down, recognizing, like Georgina Dufoix, minister of social affairs, that they had let themselves make "excessive, spectacular statements." We will accept this type of excuse because we anticipate that, beyond political polemics, there is finally being sketched out, thanks to us and for the first time, real thinking on this great national debate.

False Appeals to Fear

Because if our statistics were correct, as a simple consequence our projections for the year 2015 are also correct. They exploded like a bomb in the face of an official disinformation campaign. However, in that case also, there have been many expressions of regret from those who insulted us. What only yesterday was a shameful business and a case of racist aggression (that is, making projections by nationality, distinguishing between Europeans and others, and even looking into the question of French citizenship) no longer is that. On the contrary everyone will prepare statistics from now on. They have promised it, they have sworn they will do it--even the state, which has announced that it will issue its statistics in the first few months of 1986. A ridiculous taboo has been disposed of. Many people are already thanking us. The others will do so later on, as you will see.

What we were particularly criticized for was the shock treatment used and these now well-known, 30 year projections. They spoke of our penchant for predicting catastrophes, of our fantasies, of our using excessive language, of our appeals to fear. I will ignore all of that. And this time it was to me personally that these elegant expressions were addressed, because I was the author of the commentaries. They spoke of my "imagination," as if, as a novelist, which is true, I had written a new novel, black and in anticipation of all of that.

I have to answer this, to end the matter.

I was investigated, quite stupidly. From the time that this study was decided on, I saw a considerable number of people, read everything written on the subject, built up an enormous file of press clippings, and traveled a great deal in France. Then I was initiated, by the best specialists available, into delving into the secrets of demography, which is fascinating. When the

figures prepared by Gerard-Francois Dumont were dropped into my office, I already knew a lot about them. So much so that I realized, with astonishment, that everything that I had learned, checked, heard, and saw was precisely packaged in the figures with no need to imagine anything or to let myself become involved in alleged fantasies. Our future in 2015 flowed from the brutally dry spring of statistics (once again, I repeat, if nothing happens to change them).

On the army and the national education system in 2015, on the consequences of the right to vote and automatic naturalization, on the de facto segregation which already exists in Marseille, Paris and in many cities and which I saw spreading in 2015 like a Lebanese type of leprosy, on the tragic imbalance of births in 30 years--everything that I had written, everything that I had described, came from simple reflection, in the sense that a mirror reflects an image. In the mirror our statistics quite naturally took shape. Hence the shock. Oh well, I assure you that, once you have the same statistics and with a minimum of intuition, any Frenchman would have done this, with the exception of certain, obstinate politicians. That falls outside their understanding, that's all.

I had only lent my pen to millions of French people who would suddenly discover in the mirror what all of us already felt, without even having the need for statistics. This is quite simply something felt in the heart.

Further Demographic Institute Remarks

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 pp 116-117

[Commentary by Henri Amouroux]

[Text] Words are not innocent. This faction of the Left knows this perfectly well, this group which, in order to avoid seeing and studying these problems which could threaten our future, makes use of language which it considers will project the most revolting images in the people's imagination.

As a result, our study on immigration, concerning which it would have been possible, in the course of a serious debate, to discuss both the form and the substance, was made into an occasion for a festival of serious insults. It was the pretext for an attempt to create an amalgam, an amalgam being the specialty of totalitarian minds and regimes. It was as if they were thinking: "You annoy me with your arguments and your statistics, and the truth you are telling displeases me. Therefore, I will identify you with the devil, with absolute evil." In this sense the devil is Hitler and the absolute evil is nazism.

It was Minister Dufoix, the government spokesperson, who declared in a statement considered excessive even by her friends that our study was inspired by "the maddest theories of nazism." It was Max Gallo, the former government spokesman--but his previous function still sticks to him and to his pen--who

in a comment published in LE MATIN referred to "Doctor Mengele," to Hitler, who "needed Hindenburg and von Papen," to the exposition held at the Palais Berlitz during the nazi occupation, called "The Jew and France," nd even to the delivery by the Vichy authorities of several tens of thousands of Jews condemned to perish in the concentration camps!

Hateful and Insane Language

Thus, merely raising the immigration problem, discussing it, and using the figures prepared by Gerard-Francois Dumont, president of the Association for Demographic Research and Information, was equivalent, in the eyes of Minister Dufoix and Max Gallo, to collusion with Hitler and to Doctor Mengele. When the convoys of Jews arrived in Auschwitz, Doctor Mengele selected the detainees whom he was to use for mad and criminal experiments. Our study was equated with these nazis who in November 1938 organized in Germany a night of terror called "crystal night," following the death in Paris of a counselor of the German Embassy, who was killed by a young man named Herschel Grynspan. In the course of this night 814 Jewish stores were destroyed, 191 synagogues were burned, and 36 Jews were killed.

The "logic" of Dufoix and Gallo led them to identify those who drew public attention to the dangers of uncontrolled immigration in France with the most devoted servants of a doctrine known to history, which was followed by a pitiful procession of the millions of people killed in the concentration camps.

That was hateful. And it was insane. It was all the more hateful and insane because the accusations came from the lips and the pens of men and of women who are seriously compromised by their associations with this other totalitarianism, which is just as cruel but has much greater longevity than nazism: communism.

Novelist or Prophet

Those who spoke and wrote about "Hitler and Mengele" carefully avoided discussing first of all the figures prepared by Gerard-Francois Dumont. They attacked Jean Raspail, the novelist. But why can't a novelist at times be a prophet? When H. G. Wells wrote "The War of the Worlds" in 1897; when George Orwell wrote "Animal Farm" and "1984" something like 40 years ago, which were visions of the totalitarian and bureaucratic world, he must have been attacked, I imagine, by critics who denounced him as foolishly as those who attacked Jean Raspail for his novel, "Camp des saints" [Camp of the Saints]. This Raspail novel is a work which perhaps the future will find mistaken, but which had the merit of raising, many years ago, a question which even the Left will find it difficult to avoid: that of the identity of France.

It was Jean Daniel who, clearly, does not approve of everything in our study but who wrote these words in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: "Now, it is perfectly legitimate to ask ourselves about the implications of the flow of immigrants,

as well as about certain disequilibria in demographic trends. This is a matter which involves not only France, but Europe as well."

It is even a question which involves Africa.

Do we see in the case of these French mothers who cannot go to visit their children born of Algerian fathers more than an attempt by Algeria to maintain its national and religious identity?

And aren't the Israelis confronted with a problem of maintaining their own identity?

To Ruin Our Study

Whether or not one agrees with all of the words which we used, let us discuss our projections, which are of uncertain value, like all projections--as Louis Pauwels said at once. So be it. But on the substance of the question--and it is the substance of the question which counts--Laurent Fabius had a marvelous opportunity on 27 October to ruin our study, when he spoke to millions of French people on television.

He had known of this study for 48 hours. He knew of the statements by Minister Dufoix. He could have known of the editorial by Max Gallo. Now, not only did he avoid expressing an emotion which he was only to give vent to 3 days later in the National Assembly, in the course of a pitiful "session session for catching up on Assembly business," but he said he agreed "with only one or two exceptions" (we will never know what they were) with the views held by Jacques Chirac on the questions of insecurity and immigration.

Come on, the manufacturers of nonsense are fakes. They want to make us believe that history repeats itself.

Today, in 1985, the French people know very well that it is not 1938. The Germany of today is not under the nazis. Italy is not a fascist country. And Franco is dead.

France is not encircled by nations preaching immoral and contagious doctrines. If there is, in fact, a totalitarian threat, it is found in Eastern Europe. This involves the threat posed by Soviet Russia, which already holds many countries under the yoke of its ideas and of its prohibitions.

The manufacturers of nonsense are acting today, driven less by virtue than by political interest, which is much worse. They rattle the skeletons which they shook in the past when--with a hypocrisy of the pen which was added to the malice of insinuation--Francois Mitterrand, in "Le coup d'etat permanent" [The Permanent Coup d'Etat], already has compared General De Gaulle to Franco, Mussolini, and, finally, Hitler.

Griotteray Comments

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 pp 116-119

[Text] Students of politics and of the future can return to their beloved studies. The terms of the political debate are decidedly unforeseeable. Everyone expected that the conflict would be centered in the economic field. Now what are the two politically decisive questions of these past 5 years? I would say the schools and immigration. The first question caused the explosion which ended on 24 June 1985 with 2 million French demonstrating in the streets. The second question has overturned electoral assumptions in a manner which can be considered permanent. The electoral "card" which well served Jean Marie Le Pen in the past is too clearly associated with immigration questions for the electoral score of the National Front to last very long, unless what brought the front into being does not disappear.

In this sense the debate begun by LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE will have served only as a catalyst. We can discuss the statistics and the interpretations to be made of them. The fact remains that there will be an "immigration question," just as there was a "social question" during the 19th century. And to answer this question it will not be possible to limit oneself to "letting things ride from time to time," in the words of Francois Mitterrand. The RPR [Rally of the French People] and the UDF [French Democratic Union], which so legitimately aspire to regain control of the government in 1986, will be judged in particular on the action that they will take in this area.

Contrary to what many people want to make us believe, these measures have been studied and discussed in various documents. It is a test of intention to state that the opposition has nothing to say on this subject. On the other hand, what is true is that more than one of the opposition representatives (We will mention no names.) would like to avoid talking about the subject and that others have ideas exactly contrary to those which their respective parties have adopted.

This last attitude is based on two evident reasons, but which are too rarely given proper emphasis: first, there is the desire to take care of one's image before the media, which is sympathetic "with the Left." In his own time Leon Blum spoke of the fear that "people will say you are a communist." There exists today a fear of "what will they say in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR" (or in other, similar publications.). People will say to me: that is stupid. It's 5 years since the Left saw all of its hopes go up in smoke in less than a week. How could they still be courting the favor of those who have been a sounding board for the Left for so many years? In fact, it is stupid, but there it is. Just as the Marxist Christians will probably be the last to revere Marx, for a long time to come there will still be members of the RPR or of the UDF who will be haunted by the idea of displeasing the media of the Left. The second reason is that those who disagree with the views of their party on immigration questions are either not holding elective office or have been elected in areas where immigration is a marginal phenomenon and where, consequently, the

vote in favor of Le Pen itself is very small. Thus, there are positions being taken which are considered "courageous" but which are based on a little bit of cowardice, of compromises, and of taking the easy way out which somewhat diminish their heroic side.

However, we cannot fool around for long with the facts. At present the diagnosis has been made, and it has been presented publicly. Even if a real embargo is placed on the statistics the government has, which poses the whole problem of information in a democracy. Is it proper that so much money should be spent every day to improve our apparatus for collecting statistics and that the authorities can cover up reality by mutilated statistics, on incorrect or dissimilar bases, and oriented to serve their presuppositions? That is the first thing that the new governing majority will have to do: develop unquestionable facts and statistics. There are thousands of government employees who work for the INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] and in many other government offices, at the departmental or other levels, who collate all possible and imaginable data. If they can't do that, what good are they?

In fact, they can do this very well, provided they receive orders to do so from a determined government. Notwithstanding the lack of precise statistics, we know right now that the contribution of immigrant labor can be considered as largely surplus to our needs. We can take into account its actual cost, particularly in terms of social security allocations. Is it a scandal to say so? No. What is scandalous is the desire to make a whole people (our own) feel guilty about another people toward whom we have shown a generosity unknown elsewhere in the world. Thus, to know what will be done after the elections of March 1986, we will need to refer to a few documents and easily obtainable statements. We will also find them in the publications of the Perspectives and Realities Clubs and in those of Club 89, as well as in the RPR brochure entitled "Le Renouveau" [The Renewal] and in documents published by the UDF, whose substance will be found in the governmental platform now being negotiated between the RPR and the UDF.

Of course, we will find there the reaffirmation of a need for tighter control of our borders. In the first place that requires a strengthening of European cooperation (What's the use of closing our borders to Zairian immigrants if they can freely enter Belgium and come to France from there?). That involves a restrictive visa policy, particularly with the countries of the Maghreb. And too bad if that creates frictions with certain countries. To govern is to choose, as Pierre Mendes France used to say. In the domestic sphere there is a whole series of simple measures to undertake, which would aim at making immigration less attractive. Reference is often made to the case of family allowances which, by a singular, perverse effect, "encourage births in those non-European families which already have too many children, without having any significant impact on Frenchwomen. In fact, this is an example, but it is a whole system of social security which is involved, from which even clandestine immigrants benefit, and which must be restudied, chapter by chapter.

However, it is in the legal area that it will be necessary to act the most quickly and firmly. It will be necessary to be determined to "go all the way," so that the laws of the republic can once more be applied in certain areas which have become territories outside the law, where the police cannot enter. Much more than financial resources, it is political will which the police need to take action in this area. And it is this same political will which will make it possible to carry out identity checks. Is it so much to ask people to carry a small piece of paper with them, certifying their identity? If they have such an identity card, what are they afraid of? And if they don't have such an identity card, by what right are they immune from control? Regarding obtaining this national identity card, that be done under a specific procedure, aimed at returning to the ways of a chosen nationality and no longer obtained clandestinely.

What is extraordinary is that some people are afraid of the "cost" of such a policy. Apart from assistance to help immigrants return to their country--for which the necessary finance is rather easy to imagine--truth forces us to say that this policy will cost almost nothing and, due to the abuses which it will bring to an end, it will even make it possible to achieve some substantial budgetary savings.

Thus, there are pages and pages of measures which will have no other effect than to make sure that the clocks run on time. Many people will ask themselves whether that will be possible? Can we have confidence in the traditional parties? This is an area where we delayed a great deal and at times made the wrong decisions prior to 1981, it is true. This is another reason for thinking that we will do the job all the more quickly after March 1986.

Commentary by Pierre Chaunu

Paris LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE in French 9 Nov 85 p 119

[Text] The reaction of the government spokesperson regarding the study in LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE on immigration, using the calculations of Gerard-Francois Dumont, is revealing and absurd. It reveals a surprising degree of irresponsibility. Minister Dufoix (remember her handling of the "Greenpeace" affair and the AIDS question) spoke, snarled, threatened, and then apparently reflected--perhaps someone even reflected for her in her personal cabinet--on the imprudence shown in her first reactions.

The advisers who inspired the statements by Minister Dufoix have proved their total inability to anticipate changes. They only know the verse from Ecclesiastes: "What has been is what will be." Oh well, no. What will be is what they have been totally unable to imagine. Unless the wall of cowardly silence is broken, we will finally succeed in provoking this positive, retroactive step which Alfred Sauvy so well defined in his celebrated statement: "Predict in order not to see."

So let us look again at the challenged data in the assumptions regarding the future by Gerard-Francois Dumont. Is it necessary to recall them? These only involve a hypothetical future situation, which we will call an assumption. In a scientific study you calculate several projections, following several assumptions. Don't ask a news magazine to publish all of the assumptions calculated which call for space. A magazine like POPULATION would be honored to do this. LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE limited itself to the publication of a single, plausible assumption if bad luck ensured that France continued to be led for a long time by the "irresponsible leaders" of today.

The first challenge concerns the 2.6 million non-European foreigners. All of the experts know (see Jacques Dupaquier) how much the census of 1982 is open to challenge on this point. How can we take into account clandestine immigrants and people left out of the count? A number of converging indices show that Gerard-Francois Dumont's assumption is plausible and relatively low, with the end to immigration controls, our borders like a sieve, and police who are discouraged if not disarmed, and who wisely fold their arms. Is it necessary to add those automatically naturalized through the operation of legislation which goes back to the time when immigrants were Europeans of Jewish or Christian ancestry and sincerely wanted to integrate themselves into French society and for whom military service was a serious obligation, equally binding on all?

The second point is more serious. I have already mentioned it.* It involves the demographic differential. An immigrant population which is integrated into another society does not maintain for long a fertility rate radically higher than that of the society which accepts it. However, that is precisely where the shoe pinches.

The Marange Report

This immigrant population is not being integrated. It is meeting obstacles which are difficult to overcome. The Marange report underlined the failure of the children of immigrants to assimilate themselves into French society. This new phenomenon is only beginning to become apparent. When the volume of immigrants crosses a threshold already reached in southern France along the Mediterranean and in the large cities, a kind of de facto spatial segregation will occur which will have the effect of maintaining fertility differentials.

Therefore, there is nothing to prove that the Arabs of the Maghreb in our country will suddenly behave like Malthusians tomorrow, as the Italians did in France. With a different cause there will be a different effect. Until more detailed information is available, the assumption made by Gerard-Francois Dumont is therefore as valid, if not more so, than those made by the office of the government spokesperson.

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* In LE FIGARO of 31 December 1980, p 2.

The essential problem remains: the fertility rate of Frenchwomen and the evaluation of the immigration flow from the South. The rate of 1.25 children per woman predicted in France in 1992 is, unfortunately, the level reached in 1985 by more than 100 million Europeans on our borders (in the Federal Republic of Germany, the northern part of Italy, Denmark, and Holland). That is the level which we will reach if the socialists continue in government. The fertility rate is already lower in the large German cities (Munich has a fertility rate of 0.75 children per woman.) and in most of the large Italian cities, thanks to abortion (about 1.0 abortions per woman). Germany had been stable for 10 years around the long time unthinkable level of 1.40 to 1.45 children per woman (I had predicted this in 1964.). In the past 2 years Germany has fallen below 1.25 children per woman.

Finally, here are irrefutable statistics whch Minister Dufoix should know and which prove, unfortunately, how far Gerard-Francois Dumont has looked ahead toward the problems which lie in front of us. Unless there is a miracle, which we are trying to bring about. Between 1968 and 1972 Rennes and Niort had fertility levels of 2.4 and 2.71 children per woman. In 1984 the had dropped to 1.38 and 1.42, respectively. In 1984 Poitiers had a figure of 1.34; Limoges, 1.26; Limousin, 1.42; and Toulouse, 1.40. The Limousin and the Poitou-Charentes areas have almost no immigrants. They are the areas which have dropped the most. They didn't wait until 1992 to prove that, after all, Gerard-Francois Dumont is right. I wish that the Muslims in France could live, transmitting to their children their culture and their faith, in an atmosphere of order and harmony. That is why I raise my voice now to call for a major national policy of giving priority to life, which the present opposition should win with in the period after 16 March 1986. You won't be able to build a rampart against the wave of immigrants coming in from the South, simply to protect an old people's home. A third child in every home is the only way of maintaining a French France which will also have among its descendants people of Maghrebian ancestry, who will have agreed to share our destiny, respecting our customs and our traditions.

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POLITICAL FRANCE

MARCHAIS, PCF, SOVIET TIES EXAMINED THROUGH FABIEN BOOK

Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI in French 12-18 Sep 85 pp 7-13

[Article by Serge Maury: "How Marchais Handled Marchais]

[Text] That Gorbachev would receive Georges Marchais in Moscow was not a surprise. Why would the new Soviet leader refuse to see the leader of a communist party which is largely back in the socialist camp after a few years away from it? That the two men issued a joint communique whose contents were of interest to almost nobody is a fairly natural development. What was strange, on the other hand, is that this statement did not contain any attacks against the terrible French socialists who sold out to the big capitalists and the mercenaries of imperialism. The paradox is that today everything is going on as if it were the French communists who, in a sectarian or dogmatic way, are acting much like the Soviets. For their part the Soviets seem to want to improve their image. They have avoided displaying a dogmatic position, to some extent. For undoubtedly it is the Soviets who, in the joint communique, carefully avoided expressing the most primitive form of the anti-Socialist Party propaganda which is so dear to the PCF [French Communist Party].

How did this happen, when just 10 years ago the French communists seemed to wish to move away from Moscow, following the example of the Italian communists, in order to reestablish their democratic and liberal virginity, so to speak?

The enigmatic Jean Fabien (see "La guerre des camarades" [The War Between the Comrades], published by Editions Orban) provides an answer to this question. Who is Jean Fabien? We can state once again that behind this collective pen name are members of the apparatus of the French Communist

Party who worked for the adoption of Eurocommunism in the PCF. The present party line has cast them into the depths of despair.

An Unavoidable Deterioration

For our part, we don't intend to become involved in an internal party debate which does not concern us at all. Although the Stalinist communists look terrifying to us, the reformist communists often look to us either as utopians or as quite naive in their outlook. On the other hand, it is important for us to understand how the French Communist Party could take the sharp turn which led it to the brink of a break with Moscow, finally returning to an excessively pro-Soviet position. This is particularly important, as this change in the party line looks like a real kind of sabotage, a formidable kind of suicide. By refusing to adapt itself to modern realities, the communist party has condemned itself to an kind of deterioration which, over the long run, threatens to make it totally irrelevant.

We can take some pleasure from this, since the decline of the Communist Party plays into the hands of reformist and liberal forces. On the other hand, we might consider that an Italian kind of communism is a useful stimulus which could benefit the country because of the creative challenge which it could present. In any case we need to understand that this form of self-destruction was possible. We should understand how a small, anti-party group led by Leroy and Plissonier was able to paralyze Georges Marchais, cut off those advocating change, and gain effective control of the party apparatus.

Jean Fabien, who observed these changes from inside the party, answers these questions in a clear and precise way. That is why we exclusively publish here extensive extracts from the book published under his name. [Text of comments from L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI and extracts from "La guerre des camarades" are identified]

The Communist Party: the Secret History of an Act of Sabotage

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] It was a large-scale Soviet intervention which led the French Communist Party, and more particularly Georges Marchais, to abandon its Eurocommunist inclinations and return to communist orthodoxy as defined by the Kremlin. That is what a group of communist leaders, writing under the pen name of Jean Fabien, declare in their new book which Les Editions Orban is publishing. This is a precise, fascinating book, which absolutely must be

read to understand one of the great turning points of the past few years. Everything begins in 1973, when the PCF was trying to free itself from Moscow control by moving closer to the Italian Communist Party.

["La guerre des camarades"] Within the party a gigantic battle was taking place between those called "opportunists" (but also "liquidators," "Eurocommunists," etc), led by Georges Marchais, and the "dogmatists" (also called "pro-Soviets," "fundamentalists," etc), led by Roland Leroy. This battle, with no holds barred, took place under the watchful eyes of the Soviets. They helped and advised the latter group, while arranging for the defeat of the former.

After having condemned the Soviet Union at the time of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia it was the "liquidators" or "opportunists," led by a Marchais who had "turned his Stalinist coat," who attached the PCF chariot to the Socialist Party, whose leader, Francois Mitterrand, was not in good odor in Moscow, to say the least. In Moscow they considered him more of an "Atlanticist" and more pro-American than the leaders of the French Right.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] Beginning in September 1973, Roland Leroy took advantage of the coup d'etat led by Pinochet against President Salvador Allende in Chile to fire the first shots of the barrage.

["La guerre des camarades"] Roland Leroy immediately published in L'HUMANITE an article entitled "The Coup d'Etat in Chile and 'Le defi democratique,'" [This is a reference to "The Democratic Challenge," a book by Georges Marchais. Under the appearances of "defending" the concepts in the Marchais book, he undermined them by using a long-tested method which can be summarized in a few words: the bourgeoisie will never let us alone! Leroy wrote: "The coup d'etat and the reactionary and fascist terror in Chile demonstrate once again that imperialism, the big capitalists, and the reactionaries are ready to do anything to protect their privileges, to prevent the workers and all of the people from marching forward to democracy and socialism. They are ready for anything--even in France."

After the signature of the Common Program with the Socialist Party Roland Leroy decided to be the leader of an opposition group in the party. When the coup d'etat took place in Chile, he found suitable ground for his efforts.

He intensified his efforts, applying the famous precept of the revolutionary movement: move to the Left of a communist party which has gone too far to the Right. Leroy therefore based himself on the "spontaneous" fundamentalism of party members, on their credo: unfailing support for the Soviet Union and "innate" mistrust of the social democrats or Socialist Party, who are "worse than the Right."

Roland Leroy is too skilled a politician to apply these old fantasies literally. However, he made use of these "principles" to force a communist leadership engaged in a dangerous adventure to change direction.

It must be said that this man had so many scores to settle! "Swept off" the Central Committee of the party in 1954, to use his own term, he had just missed the supreme and prestigious position in the party leadership: that of secretary general. Waldeck-Rochet clearly considered that he had no choice. In no case, he said, should Roland Leroy become secretary general. Regarding Marchais, Waldeck-Rochet thought, I will have 10 years to train him. Unfortunately, illness was to cut short Waldeck's program.

Not that Leroy, a Norman, did not have the qualifications required to serve as secretary general. He was too well qualified! Leroy is so byzantine, so much at home in the labyrinth of government, its traps, and its terrible pleasures.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] However, supported in particular by Kanapa, Marchais tried to speed up the process.

["La guerre des camarades"] Nonetheless, what was then attempted in the PCF was done in silence. Now, how could these changes be made in a party where at least two political lines were in conflict? The use of secrecy forced the two factions in the party to make use of the techniques of palace revolutions. This made any change or evolution in the struggle very difficult.

What was done by a majority of the secretariat of the PCF and the Political Bureau--by a few men, in other words--could be undone in the same way.

Thanks to the Pinochet Coup d'Etat, Roland Leroy Undertakes His Offensive

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] And, in effect, the guerrilla warfare carried on by Roland Leroy continued. For this reason he had articles published in L'HUMANITE criticizing LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR but which were really aimed at the modernist wing of the Communist Party. On several occasions the supporters of the Eurocommunist line had to water down their statements to avoid giving ammunition to the "dogmatists."

["La guerre des camarades"] For example, after having spent nearly a week in Czechoslovakia, Paul Laurent made a joke, stating that the Czechoslovak workers and their communist party had worked steadily "to eliminate the painful traces of 1968." The purpose of the maneuver was to avoid at all cost being bypassed on the Left by Leroy, who appeared in everyone's eyes as the official spokesman of the "pro-Soviet group" and the sectarian communist element.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] Internal tension within the party was at its height when unexpected events made Georges Marchais believe that he was in a position to speed up the process he was engaged in.

["La guerre des camarades"] The death of President Pompidou in April 1974 spoiled the "Eurocommunist" plan. During his political life Secretary General Waldeck-Rochet, Marchais' predecessor, never ceased warning the other PCF leaders. He had advocated the drafting of a Common Program with the

socialists and permitted it to be completed. However, he repeated these warnings like an obsession. He said never, and underlined the never, should a first secretary of the Socialist Party be permitted to become the joint candidate of the Left in presidential elections! Because, he thought, on the basis of the enthusiasm produced by the Common Program, the socialist candidate would sweep the board.

Attentive, as always, to what he was advised to do, in 1974 George Marchais hastened to propose to Francois Mitterrand, who had become first secretary of the PS at the party congress in Epinay in 1971, that he be the candidate of the Left! "Georges" pressed the Central Committee to ratify the joint candidacy of Mitterrand. The latter began by resisting. He felt the situation was not ready for that. However, the leadership of the Communist Party immediately launched a broad campaign throughout the country to encourage people to speak up in favor of such action. The results were unexpected and quickly swept away any remaining resistance. In fact the PCF leadership opted for a joint candidacy for internal reasons in particular. They saw in this rapidly developing event an historic chance to establish a policy of union union with the socialists which had met with too much opposition in the past. There had been opposition both within the party and abroad.

Marchais Forgets Waldeck's Recommendations

It was thought that taking part in an election based on the Common Program and which would therefore imply the participation of communist ministers in the government would have a double advantage. It would involve having millions of citizens accept the idea of the participation of communist ministers in government, even in case the Left was defeated. On the basis of a good electoral performance they tried hard to demonstrate the irreversible and necessary character of modernizing the PCF.

The results were unexpected for those within the PCF who advocated a turn toward democratic practices.

However, during these presidential elections, two events should be noted which had a major impact on the future: the revolution in Portugal and the "surprise" visit of the Soviet Ambassador in France to President Giscard during the period between the two rounds of the 1974 presidential election.

This thunderbolt was not a total surprise for the communist leadership. In the party they knew that the Soviets firmly advocated the status quo in Europe.

This balance in Europe, achieved with difficulty as a result of World War II, was convenient for the Soviets. Any change which would carry the risk of changing the borders is still perceived by them as a direct threat. This was the case with Hungary in 1956, with Czechoslovakia in 1968, and with Poland more recently. In 1974 candidate Mitterrand, even though he had little chance of winning in the second round, represented a threat of destabilization for

the Soviets. Since de Gaulle they had counted on contradictions and frictions between the French bourgeoisie and the Americans. The Russians were used to this bourgeoisie, maintaining cordial relations with many French right wing politicians and satisfactory state to state relations with France. When the anti-Soviet campaigns of the Right mobilized the communists in France, the Soviets were not particularly offended, knowing well that the same men who referred to the bolshevik threat were sending them soothing messages through many channels.

Their reasoning was simple: a man of the French Right, in his relationships with the Americans, did not have to prove his loyalty. On the other hand, a man of the Left might add something in decisive areas: relations with the U. S. A., involvement in NATO, firmness regarding the USSR.

Moscow Plays with Giscard to Sabotage Marchais

The Soviet ambassador, by paying a visit to Giscard between the two rounds of the 1974 presidential elections, went to designate him, in the eyes of the whole world, as the preferred candidate of the USSR and to give him a decoration for his services to international detente.

By acting in this way the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] designated the enemy to be destroyed to the "pro-Soviet element" in the PCF, confirming them in the views they held with certainty: Francois Mitterrand is worse than the Right!

Naturally, a communique was published by the Political Bureau of the PCF, stating that the visit by the Soviet ambassador to Giscard was untimely. it would have been instructive to see those in the Political Bureau who were very happy about the Soviet action sign the communique figuratively with both hands. They knew that in political life it is easier to do the wrong thing to repair damage already done.

In applying the indirect "signal" from the Soviets on how to vote, many communists--already!--were going to vote in the second round for the candidate of the bourgeoisie. As the difference between Giscard as the winner and Mitterrand as the loser was not even 300,000 votes, that led the "changed" leadership of the PCF in 1981 to think that the communist vote for Giscard in the second round could have swung the balance over to the "correct" side.

The time had not yet come to have a "fight." Among the "dogmatists" it was expected that the "revisionists" would be hoist with their own petard and would sweep the social democrats [the Socialist Party] off the board.

Then, after the presidential elections, large numbers of letters were received at the headquarters of the party containing membership applications. However, there it was: many of the applications were addressed to the "Common Program Party," when they were not addressed to the "Socialist Communist Party."

This regrettable confusion was blamed on the enthusiasm of men and women who had previously had little to do with politics. The youth of the letter writers was considered to have been largely responsible for it.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] It was in this atmosphere that Henri Fizbin, the new leader of the PCF federation in the Paris area, took the initiative of inviting non-communists to a meeting of the local PCF committee.

["La guerre des camarades"] Towering with rage, the "pro-Soviet group" at the local level frothed at the mouth at this display of opportunism. On the other hand, the "pro-Soviet" leaders encouraged such initiatives. To destroy your adversary, you have to let him destroy himself.

The "heresy" reached its high point at the Central Committee meeting held on 10 and 11 June 1974. There it was stated that with the exception of the feudal elements of the financial and industrial world and of their political lackeys, everyone had his place in the union of the people of France! This unleashed an outcry within the party. Critics said, what? The gaullists, the bosses of small and medium-sized companies, those who had voted for the "center"--these people had a place in the union of the Left?

A large proportion of the Central Committee had become drunk with success.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] The "renewers" believed that they had won the battle. The 21st party congress, they thought, would support the new line in a spectacular way. The "dogmatists" felt that they had lost. That is when Roland Leroy decided to strengthen his counteroffensive.

["La guerre des camarades"] He prepared his tactics in complete secrecy. First of all, he let the "opportunists" destroy themselves. He let them talk on as much as possible to obtain flammable material for a spectacular trial at the Communist Party level, which had 20 percent of the votes at the party congress. Secondly, he relied more than ever on the Soviets. Thirdly, he worked discreetly on members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee "to turn them" to his way of thinking.

To accumulate flammable material, Leroy thought that it would be enough to let Georges Marchais talk. The latter believed more and more in his audiovisual skills. In effect, Marchais was beginning to perform marvelously well with the media. On television in mid June 1974 this skill served Leroy and the "dogmatists" in an unexpected way. Marchais said that, yes, the Communist Party was changing and would change even further. Yes, some members of the party were saying that certain principles were being abandoned. For communists who were used to dissimulate for long period of time ideas contrary to those expressed by the party leadership, this last statement by Marchais showed them that there were many party members who opposed the new line.

However, what created a scandal among the communists used to "fighting with the socialists," was the statement that the Socialist Party reportedly had

abandoned the principle of class collaboration. Wouldn't the PCF be the only party to oppose the bourgeoisie firmly? The outraged "dogmatists" demanded to know what difference would remain between the two parties.

The Stalinists Play the Policy of the Worst Outcome

The "dogmatists" would base themselves on this fear. It was the whole tradition of the party which was at risk, against the possibility of participation in government.

The Soviets, who were kept regularly informed of the development of this struggle within the French party, gave their "friends" an encouraging push.

Still in mid June 1974--on 19 June, more precisely--a major Soviet delegation arrived in France at the invitation of the PCF. It was led by Boris Ponomarev--called "Pono" for short--who at the time was an alternate member of the Political Bureau, a secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the boss of the International Department. He was Moscow's eye on the world. To prevent the delegation from meeting Leroy, he was sent to Cuba for 2 weeks, from 10 to 23 June.

How Leroy Set His Delayed Action Bombs

However, Leroy arranged for a part of the Soviet delegation to visit his own area, Seine-Maritime. He was therefore brought up to date precisely and by his own "men" on the wishes of the CPSU and the view of the international situation which the Soviets held at this crucial moment for the future of the PCF. What Leroy learned on his return strengthened him in the conviction that a victory over the "liquidators" was possible. Ponomarev's "heavy hand" could be clearly seen when he explained that the events in Chile had been the first and a somewhat lengthy experiment with the peaceful development of the revolution. He meant: you see, my French comrades, how that ended!

In fact, Ponomarev repeated in France what he had just published in the June issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM. Concerned about the consequences, in a period of preparation for an extraordinary congress of the party, the leadership of the PCF had decided not to publish Ponomarev's article in the French edition of the magazine. The Soviet delegation took advantage of its trip to Seine-Maritime to leave behind, for whatever use might be made of it, a translation of the text of the article for Leroy's "faithful friends."

From Cuba, naturally, Leroy took pleasure in reporting to the Political Bureau the questions asked by the Cuban comrades who sounded the same themes as the Soviets.

To Leroy and his supporters, there was nothing more to do than to wait attentively and to chose the best time to unleash their offensive.

At the end of September 1974 partial legislative elections took place in France, in the midst of preparations for the extraordinary congress of the PCF. Apart from one exceptional race in the Dordogne, these partial elections marked a decline in the vote of the Communist Party. The obsession of a major group in the party--not to lose ground to the Socialist Party--was transformed into a nightmare: it had happened! While a "great fear of well-intentioned" communists ran through the party, Leroy began a broad offensive, using all of the methods of conspiracy. In mid flight the extraordinary congress was turned away from its "renovating" course.

In the history of the PCF there has never been a draft resolution which was torn apart to such an extent. The final draft was aimed in exactly the opposite direction.

It was the brusk, backward step taken by Marchais which made it possible for the "dogmatists" to win. Warned by his extreme sensitivity to events, he estimated--and certainly overestimated--the dangers of a situation where all of the internal forces within the party and external forces (the Soviets) as well were in league against modernizing the PCF. He thought that the moment had not yet come to force his way through. One can only imagine how much Khrushchev's unfortunate experience weighed on the decision. After having carried his party through a courageous criticism of the activity of the PCSU during the Stalin period, Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964 by a party apparatus which had never accepted this formidable challenge. The Khrushchev experience marked Georges Marchais forever. At the 21st Congress Leroy roughly handled the party "fundamentalists."

How the Hard Line Communists Sabotaged the Marchais Congress

Leroy passed the draft resolution through the grinder and was cheered by a party apparatus--for the party apparatus was at the congress, for the most part--which was disturbed to see the party diluted in the union of the Left and likely to lose its identity.

Another event in November 1974 was the appointment of Leroy to the position of editor of L'HUMANITE. After the "coup" at the 21st Congress, everyone thought that the proximity of the two "comrades" would raise insoluble problems, as "Georges," despite everything, remained as party secretary general. A compromise was sought. Gaston Plissonier proposed to Leroy making him the editor of L'HUMANITE. Thus, there was neither victor nor vanquished. The diplomatic ability of "Gaston" made it possible for the two principal leaders of the PCF to accept the decision. For "Georges" "Gaston" had just approved the work Leroy had done to split the party; for Leroy he proved the importance of the central leadership of the PCF in changing a political line, slowing down or speeding up its application.

The "Renovators" Go All Out

Leroy, as editor of L'HUMANITE, never ceased demanding that the most obscure dancer at the Bolchoi Ballet and the humblest Soviet bureaucrat passing through Paris, should be warmly welcomed at the newspaper office.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] However, the renovators did not admit defeat. Georges Marchais had not yet really changed course. As it was known that the Soviet Union was paying more and more attention to President Giscard d'Esting, the renovators took pleasure in attacking Giscard's foreign policy more and more sharply in an effort to bypass the Soviets to the Left. However, they showed prudence in doing so. When, in October 1974, Alexander Dubcek stated that a totalitarian system had again been established in his country, Georges Marchais was stung to anger. This Dubcek had just complicated his business once again. For he was preparing to take his revenge on Leroy!

["La guerre des camarades"] After having their fingers burned by the sharp reversal at the 21st congress the Eurocommunist leaders in the PCF prepared a full scale plan for battle. They set up a team to "present" advanced ideas, they chose the themes to raise in preparing for and even holding a party congress which they wanted to be "historic." This 23rd Congress was to confirm the autonomy and even the "independence" of the PCF with regard to the USSR. "Fabien" knew that if they did not achieve this goal, the party would be swept aside by French public opinion, which would seek refuge in the arms of the Socialist Party.

It was a matter of urgency for the Soviets to change tactics. That is what they did. They decided that the PCF was the weakest link in the "revisionist" coalition established by the Italian, Spanish, and French communist parties. The PCF was made even weaker because the CPSU set up a "fifth column" within the French party.

The Soviets reasoned this way. Their Stalinist advanced guard within the PCF had succeeded in hindering the "democratic" development of the French party, going so far as to reverse the course of the 21st Congress. However, the Soviets considered that they had to count on their own forces more and more. They only made use of those forces developing within the PCF as support elements, charged above all with collecting "information."

A Low-Ranking Member Denounces the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] Clashes between the CPSU and the leadership of the French Communist Party continued to increase in number. With each step taken by the "renovators" the Soviets issued a warning. For the moment, things went no further. Marchais then regained his confidence and thought he could take further action.

A minor, obscure, low-ranking party member was to propose, during the discussions at the 23rd Congress, an amendment which would have "earth

shaking" consequences. The member in question lived in the Department of Essonne. He prepared a text which was entitled, no less: "Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." The secretary of the Pablo Neruda cell in Epinay-sous-Senart quite simply proposed eliminating this concept. In his view--in fact for the party leadership which made use of this member--you could not advocate full democracy and administer it with a "good" dictatorship.

As if by accident, Marchais appeared on television on the same day. He was asked about the dictatorship of the proletariat. He supported the unknown party member. What Brezhnev had feared since 1968 had happened. The dictatorship of the proletariat had become outmoded. This was the beginning of a long series of messages called "televised decisions," that is, with members of the party and even of the party apparatus learning more and more frequently of changes in PCF positions on television. The "palace revolution" to bring the PCF up to date thus made use of tried and tested methods: secrets held by a few privileged members and the use of public forums, etc. However, in politics everything is valid if it pays off. Because the use of secret maneuvers made it possible for those who were politically defeated in the corridors to take their revenge. One day or another.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] The 22nd Congress was a success for the "renovators." Furthermore, it was at this time that Roland Leroy broke three ribs following a fall in his apartment. From that moment on the Soviet counteroffensive began. The PCF leadership counterattacked by deciding to inform party members of the state of the dispute and the realities of the disagreement with the Soviet comrades.

["La guerre des camarades"] Departmental committees of the party, expanded to include the secretaries of party sections, were informed of the differences between the PCF and the CPSU. However, much to the surprise of the French Eurocommunist leaders, it was noted that very few party leaders had been much impressed by the decision of the Political Bureau to free party members of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Stalinist lobby within the PCF was operating at full speed. It made the decision of the Political Bureau inoperative. Thus, it showed the power which it still had.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] On the Soviet side they made use of the Czechs, the East Germans, and then Suslov, the theoretician of the old guard. The participation of Juquin at a meeting in favor of the dissident Pliouchtch and the appearance of Kanapa on the program, "Dossiers de l'ecran" [Screen Files] on the occasion of the showing of the film "L'aveu" [The Confession] set off the powder keg.

["La guerre des camarades"] It was in mid February 1977 that everything came to a head. On a mid February afternoon, at 4:00 pm, an emissary from Moscow arrived at the Place du Colonel Fabien in Paris, the headquarters of the French Communist Party. He had a communication to present to the PCF leadership. A few days before the "Eurocommunist Summit" in Madrid, scheduled

for 2-3 March 1977, it was known that this communication from Moscow was reportedly "cordial and frank," as described in diplomatic circles. Therefore, it was rude.

The Kremlin Uses the Threat of a Split

In effect the messenger began by indicating that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had kept itself informed of the preparations for the Madrid meeting. Then the special representative of the CPSU came to the essential point: the project for the preparation of a charter of Eurocommunism, marked more significantly by open criticism of the Soviet Union. All of this meant, in the eyes of the CPSU, an unacceptable division between the two parties! If that was the case, comrades, the Soviet messenger said, emphasizing his words, this would be a very serious matter. It would be a step toward a split.

The terrible and magic word had been spoken: a split! In national and international communist organizations there is perhaps no more effective a threat! The specter of a split haunts communist parties, as that of a schism haunts the Catholic Church.

After having made his impact, the messenger concluded in a heavy handed way by hoping that the French Communist Party would find a means of avoiding coming to such an extreme point. With all of the consequences which that implied! He was referring to all of the assistance provided to the PCF.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] However, the Madrid meeting took place. The French and Italian communists, impressed by the Soviet threats, showed the greatest prudence. That was not enough. In March 1977, between the two rounds of the municipal elections, a letter from the Kremlin, couched in terms of unheard of violence, was received at the headquarters of the French Communist Party. L'EXPRESS published a summary of it in February 1985. In the letter the French Communist Party was quite simply called on to renounce the Eurocommunist line and rejoin the socialist camp or accept the consequences.

["La guerre des camarades"] One thing was clear: the CPSU was calling for "the skins" of the members of the PCF leadership who were the most resolute in their criticism of the socialist system prevailing in eastern Europe: Marchais and Kanapa. Never, in the memory of any French communist, had such a procedure been used with a western communist party since World War II. The CPSU thought that the right time had come. It knew that, within the French Central Committee, it could count on a rather large number of members who were totally or partially on its side.

Furthermore, the polls and the atmosphere in France--everything led them to think that the Left, made up of an "Atlanticist" Socialist Party and a Eurocommunist PCF, could win the legislative elections of March 1978 and end up governing the country.

The CPSU could not accept this prospect. This government of the Left would feel itself obliged to be tougher with the Soviet Union than the government under President Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Minister Barre.

The moment had therefore come for the Political Bureau to make its final effort. It met. Each member gave his opinion about the letter from the Soviet party, of which each had received a copy.

The general tone used by the members of the Political Bureau was one of indignation. They considered such interference intolerable, and each one was "warmly" invited by Plissonier to express himself. They naturally waited for Leroy's statement. Using language indicating that he shared the feelings of his peers on the Political Bureau, the editor of L'HUMANITE nevertheless gave them a slap in the face. He stated that this letter from the CPSU in fact threatened a break with the PCF. "Roland" thus tried to strike fear among the "softest" elements in the Political Bureau, who were already frightened at the idea of directly confronting the "fraternal party." Leroy went on. He wanted to force the Political Bureau to think of nothing but that: to mend the tear and reach a compromise with the CPSU.

Then Marchais spoke. Everyone held his breath. According to him, the CPSU did not accept the independence of the French party. It was even resorting to an ignoble effort to split the party by writing in substance to the Central Committee of the PCF: you have scoundrels among the leaders of the party. Get rid of them. Everyone admitted his conclusion: the Soviets had some supporters within the party. In the leadership, of course.

At the Central Committee meeting held on 31 March and 1 April 1977 there was an outcry of indignation. Those who thought that the Soviets were more or less right avoided saying so. The others were even more outraged. Attempts to split the party--that only happened in other communist parties, particularly the small ones. Their French blood was up.

No one in any case was deceived: the letter was aimed at "Georges" in the first place and his closest "associates." Get rid of them! The Central Committee therefore gave Marchais an ovation.

[L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI] Now it was finally Georges Marchais who cracked. At about this time it was learned that pro-Soviet elements in the Swedish Communist Party had provoked a split and were applauded by the TASS agency and by PRAVDA. This contributed to throwing Marchais into a panic. He continued to be haunted by the way Khrushchev had fallen into a trap. He knew that pro-Soviet elements continued to constitute a considerable force within the Central Committee. He therefore decided to temporize, to swallow the bitter pill. Now, far from calming down, Moscow was preparing to give him the coup de grace.

["La guerre des camarades"] Becoming aware of the agenda for the next session of the Central Committee of the PCF, which was to deal with national defense,

the Soviet party reacted strongly in its contacts with the French party. The CPSU did not mince words: questions concerning French foreign and military policy in case the Left should achieve power were of considerable interest to the Soviet Union.

The CPSU thought that what would happen at the next Central Committee meeting would be a substantial change in the attitude of the PCF on matters of foreign policy and defense. The French nuclear forces were considered a negative element by the CPSU which would strengthen the independence of France. They were a hevy burden for the French workers. In the eyes of the Soviets the French nuclear forces were directed against the socialist countries and provided particular support for the American nuclear forces.

The communists writing under the collective name of "Fabien" took a deep breath before reacting. Loud remarks by Marchais are frequently made in the conversation of the secretary general. This time, within the secretariat, the loud remarks were like shouts.

Wherever he turned, Marchais saw himself as lost. In his view the first decision to be made was determining who could help him most effectively to keep his position as secretary general. After that, he would see. After all, it was better to keep his position and then come back in force in the future and continue the interrupted task of renovation of the party, rather than see the Soviets impose their man, for example on the occasion of the defeat of the Left in 1978.

Could Mitterrand help Marchais to keep his position? "Georges" did not think so for one minute. The first secretary of the Socialist Party, in Marchais' view, had only one idea in his head: to reduce the strength of the PCF, for which was only a steppingstone for him.

When he reched this stage in the drama, Marchais made a new point. He knew the Russians. In their view Eurocommunism was a single entity, a system to be uprooted totally. He knew that, in their view, the Soviets attributed diabolic cohesion to what was not, after all, anything more than a set of ideas and not a new center of communism. Therefore, you could not mince words with them.

Marchais knew that, with such tough negotiators, it was a matter of Eurocommunism against his position as secretary general. "Georges" saw that his salvation lay in accommodating himself to the Soviets.

The Soviets accepted. Without the PCF they knew that the Eurocommunist structure would crumble. And so it happened.

Once the PCF was back in the fold, they could allow Marchais to act as he saw fit within his own party.

We know what happened then!

5170
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POLITICAL GREECE

POLITICAL MOVES BY FORMER MINISTER ARSENIS REPORTED

Possible Kyrkos-Arsenis Alliance

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 2 Nov 85 pp 1, 5

/Text/ Serious developments are being methodically planned in the PASOK and KKE-Int. moderate Left area with Leon. Kyrkos (KKE-Int. chairman) and deputy and former PASOK minister Arsenis as protagonists. Their objective is to create a new political party which, it is expected, will be joined by other former PASOK ministers (the name of Ap. Alevras is mentioned).

On learning about the activities of his old friend, Premier Papandreou warned Arsenis that if he continued such activities he would be expelled from PASOK and would be charged with undermining "Change" and with conspiracy to defect.

According to political observers, the "conspiracy" charge concerns the protection Arsenis has given and continues to give to expelled /from PASOK/ syndicalists who are ready to follow him in establishing the new party which ideologically will stand between PASOK and KKE-Exterior, and which, according to reliable sources, may be joined by former PASOK ministers Emm. Drettakis and St. Panagoulis. The possibility of other PASOK cadres joining it is not excluded, while it is certain that a considerable number of KKE-Int. cadres will participate in establishing the new party. Other sources, however, are not certain that Drettakis and Panagoulis may join the new party since they were elected as deputies under the KKE banner.

An article published in yesterday's AVRIANI, which is affiliated with Minister /of Interior and Public Order/ Menios /Koutsogiorgas/ is revealing. It refers to the Arsenis denial about his leaving PASOK and states:

"With his statement which leaves things unsettled and which he made after several days of silence, Arsenis denied the orgy of rumors that he would leave PASOK." It added: "The concern that existed among the government deputies was apparent. Moreover, certain deputies did not hide their fears about the possibility of an Arsenis defection."

In the meantime, AVRIANI's "sister", the morning newspaper POLITIKI, created a sudden Lalliotis "affair" by pointing out in a front-page headline that that the government spokesman "gives the lie to Andreas the the Executive Office."

The article claims that with his statement 2 days ago ("I do not share the deductions of certain newspapers about fears and panics"), Lalliotis in essence refuted A. Papandreou and the members of the Executive Office who spoke about an imminent danger against Change by planned defections and other destabilizing activities.

Another column in the same newspaper said Deputy Press Minister Lalliotis and his assistant P. Evthimiou will soon be replaced because A. Papandreou "is not satisfied with their work." The paper mentioned as their successors D. Maroudas and Sot. Kostopoulos who "were successful" in the past as spokesmen.

The article resulted in a furious reaction on the part of Lalliotis while the premier's Political Office remained silent, a fact which political observers interpret as a direct confirmation of the article's content.

In the meantime it was made known that the PASOK Disciplinary Council had met to consider the case of the "rebel" Mitropoulos, a member of the Central Committee and decided not to expel him, but to impose a 6-month suspension of his party identity which means that, henceforth, he will not be a member of the Central Committee. Political observers consider the non-expulsion of Mitropoulos as an indication of existing fears and an exhaustion of the limits of hard reactions.

But last night Mitropoulos himself reacted with a hard statement which may now bring about his expulsion from PASOK. With his statement he accused PASOK as "autocratic" and the government as failing to coalesce with the social forces struggling for Change.

Arsenis Details Economic Program

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 5 Nov 85 p 2

/Text/ "The democratic planning with the participation of the people constitutes the basis of a viable economic development." This statement was made last night by former minister Arsenis in a speech at the Argos free open university within the framework of open discussions on the economy. The discussions are organized by the city's Labor Center. More than 800 persons attended the extremely interesting Arsenis speech at the end of which there was a question and answer period that lasted for more than an hour. Also present were many economists from the Argolis and other nomes, representing all political parties.

In his speech Arsenis underlined:

First: A self-supporting economic development must be the result of democratic planning which pre-assumes the proper functioning of the democratic state at the grassroots level.

Second: Democratic planning opposes the conservative meaning of development which leads to social and economic impasse.

Third: Maximization of individual initiative is necessary. Democratic planning says "no" to the competition between individual initiative and the public sector. It proposes a deep modification in the use of the individual.

Arsenis also pointed out that the public sector must be cleansed soon, the banks must be socialized, the functioning of the Supervisory Councils must be advanced, as should the real decentralization.

Balancing

Arsenis, whose speech was continually applauded, also referred to self-supporting economic development and pointed out that:

First: The economy must become competitive.

Second: There should be balancing between production and consumption.

Third: Production should be flexible (the economy, in other words, should be developed simultaneously in many sectors).

Arsenis also warned that the four-five large projects to be announced will not save the economy, but a number of small interconnected projects proposed by the rank and file can save it. He specifically referred to the Amvrakikos Bay projects which have already been scheduled with the participation of many agencies.

Arsenis also pointed out that during the first 4-year /PASOK/ term the foundations of such democratic scheduling had been laid and we must now proceed with their completion for a self-supporting economic development. In his closing remarks he underlined that several 4-year terms are needed for bringing about Change and that the change of a social system is a difficult task.

7520
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POLITICAL GREECE

GOALS OF FORMER MINISTER ARSENIS SEEN UNCLEAR

Athens TA NEA in Greek 10 Nov 85 p 5

/Article by Pandelis Kapsis/

/Excerpts/ The most important problem that a socialist government in Greece will have to face is foreign deficits and the danger of the International Monetary Fund. This fact had been primarily maintained by Mr Gerasimos Arsenis at a congress that he had organized prior to the 1981 elections, namely the Center for Mediterranean Studies, with the topic being the passage to socialism.

Like a bitter irony of fate, almost 5 years later Mr Arsenis' prediction has been confirmed, the only thing being, however, that it cost him his position in the Ministry of National Economy.

Nevertheless, the irony in the "Arsenis case" does not stop here. Prior to the last elections, a top-ranking cadre of PASOK's Executive Office had contended --and he is certainly not the only one-- that Mr Arsenis' "technocratisms" do not mean socialism.

A few days later, Mr Arsenis ceased being a member of the government. However, it would be difficult for one to maintain that economic policy has become more socialistic.

These inconsistencies, beyond their anecdotal interest, will perhaps help in better understanding certain of the dimensions of the "Arsenis problem." Because, of course, regardless of existing political differences, it is certain that the picture being projected to public opinion, and that often constitutes a subject of exploitation by both government and opposition newspapers, is to a great extent distorted by personal differences.

It is true that today Mr G. Arsenis has a different approach to economic problems and the policy that is required for confronting them. In his latest speech before the Chamber of Deputies, for example, he admitted that there is need for corrective measures. He added, nevertheless, that "we should boldly say that corrective measures for meeting the 1985 targets is one thing and a new economic policy, having as its basis new estimates for the next 4-year period and new estimates for domestic and foreign developments is another thing."

Mr Arsenis has not yet made clear where he disagrees with the new economic policy nor what these domestic and foreign developments that influence it are. Until now he has restricted himself to some general comments on the economy where he stresses the developmental role of the state and institutional and structural changes.

It is exactly this effort of his to differentiate, to put his own stamp, without at the same time aggravating tensions, and to cross the line of party legitimacy, is the most indicative factor of his future position.

It must, nevertheless, be noted that this estimate on the "legitimacy" of his intentions is not shared bu all in PASOK's leadership.

5671
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POLITICAL GREECE

SARTZETAKIS' DIFFICULTIES: 'STYLE,' NOT 'SUBSTANCE'

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 10 Nov 85 pp 2-3

/Article by M. Dimitriou/

/Excerpts/ Is there a "Sartzetakis issue" and to what extent? Prime Minister A. Papandreou's statement the day before yesterday to the Ministerial Council has put an end to the talk of the past few days about a change in the person holding the highest office of the land.

The prime minister emphasized, "A president of the republic exists, namely Mr Khristos Sartzetakis. Any other discussion about another person, including myself, is deceitful and without basis because it serves destabilizing intentions."

Nevertheless, together with all of those who "deceitfully" talk about the issue of Mr A. Papandreou's being elected as the fifth president of the Third Greek Republic, there are also certain straightforward and sincere persons. These are the people who base their reasoning of the facts, namely the following:

- That Mr Menios Koutsogiorgas, when he had sounded out Mr Them. Kourousopoulos, president of the Council of State, about the presidency of the republic, it is said that he had talked to him about a 2-year term of office (until March 1987). It seems that no such limit was placed on Mr Sartzetakis.

- That there is some sort of tradition that says that "charismatic prime ministers" become presidents of the republic.

- That Prime Minister Papandreou has distinguished himself into becoming a personality having broad political acceptance.

Second Five-Year Term

On the other hand, there was a clear pre-electoral statement by Mr Sartzetakis when he answered Mr Mitsotakis' allegations that the president of the republic must resign in case his party were to win the elections. Mr Sartzetakis emphasized at that time (as it was mentioned in the communique of the president of the republic) that "he does not in any way intend to resign. He will remain...until the last day of the 5-year term of office" for which he had been elected, i.e. until 31 March 1990.

At the same time, according to certain information, Mr Sartzetakis is looking at a second 5-year term of office --a desire that he has discussed with certain persons having his trust.

Mr Sartzetakis' desire to be reelected and to serve as president of the republic until 1995 plainly indicates his decision to "conduct himself" as president of all the Greek people, to preserve and strengthen his supports and to reinforce his portrait as the first citizen of the land.

It is exactly this latter ambition and "noble systematic endeavor" on the part of Mr Sartzetakis that harbors certain small and large problems that often lead to attacks. This concerns "the Sartzetakis style" as president of the republic.

Both the selective staffing of the office of the president of the republic and certain specific legislative adjustments that were called for and that had been voted for by the Chamber of Deputies indicate that Mr Sartzetakis wanted to create an "environment of trust" in the Irodis Attikou Building.

The broad powers held by the secretary general of the office of the president of the republic, namely former judge Mr Leonidas Papakaryas, no longer appears to suffice.

Thus, the "confinement" of Amb. Kon. Zeppos in the position of director of the Diplomatic Office and his being forcedly put out of commission have resulted in some problems being created with neighboring countries (Yugoslavia and Albania).

Let us, however, take a look at the so-called "Sartzetakis style" in all of its aspects (governmental, political, institutional and public).

It should be stressed that Mr Sartzetakis (regardless of how much certain people maintain that he is obsessed by "some kind of Karamanlis syndrome") does not want, as did his predecessor, to intervene in the government's task through ingenious recommendations and proposals, with the exception of three areas, namely justice, social welfare and television. Mr K. Karamanlis had also extended his interest to issues of the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of National Defense.

Once again, however, the interest of the president of the republic in justice, social welfare and television was more academic and advisory in nature except perhaps for the promotions in the Supreme Court last July.

Sometimes, of course, these interests clash with radical choices made by the government as, for example, in family planning (contraception, abortions, etc.) where Mr Sartzetakis is said to be suggesting that it must be confronted with altogether opposite criteria and in correlation with the population explosion in Turkey.

Generally speaking, one may say that despite some "clouds" the relations of the president of the republic with the government are harmonious and productive.

With regard to the political forces, while the acceptance of the president of the republic has now been supported following Mr K. Mitsotakis' "obligatory statement," come clouds have been created through the "at will" implementation of the protocol to the detriment personally of Mr Kharilaos Florakis and the two KKE's.

Conclusively, there have been until now maladroitness and manipulations in the political arena that have given cause for allegations that within the office of the president of the republic there lurks the danger of arrogance, verbosity, entrenchment from the people and their social representatives and old-time conformity.

The intention of the enemies of the current president to magnify small problems and "small eccentricities" must not give cause for criticism.

The current president of the republic has not obviously been helped by his advisers to maintain the political and popular acceptance he deserves (especially after the end of the Mitsotakis controversy). The office of the president of the republic does not change press officials "like a shirt," it is not only distinguished by the bad manners of certain of its public relations officials, it does not arbitrarily prohibit the presence of journalists (the ultimate case being the French president's press office woman director being denied access when the president had visited Mr Sartzetakis on 22 June) and photographers, but it also shows that he is being kept away from the needed spirit of dialogue, mutual trust and communication.

It is therefore clear that the so-called "Sartzetakis style" favors critics. Especially so if it is associated with allegations about conservative nationalistic ideology and mentality. Assuredly, Mr Sartzetakis has a deep feeling of patriotism. And yet recourse to the traditional ideals of Greek Orthodoxy, continuous aggressiveness toward the Slavs, rhetorical references to the "Macedonian" problem, endless conversion of history into an "ideological tool" all give rise to obviously disloyal talk.

Following Prime Minister Papandreou's explicit statement the issue that had been created with regard to the president of the republic has now certainly come to an end. What has not come to an end, however, is the "Sartzetakis style." The current president has become, thanks to PASOK's political choice, the common point of reference of the country's "progressive forces." However, this "presidential majority" is not something static and always a given fact regardless of how difficult it is to overturn its consequences.

5671
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POLITICAL GREECE

ND'S MITSOTAKIS SEEN INCREASINGLY 'ANTI-KARAMANLIS'

Athens ENA in Greek 14 Nov 85 p 11

/Excerpts/ Within ND, there are those who consider K. Mitsotakis' decision to move forward toward a "de-Karamanlisization" of the party as a sign of superiority while others consider it as a desperate defensive effort. Through a series of bold moves, ND's president has removed from key ND posts all cadres who had not submitted to him and has had them replaced with persons having his trust.

A short description of the changes in the party apparatus confirms Mitsotakis' intention to place ND under his complete control because all the changes have two common characteristics: the individuals being assigned to key party posts are either completely trusted by the ND leader or have virtually repudiated the party's "Karamanlis assets."

With regard to the category of trusted persons, indicative of the prevailing situation are the promotions and assignments of the following: promotion of Manolis Kefalogiannis to the chairmanship of the Central Regional Organization Committee (KEPO) replacing I. Varvitsiotis; the election of Giannis Kefalogiannis as member of the political council following the neutralization of "the distinguished ones;" the assignment of the youth organization to Vang. Meimarakis; the selection of the journalists of the press office; the makeup of K. Mitsotakis' private office where two relatives rule (Dora's daughter and Mrs M. Kypraiou); the assignment of his brother-in-law Pavlos Bakogiannis as political adviser; the promotion of G. Voukelatos in the "new post" of general director of the political office, etc. (the latter had discarded, even prior to the election, every pro-Rallis title and had for some time claimed Mitsotakis' confidence).

Similarly commented on is the fact that two of the three parliamentary party representatives (Than. Kanellopoulos and Mikh. Papakonstandinou) do not come from the party itself but from the Center and consequently are considered anything but expressers and guardians of the "Karamanlis mortgage." Even the only representative of the old guard who ousted G. Varvitsiotis from the post of secretary general of the parliamentary group, namely Than. Tsaldaris, is considered by other cadres as a "newly-converted" anti-Karamanlist.

Somewhat more cautious and with the maintenance of pretence is the attempted divestment of Milt. Evert's party props. Thus, following the planned refusal of the title of parliamentary representative, Milt. Evert is now realizing that the guns are being aimed at his own group. Ang. Bratakos, director general of the party, who

is considered "his man," received a grievous blow at the beginning of the week: with the appointment of G. Vouvelatos as director general of the political office, a significant net of authority is transferred from of the office of the party director general to K. Mitsotakis' office that fully controls the newly-elected political office. Besides, Ang. Bratakos had already quite a few indications of the disfavor and distrust of the leader's entourage. When a few days ago he began the preliminary work for the selection and assignment of the new unit chiefs of the party, he was informed by Dora Bakogianni not to concern himself with this matter because "the list of new unit chiefs is already being drawn up by the president's office."

K. Mitsotakis' entourgage does not consider all of these moves as being provocative or aggressive in nature. They are described as being legitimate acts of a lawful defense against every illegitimate and irregular question of a lawful and elected leadership. And given the fact that the guns are being aimed selectively at the party's "Karamanlis havens" one can easily presume whom K. Mitsotakis considers as "moral instigator" of the question.

This theory is not only categorically rejected by those party cadres in disgrace but is also criticized as being ostensible in nature since "the one doing the attacking will appear as being on the defensive." They maintain that "Mitsotakis is not being threatened by K. Karamanlis but that he is afraid of Karamanlism." In explaining this they add that "the authoritariansim of the present ND leader cannot be imposed on a traditionalist political party that has prominent and enlightened cadres and is imbued with principles and ideas that he himself had opposed during the greater part of his political career. Consequently, the survival of Mitsotakis in ND requires the 'de-Karamanlisization' of the party," according to these same cadres.

Within these conditions, the question as to which of these two versions (with reference to the reasons for the persecution of the Karamanlists) is the true one no longer has any significance. The interest is confined to and culminates in the expected reaction of the party wing in disgrace and also perhaps of the founder of the party himself.

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POLITICAL GREECE

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR ANDROPOV'S ABSENCE PUZZLING--According to diplomatic circles, the extended absence of Soviet Ambassador Andropov from Athens could mean a conscious downgrading of relations with Greece. Up to now, it was felt that Mr Andropov's absence --as well as Consul General Smirnov's-- must be linked to the Bokhan case together with the investigations being conducted on this matter in Moscow where the two Soviet diplomats are. The same circles, however, maintain that there are certain indications that lead to the conclusion that the possibility that the Soviet leadership wants to show its dissatisfaction with the Greek Government over the Bokhan case or perhaps over more general policy issues cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, according to these same circles, the personnel assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Athens is now considerably reduced, particularly with regard to the trade representation. It has also been noted that the Greek Government delegation at yesterday's reception on the occasion of the Soviet national holiday was significantly smaller than in previous years. /Text/ /Athens I MESIMVRINI in Greek 8 Nov 85 p 3/ 5671

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POLITICAL ITALY

PCI PLENUM DEBATES CONGRESS THESES AMENDMENTS

PM161220 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 9 Dec 85 pp 2-3

[Antonio Caprarica, Stefano Cingolani, Giorgio Frasca Polara, Fausto Ibba, Eugenio Manca, Enzo Roggis, and Marco Sappino report: "Central Committee Discussion and Voting on Congress Theses"]

[Excerpts] Preamble

The preamble to the theses, which outlines the domestic and international political framework within which the congress is called upon to reach its decisions, underwent only a few slight changes. An amendment from [Directorate member Tullio] Vecchietti on the Geneva meeting was approved by 69 votes to 51: The text of the Committee of 77 is maintained where it states that it laid the groundwork for more relaxed relations between the two major powers, but instead of stating that it "reopened the prospect of a halting of the arms race," it is now stated that "it can create favorable conditions for reversing the trend to the arms race."

Characteristics and Values of Socialism in the Italian Communists' Conception (Thesis 1)

On Thesis 1, which defines "the characteristics and values of socialism in the Italian Communists' conception," some 20 amendments were examined covering a number of complex general definitations. At one point it states that the "advanced areas" of capitalism "determine" or "influence" world trends even in the countries of "real socialism" as well as in the dependent underdeveloped areas. Trivelli proposed leaving "influence" and eliminating "determine," which seemed to him excessive, but his amendment was not adopted.

In the section dealing with the tasks of the Left "in the industrialized and 'postindustrial' West," the definition "postindustrial," already cautiously placed in inverted commas, was dropped. An amendment from [Directorate member Adalberto] Minucci describing that expression as "a groundless linguistic invasion with no scientific basis" was adopted by 84 votes to 60.

Next there was a lively discussion on the following passage: "We must now have a more fluid view of socialism in which the aspect of real current movement and that of the historical phase converge." Luporini defended the

expression "a more fluid view" as the most precise way of expressing a dialectical view of historical processes, not a "rigid step-by-step" conception, but he then accepted for reasons of linguistic accessibility [Directorate member Luciano] Barca's amendment ("uncrystallized view"), subsequently adopted by a large majority. An amendment from Rosario Villari designed, as she put it, to make this concept of the "fluidity" of historical processes more explicit was not adopted, however. "Rather than asserting ideal prospects of definitive solutions and formulating abstract projects," her amendment said, "we should fully exploit the gains and reforms" that the workers movement has helped to achieve during its history and thence to derive confidence "for present action." It seemed to Barca who was supported by Garavini, that it not only "dialecticalized" the view of historical processes but ultimately caused an abstract view of all research in the direction of socialism. A majority of votes rejected Villari's amendment.

A significant issue was raised by an amendment from [Directorate member Giorgio] Napolitano. Thesis 1 states that "a conception of socialism in terms of the complete state ownership of the means of production and exchange and in terms of the administrative management of planning is alien to us" (Liberini suggested that this passage was well-founded inasmuch as "complete state ownership" creates "forms of bureaucratic power and wastefulness and hinders research").

Next it states that Communists now regard public intervention as a means of orienting the overall development of the economy "in a market in which private enterprise, a public sector, and a strong cooperative sector all operate." The next sentence states that "beyond that it is the forces at play that must decide," as long as the "universal value" of democracy is guaranteed. It seemed to Napolitano that the expression "beyond that" might create the mistaken impression of an acknowledgement of the role of the market as something temporary, which conflicts with a viewpoint clearly defined in the theses and ratified by previous congresses. Turci and Ranieri too thought that the expression could be interpreted as a kind of "duplicity," especially since with regard to historical prospects the theses state that the capitalist system "is not the ultimate manifestation of civilization." Badaloni, however, said that there can be no misunderstandings because of the reassertion of the fundamental value of democracy: In any case it is impossible to place constrictions on what kinds of ownership could prevail in the future. Andiani too said he saw no danger of a misunderstanding. Luporini perceived in Napolitano's remarks a "rigid conception of socialism." However, he added, so that it is clear that "we do not want to conceal the truth," the text could be amended if it was considered that suspicions of duplicity could arise. This latter argument was also supported by Margheri.

First [Secretariat member Aldo] Tortorella then [Secretary General Alessandro] Natta recommended a formulation that would exclude misunderstandings without appearing to presume to dictate historical developments and of course leaving intact the sense of an outlook transcending the horizons of capitalist society. It was decided to entrust the reformulation of this passage to the theses drafting committee.

Next an amendment from [Directorate member Edoardo] Perna was approved, reasserting the universal value of democracy and stating that "the struggle for socialism, conceived in terms of this indissoluble bond with the values of democracy and freedom," must aim to "render effective and to extend all individual and collective rights" and to promote the citizens' broadest participation "in reaching fundamental decisions on our political, economic, and social approach."

An amendment from [Directorate member Armando] Cossutta prompted a lively discussion on the point which states that in the developed countries "the transcending of the capitalist system can be conceived not in terms of major traumatic breaks but of a complex combination..." and so forth. Cossutta, who said he considered "a clear statement of intention" necessary, proposed that this sentence begin: "Communists work for the transcending of capitalism...." [Directorate member Fabio] Mussi, De Pasquale, Andriani, Libertini, [Directorate member Gerardo] Chiaromonte, Triva, Spriano, and Peggio all spoke against the proposal, which was basically supported by Tognoni. With differences of detail, it was pointed out that the idea of the "transcending" of capitalism is made absolutely clear in the theses but that Cossutta's amendment embodied an element which exceeded the party's immediate tasks and which conflicts with the view of socialism as a process, as defined in the theses. The Cossutta amendment was rejected by a very large majority (with two votes in favor, from Cossutta and Cappelloni).

An amendment from Natta was adopted, however, providing the following clarification: "the transcending of the capitalist system is regarded by Italian Communists..." and so forth, thus eliminating any misunderstanding.

Peace and Disarmament (Thesis 2)

Several substantive requests were made for changes to this thesis. Following a debate some were withdrawn or shelved pending an examination of the program document. First, a recommendation from [Secretariat member] Gian Carlo Pajeta that the nonaligned countries' role in the international detente process be stressed was accepted.

Fieschi submitted a two-part amendment--regarding the passage which identifies the rejection of the militarization of space as a prime and indispensable condition for balanced and controlled disarmament--suggesting the inclusion of a direct reference to the responsibility in this connection of the Reagan administration, whose conduct has consituted "the chief obstacle" to the initiation of a progressive elimination of the blocs and which was facilitated "the acceleration of the rearmament process." Illustrating his proposal with a series of details, Fieschi described it as "an erroneous stance less advanced than those of the European social democratic parties and of the U.S. democratic community not to specify the U.S. responsibilities in this regard."

Gian Carlo Pajetta immediately suggested, in the light of the Geneva summit, that the fields of greatest conflict between the superpowers--star wars, for instance--be regarded as "still open to the quest for solutions based on a rapprochement of stances or an understanding." Next, Ledda proposed an

alternative amendment to the first section intead of Fieschi's, namely, to specify that the militarization of space "is now specifically reflected in the U.S. SDI program." Luciana Castellina requested the inclusion of "a general assessment of U.S. policy" in Thesis 15, which in her opinion is "particularly incomplete." [Directorate member Giulio] Quercini said he basically agreed with Ledda's suggestion.

At this point the debate on Fieschi's original proposal was combined with some observations made by Luporini. In his opinion, the PCI "is a long way behind in its formulation of a precise policy on disarmament and security" as compared to the German SPD, which has, in this connection, "developed relations and a dialogue with the East European parties." [Foreign Section Chief Antonio] Rubbi accepted Ledda's amendment and stated his opposition to Fieschi's "approach," which "challenges the very structure of the document and evades analysis as much as possible."

Galluzzi added that "a process of apportioning blame would ultimately cause us to neglect the novelty of the resumption of the dialogue in Geneva and the importance which the PCI attaches to the opportunities provided for negotiation." Segre too regarded the original text of Thesis 2 as "of greater political force" with regard to the possibilities of dialogue. Garavini, agreeing with Luporini, asked that there be "no failure to mention here that European governments' support for SDI is an obstacle to the detente process." [Directorate member Pietro] Ingrao, citing Luporini's remarks, said he favored the identification of "the Americans' primary responsibilities." The PCI, which has always forcefully pointed to Soviet responsibilities, "must not show any timidity on this point, lest we obscure an essential aspect of our policy."

According to Ingrao, there is no question of "an anti-U.S. gesture," since "there too there are currents of sharp criticism of the Reagan administration's conduct." Ingrao said he supported Fieschi's and Luporini's requests.

Gianotti supported them too ("The future of Geneva will depend partly on pressures on the European governments in connection with SDI"). Pieralli proposed emphasizing the reference to "star wars" by including the Ledda amendment (points to "specific responsibilities") in the policy document and an amendment from Luporini ("concerning the role of the European and Italian Governments") in the program document. Cossutta supported Fieschi's and Luporini's proposals. [Directorate member Paolo] Bufalini, however, supported Ledda's proposal (warning against "forecasting areas of negotiation through sweeping assertions") combined with a worried assessment of the consequences of the decision "adopted and carried forward" by the U.S. Administration. At this point Luporini accepted Pieralli's suggestion to transfer his request to the program document.

Natta spoke next to advise against "overly isolating each individual thesis in the documents, which should be in the nature of political statements, not analyses of responsibilities of reconstructions of causes." The PCI secretary general stressed that the text submitted already reflected "our unequivocal position of absolute opposition to the militarization of space and to European

governments' support, especially Italy's, for the SDI program." To "avoid distorting the substance of the theses," Natta asked for the adoption only of Ledda's amendment, which is "explanatory and elucidatory." Ledda's amendment was indeed adopted unanimously and Fieschi did not insist on his own.

Next two more amendments were submitted, one from Cossutta, the other from Gianotti.

Cossutta's amendment stated that "in order to halt the general arms race it is necessary first to isolate and defeat the plan pursued by the U.S. leaders for economic, political, and military domination worldwide." This domination, he said, "has encountered increasing limitations in the expansion of the area of socialist countries, the development of the anti-imperialist struggles, and the quest, however difficult, for real national autonomy on the part of former colonial countries." The United States, he went on, "has increased its political and military aggressiveness" within the context of "an offensive strategy designed to block the peaceful development of the socialist countries' economies and the developing countries' autonomous national experiences."

Returning to Natta's observations about the nature of the document, Bufalini described this amendment as "an outright thesis in itself" which "raises important political issues," on which he urged Cossutta to "reflect." Bufalini said: "The analysis of responsibilities is a complex issue and cannot be unilateral but must be conducted on the basis of an objective historical reconstruction. Otherwise the net result would be a denial of our policy line, pursued for years and years, even in a different situation. Such an amendment would introduce into the congress debate a number of arguments that are not helpful at the moment. Some of our criticisms of particular acts or tendencies of Soviet policy were, and remain, justified. But I see no reason now for a controversy that would have the result of reducing the impact on our assessment and stances of the elements of dynamism of the present Soviet initiative."

Following Bufalini's speech Cossuta spoke next, announcing that he was not withdrawing his amendment. In the vote that followed he was defeated by a very large majority (with only two votes in favor).

Next Gianotti's amendment was considered. Gianotti proposed at first that immediately after the reference to the elimination of the blocs the following sentence be inserted: "We believe that unilateral acts limited to disarmament can facilitate a climate of international trust and mark a change of course."

The following spoke on the subject: Boffa, Castellina, De Pasquale, Maura, Vagli, Gerace, Pieralli, Bufalini, Vitali, Andriani, and Gruppi--all of them opposing "unilateral acts," for various reasons.

A revised version of Gianotti's amendment was defeated by 95 votes to 55.

At Cappelloni's request the whole of Thesis 2 was submitted to a vote in which it was approved by a very large majority, with only 3 abstentions (Cappelloni, Castellina, and Cossutta).

New Order in International Relations

An amendment from Bassolino asserting the need for "a major democratic thrust capable of influencing parliament and the government" for "the reform of article 80 of the constitution, on the procedures for the appraisal and approval of international treaties and for the establishing new rights and powers of public intervention" in connection with missile deployment. The amendment stressed "the just demand for a referendum on Comiso." In the debate it was pointed out that this issue was a matter for the program document.

PCI and the Countries of "Real Socialism" (Thesis 14)

Before broaching the substance of the thesis the subject of its title was raised, starting with an objection from Boffa concerning the expression "real socialism" (which is in inverted commas in the thesis): "This," Boffa pointed out, "is an expression which originated with a polemical intent directed against us, to stress in fact that the 'reality' of those experiences was there in opposition to our criticisms. But it does not even appear in Soviet documents now. I would therefore suggest using the expression 'socialist-type countries.'" Several objections were made, which can be summed up in Ingrao's remarks: "'Real socialism' is indeed an artificial term, which does, however, present easily identificable characteristics the expression 'socialist-type,' however, seems to me too difficult and threatens to obscure our critique of those countries." Other formulations were suggested by various comrades--Napolitano ("Countries governed by communist parties" or countries "with a communist leadership"), Natta ("socialist countries," simply because this is the expression generally used in current political and diplomatic documents), Gruppi ("Of socialist leanings"), Mussi, and Berlinguer (the former proposed a descriptive title, so to speak: "The PCI and Relations with The USSR and China"). Ultimately there was a vote in favor of keeping the title unchanged, by 102 to 97.

Next two amendments from Cossutta were considered, which virtually replaced the existing thesis. The first, he explained, was designed to emphasize the value of the October revolution as a "permanent ideological inspiration and reference point" for Italian Communists, who are committed "to the theoretical development and practical implementation of the 'Italian road to socialism'" and the second concerning the thesis' critical verdict on the characteristics of Eastern bloc societies. According to Cossutta, the latter would mean "taking undue account of the external pressure exerted on us" and consequently underestimately the innovative elements that have emerged in the life of Soviet society: "It would therefore be a serious mistake to reassert the verdict issued by the 16th congress, since events have shown that it was incorrect."

The first to reply was Spirano, who denied that the assessments issued by the last congress had isolated the PCI, as Cossutta argued: "On the contrary, the international status that we acquired by adopting those stances has enabled us to expand our ties with the other left-wing and democratic forces." The next speaker was Natta, who pointed out that the innovations that have occurred in the USSR's leadership do not disprove the stances adopted by the PCI over the years but in fact reinforce them: "Of course there can be no question of

presuming too much or of considering our opinions decisive, but certainly our encouragements of serious and thorough reforms in those countries, first and foremost in the field of democracy, were precisely in the direction that is now emerging. And we would not now be making a wise, opportune, or useful move, partly as regards the attempts under way in the USSR, if we were to dilute our critical encouragements or weaken our stances."

The same opinion was expressed by [Directorate member Gianni] Cervetti and Rubbi, while Cappelloni spoke in support of Cossutta's proposal, stressing that the innovations in the Soviet leadership "stem from the democratic potentials that I believe are still present in that society." Next Bufalani asked Cossutta to withdraw his amendment, but the suggestion was not accepted. The ensuring vote resulted in the rejection of both amendments, with only two dissenting votes.

It was decided that the drafting committee should consider an amendment from Trentin designed to specify some aspects of what Thesis 14 calls the "fundamental shortcomings which generally characterize" the countries of "real socialism." Another amendment from Trentin concerning "trade union freedom" in those countries was not adopted, simply because this concept was considered to be embraced in the assertion that the need for new forms of economic management "cannot be separated from the need for promoting forms of democratic life, individual freedom, political participation, and public initiative." An amendment submitted by Turci, to include a reference to Afghanistan in this thesis, was not adopted because the Afghan issue is raised in the international section of the program document, which was considered the most natural context for it. An amendment from Pieralli confirming appreciation of Yugoslavia's role in the nonaligned movement and of Cuba's effort in connection with the Third World countries' debts was adopted as a recommendation for the final draft.

Relations With the United States (Thesis 15)

A broad debate took place on this thesis, which aims to specify the PCI's stance toward the United States. The text proposed by the committee of 77 states that the PCI nurtures no "anti-American feelings," while nevertheless combating the Reagan administration's "policy of rearmament and of seeking supremacy." It states that the PCI's stance is dictated not "only by the awareness that Italy belongs to an alliance in which the United States has an essential role," but also by confidence in "the American people's democratic energies" and by the desire for cooperation with the most advanced U.S. cultural and political forces. Luciana Castellina criticized the entire formulation of Thesis 15, saying that in its indictment of U.S. policy and assertion of its dangerous nature it is less advanced than even certain Socialist International documents. Comrade Castellina presented an amendment intended to replace it completely. It states, among other things, that "a dogmatic and splittist view of U.S. life is not part of Italian Communists' culture." This, however, does not eliminate the "crucial" problem of "a new U.S. quest for hegemony." It argues that Reaganism is not a passing trend but reflects something more deep-rooted --a long-term response to the seventies crisis of the capitalist order.

It is the "quest for world domination," which uses the East-West conflict partly by "exaggerating the condemnation of the alleged Soviet expansionist threat." So it is not enough to say that Italy "must remain within the Atlantic pact, defending its own national dignity and the alliance's defensive nature": It is necessary to recognize "the topical and substantive reasons for our autonomy." Last, it states that "while it is true that the Geneva summit could not reverse the basic trend of the U.S. world policy (and any delusions in this regard would weaken our position), that meeting did certainly demonstrate the forces that are opposed to that policy." Another amendment was proposed by Marisa Rodano, who considered the wording of Thesis 15 "defensive," because "it seems to shelve the struggle against the Reagan administration."

Napolitano voiced his sharp disagreement with Castellina's amendment, which he described as "dismissive" of the theses put forward by the committee, in which the will to combat the Reagan administration and the assertion of its dangerous nature are repeatedly expressed in the most vigorous manner. There is another slant to Thesis 15: It concerns the PCI's specific attitude toward the United States as a whole. The intention was to stress that our opposition to Reagan's policy implies neither a negation of the possibility of Italian Communists' cooperation with the more progressive U.S. cultural and political forces nor a calling into question of our country's alliance with the United States, this latter being a point on which the most artificial attacks on our party are based. Napolitano said that Castellina's amendment rejects the basic intention behind Thesis 15 and constitutes a sort of summary of criticisms already made in various parts of the document, or presents very questionable assessments such as the description of the Reagan policy as a "long-term" trend. Boffa too stressed that for the first time Thesis 15 specifically defines the PCI's stance toward the United States and he defended its substance, pointing out that Comrade Castellina's amendment eliminates crucial aspects of our international stances, including our assessment of the Geneva summit. Ledda voiced his disagreement with Castellina's amendment, stressing the specific character of this thesis, which broaches the new issue of the PCI's relations with the United States. However, precisely to this end he proposed a number of corrections to the draft submitted by the committee. He said that he too was not an "anti-American" (though he "deplored this current identification of America and the United States") but considered Thesis 15 "defensive and conciliatory" and undermined by the "quest for some basic legitimization." According to Luporini, such an approach "gains us no friends either in Europe, or in the American area as a whole, or in the United States." Gruppi spoke in favor of Rodano's amendment and against Castellina's.

Ingrao said he agreed with Comrade Castellina's stance, adding that it concerns "an important point" of the "document." One of the mainstays of the theses, Ingrao said, is the analysis of Reaganism and of its contradictions. We must not underestimate the tenacity of the existence of an American imperial system. A clear stance in this regard would make us more confident in tackling splittist positions. Cossutta said he agreed with Castellina's amendment because it asserts the desire for friendship with the U.S. people but "at the same time issues a verdict on the imperialist U.S. policy in the military, economic, and political fields." Mazza voiced the opinion that a "revised" version of Castellina's amendment "could be taken into careful consideration."

Gian Carlo Pajetta said he rejected Castellina's amendment "because it conflicts so much with the theses" already adopted. Thesis 15 is not dictated by a desire to "gain legitimization" but seeks a more correct approach. Pajetta said, however, that a reformulation would be possible, taking account of Rodano's and Ledda's amendments.

Natta spoke next. We must not write defensive documents or provide sops or seek legitimization, he said. Thesis 15 is devoted not to a verdict on the Reagan administration, which is however mentioned, but to another important matter: the relationship between our party--a party, let us remember, that aspires to govern Italy in the centuries ahead--and the reality of a country allied to our own and the forces at play within the United States. Having said this, let the clearest formulations be adopted. Comrade Castellina, however, issues verdicts which conflict with those already asserted in our document. For instance, we must be careful with regard to the significance of the Geneva summit. In any case we have said there is an element of innovation there and we perceive a change of course or at least the halting of a very negative trend. And we emphasize this innovation partly to encourage all the forces committed to detente. But if we say first that a hope has emerged we cannot immediately add: But it is an illusion!

Next Natta added that there is no doubt about the need for the most explicit criticism of the U.S. Administration's policy, which is indeed expressed in many points of the document. The aim of Thesis 15, however, is to confirm our attitude toward the U.S. political and cultural reality, within the context of the Italian-U.S. relationship of alliance. This--Napolitano is right--is in order to dispel a preconception that has surrounded us and that has burdened Italian political relations. In other words, it is a matter of stating explicitly what we are and what we want to be and of seeking relations that in fact we have never had. I am in favor of having such relations, Natta said, and of an effort to find real interlocutors in the U.S. political and cultural world too--the same effort we have made with respect to other countries.

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

PINTASILGO COMMENTS ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

PM050856 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 25 Nov 85 p 10

[Interview with Portuguese presidential candidate Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo by Nicole Guardiola in Lisbon; date not given]

[Excerpt] Lisbon--Question: What reasons prompted you to initiate a candidacy for the presidency of the Portuguese Republic?

Answer: My candidacy is in response to a specific situation regarding Portuguese democracy and seeks to provide a modern answer to a problem facing other democratic countries too, namely, the proper place for the chief of state in presidentialist or semi-presidentialist systems in countries where there is at the same time a large range or fragmentation of parties. What I mean is that in such situations the chief of state's role is increasingly important because through the exercise of his functions he establishes a direct rapport with the citizens, because he is elected by universal suffrage, and with regard to all the political forces he can perform a role as mediator, as organizer of potential expressions of consensus on individual issues.

Question: Do you believe that a controversial figure such as yourself is best suited to this role of mediation to rally potential consensus?

Answer: The idea generally exists that the person who rallies a consensus is a gray figure incapable of resoluteness and without ideas of his own. I believe that the best of them are not appeasers, or those who seek the lowest common denominator, or defenders of the reign of mediocracy, but on the contrary those who tackle problems with an innovative attitude.

Question: Will the parties be willing to engage in such a dialogue?

Answer: If the political apparatus ever superimposes its own will on that of the voters it will be the start of a diminished democracy, of a democratic facade. The parties' raison d'etre is to express organized currents of opinion.

In modern societies there are major areas of intersectorial problems and a politicians' role is to define these areas and the protagonists active within each of them to bring all these protagonists together to seek a consensus. The essential factor in this task is not major mobilization of people but the ability to analyze problems and to formulate the most suitable proposals for resolving them.

Question: But the majority of parties in Portugal refuse to sit down at the same table as the Communist Party....

Answer: I believe that the State Council is one of the essential mechanisms for the Portuguese president's action and in it all parties, including the Communist Party, sit around the same table. To conduct a dialogue with the Communists it is enough for me to observe the Portuguese Constitution. I do not believe that a parliamentary party can be excluded from the State Council. Furthermore, I want to say that I am not concerned about the party allegiances of Portuguese citizens who support me. They are all Portuguese, and that is all that counts, the only important thing is how much support they can provide and how much they want to help their country.

Question: Are you very critical of Portuguese political life?

Answer: I must admit that Portuguese political life is in a serious state of decay because political leaders have grown aloof from the country's problems, from the modern solutions to those problems--which do exist. Everything has been boiled down to the power struggle. Since 1980 we have witnessed an almost total neglect of national problems and the absolute predominance of the balance of power, as though the Portuguese people could be bought. This is what I want to combat, and although I have a blueprint for government, I wish to assert it by means of a proposal embodying the solution to the problems.

Question: General Antonio Ramalho Eanes, who also attempted such a role, was "punished" with the revision of the Constitution, which cut his powers, and he had to form his own political party. Are you not afraid that the same could happen to you?

Answer: The mistake our politicians make is to believe that history repeats itself. What has happened in Portugal over the past 10 years will never happen again. General Eanes correctly said some months ago that the end of his second term marks the start of a new phase in Portugal's life. The latest general election showed that Portuguese society is ready for change, and what happened in parliament will happen in the presidential election too. We are approaching such a serious emergency situation that it is necessary to renegotiate the president's powers as thoroughly as possible. My interpretation of these powers differs from General Eanes' and, like General De Gaulle, I believe that every chief of state forms his own personal assessment of government..."

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

SALGADO ZENHA ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

PM081910 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Dec 85 (special supplement) pp 2-4

[Interview with Portuguese presidential candidate Francisco Salgado Zenha by M. Bettencourt Resendes; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Introductory paragraph omitted] DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Some 2 years ago you regarded yourself as "too left-wing" to be president of the republic. Today, apparently, you no longer believe so.

Salgado Zenha: The words should be placed in their historical context. In fact it was not in my plans to run for the presidency of the republic. The problem confronted me under circumstances which arose recently, and I accepted the challenge. I do not doubt that there might be other candidates better than myself. Moreover, in that interview which you mentioned, I cited the names of Professors Henrique de Barros, Ferrer Correia, and Miller Guerra. Why have they not put themselves forward? That is a question which should be put to them and not to me. In the current circumstances I believe that I am the best of the candidates who have put themselves forward.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: So do you believe that the fact that your profile is markedly left-wing has ceased to be important in this respect?

Salgado Zenha: The "markedly" is your word. I said that I deeded preferable a candidate with the same political profile as General Ramalho Eanes, and that I was to the left of the current president of the republic. I believe that a president of the republic should be only Portuguese and a democrat, and so I feel able, as president of the republic, to be only Portuguese and a democrat, and to be so as a candidate, too. This is without in any way renouncing my political convictions, which everybody knows. I am a democratic and independent Socialist, since I no longer belong to the Socialist Party [PSP]. This is a normal matter; what matters is the function which is performed. In my opinion, certain functions are performed by taking into account not a party program inherent in that body itself.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Was it never on your political horizons to run for the PSP leadership at the next congress, before you decided to run for the presidency?

Salgado Zenha: I did not take part in the last PSP congress for reasons which I made public.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Fine, but I was talking about the next....

Salgado Zenha: There was no reason to change my attitude with respect to the next congress.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: My question also had to do with the fact that, in the wake of the October [general election] results, many of the Socialist leaders have publicly demanded radical changes in the party's leadership and strategy....

Salgado Zenha: Since I have left the PSP, I do not have to discuss the party's internal problems. The only thing that I will say is that I believe that a strong and influential PSP is an essential element for Portuguese democracy. Right now I can make no contribution to the PSP, since I do not belong to it, but neither will I do it any harm, because a strong and influential PSP is an essential element. My disagreement with the current PSP leadership is over the fact that the presidential role should not be made partisan. This was the viewpoint which the PSP upheld in previous presidential elections. The current PSP leadership has changed its viewpoint. It is fully within its rights, but I am also entitled not to change.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: According to what you stated in the interview which you recently granted to the Portuguese Radio-Television System, this is also your main disagreement with candidate Mario Soares. I will ask you whether there are not other significant differences in your candidacy programs.

Salgado Zenha: That is for the public to say. It will take a very long time to explain this systematically. Dr Freitas do Amaral advocates the bi-polarization of Portuguese political life, as General Soares Carneiro did in 1980. He believes that presidential elections should be contended French-style. That is, there should be two blocs, one led by the leader of a party coalition, and, on the other side, another, similar political pole. So there would be a confrontation in that system. Dr Freitas do Amaral leads one of those poles and Dr Mario Soares intends to lead the other. Therefore, this means making partisan the idea of what presidential elections are.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: But do Mario Soares and Freitas do Amaral have the same idea?

Salgado Zenha: Substantially, this is so--that is, making Portuguese political life, and hence the presidential role, totally partisan. Moreover, at heart, the two political leaders whom I have mentioned would like the election of the president of the republic to be conducted by parliament.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: And are you opposed to that kind of election?

Salgado Zenha: I am. I believe that democracy in Portugal is still being formed. I do not mean that it is not a democracy. It exists, with defects, limitations, and imperfections which should be corrected, but its process of formation is not yet complete. During this historical period the president of the republic should be the president of all the Portuguese people. He should not be the representative of party forces; he should be the same both for those who support him and for those who oppose him and be a factor of balance and harmony within the Portuguese political system.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: How do you view the fact that the current president of the republic has decided to support one of the candidates to succeed him at Belem Palace?

Salgado Zenha: I believe that it is a normal situation. I know of no democratic country in which the president of the republic loses the right to support another candidate in presidential elections following his term. I believe that Portugal would not be a complete democracy if the elected president's right to support a candidate in the following elections were not recognized.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Do you believe that the current president of the republic's independence has been affected by the active part which he has played in the formation of a political party?

Salgada Zenha: That question proceeds from presuppositions and considerations to which only President Ramalho Eanes can reply.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Fine, but did not Gen Ramalho Eanes break the agreement which he signed with the PSP?

Salgado Zenha: That is a question which should be put to Gen Eanes. I am putting forward my candidacy and will not express opinions on problems with which I have nothing to do.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: To change the subject--or rather, to change the party--do you still believe that the Communist Party's participation in the government would be dangerous for Portuguese democracy?

Salgado Zenha: Well, when that question was put to me it was in my capacity as a PSP member. What I said was that I did not agree with there being a government coalition between the PSP and Communist Party for reasons of an international nature, since the differences between the two parties on foreign policy are so great that, in my opinion, an agreement was not feasible. The PCP is opposed to NATO, the PSP and I are in favor of NATO; the PCP is opposed to the EEC, and the PSP and I are in favor of Portugal's EEC entry.

So I maintain the same viewpoint.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: However, allow me to attempt to clarify this issue better: Do you accept the PCP's participation in the government without its being in an alliance with the PSP?

Salgado Zenha: I neither accept nor reject.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: If you are elected president of the republic, that problem could confront you....

Salgado Zenha: Let us see whether we understand each other. Nowadays the government is not politically accountable to the president of the republic. The president has only to interpret the people's vote. Governments are formed in accordance with the Portuguese Parliament's wishes.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: Do you mean that the president of the republic does not have the right of powers to prevent any party's participation in the government?

Salgado Zenha: The president of the republic is the guarantor of the constitution, freedom, and the principle of democratic alternation. That right is not exercised by inaugurating or not inaugurating. It is guaranteed by the right of veto and by the power to dismiss the government itself. If the government performs actions resulting in the discontinuation of the democratic system I will dismiss it immediately. Any government which endangers fundamental freedoms will be dismissed immediately. I will not accept being the president of the republic who is the grave digger of democracy itself. If parliament shows itself in favor of and makes viable a government in which the Communist Party takes part, the problem is not mine but that of the parties forming that coalition. If that government performs any action against the constitution, against the system of public freedoms, or against the principle of democratic alternation, I will dismiss it immediately, whatever government it is.

This must be considered in general terms and not proceeding from the presupposition that A, B, or C is the vehicle for a specific idea, otherwise we will return to the Inquisition. People are all equal before the president. If they perform some action against the constitution, then the president uses his powers--not the other people's powers. The president of the republic cannot be the guardian of the political parties. The parties must come to terms among themselves.

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS: I would like you to point out the basic program differences between your candidacy and that of Miss Pintasilgo.

Salgado Zenha: Miss Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo has an exaggerated idea of the presidential powers. Her program is a government program. I believe that one of the principles that there are in the constitution is that of the separation of powers. Any state body which seeks to misuse its powers will create a situation of political instability. I will not refer to her program, since Miss Pintasilgo's manifesto has not yet been published. I believe that she expresses many generous ideas, although without specifying the means whereby the realization of those generous ideas is to be achieved.

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DISTINCT TENDENCIES SEEN WITHIN LEFT

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 1 Nov 85 p 15

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice]

[Excerpts] The final lineup of presidential candidates reveals that the political Right is showing itself to be united and that the Left, on the contrary, has not been able to do the same. The Right is therefore prepared for the challenges of the political decade that is just beginning. But this time it is not the Right that we need to talk about but the three branches of the Left, our purpose being to describe them and try to explain the main reason why their unity is impossible.

The first branch of the Left is hegemonic within the PS [Socialist Party], is currently represented politically by Mario Soares, and could be described as the natural heir to the republican tradition--possibly in a process of modernization along moderate leftist lines marking it as possibilist, Europeanizing, and psychologically prepared to adjust easily to the political practice of the EEC.

The second branch of the Left is hegemonic within the PCP and is represented politically by Alvaro Cunhal (and, to some extent, by General Eanes). Heir to the Jacobin stream of republican tradition, it is by inclination authoritarian, dirigiste, autarkist, nationalist, and the defender of a premodern and predemocratic view of Portuguese political organization. This was the Left that generated the revolutionary process (disregarding the spontaneity and anarchy involved), and this is the Left that assigns a political role to the "politicomilitary elite." It is a branch of the Left that is in ideological and cultural regression, but as will be seen, it is the branch best adapted to the current situation in the Portuguese social system.

The third branch of the Left is hegemonic within the Portuguese cultural subsystem. Politically, it expressed itself in particular by voting for the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party], and its leading political representative is Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo. It is heir above all to the leftwing Christian Messianism of the 1960's, the crisis of conscience experienced by the sons of middle-class families under Salazar, and the populist and grassroots logic of certain hard-to-label revolutionary movements under the First Republic. This

was the Left that provided the folklore and dreams for the PREC, is seated in the dock in the Monsanto courtroom, is enthusiastic about the basic communities, admired Cuba, took off on a revolutionary crusade with Guevara, and drinks in the theology of revolution through translations of mediocre quality.

For our purposes here, that tripolar arrangement of candidates signifies the impossibility of achieving hegemony in relations among the three components of the Portuguese Left. During the revolution, the Messianic component seemed hegemonic, and it was Otelo who called all the shots. Since the revolution, there has been the natural agreement--like God and the angels--between Cunhal and Eanes, despite all that distinguishes one from the other. For years, the near hegemony of the authoritarian Left has prevailed, but at no time has total hegemony been possible. The reason during the revolution was that the branch of the Left that was modernist and loyal to republican tradition headed the antiautocratic fight and that the "folkloric" component did nothing but throw more wood on Cunhal's fire. Since the revolution, it has been impossible because the memory of 25 November [1975] prevented a rapid rapprochement between Eanes and Cunhal, because the modernist Left's alliance with the Right in the government prevented a militaristic presidential system, and because, in the meantime, the presence of Ramalho Eanes prevented the leap forward that would have been represented by Socialist hegemony when the latter was in a favorable objective position to achieve it.

The current tragedy in the Left is precisely the way in which this situation was reached and the way in which the country has developed during these 10 years. By this I mean that the deterioration in purchasing power, the negative rate of investment, and the destruction of the economic-financial structures that were carrying us into modernity--all of that, plus a few more things, has caused a degeneration of the Portuguese social system that is at the origin of the degeneration of its political system.

If consolidating the hegemony of the modernist Left was difficult 10 years ago--primarily for political reasons--doing so now has become even more complicated, no longer so much because of political factors (since the world has shifted to the right and toward liberalism), but above all because of psychosociological factors: Portugal has regressed in the direction of the Third World over the past 10 years, and as is natural, the Europeanizing Left is not in the best position to rally voters in a state of historic regression.

The PRD phenomenon, the fussy and skillful populism of Manuela Eanes, and the popularity of Pintasilgo all reveal a single fundamental reality: Portugal is becoming increasingly a Third-World country and is joining that crowd, as is obvious, through the left side of its political spectrum.

But at this moment, everything is still up in the air, and the struggle to reach Belem Palace (or, more accurately, the second round) remains to be resolved as far as the Left is concerned.

A combination of circumstances so favorable to the modernist Left is not likely to be repeated. Mario Soares has the opportunity here to alter the

direction being taken by the Portuguese Left, which is tending toward a strengthening of the drive toward authoritarianism, with populist irredentism once again playing into its hands. If Mario Soares does not reach the second round, things will develop as expected--specifically, without the conditions that would allow the modernist Right [as published] to remain hegemonic. If Soares does reach the second round, he will save the Left and perhaps save the system. Especially if he loses.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLL ON POPULAR CONCERNS: EMPLOYMENT DESIRED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 1 Nov 85 pp 6-7

[Text] It has been confirmed: the Portuguese want to work. They want to have more jobs. Are they realistic: are they wanting the impossible? No, that was just an odd slogan painted on the streets of Paris 17 years ago by the spoiled children of the society of abundance. They want only the possible: their chief concern is to be provided with the means of earning their daily bread.

When asked to name the chief problems they would like to see solved in this country, the Portuguese put "the creation of more jobs" in first place (21.4 percent). The second thing they would like to see resolved is the issue of wages in arrears (20.8 percent). "Increased purchasing power" was only in third place (19.9 percent), that being a vague thing that the Portuguese realize does not fall from the sky.

In fourth place (13.2 percent of those polled) is the housing problem, a matter of real distress in a country which, according to statistics, is short 700,000 dwelling units--that is, the equivalent of a big city. And only in fifth place do we see health, which is a matter of concern to 8.7 percent of the Portuguese.

Next comes the fight against corruption--a popular topic at the moment and a recent addition to the catalogue of national diseases, which explains why it has been added to the list of election promises. It is viewed as a priority by 4.7 percent of the Portuguese. Next in line are those for whom the essential thing is to create a climate of hope (3.9 percent).

What about education? It is on the skids, but only 3.4 percent feel that it is the main problem to be solved. Maybe that's why... But is it cause or effect? To the Portuguese, knowledge may not be all that important. They are also not overly concerned about the fact we are being admitted to the EEC and that little has been done to prepare for the shock. "Adjusting to entry into the Common Market" is in ninth place (1.4 percent). It may not be presumptuous to conclude that the great majority of Portuguese are not too sure what the EEC is. It is true that we are not alone, since the majority of citizens in the European Community, in varying percentages, also do not know.

Rich Concerned About Wages in Arrears

"What problem in the country needs to be solved?"

Problem	Total	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic class		
		M	F	18-44	45+	A/B Upper	C Middle	D Lower
In first place:								
Corruption	4.7	6.0	3.5	5.0	4.4	9.0	4.2	-
More purchasing power	19.9	20.2	19.6	11.0	28.1	7.6	22.3	25.4
Housing	13.2	13.5	12.8	14.4	12.1	7.3	12.1	32.4
Climate of hope	3.9	4.8	3.1	6.0	2.0	9.3	3.0	.4
Creation of more jobs	21.4	15.2	27.0	28.5	14.8	15.7	23.6	15.4
Wages in arrears	20.8	23.0	18.8	18.8	22.7	24.1	19.4	24.5
Crime	1.2	.2	2.2	1.9	.6	1.2	1.4	.1
Education	3.4	1.5	5.1	4.8	2.1	6.8	3.0	-
Health	8.7	10.2	7.4	6.9	10.4	18.4	7.2	1.8
Adjustment to EEC	1.4	2.8	.1	2.8	.1	-	1.9	-
No answer	1.4	2.6	.4	-	2.7	.6	1.8	-
In second place:								
Corruption	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.8	15.0	4.1	-
More purchasing power	15.2	15.1	15.4	16.3	14.3	8.6	16.0	22.2
Housing	17.1	16.0	18.0	12.7	21.0	8.8	17.1	29.6
Climate of hope	2.4	1.5	3.2	3.2	1.7	.8	3.1	-
Creation of more jobs	26.8	26.4	27.1	30.4	23.4	15.6	28.8	32.9
Wages in arrears	14.1	14.5	13.7	11.4	16.5	6.7	15.8	14.8
Crime	3.5	2.3	4.6	5.4	1.7	7.3	3.0	.1
Education	5.1	5.7	4.5	6.4	3.8	19.5	2.1	.1
Health	5.8	6.2	5.5	5.0	6.6	8.2	6.0	.3
Adjustment to EEC	1.8	1.6	2.0	3.5	.3	8.7	.3	-
No answer	2.6	4.8	.5	.1	4.9	.8	3.4	-

Little Fear of Crime

And so, among the concerns suggested in the poll, we come to the one that worries Portuguese the least: crime. Despite everything--the full jails, the spectacular escapes, and the trials reported on the front pages--only 1.2 percent of our citizens assign first place to the fight against crime. We are mild tempered despite everything.

The creation of jobs is the basic program, and this is also shown by the fact that most of the inteviewees not considering that a priority nevertheless put it in second place. Among the secondary concerns of the Portuguese, housing becomes more important, while the problem of wages in arrears drops to fourth place. But the hegemony of the "big four" remains: the things that really vex the hearts of all of us are employment, purchasing power, wages, and a little corner to live in. The rest of it--such inestimable benefits as health, justice, and culture--is relegated to the second half of the list. Signs of the times.

Lisbon Wants Money; Rest of Country Wants Employment

"What problem in the country needs to be solved?"

Problem	Total	City: Lisbon	Porto	Coimbra	Evora	Vila Real	Viseu
In first place:							
Corruption	4.7	2.7	5.3	17.2	4.9	16.7	22.5
More purchasing power	19.9	21.6	16.1	21.6	15.3	17.2	16.4
Housing	13.2	14.2	13.1	7.9	8.0	4.0	5.1
Climate of hope	3.9	4.9	2.3	1.0	1.9	2.9	3.1
Creation of more jobs	21.4	15.8	34.3	22.5	25.6	27.1	27.8
Wages in arrears	20.8	21.4	21.7	13.6	22.6	12.0	10.0
Crime	1.2	1.2	.6	3.7	.9	4.5	1.4
Education	3.4	4.8	.6	-	2.2	3.7	3.9
Health	8.7	9.8	6.0	5.1	16.5	8.7	4.7
Adjustment to EEC	1.4	2.0	-	.7	2.2	.8	1.3
No answer	1.4	1.5	-	6.6	-	2.4	4.0
In second place:							
Corruption	5.7	6.1	3.3	10.5	7.0	4.9	7.6
More purchasing power	15.2	14.6	15.6	17.0	20.3	15.4	16.5
Housing	17.1	13.7	27.3	15.8	11.2	12.0	10.3
Climate of hope	2.4	1.9	3.5	1.4	2.1	.8	10.0
Creation of more jobs	26.8	28.3	26.9	15.7	18.5	24.1	20.3
Wages in arrears	14.1	14.8	11.5	9.4	23.2	23.7	16.8
Crime	3.5	4.1	1.8	5.2	2.0	4.6	3.0
Education	5.1	6.1	2.7	5.9	3.0	5.5	2.0
Health	5.8	5.1	6.7	7.4	10.9	5.9	4.7
Adjustment to EEC	1.8	2.2	.6	2.7	1.0	.8	4.6
No answer	2.6	3.0	-	9.0	.9	2.4	4.0

If we make a detailed analysis of the sociological groups of inhabitants polled, we see that the need to create new jobs is of concern primarily to women, young people, and the middle class. That is understandable: those are the groups that are entering the labor market in larger numbers every year. But among men, the major concern is wages in arrears. The same is true in the upper class, and that is one of the odd things about this poll: why are the richer citizens concerned about a problem that is probably having a greater effect on the other two classes? The answer is to be found partly in an economic viewpoint--the awareness that wages in arrears indicate financial disorder in the firms--and partly in a sociological viewpoint--the feeling that this is one of the most direct factors for social instability and the radicalization of the masses. Those masses (32.9 percent of the lower class) are more concerned about housing, and there is nothing odd about that.

It should also be pointed out that those over 45 years of age mentioned purchasing power as the priority problem to be solved. They would like to see it increased. Other details: the "creation of a climate of hope" is most desired by the upper class (9.3 percent), that being the class most inclined to daydream. On the other hand, it is the upper class which suffers least from the housing problem (7.3 percent), but reveals itself to be particularly

sensitive to the problems of health (18.4 percent) and education (6.8 percent). Crime frightens women in particular (2.2 percent).

Lisbon Wants Purchasing Power

Geographically, it turns out that employment is the chief problem in five out of the six cities covered by the poll, the exception being Lisbon, where the biggest need is said to be more purchasing power (21.6 percent). Does this mean that Lisbon wants to buy, while the rest of the country wants to work? That may be too simple a conclusion, but the results open up a vast area for reflection. All the more since the second-ranking concern among Lisbon residents is wages in arrears (21.4 percent), while the lack of jobs comes in a poor third (15.8 percent), slightly ahead of housing (14.2 percent, or more than in any of the other cities).

The fight against corruption is desired above all in Viseu (22.5 percent), and it is Lisbon that sees the greatest need to create a climate of hope (4.9 percent) and improve education (4.8 percent). Health is of concern to Evora (16.5 percent), which, being the center of a very distinct agricultural region, also feels particularly affected by the issue of entry into the EEC (2.2 percent). Crime--another interesting issue--is of concern especially in Vila Real (4.5 percent), Coimbra (3.7 percent), and Viseu (1.4 percent) but less so in the major urban centers of Lisbon (1.2 percent) and Porto (0.6 percent), with Evora in between the latter (0.9 percent). Could it be that the smaller centers are more sensitive to this issue than big-city inhabitants, who are afflicted by other overwhelming problems? The bomb that killed Sidonio Cabanelas in Vila Real a few months ago probably has something to do with the state of mind in that city in the Marao Mountains.

No to Coalitions

The Portuguese are tired of government coalitions. By an absolute majority (50.6 percent), they say they favor a government consisting of a single party that can implement its program on its own. But 39.5 percent feel that the next government should be based on an agreement among several parties, and 7.1 percent did not choose either solution.

All the same, that feeling is not unanimous. In the lowest social group, 52.7 percent feel that a coalition of several parties would be better. The upper class feels the same way, but less vehemently (47.8 percent). And the young people are divided almost in half, with 45.7 percent favoring a coalition and 45.5 percent favoring a single-party government. The desire to see a single party in the next government predominates in the middle class (54.6 percent) and among men (50.8 percent).

Of the six cities included in the poll, only Lisbon would like to see an agreement among various political groups (46.7 percent). Coimbra takes the opposite view (77.4 percent). It is in Vila Real, which also prefers a "monochrome" government, that the fewest people support a coalition, but that is also the city with the largest number of undecided respondents. Evora is where opinions are most divided (51.4 percent against 38 percent).

Long Live "Monochrome"

"The next government should be..."

Answer	Total	Sex M	Sex F	Age 18-44	Age 45+	Socioeconomic class A/B Upper	C Middle	D Lower
One party with its own program	50.6	50.8	50.4	45.5	55.4	45.6	54.5	30.3
Several parties in mutual agreement	39.5	38.5	40.4	45.7	33.7	47.8	35.6	52.7
Don't know	7.1	7.2	7.0	7.0	7.2	3.6	8.0	7.0
No answer	2.3	3.5	2.2	1.9	3.7	2.9	1.8	10.1

"The next government should be..."

Answer	Total	City Lisbon	Porto	Coimbra	Evora	Vila Real	Viseu
One party with its own program	50.6	41.6	65.8	77.4	51.4	72.7	64.5
Several parties in mutual agreement	39.5	46.7	27.4	19.5	38.0	16.4	26.1
Don't know	7.1	8.5	4.8	2.1	5.7	10.9	5.4
No answer	2.3	3.2	2.0	1.0	5.0	-	4.0

It turns out, then, that the greatest distrust of a single-party government exists on the coast and in Evora. For its part, the interior is definitely in favor of an end to agreements and of "the fewer people the better" in the country's government. While matters in Portugal are decided on the coast, it happens that for once the general attitude is leaning toward the opinion expressed by the interior. The figures are what they are.

Technical Data

Universe: Portuguese population over 18 years of age residing in the cities of Coimbra, Evora, Lisbon, Porto, Vila Real, and Viseu. Sample: 604 individuals. Sampling: Random, stratified by city, nonproportional imputation. Selection: Homes selected by random route method, with individuals to be interviewed selected by the Kish method. Technique: direct personal interviews using a structured questionnaire at the interviewee's home. Sampling points: Six cities in which starting points were selected. Fieldwork: Interviews conducted between 9 and 16 October 1985. Margin of error: In total, an error of +4 percent in a confidence interval of 95 percent. For P = 50 percent. Institute responsible: The survey was conducted by NORMA, Inc., the Portuguese member of Gallup International.

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POLL REFLECTS STABILITY ON MAJOR ISSUES, PERSONALITIES

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 7 Oct 85 pp 13-23

[Text] Spain has been a constitutional democracy since December 1978 and, as has been indicated since "Barometer's" first poll installment, most Spaniards have a good opinion of both democracy as a political system and the Constitution devised on the basis of the consensus of the majority parties. Democracy is accepted by nearly 80 percent of Spaniards, whereas those who reject it number slightly over 7 percent. Based on voters from the different parties, it is those from AP [Popular Alliance] who have a higher rate of rejection (twice the overall average, 15.1 percent); but this number is small compared with the 67.3 percent of those who accept it. Based on sex, the rate of acceptance is quite similar between men and women, although the men declare themselves to be slightly more democratic. Based on age, the ones most favoring the democratic system are between 30 and 45 years old, followed by the youngest.

The Constitution, with less support than democracy (something logical, because its structure is concrete), is accepted by over 60 percent of the population, and rejected by only 8.6 percent.

On this occasion, the most critical position toward the Constitution is shared by AP and Communist voters. Percentage-wise, it is the Alliance members who reject it more than the Communists do; but there are also more Alliance members who accept it.

A clearcut sign of approval for the democratic values and the Constitution is the fact that each one of the seven surveys on acceptance of democracy and of the Constitution has brought similar results, not only in the overall sample as a whole, but also in each one of its segments.

We Are All in Politics

The acceptance of democracy and of the Constitution coincides with the fact that a 70 percent majority think that, "it is better for each and every one of us to take an interest in politics and consider ourselves responsible for it"; as opposed to 21.5 percent who think that, "it is better for a prominent man to have authority and decide for us." The question was deliberately phrased the same as in the Foessa Report of 1975, to note the historical change of

opinions. On that occasion, the responses were 56 and 36 percent, respectively. The conviction regarding collective leadership in political life has increased 14 whole points during the last decade.

Based on age, the younger people were, the more often they were democratic.

To gauge the degree of individual identification with the state as a political organization, people were requested to choose between two propositions (which were also posed in the 1975 Foessa Report): "All of us are the state," and "the state is those who give orders." Ten years ago, the latter was what 44 percent of Spaniards thought; in September 1985, the number declined to a still revealing 34 percent. On the other hand, those who felt that they were leaders of the state, who numbered 47 percent in 1975, total 57 percent now.

...But From Afar

Nevertheless, all this undeniable democratic sentiment coexists with a meager interest in politics: Only 32.7 percent claim to have much or considerable interest, as opposed to 14.1 percent who admit to having little or no interest.

The Communist voters (the most politicized) are the ones expressing the greatest interest, and those from AP are the ones voicing the least. The Spaniard seems to be aware of his present apathy concerning politics; and so, he comments: "We Spaniards have less interest in politics than the citizens of the European democracies do"' and he admits that "Since the last general elections of October 1982, the political interest has declined." In both judgments there is homogeneity among the various segments, whether they be based on sex, age or political affinity.

The trip to China and Japan made by the head of the government, accompanied by businessmen, is possibly the leading factor that has caused a moderate increase in all the popularity indexes of Felipe Gonzalez and his cabinet; and this is despite the fact that the journey was marked by incidents which, in view of the data, many of those interviewed have not taken into consideration.

Government and Prime Minister: Favorable 'Rentree'

During the first UCD [Democratic Center Union] governments, it was claimed that their prime minister, Adolfo Suarez, traveled outside of Spain to carry on a campaign inside the country. The data from the 22d poll installment make the hypothesis that the prime minister's trips abroad improve the popularity of political leaders admissible. Felipe Gonzalez' image as head of the government, even after a criticized summer, has undergone a noticeable improvement: 2.8 points in the "good" connotation, a 2.9 point reduction in the "bad" ,and a 5.7 point increase in the neutral vote on this.

The fact that it is among the AP electorate that Felipe Gonzalez' improvement has been the greatest is inevitably linked with the role that businessmen played on the prime minister's trip, the basically economic nature of the latter and the information published by the news media on the negotiations.

In the view of the Alliance electorate, Felipe Gonzalez' "good" connotation has increased 5.5 points and the "bad" one has declined 14.1 points, with a 19.6 point rise in the neutral vote.

AP Votes

On this occasion, the improvement in the government's image has accompanied that of its prime minister, with a 2.6 point increase in the "good" connotation and a 1.2 point decline in the "bad" one, making his neutral vote become positive by 1.1 points; which represents a 3.6 increase in comparison with the poll installment of August. It is also among the AP voters that the government's image has improved most decidedly.

A year ago, "Barometer's" 10th poll installment showed that September 1984 reflected the critical turning point, with the greatest erosion of the Socialist option; because the head of the government, after a summer with a high degree of questioning, had suffered a major decline in his image. Nevertheless, in this installment of September 1985, there is every indication that the Socialist government is staking everything on preparations for beneficial general elections.

Four Phases

When the time is short before the marking of the government's third anniversary, the legislature can be divided into four periods: a first year of popular enchantment, which lasted from the October 1982 elections until December 1983; a second year of a continuous loss of image, until October 1984; a third year of balance, with slight declines, until September 1985; and a fourth clearly preelectoral year the evolution of which is still difficult to guess, but which, at least at its beginning, is favorable for the Socialists: for the time being, a good "rentree" [re-entrance].

Manuel Fraga's image as leader of the main opposition party continues as it was, without rising or falling after four poll installments. The neutral vote on Fraga's image has varied two tenths of a point; he is still accepted by his voters and completely rejected by the rest. In the popularity "ranking" of the leaders, he retains an unchangeable fourth place in all 11 surveys.

Suarez, Better Than Guerra

Adolfo Suarez is also steady in his image, which is better than that of Manuel Fraga and worse than that of Felipe Gonzalez. On this occasion, Suarez is ahead of Alfonso Guerra again in the "ranking," occupying second place after Felipe Gonzalez.

Santiago Carrillo and Gerardo Iglesias have received the two wors ratings since the beginning of "Barometer." Owing to the appearance of Jose Antonio Ardanza, who is still little known, Oscar Alzaga has for the second consecutive time lost his last place rating position.

PSOE Advances

With the Socialists' electoral increment of 3.2 points in the voting intention without projection, and of 2.4 points with projection, the government party, standing only 6.2 points from October 1982, is assured, for the present, although without much leeway, of the absolute parliamentary majority.

AP has declined, receiving the lowest number of points since the beginning of "Barometer," both in the voting intention without projection (23.3 percent) and with a projection of undecided (25.1 percent); a voting intention somewhat less than even its results in October 1982.

Of the two parties which regularly receive voting intentions exceeding their meager results in October 1982, CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] ranks between 5 and 6 percent, and PCE [Spanish Communist Party] has suffered a major decline, possibly as a result of the growing division among Communists.

NATO: Confusion

The confusion has increased in the opinions regarding whether or not Spain should remain in NATO: Those favoring egress have decreased; those for total entry remain the same; there is also a reduction in those who prefer membership only in the political organization and not in the military; and, in particular, there is an increase in those with don't know/don't answers who number nearly 30 percent in this installment. Perhaps the lack of decision has something to do with the lack of exactitude regarding the "when" and "how" of the holding of the referendum and with the Democratic Coalition's announcement that it would "pass" on it, if the latter is called for.

Finally, the different progress in the popularity indexes for the two majority labor confederations, UGT [General Union of Workers] and CCOO [Workers Committees], is noteworthy. The latter has received a very steady acceptance, close to that of the UGT confederation. Nevertheless, UGT has been subjected to significant ups and downs, associated with its different level of confrontation with the governm ent. Thus, UGT is observing how the very times of its best understanding with the government coincide with its least popular acceptance.

Democracy

Spain is a democracy. What is your opinion of democracy as a political system?

Good: 77 percent; fair: 11.4 percent; poor: 7.4 percent.

Constitution

What is your opinion of the Spanish Constitution?

Good: 61 percent; fair: 22.2 percent; poor: 8.6 percent

The State

Do you believe that "all of us are the state," or that "the state is those who give orders"?

All of us are the state: 57.3 percent; the state is those who give orders: 34.4 percent; don't know/no answer: 8.3 percent

The Power

With which of the following two statements do you most agree?

It is better for a prominent man to have authority and decide for us: 21.5 percent; it is better for each and every one of us to take an interest in politics and consider ourselves responsible for it: 69.7 percent; don't know/ no answer: 8.8 percent.

Politics

In general, do you have much, considerable, little or no interest in politics?

Much: 5.7 percent; considerable: 27 percent; little: 38.8 percent; no: 25.3 percent; don't know/no answer: 3.2 percent

In Comparison...

Do you think that we Spaniards have more or less interest in politics than the citizens of the European democracies do?

More interest: 6.7 percent; the same interest: 25.5 percent; less interest: 44.2 percent; don't know/no answer: 23.6 percent

All For Democracy

Spain is a democracy. What is your opinion of democracy as a political system?

Overall	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	74.5	76.1	79.0	72.6	75.0	81.0	77.0
Fair	16.4	14.3	11.9	13.9	14.3	11.6	11.4
Poor	5.7	6.6	5.5	10.1	7.8	5.5	7.4

PSOE	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 95
Good	81.7	86.1	89.1	84.9	85.9	89.6	85.2
Fair	13.6	8.6	6.0	9.9	10.9	5.7	7.4
Poor	2.9	2.3	1.9	3.4	1.9	3.2	4.6

AP	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	70.1	66.7	66.8	57.6	71.6	73.7	67.3
Fair	16.2	20.7	20.8	15.2	14.7	18.8	16.1
Poor	11.1	9.9	10.0	21.9	11.8	6.8	15.1

PCE	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	81.2	80.5	85.4	70.3	66.7	79.1	81.4
Fair	8.3	13.9	10.4	13.5	15.2	13.4	9.3
Poor	10.4	5.6	4.2	16.2	15.2	7.5	4.7

	Sex		Age			
	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
Good	78.2	75.8	78.1	84.3	74.4	66.2
Fair	12.3	10.6	9.8	8.9	13.4	15.2
Poor	7.8	7.7	9.4	4.9	8.2	9.3

A Good Constitution

What is your opinion of the Spanish Constitution?

Overall	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	61.1	61.1	66.3	59.9	67.0	66.9	61.0
Fair	24.0	24.5	20.8	22.8	20.9	20.4	22.2
Poor	5.9	7.2	5.9	9.6	5.7	6.9	8.6

PSOE	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	73.6	71.5	79.2	74.4	77.5	79.7	75.0
Fair	18.4	19.6	12.5	18.0	15.6	12.2	16.0
Poor	1.7	2.6	2.1	3.7	3.1	4.2	2.8

AP	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	52.9	56.7	50.8	53.8	67.7	60.4	61.0
Fair	25.6	28.8	33.3	22.0	18.6	30.0	22.4
Poor	11.9	9.0	9.2	16.7	7.9	5.8	13.2

PCE	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85
Good	70.9	72.2	68.9	54.1	54.4	70.2	55.8
Fair	25.0	24.5	25.0	27.0	21.2	17.9	34.9
Poor	2.1	5.6	4.2	8.1	12.1	11.9	4.7

	Sex		Age			
	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-55	+ 65
Good	63.8	58.5	58.9	64.6	62.4	54.3
Fair	22.4	22.1	25.8	23.9	20.2	17.2
Poor	10.4	7.0	10.5	7.9	7.6	9.3

The State, For Debate

Do you think that "all of us are the state," or that "the state is those who give orders"?

			Vote Oct 82			Sex		Age			
	Foessa 75	Sep 85	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
All of us are the state	47	57.3	62.0	58.5	58.1	60.0	54.9	57.9	65.6	53.1	49.7
The state is those who give orders	44	34.4	30.6	36.1	37.2	34.7	34.1	36.9	29.2	35.7	37.1
Don't know/no answer	9	8.3	7.4	5.4	4.7	5.3	11.0	5.2	5.2	11.2	13.2

Against Enlightened Despotism

With which of the two statements that I shall read to you do you most agree?

			Vote Oct 82			Sex		Age			
	Foessa 75	Sep 85	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
It is better for a pre-eminent man to have authority and decide for us	36	21.5	12.7	46.8	0.0	21.2	21.8	9.4	20.0	28.6	30.5
It is better for each and every one of us to take an interest in politics and consider ourselves responsible for it	56	69.7	80.6	44.4	100.0	70.5	68.9	84.3	75.4	60.5	52.3
Don't know/no answer	8	8.8	6.7	8.8	0.0	8.3	9.3	6.3	4.6	10.9	17.2

Europe, More Politicized

Do you think that we Spaniards have more or less interest in politics than the citizens of the European democracies do?

	Overall	Vote Oct 82 PSOE	AP	PCE	Sex Men	Women	Age 18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
More interest	6.7	7.9	1.9	11.6	6.6	6.9	7.3	6.6	7.9	3.3
Same interest	25.5	25.9	28.8	34.9	26.7	24.3	23.0	25.2	26.7	27.8
Less interest	44.2	43.2	52.2	46.5	49.6	39.3	52.3	47.9	38.4	35.8
Don't know/ no answer	23.6	22.9	17.1	7.0	17.1	29.5	17.4	20.3	27.0	33.1

Politics Is Boring

In general, do you have much, considerable, little or no interest in politics?

	Foessa 75	Sep 85	Vote Oct 82 PSOE	AP	PCE	Sex Men	Women	Age 18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
Much	3	5.7	5.1	4.4	23.3	7.2	4.3	5.6	6.9	4.4	6.6
Considerable	12	27.0	29.2	21.4	58.1	36.4	19.5	32.8	32.4	21.8	17.9
Little	28	38.8	42.8	45.4	11.6	34.7	42.5	38.3	42.0	38.7	33.1
No	57	25.3	20.6	23.4	7.0	18.0	31.1	21.6	16.4	30.2	38.4
Don't know/ no answer	-	3.2	2.3	5.4	0.0	2.8	3.6	1.7	2.3	4.9	4.0

Fixed Interest

Since the last general elections of October 1982, do you think that your interest in politics has increased, decreased or is still the same as before?

	Overall	Vote Oct 82 PSOE	AP	PCE	Sex Men	Women	Age 18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
Has increased	18.0	17.6	9.3	41.9	18.2	17.8	25.8	15.4	16.6	11.9
Still the same	48.8	53.9	57.1	37.2	47.9	49.6	44.6	53.4	47.1	51.0
Has decreased	23.1	20.8	22.9	20.9	26.7	19.9	20.6	25.3	23.2	23.8
Don't know/ no answer	10.1	7.7	10.7	0.0	7.2	12.7	9.0	5.9	13.1	13.3

Conscious

For what concrete reasons...?

	Overall	Vote Oct 82 PSOE	AP	PCE	Sex Men	Women	Age 18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
More information in the new media	14.1	13.2	5.3	11.1	14.7	13.5	6.8	30.4	14.7	0.0

More participation	5.5	6.6	10.5	5.6	6.3	4.8	4.0	4.3	9.8	0.0
More information on political issues	7.5	6.6	10.5	11.1	9.5	5.8	10.8	4.4	3.3	16.7
More freedom	10.1	10.5	15.8	11.1	8.4	11.5	6.8	8.7	18.0	0.0
Consciousness of civic duty	15.6	17.1	15.8	5.6	11.6	19.2	25.7	2.2	16.4	5.6
Interest in politics has increased in general	19.1	23.7	5.3	16.7	20.0	18.3	21.6	19.6	14.8	22.2
Others	22.1	18.4	26.3	33.3	22.1	22.1	17.6	26.1	19.7	38.9
Don't know/ no answer	6.0	3.9	10.5	5.5	7.4	4.8	6.7	4.3	3.3	16.6

Apathetic

For what concrete reasons...?

		Vote Oct 82			Sex		Age			
	Overall	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
No interest in politics; it's all the same to me	21.7	20.2	21.4	12.5	17.7	25.3	31.3	20.7	16.2	20.8
The political situation is still the same; the problems are not solved	13.8	12.9	9.4	25.0	16.5	11.4	16.4	15.2	12.7	9.1
Poorly informed; don't understand politics	7.4	8.2	5.1	0.0	3.5	10.7	6.3	7.3	7.5	9.1
All politicians are alike; they aren't convincing	4.6	4.7	1.7	12.5	6.3	3.1	3.9	2.5	6.9	5.2
Others	17.1	19.3	15.4	25.0	22.1	12.8	10.9	22.0	19.7	11.7
Don't know/ no answer	35.4	34.7	47.0	25.0	33.9	36.7	31.2	32.3	37.0	44.1

Dissatisfied

For what concrete reasons...?

		Vote Oct 82			Sex		Age			
	Overall	PSOE	AP	PCE	Men	Women	18-29	30-44	45-65	+ 65
Dissatisfaction, disappointment, disillusionment with politics	35.8	33.3	29.8	22.2	39.0	31.9	39.0	46.7	28.2	25.0

Non-fulfillment of programs, loss of credibility	24.1	30.0	25.5	33.3	20.6	28.4	28.8	18.2	25.9	25.0
Poor operation of government or its leaders	12.1	8.9	27.7	33.4	14.9	8.6	6.8	11.7	15.3	13.9
Tired of politics, the euphoria of democracy is gone	2.0	0.0	2.1	0.0	2.1	1.7	3.4	0.0	2.3	2.8
Lack of time	3.1	4.4	0.0	0.0	2.8	3.5	6.8	2.6	2.4	0.0
All politicians are alike	5.4	10.0	4.3	0.0	5.7	5.2	1.7	6.5	3.5	13.9
Others	11.3	6.7	10.6	11.1	8.5	14.7	11.8	6.5	11.8	19.4
Don't know/ no answer	6.2	6.7	0.0	0.0	6.4	6.0	1.7	7.8	10.6	0.0

Up, Up, Prime Minister

What is your opinion of the current prime minister of the government, Felipe Gonzalez?

Overall	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	54.1	39.8	36.3	36.8	34.8	35.5	38.3
Fair	29.2	35.6	36.5	33.1	33.7	33.2	32.5
Poor	12.3	20.5	24.8	26.8	28.6	28.5	25.6
Neutral vote	41.8	19.3	11.5	10.0	6.2	7.0	12.7

PSOE	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	77.4	61.3	63.3	61.1	60.0	61.3	64.4
Fair	17.9	27.9	31.0	28.0	29.6	29.6	24.8
Poor	3.2	9.9	5.5	9.3	9.6	7.6	9.7
Neutral vote	74.2	51.4	57.8	51.8	50.4	53.7	54.7

AP	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	38.5	15.7	11.6	11.9	3.7	5.2	10.7
Fair	35.0	38.1	36.6	29.0	32.5	32.3	40.5
Poor	21.4	39.0	48.6	56.3	62.5	60.9	46.8
Neutral vote	17.1	-23.2	-37.0	-44.4	-58.9	-55.7	-36.1

PCE	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	50.0	14.8	15.5	27.4	21.1	30.0	30.2
Fair	29.2	50.8	45.1	49.3	40.4	35.0	41.9
Poor	18.8	32.8	36.6	23.3	36.8	35.0	27.9
Neutral vote	31.2	-18.8	-21.1	4.1	-15.7	-5.0	2.3

The Government Improves

What is your opinion of the present government of the nation?

Overall	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	39.4	27.8	27.9	27.8	26.9	26.9	29.5
Fair	38.5	40.9	41.5	37.2	36.5	40.9	38.6
Poor	17.6	26.5	27.8	31.4	33.3	29.6	28.4
Neutral vote	21.8	1-3	0.1	-3.6	-6.4	-2.7	1.1

PSOE	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	65.5	45.6	53.5	52.7	52.7	50.6	52.6
Fair	29.8	38.9	39.4	33.4	34.3	40.3	36.6
Poor	3.7	12.9	6.9	12.0	12.5	7.8	11.1
Neutral vote	61.8	32.7	46.6	40.7	40.2	42.8	41.5

AP	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	19.6	8.1	3.7	5.8	1.1	1.6	4.9
Fair	40.2	35.4	32.4	27.6	21.3	33.9	36.1
Poor	35.1	49.3	59.7	64.1	76.1	64.6	56.6
Neutral vote	-15.5	-41.2	-56.0	-58.3	-75.0	-63.0	-51.7

PCE	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Good	35.4	13.1	8.5	20.5	10.5	22.5	20.9
Fair	39.6	45.9	59.2	53.4	52.6	22.5	53.5
Poor	25.0	39.4	29.6	26.0	35.1	50.0	25.6
Neutral vote	10.4	-26.3	-21.1	-5.5	-24.6	-27.5	-4.7

Old Ones Known

Popularity Index

	Jan 84	Mar 84	May 84	Sep 84	Nov 84	Jan 85	Mar 85	May 85	Jul 85	Sep 85
Felipe Gonzalez	55.8	55.0	52.1	51.8	54.4	50.6	52.5	50.0	51.1	50.9
Adolfo Suarez	38.3	39.5	41.9	43.3	43.0	41.8	43.6	42.6	39.6	41.8
Alfonso Guerra	44.1	44.8	41.7	41.0	43.5	41.1	42.8	40.9	41.0	39.8
Manuel Fraga	39.3	35.9	38.0	36.2	38.3	35.3	34.8	34.2	36.4	35.6
Miguel Roca	32.6	29.3	36.3	31.5	33.2	32.0	33.4	33.6	31.8	32.2
Jordi Pujol	28.3	24.4	35.7	38.7	29.2	27.9	29.4	29.5	28.8	29.1
Antonio Garrigues	30.4	28.3	31.9	28.8	28.0	26.6	28.3	30.2	27.2	28.0

Santiago Carrillo	27.7	28.0	30.3	31.2	31.0	30.2	32.3	29.0	29.7	27.5
Gerardo Iglesias	29.9	29.2	30.4	31.3	32.3	27.7	30.6	29.2	28.7	27.1
Oscar Alzaga	21.1	24.0	24.3	21.8	24.0	23.4	25.0	24.8	22.3	24.1
Jose A. Ardanza	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.7	20.5

Fraga, For the Worse

What is your opinion of the leader of the main opposition party, Manuel Fraga?

				Vote Oct 82								
	Overall			PSOE			AP			PCE		
	Jan 85	May 85	Sep 85	Jan 85	May 85	Sep 85	Jan 85	May 85	Sep 85	Jan 85	May 85	Sep 85
Good	20.5	21.8	22.5	5.2	5.4	5.8	73.6	78.5	76.6	3.6	9.0	0.0
Fair	30.3	25.3	23.1	28.8	27.5	23.8	23.1	18.1	19.0	3.6	6.0	4.6
Poor	43.9	49.0	49.0	61.5	65.3	68.5	2.0	3.1	3.4	89.3	85.0	95.4
Neutral vote	-23.4	-27.2	-27.4	-56.3	-59.9	-62.7	71.6	75.4	73.2	-85.7	-76.0	-95.4

Suarez Remains Steady

What is your opinion of Adolfo Suarez?

			Vote Oct 82					
	Overall		PSOE		AP		PCE	
	May 85	Sep 85	May 85	Sep 85	May 85	Sep 85	May 85	Sep 85
Good	22.6	23.4	21.2	23.2	30.4	22.9	14.9	23.3
Fair	42.7	43.0	47.6	48.6	39.6	42.9	46.3	27.2
Poor	30.9	29.3	29.6	25.9	27.7	33.2	37.3	39.5
Neutral vote	-8.2	-5.9	-8.4	-2.7	2.7	-10.3	-22.4	-16.5

Toward the Alliance

In your opinion, what type of relations should Spain maintain with NATO?

	Dec 83	Dec 84	Feb 85	Apr 85	May 85	Jun 85	Jul 85	Aug 85	Sep 85
Total integration	13.0	13.0	15.4	15.8	14.7	13.1	13.9	13.3	14.8
Integration in the political organization alone, but not in the military	20.0	19.4	19.1	19.6	18.3	16.5	15.3	19.2	16.3
Total departure	49.2	46.8	46.5	41.4	45.6	45.5	48.2	42.2	40.6
Don't know/ no answer	17.1	20.8	19.0	23.2	21.4	24.8	22.6	24.9	28.4

Trade Unions: the Pulse

Could you give me your opinion of the activity of the following trade unions?

	Jan 84	Mar 84	May 84	Jul 84	Sep 84	Nov 84	Mar 85	Jul 85	Sep 85
UGT									
Good	21.3	16.5	18.7	18.4	19.6	17.0	20.4	18.5	21.2
Fair	25.5	29.6	26.6	28.6	28.9	29.2	26.8	27.9	25.1
Poor	19.8	20.8	26.5	23.0	20.6	24.5	25.0	28.4	27.1
CCOO									
Good	16.7	16.9	15.6	18.6	19.6	15.3	20.7	21.6	19.4
Fair	26.2	24.8	23.6	26.9	25.0	27.3	25.0	26.4	26.5
Poor	23.4	21.9	31.4	24.1	23.2	27.5	26.3	25.7	26.9

Technical Record

Direction: Communication Techniques, Consultants, Inc.

Execution: Sigma-Dos, Inc.

22d poll installment: Technical record.

Universe: persons 18 years of age or older; environment: Spain, with the exception of the Canaries, taking 11 autonomous regions as a sample; sample: 1,111 interviews, with a possible error of ± 3 percent, for a confidence interval of 95.5 percent and p/q = 50, based on the Arkin and Colton tables; selection: random, based on the random route method, supplemented by the quota corrector system based on sex, age and occupation; interviews: held through personal visits to domiciles; dates of field work: 12 to 17 September 1985.

2909
CSO: 3548/13

POLL INDICATES PSOE UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 14 Oct 85 pp 28-31

[Text] Difficulties for PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] in repeating its absolute majority of 1982, a slight recovery for Manuel Fraga's Popular Coalition and a progressive decline in Felipe Gonzalez' image are some of the results from an eleventh "installment" of the OTR/TIEMPO poll, directed by Prof Juan Diez Nicolas.

The Socialist Party does not appear to have been affected from the standpoint of intention of voting for it by the unfortunate summer that has just ended. On the other hand, the regrettable handling of the government crisis, the excursions on the "Azor," the festive presence of PSOE leaders among the Marbella and Ibiza "jet set," and the troubled "fly where you can" of the presidential trip to Peking have unquestionably influenced the decline in Felipe Gonzalez' political image shown by the OTR/TIEMPO poll.

During the past 5 months, Felipe Gonzalez has lost six tenths in the assessment of Spaniards, three tenths of them between June and September, until it reached 5.6 points, at its lowest interval since long before the 1982 general elections.

Nevertheless, the head of the government still leads in the "ranking" of political leaders' assessments, but with a gradual decline; while approaching him, only six tenths of a point away, is the leader of PRD [Democratic Reformist Party] and of the "reformist operation," Miguel Roca. In the competition for the central space, Roca has an advantage of three tenths over Adolfo Suarez, who is the third best evaluated leader, with 4.7 points; although he is still less well known than the former head of the government. The head of AP [Popular Alliance" and leader of Popular Coalition, Manuel Fraga, despite his active summer campaign in Galicia and his constant presence on the streets and in the news media, has not managed to destroy that bad authoritarian image with which he is judged by an extensive sector of the public, and which has left him 3.7 points in the assessment, despite the slight recovery of his political strength.

In the previous "installment" of the OTR/TIEMPO poll, it was determined that the qualities of being "intelligent" and "hard-working" were the ones most

highly esteemed by Spaniards in their leaders; while that of being "authoritarian" was one of those most repudiated. Felipe Gonzalez and Miguel Roca have benefited from this type of evaluation, which has harmed the leader of the conservative opposition because of his authoritarian quality.

The Liberal Campaign

In the poll there are questions about many more leaders, besides the four principal ones already mentioned. The head of the Liberal Party (PL) Jose Antonio Segurado, shows the effects of a good image campaign that has brought his evaluation up to 4.7 points; in other words, to the same level as Adolfo Suarez. Nevertheless, it must be noted that, whereas Suarez is identified by nearly 90 percent of Spaniards, only 20.4 percent know Segurado, for the time being.

The leader of UGT [General Union of Workers], Nicolas Redondo, and that of the major management association, CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations], Jose Maria Cuevas, are assessed very evenly, with a slight advantage for Redondo, who has 4.5 points, as compared with 4.4 for Jose Maria Cuevas. On the other hand, CEOE is a tenth ahead in the evaluation of the unions. The former "super-minister" of economy and finance, Miguel Boyer, now president of the Banco Exterior of Spain, shows in his image the effects of his departure from the government and the sentimental adventure attributed to him. He has received an assessment of 3.9 points, compared with the 4.8 that he had in December 1984. It is symptomatic to observe that "jet society" is by far the social group considered worst by Spaniards, with 2.9 points; which has contributed to the loss of image of politicians who appear to be overly associated with the "jet set" parties.

PSOE retains its preeminent position as the country's leading political force, with 29.9 percent voting intention, nearly double the 15.5 percent inclined in favor of Manuel Fraga's Popular Coalition. The two center parties, Miguel Roca's PRD and Adolfo Suarez' CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], which together totaled 7.4 percent of the voting intention in September 1984, now total 9.4 percent, with a 2-point gain for the two combined. The summer has affected the relative backing for the two center parties. In fact, PRD moved from 2.6 in June to 3.8 percent in September, with a gain of 1.2 points; while CDS dropped from 6.2 to 5.6, with a loss of six tenths. The "reformist operation" appears to have surmounted the spring crisis, largely as a result of the improvement in the image of its leader, Miguel Roca.

It is interesting to note that, out of a minimal predictable abstention of 20 percent of the electorate, only 15 percent (in all likelihood considerably less) of the voters still remain to be signed up. Realizing that PSOE is over 6 points from the necessary number for an absolute majority, and if one reckons the "concealed" vote of the right, which has been more than sufficiently proven in previous polls and elections, it would be highly unlikely that Felipe Gonzalez would manage to repeat an absolute majority of seats in elections which took place now.

Insofar as Gerardo Iglesias' PCE [Spanish Communist Party] is concerned, the September poll shows a recovery of four tenths in comparison with June, with the voting intention rising from 2.4 to 2.8 percent. In any event, it is still below the very meager results of the 1982 elections and hence, would have difficulties in maintaining any parliamentary presence. A year ago, in September 1984, PCE had a voting intention of 4.8 percent. It is obvious that the exacerbation of the internal crisis, with the radical confrontation between "Gerardistas" and "Carrillistas," has represented a disintegration of PCE as a useful vote; which explains the persistence of the leftist vote backing PSOE, despite the shift to the right by Felipe Gonzalez' government that has been evident.

In a different connection, and in the opinion of Spaniards, the government as an institution is still considered worse than the Armed Forces, the Church and Parliament. On the other hand, it is considered better than management's CEOE, the unions and Spanish Television.

Between June and September, the government lost four tenths in the public's evaluation; the Armed Forces, five; and Parliament, six. Of these great institutions, only the Church has improved, by a tenth, after the summer hiatus.

A Left-Of-Center Country

The fact is that the fluctuations of opinion concerning politicians, parties and institutions are necessarily very slight, owing to the great stability that Spaniards show on their scale of ideological self-definition which has been repeated, virtually without any kind of change, during the past 2 years. The country is still definitely inclined toward the left, with the greatest relative weight in the left-of center position and the almost non-existence of extremism.

A total of 18.6 percent of Spaniards declare themselves left-of-center, as opposed to only 8.8 claiming to be right-of-center. Somewhat the same thing occurs in the left and right relationship: 16.7 percent declare themselves to be of the left, and only 9.1 percent, of the right; while 17.3 percent position themselves definitely in the center. It is obvious that the extreme left, with 1.6 percent, and the extreme right, with 0.5 percent, lack electoral clout in Spain. The weighted averages lead us to the discovery that the left as a whole approximately doubles the right as a whole; which is clearly reflected in the ratio of electoral forces between PSOE and Popular Coalition, and backs the theory that, without a broad center force, it would be almost impossible for the right to displace PSOE from Moncloa Palace.

Technical Record

Execution: OTR/IS, with the cooperation of Emopublica, Inc, for the field work, and Unitec, for tabulation. Sample: 1,199 persons 18 years of age and older, residing in Spain. Random, by conglomerates and random route. Field: Carried out from 16 to 20 Sep ember, by polling in households. Direction: Juan Diez Nicolas.

Key to Chart:

1. Evaluation of the Principal Leaders
2. September '84
3. December '84
4. March '85
5. June '85
6. September '85

2909
CSO: 3548/13

SIFO POLL VIEWS LIBERALS' GAIN, COMPARISONS

Poll Results

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Willy Silberstein]

[Text] The Liberal Party has recorded its best result ever and overtaken the Conservatives in the SVENSKA DAGBLADET-SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] poll for October. The Center Party is at its lowest point ever. According to SIFO, the nonsocialists are now in the majority with 50.5 percent compared to 47.5 percent for the socialists.

Seven weeks after the election, there is great turbulence among the voters, with extremely large shifts in public opinion. This is illustrated by a comparison between SIFO's voter barometer just a few days before the election, a public opinion survey conducted just a couple of days after the election but not published until now, and the new survey (see the table below).

Of those polled in October, 4.5 percent did not answer or did not mention any party. All the changes are statistically reliable.

The long-term trend is as follows: Conservatives: 25.2 percent; Liberal Party: 13.3 percent; Center Party: 11.0 percent; Social Democrats: 44.6 percent; and VPK [Left Party-Communists]: 4.3 percent.

Not Comparable

SIFO figures are not directly comparable with election results. As usual, SIFO asked those it polled which party was best. But since the election was so recent, it is natural to compare this poll with the election results of 15 September, when the figures for the parties were as follows: Conservatives: 21.3 percent; Center Party: 12.4 percent; Liberal Party: 14.2 percent: Social Democrats: 44.7 percent; and VPK: 5.4 percent.

In opinion polls soon after an election, the trend shown in that election usually grows stronger: to him who has, more shall be given. And that phenomenon seems to be true today as well: the Liberal Party is moving up

fast, while the Conservatives and the Center Party are continuing to slip back.

Party	Results of Three Polls Oct 85	18-24 Sep 85	9-12 Sep 85
Conservatives	19.0%	21%	24.5%
Liberal Party	23.5	21	10.7
Center Party	8.0	8	13.6
of which: KDS	1.5	1	2.5
Social Democrats	43.0	45	45.3
VPK	4.5	3	4.8
Other parties	2.0	2	1.1

The three latest SIFO polls. In the poll conducted the week after the election, the Liberals and Conservatives each had 21 percent. Now the Liberals are up by 2.5 percentage points, and the Conservatives are down by 2.0 percentage points.

Catastrophe for Center Party

For Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin, already sorely tried, the new SIFO figures make very depressing reading. The Center Party itself (that is, the old Center Party without the KDS [Christian Democratic Union]), has never experienced a figure as low as its current 6.5 percent. "Catastrophe" is not too strong a word for a party which stood close to 30 percent during its palmy days in the 1970's.

In the postelection debate within the Center Party, calls for Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin to resign have been heard at regular intervals. They are sure to be repeated now that the party is only 2.5 percentage points from the 4-percent barrier [below which it cannot be represented in Parliament]. Very hard times are ahead for Falldin.

Winning Horse

The winner in the election--the Liberal Party--is being carried forward on its wave of success. The party has never had a score as high as today's 23.5 percent. In 1967 it had 21.5 percent. Another peak of 18.5 percent came in 1979, when the Liberal Party formed a minority government.

A look at the past can serve as a reminder of how unstable big advances in the nonsocialist camp can be. Before the 1982 election, many members of the Liberal Party were even worried that the party would not be able to clear the 4-percent hurdle and get deputies elected to Parliament. The party obtained 5.9 percent.

The upswing was not unexpected, although no one could have anticipated that it would be as large as it was. Besides the fact that nonsocialist voters in general tend to bet on a winning horse, Bengt Westerberg received considerable attention in the mass media, where he was depicted time and again as the big winner in the election.

Psychological Limit

It is clear that he has continued to take voters away from the Conservatives, who have now fallen back by 2 percentage points. In the postelection debate, the party leadership has been criticized from within the party over the way the campaign was conducted. Because SIFO figures for the Conservatives were above 30 percent only a few months ago, expectations within the party were at a high pitch.

Ulf Adelsohn has responded by pointing out that even though the Conservatives are down by a couple of percentage points, their election result was the second best in modern times. In those circumstances, the fact that the party is now below the psychologically important 20-percent level may begin causing some alarm at Conservative headquarters in the Old Town.

Irritation

Since the election, Conservative irritation with the Liberal Party has been brought fully into the open, partly in connection with the general political debate in Parliament and in a couple of interviews published in SVENSKA DAGBLADET. There will now be a difficult balancing act as each of the two parties tries to preserve the credibility of a nonsocialist alternative for government while simultaneously attacking the opponent enough to ensure that its own party grows.

The Social Democrats are down by 2 statistically reliable percentage points. The talk that there will be an austere budget bill in January 1986 may account for that decline. Another possible explanation is that the attention being paid to Westerberg has also caused losses for the Social Democrats.

New Role for VPK

The VPK is still hovering around 4 or 5 percent. Ahead of us are 3 years in which that party may come into focus on many issues. The VPK must vote with the Social Democrats in Parliament if the government is to have a majority for its bills when the three nonsocialist parties vote against them.

This naturally provides the VPK with a chance to push the government's policy toward the left. But at the same time, it may put the VPK in the tough spot of having to swallow bitter pills from the government so as not to precipitate a government crisis.

The party leadership has been criticized by some districts in the past for being too ready and willing to engage in parliamentary huckstering. Now the situation may become even harder to handle.

Poll Covered 2,249 Individuals

And in conclusion, we come to the obligatory data on the poll itself: 999 people were interviewed in their homes between 9 and 29 October, and 1,250 individuals were polled by telephone between 7 and 22 October. Telephone

Party Standings in SIFO Polls From June to October



Bengt Westerberg has suddenly become SIFO king in the nonsocialist camp. The shift among the nonsocialist parties in recent months is unique.

interviews are considered less reliable because those interviewed must reveal their party preferences. During visits to people's homes, the interviewer does not know which "ballot" has been placed in the envelope for SIFO.

Perhaps it should also be pointed out that SIFO does not select those to be polled. Their names come from DAFA (National Computing Center for Administrative Data Processing).

A new feature in this poll is that SIFO no longer interviews only people up to and including the age of 74. The upper age limit has been dropped.

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Liberal Party's--and the Palme Government's--Standing"]

[Text] The ballots had scarcely been counted before a new term was added to our political vocabulary: the election results had been decided by "the Westerberg effect."

Following the SIFO poll whose results are being published in SVENSKA DAGBLADET today, there is reason to widen the discussion. Bengt Westerberg certainly has many splendid qualities. But there is no reason to show such mild disdain for the voters as to think that they are swept away like a teenage girl with a new crush as soon as a new young man appears on the scene. There is good reason to look first for politically rational reasons for the strong change in public opinion shown first in the election and now in this SIFO poll.

One accepted opinion is that there is a large group of general nonsocialist voters who support whichever nonsocialist party happens to be ahead at the moment. The idea is that successes by the Liberal Party very quickly led to new successes: once Bengt Westerberg and his party really had the wind at their backs, the force of the wind could only increase.

There is some truth in that, but the phenomenon can be described in an entirely different way.

The Liberal Party was strong until the mid-1960's. In the 1964 parliamentary elections, it obtained 17 percent of the vote--or several percent more than either the Conservatives or the Center Party. The party had remained at that level or above since the end of the 1940's.

The Liberal Party's crisis began as the 1960's gave way to the 1970's. In the 1973 parliamentary elections, the party received only 9.4 percent of the vote.

A tortuous path from the palmy days through Helen's dualism led to Ullsten's election disaster in 1982. The party reached an alltime low--only 5.9 percent of the voters voted for the Liberal Party.

The Liberal Party [FP] lost large chunks of its former support with every new election defeat. Of those who had voted for the FP in 1979, only 44 percent voted for it in 1982. The FP had lost over 320,000 voters in just 3 years.

The corresponding figure for the preceding 3-year period was about 220,000--of those who had voted for the FP in 1976, that many did not renew their trust in the party 3 years later.

The picture is similar if one goes back another 3 years in time.

Those figures modify the picture of the Westerberg effect and of a large and faithless group of general nonsocialist voters flitting from flower to flower.

The figures say that an important factor was probably the existence of a sizable group of Liberal Party supporters who were prepared to come home to their party as soon as conditions in that party had normalized.

That is not the entire explanation for the unprecedented leap in today's SIFO poll to 23.5 percent. But it indicates part of the pattern.

That "historical" explanation may give some relief to Center and Conservative Party supporters who will naturally feel somewhat glum over today's poll results. These very extensive shifts in public opinion are due not so much to their own weakness as they are to the Liberal Party's earlier weakness and subsequent recovery.

At the same time, that argument is of a nature to depress strategists in the two other nonsocialist parties for another reason. If it is true that the FP is primarily taking back its own voters, there is no easy way back for the Conservative and Center Parties to their respective levels of 30 and 15 percent. The Liberal Party has come to stay at its relatively high level.

The really interesting question presenting itself is naturally this: why do so many voters, including of course a sizable group of former FP supporters, feel that the Liberal Party is their party and their normal political abode?

For the FP's leadership, that question is of crucial importance as far as the next 3 years in Parliament are concerned. To put it rather simply: did people vote for the FP because they saw it as an express nonsocialist alternative with somewhat smoother edges than the Conservatives? Or did their vote reflect a flight from the Conservative Party's sharply defined nonsocialist alternative to the FP's "both-and" alternative? In short, what image of the FP do the FP's voters have?

It is when the FP answers that question that the strategy for the next 3 years will also be decided. The express nonsocialist alternative will strengthen its position through a clear and unequivocal opposition policy. The "both-and" alternative will seek cooperation with the government, and it will mean that the political middle has been reborn in Swedish politics--with whatever lifespan that may mean for our new 20-percent party in Swedish politics.

Palme's Government

The Liberal Party's upswing is spectacular. The same can be said of the Center Party's decline. Only 6.5 percent of the voters support the Center Party. It is only with the help of KDS supporters that the combined Center Party alternative totals 8 percent.

That score will not be of minor significance as far as the future course of events in the Center Party is concerned. But it is also significant from the standpoint of anything that happens in Swedish politics over the next 3 years.

As is true in any ambiguous situation in a parliamentary system, the possibility of new elections is an asset for the government.

In a situation where the government party is in danger of being the sole loser, new elections do not constitute a threat; what the opposition sees in new elections is not the danger of its losing but, primarily, its chance of winning. But at this point, it is certainly not only the government party that looks like being a loser.

Today's SIFO figures show that there is scarcely any limit to how far the Center Party may decline under present conditions. New elections might almost wipe the party out.

If anything, the shifts in public opinion since election day have strengthened the political position of the Social Democrats despite the appearance of a nonsocialist majority among voters.

At the same time, it needs to be said that the government party also has reason to view the current trends in public opinion with some concern. In itself, the Center Party's setback strengthens the government in the short term, but it is also obvious that the leftist wave which parts of the organized labor movement thought they could see emerging is not especially apparent. The Liberal and Conservative Parties combined currently have the support of 42.5 percent of the voters. We are tempted to quote our commentary from the day after the election:

"Another such 'loss' for the liberal renewal in Swedish politics and that new liberalism will have its own majority in Parliament."

Since we wrote that, the two parties have increased their combined voter support from 35.5 percent to 42.5 percent.

Viewed as a leftist wave, public opinion seems to be behaving in a somewhat undisciplined manner.

Polling Techniques Examined

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 85 p 2

[Interview with Hans Zetterberg, head of SIFO, by Gunnar Andren]

[Text] [Question] Can we rely on SIFO? On election night, you stated that SIFO and other public opinion institutes would have to be counted among the losers in that election. How could you have turned out to be so wrong?

[Answer] Certainly we can rely on SIFO—provided that the voters don't change their minds.

I would like to say this:

The election forecast was correct when it was made. "This poll concerns the situation on Wednesday and Thursday of election week" was what we wrote in the SIFO text that you yourself published in SVENSKA DAGBLADET. What happened then was that many voters changed their minds after the TV debate among party

leaders. And as far as the main issue--a continuing majority for the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the VPK--was concerned, we were right. Their combined total was 50.1 percent.

[Question] Well, you are right about that. The discrepancy for the Center Party, the Social Democrats, the VPK, the Environment Party, and all the others if those others are to be included averaged 0.6 or 0.7 percent. But the SIFO forecast gave the Conservatives 3.2 percent more than they obtained in the election and gave the FP 3.5 percent too little. That is not an acceptable margin of error, is it?

[Answer] No, but the explanation is that developments moved more quickly during the last few days before the election. You yourself expressed the view that the FP had progressed greatly after the TV debate and predicted a sharp upswing, didn't you?

[Question] Yes, I certainly turned out to be one of the very few who could note that the FP did not come up to my election prediction of a full 15 percent. But did the SIFO forecast as well as that by the IMU [Institute for Market Research] come too early?

[Answer] Yes, they did. We would have to measure changes in public opinion at a very late date to be completely accurate. We might even have to publish the results on election day, which has its drawbacks. It happens in other places, but I don't like the idea.

[Question] But didn't SIFO have any indication of the sudden shift which was underway and which has very clearly continued since the election--granting that perhaps not too much attention should be paid to every percentage point that has changed in today's voter barometer?

[Answer] Of course, and I would like to show you the survey we conducted from 12 to 14 September. But let me say first that there were two very clear indications of what was happening.

As you yourself reported in SVENSKA DAGBLADET on 1 September, the inclination by Conservative Party sympathizers to vote diverged markedly from that of supporters of the other parties as early as the end of August. It was 10 percent below what it "should have" been. It was also clear from other questions SIFO was continuously asking that the Conservative Party's sympathizers were not as willing to discuss politics and had almost stopped bringing up political topics for discussion some time before the election, whereas the opposite was true of the FP's sympathizers.

[Question] That survey that you mentioned. What did it show?

[Answer] From 1730 hours on Thursday until 1630 hours on Saturday, SIFO interviewed a total of 666 people by telephone. We obtained the following results--and it must be noted that these figures have not been reworked in any way at all or checked against the way the interviewees voted in the previous election:

Election and Poll Results

Party	Election 15 Sep	SIFO 12-14 Sep
Conservatives	21.3%	21.0%
Center Party	12.4	12.8
Liberal Party	14.2	15.1
Social Democrats	44.7	44.4
VPK	5.4	3.8
Environment Party	1.5	1.6
All others	0.5	1.3

Substantial elements of the election results are also found in that poll. You can see the full extent of the upswing for the FP, and you can also see that the Conservatives are below their election result in 1982 and that the Center Party is fated to become the smallest nonsocialist party.

[Question] But the figures also indicate a change of government!

[Answer] That is a serious defect. The figures show that the nonsocialists should have obtained 48.9 percent of the vote, compared to 48.2 percent for the SDP and the VPK, whereas the actual result was 50.1 percent for the SDP and the VPK, compared to 47.9 percent for the Conservative, Liberal, and Center Parties.

And even though the margin of error for each party is quite small, the total result is wrong. The VPK's share seems to be lower in telephone interviews than it is in personal interviews. Whether that is a temporary or permanent difference is something we do not know yet.

[Question] The upswing for the FP is remarkable in any event and almost extreme. It is true that sharp swings have occurred before, examples being the SDP's final spurt in the 1968 election campaign, the Center Party's success in 1973, and the FP's setbacks in the summer of 1979 and especially in 1982. Is there an explanation for this?

[Answer] There are always explanations. Curves which once were safely stable are now swinging as though they were tracking a heart attack instead of a normal rate. Many voters--especially on the nonsocialist side--are "borderline" cases: they have more than one party's flower in their political bouquet. It means that big swings in party preferences can easily occur.

[Question] Yes, but even so, the FP is now moving ahead at a tremendous clip and at the expense of both the Conservatives and the Center Party. At the same time, it was not more than about half a year ago--in May 1985--that even SIFO was reporting 7 percent for the Liberal Party. Isn't it true that neither the Conservative nor the Center Party has changed its policy since then?

[Answer] That is true, but--although I cannot back this up with figures--the situation seems to be that when a large group of nonsocialist voters see that it is apparently not possible to beat the SDP and Olof Palme, they show their

disappointment by "punishing" the party and party leader that seemed to represent the chief alternative. It happened to Thorbjorn Falldin, and now Ulf Adelsohn seems to be encountering the same thing. It is an emotional commitment that is finding expression in that way.

[Question] Now I must ask you this:

Hasn't SIFO misled public opinion and perhaps influenced it as well by giving the Conservatives excessively high figures for a long time? I saw an article on that topic in DAGENS NYHETER. Isn't it true?

[Answer] It is obviously necessary that people be confident that the changes reported occurred among the voters and not at the public opinion institute. That is why it is important for survey methods to be stable--the same from one period to the next.

I will tell you that SIFO measured the Conservatives using exactly the same techniques when they had 10 percent in 1972 as it did when they had 30 percent for the first time in 1983. The same applies to the Social Democrats, whether they have had less than 40 percent or more than 50 percent. The same is true for all parties. We are in the fortunate position of having hundreds of samples, and we can calculate margins of measurement error and of significance empirically, not theoretically, as is usual in other contexts.

[Question] But why doesn't SIFO explain how you do things? Why the secretive ways?

[Answer] That is entirely untrue--and it does not become more true by being repeated. The methodology for SIFO's voter barometer is public in all its parts--except that the names and party preferences of those interviewed are never revealed. Detailed statistics concerning the functioning of our systems of questions, both during interviews in people's homes and now by telephone, are available from us shortly after the start of every month.

[Question] But politicians often say that they do not believe SIFO's figures. What is your answer to that?

[Answer] The same that you usually give: the voter barometer is not produced for politicians or parties or for the government or for purpose of election research. It is commissioned by and for SVENSKA DAGBLADET, GOTEBORGS-POSTEN, ARBETET, and SKANSKA DAGBLADET and the readers of those newspapers. No one else. The newspapers represent differing political views, but SIFO is neutral when it comes to political parties.

[Question] What is the specific difference between telephone interviews and interviews in people's homes?

[Answer] The number of people not naming a party amounts to 15 or 20 percent in telephone interviews even though two questions are asked: "Which political party do you consider best today?" and "Which party do you lean toward most?" Compare that to the figure for interviews in people's homes, where the

interviewer never finds out how the individual voted, since a system resembling the balloting procedure is used. The number not naming a party is very low in that case--only about 5 percent on average.

[Question] So I and other people can have confidence in SIFO in the future?

[Answer] Yes.

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CSO: 3650/72

POLITICAL SWEDEN

PAPER PERCEIVES USSR 'SUPERPOWER ARROGANCE' TOWARD SWEDEN

PM180954 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Moscow's Welcome"]

[Text] A day after the Swedish prime minister officially announced that he will visit the Soviet Union Moscow has voiced the scarcely veiled threat that it will "take the necessary steps" in the disputed economic zone in the Baltic.

A few hours earlier the Soviet fleet had provided an example of such steps. Swedish fishing boats were driven from their fishing grounds by Soviet inspection vessels and were forced to abandon their tackle.

After this expression of Russian hospitality Prime Minister Palme can hardly feel particularly respected in the Soviet capital. The Russians are showing him the usual combination of enticements and threats. The Soviet Union's state news agency made no mention at all of Olof Palme's forthcoming visit to the country when it put out an article in which the prime minister's view of the summit in Geneva was mentioned in positive terms. Instead of repeating and underlining the invitation, a threatening article is published in IZVESTIYA.

The suggestion that the Soviet Union could be forced to consider suitable measures to defend its interests in the still disputed zone in the Baltic comes shortly after Swedish statements that Sweden has thought that it has seen signs of a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Sweden in the search for a solution for the zone that has for many years been a bone of contention.

The move from Moscow reflects a growing Soviet irritation with what are called third countries (principally West Germany and Denmark) being allowed by Sweden to fish in the disputed area. The unpleasant element in the Soviet action is that Moscow is invoking "current international law and Soviet legislation."

This is a symptom of superpower arrogance. Adopting unilateral measures in a disputed area is irreconcilable with international law, as Foreign Minister Sten Andersson pointed out in a short and terse reaction Friday [13 December].

When Olof Palme spoke Thursday on the theme of "Swedish Security Policy" he said that during his forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union he will say that Sweden wants good relations with that country. But the prime minister stressed

that relations must be built on a foundation of mutual respect for the fundamental principles of international law and on respect for Sweden's territorial integrity.

The brusque signals from Moscow communicated by IZVESTIYA, the Soviet government organ, do not bear witness to either respect for international legal regulations or respect for Sweden's prime minister.

Nor will the Soviet attitude make the negotiations on the economic zone in the Baltic any easier. Instead Moscow's action appears to be a Soviet attempt to frighten Sweden into making concessions when it comes to fixing the disputed demarcation line in the Baltic.

For the last 10 years Sweden and the Soviet Union have been negotiating in various rounds of talks on the drawing of a demarcation line in the Baltic without their being able to reach any agreement on the two countries' economic zones. Sweden has said that the demarcation line should be drawn between Gotland and the Baltic coast. The Soviet Union has said that the demarcation line should be drawn midway between the Swedish and Soviet mainlands.

Such a demarcation line would not only affect Swedish fishing. It would also have other, more serious consequences for Sweden. Recently, Sweden had thought that it had been able to see increasing Soviet understanding for the original Swedish position. However, Sweden's negotiating position has been weakened by the willingness demonstrated in the past to compromise on the drawing of the demarcation line.

If the Soviet Union wants now to seek to exploit a vacillation on the Swedish side by excessive actions against Swedish fishermen and a scarcely camouflaged threat of actions in the disputed area this is not the way to bring about the normalization of relations which Moscow so often says it is striving for.

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CSO: 3650/844

TALKS WITH U.S. ON NEW BASES ACCORD POSTPONED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Nov 85 pp 1,10

[Text] Ankara--Technical talks between Turkey and the United States on the review of the Defense Cooperation Agreement have been adjourned until next month. Although it was announced after the talks opened in the first week of November that the discussions would continue, officials have confirmed that the second round of talks have been adjourned until next month because the U.S. administration has not yet decided the course it will pursue at the talks.

Circles linked with the issue stated that the U.S. departments of Defense and State, the National Security Council and the White House have not yet agreed on the strategy to be pursued during the bargaining for the bases and that this has resulted in the postponement of the talks.

The same circles indicated that the U.S. embassy in Ankara is awaiting official instructions from Washington with regard to American counterproposals.

U.S. embassy sources in Ankara speculated that the Geneva summit may have had a role in the postponement of the talks. However, these sources "ruled out" the possibility that the United States "may be dragging its feet" on these talks.

Meanwhile, it has been learned that there have been contacts between the U.S. envoy in Ankara, Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe, and the Director General of the Foreign Ministry's Common Defense Affairs Department, Ambassador Selcuk Korkut, on the format of the technical talks. These contacts indicate that the talks will proceed more smoothly in the future. Indeed, Foreign Ministry spokesman Yalim Eralp told reporters yesterday: "We expect the talks to resume in the near future."

Interim Status of Bases Questioned

In response to reporters' questions, the Foreign Ministry spokesman clarified the issue of what the status of the bases will be during the talks. Eralp said: "The agreement remains in effect as long as we do not abrogate it." In response to another question, Eralp implied that Turkey reserves the right to annul the agreement saying: "We always have the means to abrogate the agreement. However, that is not our goal. Our goal is to put Turkish-American relations on stronger foundations."

When asked what the status of the bases will be when the 3-month negotiation period envisaged by the agreement expires before a new accord is reached, Eralp said: "The agreement remains in effect as long as we do not abrogate it." When asked whether an interim arrangement will not be necessary in such a situation, Eralp repeated the same answer. He thus signaled to Washington that in case the 3-month negotiation period expires without a new accord Ankara will permit the bases to continue operating in accordance with the provisions of the 1980 agreement without requiring an interim status.

How can the agreement be abrogated? In answering this question yesterday, Foreign Ministry officials stated that paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 7 of the agreement may be invoked. Paragraph 3 states that the agreement may be abrogated at the end of the 3-month negotiation period and Paragraph 4 says it may be annuled "with a 1-month notice if any one of the sides concludes that some aspects of the agreement are not being implemented."

9588
CSO: 3554/17

POLITICAL TURKEY

DENKTAS SCORES PLANNED TALKS ON EEC-CYPRUS CUSTOMS UNION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Nov 85 pp 1,8

[Text] Nicosia--It has been announced that at the meeting of the EEC foreign ministers in Brussels two days ago it was decided to open talks on establishing a customs union between the Greek Cypriot Administration and the EEC. President Rauf Denktas of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] declared that the decision is one-sided and contravenes the principle of the equality of the two communities in Cyprus.

According to the Greek Cypriot press, which reported the decision to open talks to establish a customs union between the Greek Cypriot Administraion and the EEC, the starting date of the talks will be decided jointly by the EEC Executive Committee and the Greek Cypriot Administration. The Greek Cypriot papers further write that the said talks will conclude by the end of December.

In his statement on this issue, TRNC President Denktas said:

"The fact that the EEC has moved toward a customs union with the Greek Cypriot Administration as if the Turkish Cypriot side did not exist raises serious doubts on whether it really supports the UN Secretary General's initiative on Cyprus. Can the EEC not see that with such pro-Greek Cypriot actions it is simply encouraging the Greek Cypriot side to maintain its negative attitude and thus blocking the path that may lead to a compromise and a solution in Cyprus?"

Denktas added that the establishment of a customs union between the EEC and the Greek Cypriot administration will effectively make the EEC a partner in the illegitimate and inhuman economic embargo that is being implemented against the Turkish Cypriot side.

9588
CSO: 3554/17

'REAL' PURPOSE OF U.S., TURKISH AEGEAN VIOLATIONS

Athens ETHNOS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 27 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Stratos Kalogeropoulos]

[Text] There are no encouraging prospects for re-establishing any kind of cooperation between Greece and the military branch of NATO, as long as issues connected to Greece's sovereign rights in the Aegean are still pending.

The commander of GEEThA [National Defense General Staff], General Kouris, made this reminder to the deputy commander of the European allied forces, German General Mach, who came to Athens for a familiarization visit.

Furthermore, the GEEThA leader noted to General Mach that Greece's relations with the NATO military system are entering, inevitably, a new period of tension following the recent mass violations of the country's national airspace by the U.S. and Turkish air forces during the recent exercise in the Aegean.

It should be pointed out that the numerous violations on Tuesday, and the interceptions of the intrusions in the southern and northern Aegean were reported to General Kouris by the GEA [Air Force General Staff] commander while he was talking with General Mach. In the case in question, the reports of the jet pilots concerned with intercepting the violations stress clearly that it involves methodical actions, not accidents due to the high velocities of modern airplanes.

The GEA's aerial photographs also clearly show that the choice of this area for allied exercises in the Aegean is matched with planned provocations in Greek geographic territory, with a further target of escalating a new series of pressures on Greece.

According to the facts from military analysts, the frequency of the violations in the "Athens FIR" aims, in a first stage, at legitimizing the real Turkish and U.S. contestation of the 10-mile expanse of Greek airspace, in conformity with the breadth of Greek shores.

To the Turkish and U.S. demand for restricting the airspace to six miles, the Greek staff counterposes the armed forces' right to control the outermost boundaries of the realm; therefore, any type of settlement in the NATO frameworks is rejected.

As General Kouris charged to General Mach, the Turkish airplanes, using the opportunity of participating in NATO exercises, are trying to reconnoiter the

degree of defensive organization and preparedness of the Greek islands in the Aegean.

The Jurisdiction

As concerns the Turkish Air Forces' refusal to submit flight plans to the Greek authorities during its entry into the Athens FIR, NATO is now proposing re-establishment of the Larisa-Eskisehir telephone circuit connecting the commanders of the 28th TAD (Tactical Air Force) and 1st TAF (Tactical Air Force), which is controlled entirely by the Turkish GEA.

Aside from these jurisdictions, however, NATO granted to Turkish generals the administration of the headquarters of the southeastern wing of NATO in Smyrni [Izmir], which means that it is impossible for Greece to revive its relations with the Alliance's military branch.

The staff is confronting with absolute composure the NATO hint that it is possible Turkey may again put in practice the "NOTAM 714"; that is, including in the "Istanbul FIR" international airline zones over the islands.

In practice, Ankara's proclamation 714 plans for classing in the "Istanbul FIR", from north to south, the islands of Samothraki, Limnos, Lesvos, Agios Evstratios, Psaras, Andipsaras, Khios, Ikaria and Dodekanisas, east of Rhodes and Karpathos--that is, half of the Aegean airspace.

The GEEThA, in accordance with the counterplans provided, this time is not going to get involved in interminable discussions with NATO or other accomodating mediators, and will proceed to countermeasures which will create, without fail, problems difficult to solve throughout the Alliance's network.

And, as was stressed to NATO factors, Greece is not the one who will repent if it puts into practice its own "NOTAM 1157," which provides for proclaiming the Aegean a dangerous area for flights of foreign military airplanes.

Let us not forget that the application of this NOTAM in August, 1974, shocked, first of all, NATO itself which was forced to cancel not only the planned exercises in the Aegean's international waters, but also its communication with the regional headquarters of southern Europe and Turkey.

Via Bulgaria

As long as the Aegean was a dangerous area, flights, especially of military airplanes from the West to Turkey, took place via Bulgaria from the north and, from the south, via the FIR of Malta and Cyprus. The closing of Aegean air corridors for military airplanes is the great trump card in the Greek staff's applications, regardless of the show of force undertaken by the Turks and Americans during their maneuvers. With the above presumptions, Greece, as it has been explained to Brussels, is putting a definite end to proposed, suspicious arrangements, such as the abolishing of Limnos' Tacan (Tactical Navigation) radio aid, which controls to a great degree the approach of foreign military airplanes to the northern Aegean area.

Finally, NATO's enraging demand for all of eastern Greece's radar to be connected with receiver centers in western Turkey, for joint defense strategy reasons, is definitely being rejected.

Such an imprudent act would give the Turkish staff the opportunity to securely monitor 100 percent of the Greek Air Forces' activity from Crete to the country's northern borders and the eastern islands.

Regardless of NATO's ensnaring proposals for arrangements in the Aegean, Greece is answering straightforwardly that its national airspace will always be measured based on the boundaries of its continental territory in connection with its territorial waters, throughout the expanse of its seas.

9247
CSO: 3521/37

PASOK'S 'MAGIC FORMULA' FOR MAINTAINING U.S. BASES

Athens ENA in Greek 7 Nov 85 p 9

[Text] The formula which A. Papandreou has apparently arrived at concerning the future of the U.S. bases in Greece is like a "magic picture." This magic picture will be able to persuade credulous or well-disposed people that the bases are being sent away, while distrustful and more observant people will "discern" that the bases not only are not leaving, they are being strengthened....

This is because one or two of the bases more known to the Greek people will be "packed up" to be removed, in accordance with plans for their readaptation, either to Rota, Spain, or Sigonella, Italy. Turkey will have to be excluded so it will not be thought an attempt is being made to strengthen the Turkish role, with an extortionary meaning, at Greece's expense. Included in the category of "facilities" for removal are Ellinikon and probably Nea Makri (which is in the direct view of many), as well as some telecommunications stations and certain nuclear weapons depots.

Furthermore, the advanced, modern technology allows for the U.S. Navy's very strong telecommunications base at Nea Makri to be cut off. This is a base which, according to an old expression of a qualified government official, "catches" even submarines sailing in the Indian Ocean.

In another branch of the "formula" for removing-maintaining the bases is amalgamating some of them--such as Nea Makri with the Gournia telecommunications station. In this case, the "loss" from the cut-off will be balanced by the strengthening of the amalgamated stations and, by extension, by the upgrading of their strategic and operational importance. And where this upgrading extends to operational practice, and reveals the base which remains of more momentous importance than that which was "cut off," the military facility will be called a " "NATO" facility. Such as Volis Field in Crete, the ACE High (Telecommunication System of the Allied Command Europe), the airspace surveillance system known as NADGE [NATO Air Defense Ground Environment] and FORACS [Fleet Operational Readiness Accuracy Check Sites] (the navy's unit for checking the precision of weapons systems).

So to the NATO formula which the government rejected during the Greek-U.S. negotiations (it maintained the bases did not serve the interests of the Atlantic Alliance, but of the United States only) Papandreou is now returning, to cover those bases remaining beyond 1988--for an indefinite, additional period of time.

However, despite the fact that satisfying the U.S. demand for the bases' future was a basic prerequisite for U.S.--and by extension, western--support of an economically tottering country, the government avoided making additional demands.

This stance of the Greek Government does not appear to be accidental. Simply, the Greek Government is obliged to "eavesdrop" on what is happening on our right, where the new U.S.-Turkish agreement is evolving. It would be nationally damaging--but also encumbering in terms of the party--for the government to ask for and--why not?--to take trade-offs, primarily of an economic nature, without first knowing what to demand so Turkey will not come out a beneficiary at the expense of the present correlation of forces pursued by our country. It was, therefore, natural last weekend, when Michael Armacost spent a "long weekend" in Ankara listening to Turkish requests for an increase in aid, for the Athens telephone line with our embassy in Ankara to have lit up. Any information was valuable for the coming Greek requests for additional economic and other exchanges; when, that is, these requests will encircle the type of renewal for the terminating 1983 Greek-U.S. agreement, and their satisfaction, appropriately argued, along with the removal of certain bases and concealing of the amalgamation of others, will be one more "victory" for the government over the United States.

Essentially, at any rate, the government, in accordance with its negotiating tactics, has no other possibility than following the policy of K. Karamanlis; a policy which overlooked the amount of aid and was interested foremost in the correlation of Greek and Turkish forces, stability in the Aegean and the maintenance--by extension--of the seven-to-ten ratio. It was a clever tactic which allowed Ankara to turn to extortions and devote itself to tough negotiations, and in the end our country benefitted the same proportionally, without any particular negotiating "cost in friction" for Greek-U.S. relations.

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BRIEFS

FRENCH MISSILE PURCHASE MEETINGS--A new round of talks will begin in a few days between Greek and French air force officers, this time not on the "Mirage-2000" but on purchasing the ultramodern air-to-ground and air-to-air "Matra" missiles. These missiles will be carried by new combat airplanes, whose construction began five months ago in Bordeaux, France. Correspondingly, as was made known, a group of air force technicians will depart for France in a few weeks to oversee construction of the Mirages. The first aircraft will be delivered, in full operational readiness, at the beginning of 1988. The Ministry of National Defense has not announced anything concerning the new talks with the French, nor how much the new missiles will cost. According to information, however, the purchase of the new missiles will be accompanied by compensatory benefits. [Text] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 8] 9247

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MILITARY ITALY

DEFENSE CHIEF OF STAFF ON REORGANIZATION OF ARMED FORCES

General Bartolucci's Address

Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian 10 Jul 85 pp 382-386

[Text] A Smaller Army, but a Better Armed and a More Efficient Army. A Streamlined Navy and Air Force, but with Modern Equipment

The top military are ready to assume the responsibility of even painful technical-operational choices in order to create a more streamlined apparatus, balanced and compact in its components.

The principle of deterrence is predicated on an apparatus with credibility and credibility is based upon operational capability and technological efficiency.

The reorganizations involve the operational forces and support organizations, including the Defense technological-industrial structures that are no longer productive.

The draft of a bill regarding the legal and financial conditions of the military and the protection of retired personnel is ready.

"At a time when the Armed Forces are subjected to sacrifices of a magnitude that requires the reorganization of the operational component, it would be improper to force them to keep in operation unnecessary organizations solely for political and social reasons that have prevented their elimination, or even a mere consolidation, in the past."

This was among the statements made by General Lamberto Bartolucci, Defense Chief of Staff, in his address at the close of the 36th session of CASD [Defense Center for Higher Studies] (26 June). Bartolucci had emphasized the need to "prune the dead and unproductive branches of the military apparatus" in order to be able to achieve the goals of readiness and efficiency necessary for a better performance of its tasks. This is necessary because there is the possibility of tightening the Defense budget: "With the available funds, the Defense Chief of Staff said, "neither the objectives necessary for carrying out the interforce missions set forth in the White Paper nor the meeting of NATO standards can be achieved."

Here is the text of Bartolucci's address, carried in its entirety by INTERARMA (Only the subslugs are the editor's):

"The extremely important problems discussed during the 36th session of the Institute give me the starting point for dwelling today on some salient points for modernizing our military apparatus. This is a problem that commands the full attention of the top political-military echelons in order to formulate a proper and definitive solution, projected and good for the last 15 years of the current century."

Operational Capability and Technological Efficiency

"The central point, the focus of the adjustment in question, such as it emerges from the results of the most recent planning studies, is the restructuring of the military apparatus. As is known, in outlining the model of national defense, the 1985 White Paper pointed out the principal interforce operational missions of the Italian military apparatus. It was a matter of a describing, in minute detail--or, as it is referred to in technical jargon, to take apart--that great common mission of defending the nation that the constitution of the Republic and the law of principles entrust to our Armed Forces. This has made it possible to give more definite outlines both to the political-strategic objectives of the defense model and to the tasks that the operational components of such a model are called [upon] to perform. One can, therefore, say that the interforce missions correspond to the aggregate of the tasks that the Italian military apparatus is called upon to perform.

"The analysis of these tasks makes it possible to define the operational requirements and, therefore, the operational level and composition of the individual forces. However, a mere quantitative assessment, even if combined with interforce proportional and balancing criteria, is not enough.

"The principle of deterrence is postulated on an apparatus that is plausible and the credibility is based on operational capability and technological effectiveness. Therefore, a process of verification in greater depth is indispensible in order to direct long-term planning and define the program of the defense interforces as accurately as possible. This by absolutely keeping in mind as well the financial resources that are realistically believed to be made available within the time span of the planning. Such verification was completed a short time ago by the Defense General Staff and has made it possible to achieve results that I consider to be of great importance for the future of the Armed Forces."

The 1975 Restructuring

"The present situation cannot be understood without a brief mention of the past. The comprehensive strength of the present military apparatus was determined in 1975 when, on the basis of available resources, it was decided to restructure the apparatus by cutting it down in size, with the intention of achieving a qualitative improvement of the operational forces. The levels of the forces set in 1975 were judged to be sufficient to meet the needs of those days, keeping in mind the quantum leap in quality that the modernization would have engendered. Actually, the modernizing process, which was based mainly on supplemental appropriations, in the following years underwent conspicuous regressions. Specifically, the main causes of the incomplete success of the modernizing process were the extent of the inflationary phenomenon, the freezing of annual budgets, the increase in the cost indexes of military materiel and, due to all sorts of difficulties, the

non-implementation of the scheduled cuts in the manpower programs of the Army. The assessment of the situation, made in mid-decade in 1981, led to the formulation of a long-term financial premise that foresaw a progressive increase in resources in order to obtain, although belatedly, a satisfactory implementation of the modernization plan. This premise, expanded before the Supreme Council of Defense, obtained a political agreement in principle. Nevertheless, during the following years, the increase in the budgets--stimulated undoubtedly by a commitment made within the NATO Alliance, the well-known annual increase of 3 percent--did measure up to expectations and, as a matter of fact, the 1981 premise, once again submitted to the Supreme Council in 1983, was not considered and, although some of the more recent budgets have shown a certain tendency to remedy the situation, the prospect for the immediate future is not at all encouraging. In order to insert into this difficult starting point the process of adjustment of the defense model, it is evident that a strict verification to obtain a clear understanding of compatability was of the essence. The outline of the needs set forth in the White Paper, the increased importance that the strategy of the Alliance places on the conventional apparatus and the greater involvement undertaken by Italian policy within the Mediterranean region have required, in the first place, the absorption of the 1975 objectives into a smooth-running plan more in keeping with the new operational needs and new technological realities."

Reductions: Objectives-Resources Gap

"The updating of the objectives' outline could not, however, disregard the constraints imposed by the limitation of the available resources resulting from an economic policy of the government aimed at eliminating the deficit in public expenditures. This need for balance will force reductions in the Defense budget. This is not a matter of mere hunches, but of an estimate based on the information given and on the directives issued by the minister of Defense as a result of which a basic financial premise, lower than that of 1981, was established. As a consequence of this, a reference point was given to the planning; the analysis made by the Defense General Staff has confirmed that there is a serious gap.

"It is evident, at this point, as has resulted from General Rossi's (CASD president) report, that the gap is so wide that even if it were possible, beginning in 1986, to obtain what was allocated in 1981, it would, nevertheless, be necessary not only to prune those dead and unproductive branches, as I have defined them on other occasions, but it would actually begin to affect the very strength of operational units.

"As we have seen, it would be necessary to conform to a financial premise that is more restrictive than that of 1981; the second finding of the report revealed that neither the efficiency objectives necessary to meet the interforce missions nor the upgrading to meet NATO standards could be met with the funds available. Having to face such a worrisome prospect, the Defense General Staff has considered it necessary to look at the future very realistically in order to make choices that can no longer be postponed. To this end, believing the way to quality and efficiency to be an absolute necessity, it was considered that there were still margins for additional quantitative reorganization in our structures that would allow the saving of resources which could be earmarked of the needed qualitative improvements."

The Reorganization

"It is a matter of reorganization that affects both the operational forces and the support organizations. With regard to the operational forces, the study revealed the need to effect a quantitative reduction of the land apparatus in order to reach a substantial qualitative improvement. Detachments and units with incomplete personnel structures, redundant commands and training organizations, armaments and equipment that are obsolete, but still costly because of the need for their continuous and frequent maintenance, detract from the credibility of the military apparatus and demand resources that could be used in the first-line components. Therefore, a cautious and decisive action to cut down will bring about a substantial increase in the funds available to be invested, while at the same time reducing the expenditures connected with manpower and operation. It is evident that a reduction in the quantitative level of the operational forces must be made in the context of a reorganization of the support organizations to be pursued relentlessly, despite the foreseeable difficulties that such measures involve. On the other hand, while the Armed Forces are forced to make financial sacrifices of such a magnitude as to require the reorganization of the operational component, it would not be right to force them to keep in existence organizations that are unnecessary or uneconomical because of political-social considerations that have prevented, even in the recent past, their elimination or their mere reduction in size.

"Redundant territorial and support structures draw a substantial share of resources; thus, the present situation is clearly unsatisfactory from the cost/efficiency point of view. The reorganization is feasible by reducing the number of military districts, hospitals, depots, training and territorial commands and organizations that are superfluous, in addition to some operational supports as well that are no longer productive structures of the technical-industrial sector. With a dearth of resources, the need for integration dictates aiming at the best fulfillment of the functional needs of the Armed Forces."

Critical Conditions for the Land Forces and Decline for the Navy and Air Force

"The military high command, conscious of this, is ready to assume the responsibility of painful choices of a technical-operational nature affecting the manpower level in order to achieve those goals of readiness, efficiency and, consequently, of credibility that I consider indispensible for a better performance of our mission. The center having jurisdiction should make the most careful decisions possible to safeguard the needs of national defense as well as the commitments made within the Atlantic Alliance. As a matter of fact, if the requests for confirmation that have been made repeatedly are not taken into account, the balancing of the military apparatus will not meet the hoped-for results, results that must be such as to bring about, in the end, a more streamlined military apparatus, compact and balanced in its components and atuned to the emerging technological realities that will find an effective application during the 1990's. I believe I must emphasize, for the sake of clarity, that, if in the years to come, the premises for cutting down the defense budgets come to pass, the situation of the land forces will remain critical despite the savings of financial resources resulting from the indispensible reduction of the operational forces and their supports. In addition, there will be a further decline in quantity and quality of the operational lines of the Navy and the Air Force with the consequent compromising of their respective capabilities to carry

out the tasks delineated in the White Paper. Should this occur, it is a prospect about which the country must be fully apprised and that the politicians must evaluate carefully, taking into consideration that the Italian Armed Forces, as stated in the constitution, are an essential and irreplaceable element for stability and peace. To penalize them would have negative consequences on Italian industry, both from the employment standpoint and the technological one, with adverse effects, therefore, on its capability to compete in the international market. For this reason, it is essential that the Armed Forces be adequately supported by both the government and parliament in order for the effort aimed at achieving a balance in the structures to have a corresponding adequate financial commitment in the area of the modernization programs in order to respond properly to the technological challenge and to the need for a higher operational efficiency."

Smaller, but More Efficient Armed Forces

"Looking at the future realistically, the idea of a smaller Army must be accepted, but only if it is better armed, better equipped and more efficient, and of a Navy and an Air Force smaller in size than the optimum, but on condition that they be equipped with modern and up-to-date equipment. Only by means of this technological quality and efficiency can a more effective defense model and wise investment of resources be achieved. Furthermore, I must add that the 1975 reorganization failed to succeed, not only because the reduction was not effected to the extent it was supposed to be, but because it did not achieve the degree that had been estimated. In my opinion, it is necessary today to take great care in order to prevent the repetition of experiments that turned out to be sterile and unproductive. A new failure could also irreparably prejudice the military apparatus because of the negative effects that inefficiency and inoperability have on the cadres. This last consideration inevitably directs my address, prior to its conclusion, to the supporting element of the military apparatus: that is: the man, on whose moral strength the real value of every military apparatus actually depends."

Man, the Supporting Element

"The moral strength of cadres, of the volunteers and of the draftees springs, in the first place, from the innermost motivation, from the intellectual and professional qualities of the individual, from discipline and from efficient and continuous training. In order to achieve that, for all of these elements to develop and reach a satisfactory level, it is necessary, in my opinion, to safeguard the unusual peculiarity of the military status, by bringing out its moral inspiration on the one-hand and guaranteeing an adequate financial-remunerative dignity, on the other hand. From this point of view, the need of a legislative proposal that single-purposely covers the delicate facets of the military position as related to the peculiarity of status and employment has become ever more pressing. The juridical-financial protection of personnel is of great importance that is strongly felt by the entire military complex and the General Staffs have studied it in depth and have prepared the draft of a proposal for a bill that contains a series of regulations aimed at controlling, in the future, the fundamental elements of the juridical and economic treatment of the military. It is indispensible for this proposal to be quickly and considerately implemented if the qualities and motivation of personnel, together with the technological progress, are to be kept at a standard that is equal to the challenges of the future. It is only in this way that the ultimate and effective level of operational efficiency of a balanced military apparatus can

be effectively achieved. In this context, the fair protection of retired personnel should be properly stressed because it continues to suffer disproportionately, depending on the year of retirement, despite recent actions that have relieved only partially the hardships resulting from the phenomenon of pensions based on the year of retirement. As a matter of fact, the annuity of an officer who retired in the early 1970's is, after the recent equalization, only about one-half of that of a colleague of the same rank who retires today. In order to correct this unjust situation another bill was prepared and submitted aiming at ensuring full retirement coverage for those who, until now, have been denied such a benefit. Therefore, I address myself to the sensitivity of our politicians in order to prevent the legitimate expectations of the members of the Armed Forces and retired military personnel from going unfulfilled."

The CJCS concluded his address by thanking the outgoing president of CASD and by bidding farewell to those attending the 36th session, which was then adjourned.

Military Observer Comments

Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian 10 Jul 85 pp 387-392

[Text] It finally appears that something is moving here at home; we have become aware that perhaps the course we have followed until now does not lead very far.

Last 26 June, Chief of Defense General Staff, General Bartolucci, at the close of the 36th session of CASD [Defense High Studies Center], sounded an alarm, which, because of the occasion and his position, must be considered with care and apprehension: "The Armed Forces must reorganize themselves, eliminate the dead and unproductive branches, otherwise ..." We would say: almost start all over!

How have we come to this? For some time now political and military authorities of every country, experts, scholars and technical experts ask themselves in an ever urgent and serious manner: How will the Armed Forces be structured during the '90's and at the beginning of the new century? There is not much time between now and the year 2000; a child born today will be a mere adolescent then; however, the social, economic, technological and political changes that are foretold for that time are enormous. Europe will become smaller and smaller and poorer; the limelight will be on countries with hundreds of millions of poor and needy people. Mexico City will have more than 30 million inhabitants; Lagos, Calcutta, Cairo and Sao Paolo, not many less, while London and Paris will be medium-sized cities filled only with history and tourists. Nearly 50 years of peace "suffered" because of fear, not "chosen" because of wisdom, have gone by since the last great war, the war of wars that in 6 years annihilated almost 50 million human beings, that began with rifles and bayonets, cavalry and biplanes and ended with strategic missiles--that is what the V2's actually were--jets and atomic bombs. Limited wars, guerrilla wars and small wars by professionals, often bordering on treacherous terrorist actions, have taken the place of the enormous conflicts during which Europe destroyed itself. It is worthy of note, however, that the possibility of the same enormous conflicts repeating themselves have never disappeared.

The Armed Forces have developed, as everthing else has, but almost strictly in a technical and technological context, keeping their structures and thoughts geared

exactly on the past great conflicts, always possible, but forced to fight wars and little wars by experts and professionals. These are the Armed Forces of today: large enough to be able to fight a general war and sophisticated and trained enough, at least in some of their not so negligible components, to be able to cope with guerrilla wars and small actions; in other words, Armed Forces that are very flexible, very well equipped, very well trained and, therefore, very costly.

In the past, the potential enemy to confront was of equal strength: France and Italy, Russia and Austria-Hungary and so on; as for the others, the small ones, the poor or emerging nations, it was sufficient to send a gunboat into one of their ports, a small expeditionary force, a strong ultimatum and that was that! Today it is no longer that way. Small nations which at one time did not exist or were negligible: Libya, Syria, Israel, Cuba, just to mention a few, or actually political or religious factions such as Shiites, Druses, Palestinians, Vietcong, Sandinistas, Afghani Mujaheddin and many others, who can cause apprehension, exact blackmail, engage and even defeat great or medium-sized powers. It is necessary, therefore, for these powers to have the means to wage not only a general war, but also deadly, often times unpredictable, costly "pin-pricks" and to do it promptly and decisively anywhere.

At this point, it is evident that poverty and bankruptcy are unacceptable in order to afford the luxury of a good defense; it is imperative to make some choices.

We think that:

It is in the common interest to increase the conventional forces in order to escape from the nuclear monopoly and, therefore, blackmail by the great powers.

Conventional weapons are far more costly than nuclear ones. Their cost, according to recent figures, increases an average of 6 percent per year and their operational life becomes increasingly shorter.

The yearly increase of 3 percent in the NATO military budgets, which yesterday was considered sufficient to maintain the level of defense equal to that of the threat, is no longer enough.

According to a careful study carried out by General Luigi Caligaris, an extremely well-informed military critic and well-regarded author, a European research group is cited as having indicated that an annual increase of 7 percent would be acceptable for the above-mentioned purposes.

The world economic crisis makes it doubtful that anyone could keep increasing the budget by 3 percent annually and that would be the limit, even for the USA or the USSR.

From all these considerations there emerge only two paths that can be followed:

1. To accept, attempting only to contain it, the downgrading of the defense apparatus, hoping only that the same is happening to the potential adversary;

2. To make a complete review of the defense apparatus for the purpose of drastically reducing its cost and maintaining its efficiency at a high and adequate level.

Someone has already made a choice; we are talking about Europe. The United States, because of its enormous economic-industrial potential, which, moreover, is continuing to grow; the Soviet Union, because of its extraordinary riches and because of "being able to do everything without having to justify anything," are not, for the time being, affected by the crisis. This "someone" is Great Britain, which has thought out, planned and formulated a complete restructuring of its defense apparatus.

General Caligaris, in the previously-mentioned study, has clearly outlined the plan; the basis of everything is to make better investments with the funds available, this appears obvious, but it is not!

We believe that one statement on the subject is particularly revealing. It is that of the Chief of the Defense Section of the Foreign Office, Robert Alston: "In the past, we worried about having more money, today, however, we must worry about spending what we have well."

The two main points of the reorganization are:

First: There will be two top officials responsible for everything:

A top military, the Defense Chief of Staff and the Permanent Under Secretary, as political top authority.

The first will make the strategic decisions, evidently based on the directives from the political side, the choice of equipment, the planning and directing of the missions, the management of military personnel. The second will provide the resources, their management and distribution, the programs and will administer non-military personnel.

From the two top officials on down there will be commands and offices having maximum responsibility and close connections between them with a saving, compared to the old organizational charts, of as many as seven billets for three-star generals and admirals and the resulting consistent cuts in all other ranks and, therefore, in manpower and expenditures. In addition to the Sections depending from the two top echelons, seven in all, there is the most important Office of Management and Budget, mandated to check on the expenditures directly.

The General Staffs of the Services will continue to exist, but only for routine purposes, for training, for oversight and efficiency control, for carrying out their specific missions jointly, as much as possible.

One thing seems worthy of particular emphasis: there will no longer be a preset rotation for the office of Defense Chief of Staff among the three Armed Forces.

The office will go to the officer judged to be best suited, the service to which he belongs notwithstanding. It will never happen that a "mediocre" officer is chosen over and "outstanding" one merely because, at that time, it happens to be his "team's" turn for that one office!

Someone has asked how can the "best" always be chosen from among officers with training and experience that are so different and with little possibility of direct comparison beforehand. There may be some difficulty, but, after all, at the time there will not be that many candidates so as not to know each of them thoroughly. If they are not sufficiently known, it would be their fault after all because they had not made themselves sufficiently visible.

Second: Turning over military factories to civilian management.

This is a truly revolutionary innovation. The Royal Ordnance Factories will be turned over to the private sector. These factories, equipped with high-level technology and with great experience and capability, have great traditions and indisputable successes, but they are irreparably hampered in their progress because they are state-run apparatuses. Turning them over to private management means many things, but mainly this:

Closing the factories that are no longer productive or that are losing money;

Development and expansion of those making a profit or, at least, being capable of making progress;

Streamlining personnel, that is, mobility or separation. Within a short time there were 875 hirings and 7,260 separations, retirements or early retirements.

On top of all of this, there is a "hatchet office" that is the keystone of the system, the Management Information System, which has the task of establishing whether the resources used are justified by the delivered product and to suggest drastic remedial action.

In other words, this is the first time that the concept of gain, of yield, of profit, is being introduced into defense production, of making money, so to speak, with the only difference being that this time the one who profits is the nation.

We have attempted to describe what is happening in Great Britain and only in a very cursory way. Actually, there are many more enacted measures, but all of them are part of the same plan, that of achieving the modernization of the defense apparatus, to update it, to make it efficient and compatible with the national economy. France is successfully following the same course; West Germany, for some time now, has followed the same course with visible success. Canada, Sweden and The Netherlands are headed in the same direction and research is now in progress in Spain; great progress has been made in Japan, Korea and Brazil, actually, almost everywhere.

What about here at home? In Italy? Let's broach the subject while holding our breath, especially for the part of this article that, although cursory, is close to our hearts, and immediately we can candidly affirm, someone might say, coarsely, that, at first glance, little or nothing has been done.

It is true that a reorganization was attempted in 1975. Some top echelons were merged, a few central offices, but all the dependent branches were left virtually untouched. General Bartolucci, in his address to CASD, characterized it as a failure because "the cutting down did not occur in the measure that was needed."

Everything has more or less continued the same as always. The 1985 White Paper has paved the road of Defense with good intentions and excellent purposes, however, 8 months have passed since its publication and nothing has happened: the silence is deafening!

Army, Navy, Air Force, each continues fearlessly to go its own way. They are like polite tenants in a condominium who greet each other courteously when they meet on the stairs and badmouth each other behind closed doors.

As a matter of fact, the Navy and the Air Force pretend not to know each other since the "Garibaldi" affair, which is still very much in evidence. What news have you, Mr Minister?

The much talked about Defense Chief of Staff, who is first among the Chiefs and higher than they, even in rank, is responsible for everything, together with the secretary general, still appears in the pages of the White Paper where he has been described so well. For the time being, he continues, as before, to act as a mediator between the three Chiefs, who are "implacable" friends.

In General Caligaris' report, which we mentioned earlier and from which we have obtained considerable data, there appears an interview with Defense Minister Spadolini. There are a lot of good intentions, many promises, but then, at a specific question (today our General Staffs are spread throughout Rome in various buildings. Could they not be brought together, or at least have them under the same roof?) he answered literally, "The idea of an Italian Pentagon goes back more than 20 years ... I ask does it make any sense to spend 100 billion lire for a Pentagon when only 50 of the 500 barracks in existence were built after the war and many others actually date back to the 'Risorgimento'?"

Ah! Mr Minister! What an answer ... to begin with, it is not a "housing" problem, but a "functional matter of the defense brain," which is a totally different problem ... then, we, and perhaps you (Do you remember that beutiful film "Drums of Glory" with Alec Guinness?) know of British barracks that are much older than ours, but they are well maintained and constantly updated; it is a matter of pride with them despite the fact that their climate is quite different from ours!

The many old barracks in existence have not, however, prevented the British from bringing together in one place their General Staffs, just as old buildings, which certainly exist there, have not prevented the United States, Germany, Greece, Sweden and many other countries from doing likewise.

To build new, very modern barracks similar to hotels is certainly nice, but it also has a touch of demagoguery. To build a Pentagon is only functional: the former is a current expenditure, the latter a necessary investment.

To have a unified General Staff, whose members talk the same language, who know each other, visit and confide in each other and thus overcome old mistrusts and foolish platitudes: this would be a proper objective and would certainly pay off.

Just imagine a meeting of officers of the three General Staffs set in Rome on a weekday morning at the Defense General Staff on Via XX Settembre. The Navy officers,

who would wear their uniforms for the occasion because they traditionally wear civilian clothes on duty, would leave from Lungotevere, those of the Air Force from the Viale dell'Universita'. For a one-hour meeting they have to waste all morning, so, before calling it, they have to think it over and, more often than not, nothing happens.

So much for considerations and reflections, let's now go on to more serious things, to the future, to what is possible, to how it is necessary to react and in what directions to go after the alarm was sounded by General Bartolucci and problems that appear on all sides.

It is immediately evident that if a radical reorganization is to be initiated, the time is particulary propitious:

We have ahead of us well-founded hopes for political stability until the 1988 political elections.

There is an attentive, willing, sensible parliament, and the referendum-like election of Cossiga is a sign.

The international situation, while Reagan and Gorbachev are in power, excluding the always possible and deadly "pin-pricks," is good as a whole.

Even the president has changed, that is, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. President Pertini has left the presidency and the highest military responsibility and also a great vacuum. We bid him farewell with the greatest respect, proud to have had him, with his adament strength of character and his courage, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

But, for loyalty's sake, it is not easy to forget that he, in good faith certainly, because of his mental and spiritual make-up as an "old socialist," of being politically persecuted by a state that exalted the Armed Forces in an inordinate way, of being partisan, a very noble attribute that means "a man of the party," has never held the Armed Forces in great esteem, at least not the same esteem in which he held other sectors and organizations of the nation.

It is not easy for us to forget that his [Pertini's] otherwise great and most appropriate statement, "Let the arsenals be emptied and the granaries be filled," which was directed at the entire world, was not made at the UN, nor at the Kremlin, nor at the White House, but on national television in an end-of-the-year address. Many interpreted it as an invitiation to unilateral disarmament. Were they to blame?

We cannot eastly forget either his message made on the spur of the moment, to be sure, following the 1980 earthquake in Irpinia and the little attention paid on that tragic occasion to the Armed Forces who were the most generous stars in almost all of the aid given under conditions that were extremely difficult, nor other instances nor the little attention given the Defense Council, which met only rarely under his chairmanship.

It is evident, we think, that we do not belong to the group of President Pertini's "widows," but we bid him farewell loyally and we thank him for what he did for Italy and for the great prestige he won for us all and we wish him long life and good luck.

On his successor falls the heavy burden, among many, for the supreme military responsibility of the nation, according to the dictates of the constitution. Because of all of the above-mentioned facts, therefore, the time appears to be most propitious for attempting a military reorganization, which having failed in 1975 and having been appropriated by the White Paper in 1985, which General Bartolucci, a few months before leaving office, indicates being an absolute necessity.

What is the reorganization's agenda? The Chief of Staff has indicated part of it precisely to be: reduce, proportion, cut, eliminate and update.

Let us attempt to present some of the criteria that we consider fundamental for this purpose:

1. A single head. Achieve at least a Defense General Staff that has the maximum managerial and strategic powers and the maximum responsibility.

Service General Staffs delegated to training, inspection and operation of the Services in accordance with the directives of the Defense General Staff.

2. Reduction in numbers to the benefit of quality. A determined reorganization in numbers to improve the quality of the forces. Achieving the European levels in the proportion between draftees and volunteers. We have, roughly, a proportion of 5 percent volunteers to 95 percent draftees; France and Germany have 30 to 70 percent, more or less.

Less units, therefore, accepting the resulting risks, but units on which we could truly depend.

We merely remember only one thing from the great experience in Lebanon: the joy, the relief, everyone's pride, really everyone's because "it went well," we had not made a bad impression, we were like the others, and so on.

That will no longer do. Let us remember, it is true, that in Lebanon everything went well: the logistics, the services, the morale, the medical service, precisely everything ... however, we did not do one thing, and, therefore, it could not be verified: we did not engage in combat.

3. Territorial reorganization. The minister mentioned 500 barracks, do we actually need all of them?

We have 20 operational or territorial commands with three-star generals, dozens of lesser territorial commands spread out everywhere, often merely because of tradition, "because there has always been one" ... here too drastic reductions!

Everywhere we have detachments, warehouses, depots, hospitals and infirmaries, a thousand kinds of schools, ammunition dumps ... everything. Here too, hard and pitiless reduction!

4. Training. Almost all of our cities or towns would like to have a nice barracks with a nice infantry battalion or better yet, Alpini or Bersaglieri, or a nice naval base or a nice military airfield. They would like to have them, but on one condition:

that they should never fire a shot, that the tanks never move, the aircraft never fly, especially if they are supersonic, the ships never sail near the shore, especially if there are bathing beaches.

Eliminate the military installations wherever regular and planned training is impossible to carry out.

5. Civilian personnel. We continue hiring, as if nothing had happened.

It is a way of combatting unemployment, especially in the South, at the expense of defense, naturally.

Arsenals and factories with thousands of workers. They have become mere centers for bidding and contracts for private industry and they produce nothing. The hallways of the ministries overflow with employees, almost always women, almost always hired as "laborers," later revealing themselves to be college or high school graduates and desirous of having desks and offices. That British Management Information System, delegated to control expenditures with ample powers, would have had quite a job to perform here.

We could go on and on! Enough! We say only: Do something before we deteriorate irreparably with the budget being unable to maintain today's Armed Forces in an acceptable manner.

Let's not let them deteriorate; let's not accept their existence merely for the commemorative messages, the parades, the disasters, the strikes, the guarding of electoral precincts, the warehousing of youths while they await their first job, the blood drives, the complaints of mothers, of the pacifists and of Falco Accame, but let's see to it that, yes, they are all of the above, if they really have to be, but also, and above all, let them be a valid instrument of war, of combat, for that defense of the nation that the constitution entrusted to the citizen as a "sacred duty."

9731
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MILITARY NETHERLANDS

NEED FOR INCREASE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS QUESTIONED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 9 Nov 85 p 8

[Commentary by G. van Benthem van den Bergh, chief associate at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague: "Why Does the Defense Budget Have to Go Up? Need for Thought about the Concept of 'Conventional' Arms"]

[Text] Certainly the least discussed part of the 1 November decision is the annual three percent increase in the defense budget that the cabinet committed itself to with Nato. Is there a better reason for that decision then merely to prove ourselves a faithful ally? It is of course possible that the increase will benefit Netherlands business, but it has not been--and cannot be--justified on those grounds.

The three percent goal dates way back to 1977 and is a product of the effort to strengthen Europe's conventional defense. And that effort in turn plays a very important role in the discussion of the so-called burden sharing between the United States and Europe.

Nato has a long tradition of agreeing to ambitious goals and then not meeting them. Way back in1952, for instance, in Lisbon the Nato Council set a goal of increasing Nato's military forces from 25 to 96 divisions within 2 years. They thought they needed to do that in order to stand up to the Soviet Union's superior conventional forces, which at that time were estimated at 140 to 175 divisions, besides reserves which would double that figure again.

Since that time the Soviet Union's conventional superiority has remained a constant theme in Nato, although at various times it has received more or less emphasis depending on current thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy.

In the 1950's as the fear of war in Europe subsided, military strategy came to emphasize nuclear deterrence. The United States adopted the so-called "New Look Strategy," preferring (cheaper) nuclear weapons to conventional military power.

It is often claimed that at that time we came to rely on "massive retaliation," as it is called, on the threat to use large numbers of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union if it attempted any expansionist move whatsoever. In fact, Dulles' promise, from which that slogan was borrowed, was intended to warn the Soviet Union that in the future the United States would be able to reply with atomic weapons to a challenge such as that in Korea.

This was more a matter of calling the Soviet Union's attention to a risk than a general strategy.

The Kennedy administration did, it is true, bring about an enormous increase in the number of strategic nuclear weapons, but at the same time it accepted a new strategic conception that came to be called "flexible response" when it was agreed on by Nato in 1967. In fact it was anything but clear what this response--which would not necessarily lead to nuclear war--could consist of. But the strategy did imply a different structure of military forces.

The continual American pleas to strengthen conventional forces did not lead to much in practice, however, because the European allies continued to feel that the chances of war were slight and (with the exception of De Gaulle's France) felt themselves adequately protected by the combination of American strategic nuclear weapons and American troops stationed in Europe and armed with tactical nuclear weapons.

Emerging Technologies

Besides the traditional argument that conventional forces should be strengthened because of the presumed Soviet superiority (now we are also to make use of the so-called "emerging technologies" (ET) to do this), we now hear yet another argument, which also played a role in the cabinet decision: reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

It is not terribly clear however how this conclusion follows from that goal. For many it is simply a corollary of the idea that "nuclear weapons are bad," that the fewer of them you have and the less you depend on them, the better it is. Many people find that reason enough to demand a reduction in the Netherlands' nuclear tasks. They assume a sort of trade off: if you reduce or drop the one (nuclear tasks), then you have to strengthen the other (conventional defense). That explains the cabinet decision.

How convincing are the arguments for increasing conventional defense? The first argument is based on the possibility that the Soviet Union might carry out a conventional attack, which could not be deterred by nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, it is said, has a strategy of the lightning offense.

The Soviet Union, it is further claimed, possesses non-nuclear missiles capable of putting both nuclear weapons and important military objectives in Western Europe out of action so quickly that defense would be impossible. This presupposes nearly perfect war planning and execution on the part of our opponent, while our own military capabilities are greatly underestimated. The only response, it is said, is to entertain an offensive strategy ourselves, making use of emerging military technologies.

This has gradually become the "accepted wisdom." In fact, however, the Soviet Union is in no position to attain a quick victory because of what Clausewitz called "friction," but also because it would not be able to put all nuclear weapons out of action (and in any case could never be certain of doing so).

Nato takes seriously the opponent's contingency planning, which--like most military planning--is based on the need to prevent an initial defeat such as was suffered in the previous war. We would complain very strongly if the Soviet Union took our contingency planning and war scenarios as seriously as we do its strategy of the offensive (which is not the same as offensive strategy, a term which really suggests readiness to attack). The Soviet Union does take them seriously though. However, it is no more than we should expect of the military if they imagine all possible combat possibilities and plan for them to some degree. We cannot attach any political significance to military contingency planning if there is no political reason to do so.

Misunderstanding

The supposition that the Soviet Union could launch a conventional lightning offensive rests moreover on a misunderstanding, or more accurately, on an incorrect interpretation of deterrence.

People assume there is a distinction (or threshold) between the various levels of force. Thus, they say, a nuclear deterrent does indeed deter nuclear war, but a conventional deterrent is necessary to deter conventional war.

Way back at the start of the 1970's Bernard Brodie wrote a devastating criticism of this line of reasoning. In fact the distinction between nuclear and conventional deterrence is of no significance whatsoever any more in Europe. You might say that all weapons have been nuclearized in Europe. After all, any military confrontation in Europe, intentional or unintentional, could escalate into a nuclear war. And a nuclear war very likely could not be restricted to Europe. The important point is "could," the fact that neither of the two superpowers could ever be certain that things would not escalate.

In Europe the boundaries between the two security blocs are entirely fixed and recognized by both sides as inviolable.

Because of its geo-strategic position, the Soviet Union will always have a conventional superiority over Western Europe. However, that superiority has no military-strategic significance as long as the Atlantic alliance exists and is sufficiently united politically and militarily to ensure there is a risk of escalation. We are talking here about the "utility in non-use" of nuclear weapons. The purpose of nuclear weapons is to be there. They are there to exclude any idea that there might be some profit in a military adventure and to keep political crises within limits. Nowadays East-West conflicts in Europe are about arms control rather than Berlin. That is an enormously important difference.

Do we not need any conventional defense at all then? Of course we do, although we need less rather than more. We could answer the question of how much conventional defense is just enough as follows: armed forces and weapons must be such and of such numbers that it is impossible to imagine any scenario where the Soviet Union could conquer Western Europe in whole or in part completely without risk.

"Completely without risk" is a demanding criterion, which means that at present the risk of escalation is overinsured rather than underinsured--and for the sake of stability this must remain so. It is in any case unnecessary to strengthen our conventional defense in line with the offensive strategy which General Rogers--and many with him--wishes. Rather, the Soviet Union must be convinced that a strategy of the offensive is contrary to its own interests. Imitating the opponent can only lead to greater tensions and to a conventional arms race in Europe.

Complicates

Naturally it complicates things that the most important pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States, wants to adhere to the goal of three percent growth, both for reasons of burden sharing and for reasons of strengthening conventional defense. Since 1977 defense budgets have been increased to be sure, although the three percent has certainly not been achieved everywhere. From a political point of view it may be that a concession to the United States is necessary. Nonetheless, the discussion within Nato ought to deal with substantive questions rather than with quantitative criteria.

The present military-strategic equibrilium rests on the deterrent effect of the shared danger of nuclear war and compels the opponents to certain forms of limited cooperation. The more stable the equilibrium, the greater the chances of making that limited cooperation permanent. Today things could move in the wrong direction: if Europe's role is strengthened at the same time as conventional defenses are strengthened and the role of nuclear weapons is reduced, this could lead to a reduction in the risk of escalation and thus to an increase in the chances of war.

Given the totally disproportionate relationship between the possible gains and risks of a military confrontation in Europe, it will certainly not come to that for the time being. Nonetheless, why should we for dubious reasons set out on a more dangerous course if we do not need to? In any case it would be highly desirable to think a bit about the question of what exactly the concept "conventional" means in the age of nuclear weapons.

12593
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ECONOMIC DENMARK

GOVERNMENT PROPOSES ADJUSTMENTS TO DECREASE DEFICIT

Schluter Defends Government Intervention

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Dec 85 p 16

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen: "The Action is Humane"]

[Text] Unemployment will continue to decline. This applies also to the deficit in the balance of payments and the national budget, and the government is holding steady to its economic goals, which it believes it can achieve with the adjustment now on the table.

"The thought behind the adjustment of the economy is to stop in as gentle a way as possible increased consumption. The action will mean a sensationally low deficit in the national budget in 1986. It will go well on the right path. Real wages will rise, and the government is holding steady to its goal of equilibrium in the balance of payments in 1988 and for the elimination of the budget deficit by 1990."

This is what Prime Minister Poul Schluter (conservative) said yesterday as he, together with Finance Minister Palle Simonsen (conservative) and Economics Minister Anders Andersen (liberal) presented the government's proposal for adjustments in the economic policy.

"The limitation of demand by eight billion kroner will enable us to bring down the deficit in the balance of payments according to schedule. We are on the right path, but the problem is that economic progress and the overheated construction sector have placed extraordinary pressure on the balance of payments," the prime minister said. He continues to believe that unemployment will decline -- even if not at the same rate as now -- and that price increases will be considerably smaller.

Finance Minister Simonsen said that the deficit in the national budget next year is expected to be 14.5 billion kroner. This is a drop of 12 billion in comparison with the deficit predicted when the finance law was introduced.

Economics Minister Andersen admitted that it would be difficult to hold the deficit in the balance of payments to 20 billion kroner this year. It will be

closer to 22 billion kroner, to a great extent because the drop in the exchange rate for the dollar came too late, and initiatives and investments have been larger than expected. Nevertheless, he calculates that the deficit in 1986 will have dropped to 16 billion kroner.

"We are counting on a drop in unemployment next year of 20,000. This means we will drop to an average of 230,000 unemployed at the same time that industrial exports will rise by 5 and 3/4 percent," Andersen said.

The prime minister said that he hoped that this adjustment will be effective, but "We don't know what surprises we will meet." Schluter did not want to promise that the increased energy charges would be lifted if the dollar exchange rate rose again.

Concerning the increased gross loans from credit institutions, which in the first three quarters of this year rose by a good 50 percent over loans in the same period in 1984, the economics minister said, "The financial institutions have been very active in consumer loans, and there has been a colossal growth in the issuance of real credit obligations. Therefore loans must be limited so that we can reach a more normal level, and I understand that the financial institutions are ready to follow the suggestion of limiting loans."

Economists Criticize Income Policy

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Dec 85 Sec III, p 4

[Article by Hugo Garden: "Measure Will not Reduce Consumption"]

> [Text] It is income policy that is to be saved, not the balance of payments, economists say. There is not much confidence that there will be much limitation of consumption.

Several economists believe that it is the overheating in the construction industry that is responsible for the government's Christmas action. Neither consumption nor the deficit in the balance of payments is of great importance.

The main purpose of the measure is to limit a too rapid rise in wages in construction. The effect on wage drift might bring wage policy into danger, the economists think.

The government stresses that the measure is both to limit consumption and to improve the balance of payments at the same time that competitive ability is rising.

"But the purpose of this measure can only be to hold the wage drift down," Professor Gunnar Thorlund Jepsen of Arhus University said.

"There is no doubt that building in the public sector will be greatly curtailed, and this will obviously reduce the pressure on wages. In this way the

danger of bottleneck problems is reduced.

"Private consumption will not be limited. A suggestion for the limitation of consumer loans will accomplish nothing, and the limitation of credit unions will not have much significance either, since the tax deduction will balance the increased expenditure that will come with the reduction of the loan limit in change of ownership from 20 to 15 years," Jepsen said.

"The government should state clearly that it is afraid of wage drift. If the wage structure is broken, it will have a negative effect on the balance of payments. The important thing therefore is that income policy is adhered to. In general, therefore, a measure against overheating is reasonable. The other actions concerning loans are nothing more than cosmetic and must be an indication that the politicians and their supporters believe that consumption will be limited, even if everyone knows that this is not the case," Jepsen said.

A Mild Improvement, the Wise Men Say

The economic sages are calculating the consequences of the measure. Arne Mikkelsen, head of the Economic Advisory Committee, says that the measure will lead to a mild improvement in the balance of payments compared to the opinion of the wise men, and that the deficit in the national budget will be a little less than the wise men have calculated. But he thinks that the government's opinion that demand will be limited by eight billion kroner is a little too high.

The effect of the measure on the municipalities is absolutely the largest and most noticeable effect. It is here, too, that the negative effect on employment is greatest. But the measure's effect on construction will only be a minor part of the total reduction of eight billion kroner.

The three main parts of the measure are: energy taxes of 2.9 billion kroner, reduction of municipal working expenses by three billion kroner, and a reduction of public construction by a good two billion kroner.

In construction, one billion is expected to come from the new special tax on existing and new building. The other billion will be in the form of postponement of construction by the government and by the so-called concessionary companies.

The special tax has been very controversial. Economists are divided on the effect it will have on municipal building. Jepsen says, "Reasonable communities will put off as much building as possible until 1987, and therefore the effect will be much larger than the one billion being talked about as reduction in demand." Mikkelsen says, "It is almost impossible to say what the municipalities will do."

Control of Government Finances

The chief economist of the Handelsbank, Per Bendix, agrees with Jepsen that the measure is aimed primarily at income policy and that there will not be a great effect on the balance of payments and consumption.

He is definitely skeptical about the government's opinion that the deficit in the balance of payments can be held to 16 billion kroner next year. He thinks it will be closer to 17 or 18 billion kroner.

On the other hand, the government has control of the budget deficit, Bendix thinks. He says that the deficit will be 14 to 15 billion kroner in accordance with the government's estimate.

9124
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ENERGY GREECE

PLANS REPORTEDLY DRAWN FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 4 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by Andonis Zisimatos]

[Text] The country's energy balance is being led to a complete impasse since we do not have even lignite in sufficient quantities (approximately one million tons versus 2.1 million last year) so imports can be made from other countries.

Specifically, DEI [Public Power Corporation] applied to Bulgaria and received a negative answer, but our neighboring and "friendly" country sold a significant amount of power to Turkey and, in fact, at good prices!

And, while our energy production cannot cover local demand, DEI gave a significant amount of power (more than 80 megawatts) to Albania...when in Greece we are in danger of remaining without power and are facing the possibility of big cut-offs.

According to reliable sources, the DEI administration refused to sign an agreement this summer with Austria for importing power, though it knew the shortage it would face this winter.

At the moment, power is being imported in small quantities only from the Soviet Union, at a price of about five drachmas a kilowatt, which are paid in dollars, however.

The forecasts for imports in 1985 were 1,750 kilowatt hours; up to now, only 600 kilowatt hours have been imported, which is creating big problems. But also the lakes at the power units are almost empty after the "predatory" dissipation of waters which has been noted particularly at the Pournarion hydroelectric plant in Arta which consumed, according to information, 450 million cubic meters of water, from an anticipated 158 million cubic meters.

The quantities of lignite in the station yards do not cover the needs of the two 300-megawatt units of Agios Dimitrios Ptolemais.

And, even though the energy balance is at an impasse, new developments are being scheduled.

The inclusion of nuclear plants in the DEI system is being explored in depth, and works will be continued at a very intense rate in the period of the present DEI program.

This was stressed by DEI employees who were representatives at the Twentieth UNIPEDE (International Union of Producers and Distributors of Electrical Energy) Congress.

The importing of nuclear power, they maintained, requires many years of preparation which is made even more difficult because of the seismotectonics of the Greek earth.

As the DEI program reports, in a long-term policy, and after exploitation of local sources is completed, the possibility of covering the needs in electricity from the two sources available at present for commercial use--mineral coal and nuclear power--is being examined.

Late at night, the DEI in its communication reported that the statements of its two employees do not in any way express it, and that no such press bulletin has been issued by the corporation's press office.

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END

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West Europe Report

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POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NUMBER OF HOMELESS APPROACHES MILLION

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 23/24 Nov 85 p 10

[Article by Gerd Kroencke: "Life in the Social Focal Point! There Are 800,000 Homeless in the FRG / Strange Journey to Emergency Shelters and Clothes Collection Points Show Daily Poverty Next Door"]

[Text] It's a miserable morning, some fog, some snow flurries. When the bus crosses South Bridge, leaving Duesseldorf, someone works his way to the back, serves grain spirit and cognac in plastic cups, "otherwise we won't get warm all day long." How many dozens of invitations have I had to turn down because of time conflicts; the last was a day trip to Bitburg to visit the brewery. But why should a correspondent not accept a paid trip, for once? "Press trip, social focal points" is the name of the undertaking to which the Caritas associations of North Rhine-Westphalia have invited over two dozen journalists so that they can get an idea of the poverty in the country.

On the bridge across the Rhine, one of the hosts gives a short introduction of the subject, speaks about the development and causes of homelessness, and quotes former Minister for Social Affairs, Friedhelm Farthmann, who occasionally stated "that the current cliches of the causes of homelessness--such as aggressiveness, uncleanliness, alcoholism or an uneconomical attitude--do not apply to the large majority of cases." Homelessness, we are told, is more than a housing emergency and can only be overcome within the framework of a comprehensive attempt at a solution, also including further development of social policy. "How this looks in practical terms, you will learn during the course of the day."

Nobody Comes Voluntarily

On the other side of the Rhine, in Neuss, the bus stops for the first time in the city section of Erfttal. The local paper had already announced the visit ("Focal Points in Their Sights"), and the Catholic parish priest of St. Cornelius reports that the inhabitants of the high-rise settlement reacted allergically to this announcement. Nonetheless, the chairman of the Social Service of Catholic Men (SKM) is happy that the ladies and gentlemen of the press will "examine this social focal point." Only, there is little time for examining, time is pressing.

Evidently, no one moves here voluntarily. Originally, when construction of this new city sector was started 15 years ago, inexpensive living quarters were to be created for 21,000 people--also to justify the suburban train station in nearby Norf. But in fact, Erfttal has only 5,400 inhabitants, with more young people than anywhere else (almost every other person is under 21 years of age), and every fourth person is a foreigner. Among them also live 500 resettled Poles, and the priest has the impression that these new citizens "belonged to a socially very weak class in Poland" and that now, in the West, they have even greater difficulties. Unemployed and homeless people, and "families known to the authorities" have found shelter here; it is, as the SMK chairman is wont to say, "a motley population."

It is difficult for people to feel at home in the highrises; the turnover rate this year was 17 percent. If nothing is done about it, the priest says, "this sector of town is in danger of caving in." So they are trying to get the people to identify with their neighborhood, and a riflemen's association, a sports club and a club for small gardeners were founded. The group around social worker Birgit Siempelkamp tries many little steps, from the regular "morning coffeehouse" ("...to fight boredom in the morning, to help with filling out forms...") to the Daki Cocuklar Gurubu, which is Turkish and means children's group.

"One Must Also Learn to Live"

Those and other things we only learn from hearsay, because the bus must drive on to Krefeld right away, the neighboring diocese, where over two dozen journalists are temporarily occupying the Elizabeth Bunker. We are greeted by Ernst Ludwig Giesen, director of the local association, with the words, "this is not a place where one welcomes someone;" it happens to be the furniture and clothing warehouse of the Krefeld Caritas where, in the morning, the particularly poor can pick up furniture donated by citizens who are better off. The man from Caritas mentions incidentally that "this is not the atmosphere in which church dignitaries move, it really is nothing to show off." People from shelters for the homeless look here for a wardrobe or refrigerator; refugees, once they are finally given official recognition, may find their initial furnishings here. It can happen that visitors from Poland transport a washing machine all the way home in their car, and occasionally a client resells a particularly good piece. "To be cheated," says the man from Caritas, "is the fate of those who start from love."

One floor up, along icy hallways, is the clothes collection depot: clothes no longer in fashion, or outgrown by the children, are piled on long tables and shelves. Naturally, all the people who had come this noon to select something fled immediately from the horde of casually to well dressed persons from the world of prosperity; they don't want to be inspected on top of everythin else--with foresight, the organizers had pictures taken a few days earlier.

Older and really old ladies, widows of physicians or former gymnasium teachers, serve their fellow men twice a week. It is not accidental that Margarete Mertens, 67, says that she has been coming to the bunker for 4 years. The bunker is cold in summer and icy in winter. The question why she is doing this, is answered by her with a simplicity that has become rare: "Because the poor are dear to us." We, however, must quickly leave the bunker. Its ugliness is softened only by a billboard outside, a beer advertisement: "Enjoy something special, once again."

Is it a little exaggerated that one has a bad conscience over lunch--a choice of "hunter's cutlet" or shishkebab—in a middle-class restaurant? So far, we have not yet talked to someone actually affected, but would it even be fair to expose someone to an entire gang of journalists? The organizers decided that four dioceses are to be visited, and after Neuss (which is part of the archdiocese of Cologne) and Krefeld (Aachen diocese), the diocese of Essen is next. In Oberhausen, the luxury bus heads for the "Settlement for the Homeless (Municipal Emergency Shelter)" in the city sector of Osterfeld.

Here, in three large housing blocks,live predominantly families with many children, more than 30 families in all, without leases, in so-called basic apartments, some still without bathtub or shower. Rita Wollney is one of them. Sh has just made coffee for all the guests, and through her own self-assurance she makes the reporter confident enough to inquire about her situation. Rita Wollney has brought a dozen children into the world; the youngest is now 8 years old, the oldest 27. Up to last month, nine children still lived with her, now it is "only six or seven."

For 15 years she has been living in this focal point (she herself uses this expression). Before that, the family had spent 4 years in another settlement for the homeless. She had lost her apartment in the mid-Sixties, because the house was to be razed. "Then go looking for an apartment with one child in your belly, one on your belly, and one on your hand." She had kicked out her husband only last year. "I'd rather be without a man than one who's no good." He had been an assembly worker, then was retrained as a bricklayer, and "forgot that the family has to live." Does he look in once in a while? "I'd toss him out on his ear, believe me."

Frau Wollny has resigned herself to the fact that she will probably stay there, "I do not think it an affront for me to be living here." Sure, it is difficult to get used to it, formerly they called us vagrants, but she had adapted herself to the circumstances, "to an entirely different form of life." The children could be outside a lot, and the apartment, oh well. She does have six rooms, 95 square meters, that means "the rooms are small, one can hardly label them an apartment." She says she tries to make a comfortable home for the children. But her interest in outward appearances is necessarily limited. It had always been more important to her that "the brats" had sufficient fruit and vegetables on the table.

This down-to-earth woman, who always comes up with a saucy or thoughtful saying ("as one has to learn how to swim, one must also learn how to work; one must also learn how to live"), possibly blocks our view of the misery in a shelter for the homeless. She has managed, it seems, to secure respect for herself in her larger environment. The church parish is gradually beginning to understand that the people in the settlement are part of the community; Frau Wollny was just elected to the parish council, the first one since the existence of the settlement.

Some of the people living here are already third generation; on the other hand, it is probably not coincidence that the people who finally move away often come back for a long time (a Caritas paper states that more and more young families "establish their practical and actual place of residence in their original family, although they live outside the settlement.")

On the trip to Waltrop, kreis Recklinghausen, and therefore already part of the diocese of Muenster, we read in a clever paper that, similar to Frau Wollny, about 800,000 people live like that in the FRG, and that the number increases by about 25,000 annually. "The homeless are families and individuals who, for various reasons--mostly because of owing back rent--, have lost their previous apartment." We also learn that "social focal points " are housing areas whose structures especially favor the social disadvantages of their inhabitants. Our next hosts would have liked to show us a particularly discouraging example, but first of all, the time table was already out of kilter, and it had grown dark, anyway.

Although--in the parish hall of a Catholic church--we learn some standard facts about the situation of the homeless in the countryside, such as that the stigma attached is a mite stronger than in the big city, again one can only discuss the problem, but not talk with the people affected. Fortunately, a social worker of the association "Social Partnership" has written down what he was going to say on a visit to a settlement of huts far outside the city. These remarks are read to us over the loudspeaker system on the return trip to Duesseldorf.

The Camp of Huts in the Woods

The social worker was going to explain to us that the village of huts can only be reached by one road through the forest, it lies completely isolated in the countryside. During World War II it had served as a POW camp. In the mid-Seventies, about 40 families lived there, today it is little more than a dozen, thanks to the Workers' Initiative. The apartments, 48 square meters in size, without sanitary installations and with leaky windows, are considered shelters of the simplest kind. People are not meant to feel comfortable there; rather, the kind of shelter provided is to drive them out as fast as possible. "Homelessness is not seen as a social problem in rural areas and in small towns," the social worker had intended to say, "but rather as individual failure." There had been a family with six children in one of these tiny shelters, and the parents did not even have enough room to put up a bed for each child. It had taken

the Initiative almost 3 years to get the family out of there and provide them with housing suitable for human beings.

The bus returned that evening to Duesseldorf with a one-and-a-half hour delay. At the edge of the old town, in the beautiful restaurant "Golden Ring," three Caritas directors have meanwhile waited for us for dinner. They had had plenty of time to agree on how to react to an "emergency letter" from their umbrella organization: after the catastrophe in Colombia, calls for help had also come from other parts of the world.

Is it unfair to mention that the journalists in the "Golden Ring," after the exertions of the day, were served champagne? And that, discussing poverty, they were served an excellent three course meal? The poverty of that day was soon far away again, why should one pretend otherwise.

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CSO: 3620/164

POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

OUTLINE OF RAU 1987 ELECTION STRATEGY IS CLEAR

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 5 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Gode Japs: "Kohl Must Remain an Episode. Johannes Rau in the Role of the Chancellor's Challenger"]

[Text] It was clear to the delegates and guests at last Sunday evening's state convention of the North Rhine-Westphalian SPD in Oberhausen: It was not only the state party chairman and governor of North Rhine-Westphalia, Johannes Rau, who was speaking there, but also the man who wants to occupy the center of government in Bonn for the SPD in January 1987. The overwhelming majority which his North Rhine-Westphalian colleagues favored him with at his re-election as state party chairman was also like a vote of confidence in advance for Johannes Rau, the candidate for chancellor. Ninety-eight and one-tenth percent of all delegate votes, such a thing had not happened up to then in the SPD at the election of a "state prince."

Although Johannes Rau does not intend to turn to the public as challenger of the present federal chancellor until December in Ahlen with a statement of principle on "social and ecological renewal in peace," it was already becoming clear in Oberhausen which path he is supposed to take in achieving his election goal. That goal is clear: If Rau officially receives the mandate of his party in August of next year--and no one doubts that--"then," as Rau clearly states, "I do not intend to become only the candidate for chancellor, but also to become the chancellor, the chancellor of all citizens."

Loud applause erupts at the end of the 90-minute speech, then turns into a standing ovation. Today, for his colleagues on the Rhine and Ruhr, the man who is already carrying the hopes of the SPD for the federal parliamentary elections is named Johannes Rau.

As was the case with the North Rhine-Westphalian state legislative elections on the 12th of May, "Brother Johannes" is also counting on "clear proportions" for the federal parliamentary elections, on the "absolute majority of the votes." "We do not intend to become participants, we do not intend to become partners, rather we want political responsibility for the entire republic!" And, with a wink of the eye, Rau puts into the record a comment for those critics who are inclined to see him as the great hesitator: "How

someone can twice delay and hesitate himself to an absolute majority, that I really find quite interesting."

In the federal parliamentary elections the issue for Rau concerns a "fundamental determination of policies for the future." The issue is "whether in difficult times more or less unanimity will be needed, whether social policy is something for nice days and months, or whether social policy will become important when there are difficult times to get through."

Rau is counting on the "society of unanimity," in which the strong carry a heavier burden than the weak. He is counting on "small improvements" and "persistent progress," not on big promises: "None of us can promise that everything is going to get better overnight, that we are going to solve all problems."

Rau has assigned a key role in the SPD's election victory to the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, the "SPD's new mother country." The "indispensable prerequisite" for the election defeat of Kohl's government is for "a clearly unequivocal majority of the voters" on the Rhine and the Ruhr "to decide in favor of social democracy." Here the measuring rod is being set even higher than in the latest state legislative elections: "For the party as a whole we need an exceptional achievement in our mother country so that the potholes in other regions can be filled in."

Not only the "SPD's mother country" but also the state government in Düsseldorf, which Rau controls, is supposed to assume an important part as well in gaining the SPD majority in Bonn--as a "counterpoint" to the present government: "counterpoint and counterweight with all legal, with all legitimate means." Then Rau names the tasks of his state government which are indeed becoming the SPD's election campaign themes as well: "We oppose the dismantling of social programs, we oppose redistribution from the bottom to the top, we stand for liberality and the privileges of freedom."

It is becoming clear that Kohl's challenger is looking above all for campaign debates in the areas of labor and the environment and in the social, economic, and domestic policy fields; that is different from 1983, when the first and foremost issue was security and foreign policy.

Rau knows that his election goal will not be easy to achieve. For that reason he is appealing to SPD members to pay increasing heed to voters who are disappointed with Kohl's government but are still far from considering the SPD their political homeland. Young people and women must also be wooed by the SPD as interlocutors; technicians and engineers must not be forgotten: "There is a place for them with us. We are not the party that is afraid of technology, rather we are the party which would like to use technology for a worthier quality of life."

Before the election campaign really gets started, Rau expects the SPD to have already taken care of a succession of important tasks: the working out of a program of economic policies which makes it clear which "way into the industrial society of tomorrow" social democrats would like to go; the setting

up for the federal parliamentary elections in 1987 of a campaign program "which shall have my signature on it;" the revision of the Godesberg Program in which attention is to be given to the need for "mid- and long-term intentions and present actions to remain in such rapport that people can later achieve them."

Then, after the party convention in Nuremberg in August of 1986, there will come the most important matter: "Then on all of us will lie the burden of a federal parliamentary election, a difficult one, a winter campaign, a media campaign. Then the important thing will be for the intended epoch to become the past episode."

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POLITICAL FINLAND

COMMUNIST PARTY SPLIT WORRIES OFFICIALS, SOVIETS

Split Detrimental to Country

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Nov 85 p 18

[Article by Mikko Eronen: "Dissolution of Finnish Communist Party Against Finnish Interests"]

[Text] According to the Soviet organ PRAVDA the activity toward dissolving the Finnish Communist Party (SKP), is not in harmony with the interests of the Finnish people.

The PRAVDA news article on Friday is again a clear case of taking sides with the minority communists separated from the SKP, and an accusation against the party leadership.

As usual PRAVDA did not present this concern directly as its own stand, but dressed up in an expression according to which many noted Finnish politicians, newspapers and periodicals had noticed the aforementioned matter.

PRAVDA especially emphasized that the Social Democratic Party chairman, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa and the Center Party chairman, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen have paid attention to this phenomenon.

Sorsa and Vayrynen have expressed the kinds of appraisals referred to by PRAVDA in interviews published by Finnish papers.

"In reality those working for dissolution have received support only from the constitutional rightist party and, what is even more curious, from the leadership of the Finnish Democratic League."

According to PRAVDA, behind the dissolution line are, as usual, certain leaders of the Party and the People's Democratic League.

The subject of this PRAVDA article was provided by the so-called Unity Committee founded last Saturday by the SKP minority and the so-called unity line.

The writer of the article, Mikhai Kostikov, the Helsinki correspondent for PRAVDA, wrote that many of the communist party district organizations and hundreds of local organizations condemn the dissolution activity carried out by the SKP leaders.

Forces of Friendship Being Weakened

According to PRAVDA rightist circles consider the crumbling of the SKP unity a means of weakening those political forces that are the supporting pillars in the politics of friendship and good neighborly relationships with the Soviet Union.

According to the article the task of the unity delegation is to focus the forces of the SKP organs, members, and supporters in the struggle against dissolution and the slackening of party principles.

PRAVDA mentioned the following, among others, as belonging among the chairmen of the organization: Taisto Sinisalo, Jouko Kajanoja, Esko-Juhani Tennila, Kai-ja Sinerva and Eino Kaajakari.

During the past fall the party organ, PRAVDA, has written at least three times about the dissolution of the SKP, but only in news articles. The fundamental position of the CPSU toward SKP's dissolution has not been leaked to the public. All the SKP articles of the PRAVDA, the official party organ and the most important paper of the Soviet Union, have supported the minority separated from the party. Another common feature in them has been that no accurate view of the SKP's political and parliamentary power has been available. The articles give the feeling that communists are a forward rolling mass movement in Finnish political life.

USSR 'Officially' Worried

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Dec 85 p 21

[Article: "Soviet Union Officially Presents Its Concern Over SKP's Dissolution"]

[Text] The Soviet Union Thursday officially expressed its concern over the fact that the forces that supported friendship with the Soviet Union were weakening in Finland.

The Soviet Deputy Minister of Justice, Nikola Osetrov, said at the friendship festival, traditionally arranged before the Finnish Independence Day, that the Soviet Union "shares with the Finnish democratic and political circles the concern over the fact that there are attempts to weaken and damage the unity of those Finnish democratic forces which form the foundation for the foreign policy, built on the friendship with the Soviet Union.

Osetrov had not written the speech himself, but it apparently originated from the Scandinavian department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, or perhaps from the Central Committee.

The democratic forces, of which Osetrov speaks, are the Finnish Communist Party. The weakening and damaging of the forces again points to the SKP majority way of handling the minority.

The formulation of this part of Osetrov's speech indicates that the Soviets have now drawn a sharp boundary between the Finnish parties and the Finnish government leadership. The Finnish foreign policy leadership was not even indirectly held responsible for the internal condition of the SKP.

In its other parts Osetrov's speech was quite friendly, and followed the traditional line, in which all the good facets of our relationship were emphasized.

Transportation Minister Matti Luttinen, who leads the Finnish friendship month delegation, also spoke on Thursday at the Moscow Independence Day celebration. Luttinen touched primarily on the economic cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union in his speech.

Aalto Condemns New Party

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Dec 85 p 13

[Article: "SKP Leadership Condemns Founders of New Party"]

[Text] The chairman of the SKP, Arvo Aalto, thinks that the committee created a week ago by the party minority and the so-called Unity Forces signifies preparations for the creation of a new party.

After the meeting of the SKP's Central Committee on Sunday Aalto estimated that the party leadership now has to tighten its schedule, within which the original organizations functioning in the minority districts have to announce whether they will stay within the SKP. A decision will be made about rear defences in the SKP political committee meeting in the near future.

The creation of the Kajanoja" group's and the minority group's Unity Committee means, according to Aalto, that the separatist activities of the former party chairman, Jouko Kajanoja, "have joined the activities of the TIEDONANTAJA movement."

The General Secretary of the SKP, Esko Vanionpaa, said that no party can tolerate within itself the creators of a new party. He characterized the leadership of the Unity Committee as clearly a "shadow central committee."

The meeting of the Central Committee did not actually consider organizational questions. According to Aalto and Vanionpaa the consideration of organizational questions during this phase does not require treatment by the Central Committee -- the treatment by the political committee is sufficient for most decisions on the basis of the stands taken at the meetings.

The Central Committee now focused on the position of the functionaries as well as on timely political questions, and approved statements about a crisis

program in the forest industry, the proverty program, and the South African situation, and about the recent meetings of the superpowers at Geneva.

The Central Committee also made decisions about some personnel matters and, among others, chose Heikki Lehtinen as the new chief editor of the KOMMUNISTI. Similarly three new party organizations were approved for membership in the SKP.

The solution concerning the game rules of the labor market is temporary according to representative Timo Laaksonen. Laaksonen presented a political review in the SKP Central Committee.

Laaksonen supported the united appearance of the labor movement and thought that the possible dissolution of the government in the fight over working conditions would not necessarily be a loss from the point of view of laborers and clerical personnel.

On the contrary, according to Laaksonen, the fall of the government would create a situation in which the labor movement could, by appearing united, marshal its forces and squeeze even qualitative reforms at the workplace from the employers.

Laaksonen also said about the game rules solution that it did not reduce the responsibility of the Social Democratic union leadership or Prime Minister Kalevi Sora over a "poor agreement." Laaksonen believes that during the next spring round of discussions over the work conditions the game rules matter will again surface.

12989/13068
CSO: 3617/40

CITIZENS' VIEWS ON U.S., USSR POLLED

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by J.A.: "A SOFRES-LE MONDE-Europe 1 Poll: The USSR's Image Continuing to Decline in France: Public Opinion Skeptical About Summit's Results"]

[Text] Poll conducted for LE MONDE and Europe 1 by SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] from 9 to 14 November 1985 with a national sample consisting of 1,000 persons representative of the entire French population aged 18 and over.

1. What do you think of the United States...

Question: On the whole, is your opinion of the policy of the United States in the world very good, fairly good, fairly poor or very poor?

Opinion	Repeat Inquiry Province Press/ SOFRES November 1982	Repeat Inquiry LE MONDE Antenne 2/ SOFRES October 1984	November 1985
Very good	2	5	4
Fairly good	28	35	39
	30	40	43
Fairly poor	38	29	22
Very poor	13	9	5
	51	38	27
No opinion	19	22	30
	100	100	100

[Figures in all tables represent percentage of persons polled]

2. ...and of the Soviet Union?

Question: What is your opinion of the policy of the Soviet Union in the world?

Very good	-
Fairly good	9
	9
Fairly poor	36
Very poor	23
	59
No opinion	32
	100

3. Which is the most powerful?

Question: In your opinion, which of the Western countries (the United States and Western Europe) or the Eastern bloc countries (the Soviet Union and the Eastern countries) is the most powerful militarily at present?

Opinion	Repeat Inquiry FIGARO/SOFRES October 1980	Repeat Inquiry FIGARO/SOFRES November 1983	November 1985
Western countries	11	16	21
Eastern countries	41	45	36
Equally powerful	31	27	29
No opinion	17	12	14
	100	100	100

4. The desire for peace

Question: More precisely, which country--the United States or the Soviet Union--seems to you...

Attitude Toward Peace	U.S.	USSR	No Difference	No Opinion
The most sincerely dedicated to peace in the world? (100 percent)	50	6	28	16
The most sincerely desirous of limiting the arms race? (100 percent)	36	9	33	22

5. The balance sheets of the two great powers

Question: If you compare the balance sheet of the United States with the balance sheet of the Soviet Union, which is ahead, in your opinion, on the following points?

Issues	100 Percent	U.S.	USSR	No Difference	No Opinion
Economic development	-	74	6	4	16
Workers' rights	-	67	9	5	19
Respect for public and individual freedom	-	80	3	4	13
Fight against racism	-	38	10	18	34
Reducing social inequities	-	40	21	12	27
Improving standard of living	-	72	5	6	17
Access to health for all	-	45	16	10	29
Aid to Third World countries	-	60	2	10	28

6. Star Wars

Question: Mr Reagan has proposed that the United States build a defense system in space for interception of missiles. Some say this is a good idea because it would strengthen the protection against a Soviet attack. Others say it is a bad idea because it is going to encourage the arms race.

Do you yourself think the United States should or should not build a defense system in space?

Opinion	Comparison with a US (Roper Institute) poll 1985	November 1985
The United States should do it	43	39
The United States should not do it	35	39
No opinion	22	22
	100	100

7. To talk about human rights?

Question: Concerning meetings between Western leaders and Soviet leaders, we have received the following three opinions. With which of these opinions do you feel the most agreement?

Soviet leaders should not be met with, because of human rights violations in the East	4
Soviet leaders should be met with, but on the condition that the human rights question be raised with them	71
Soviet leaders should be met with, without raising the human rights question because no one should interfere in their affairs	14
No opinion	11
	100

8. What to expect from the summit?

Question: Do you think the coming meeting between Mr Gorbachev and Mr Reagan...

Will bring about a marked improvement in East-West relations	25
Nothing much will be changed	66
No opinion	9
	100

Will make agreement possible on arms-race limitation	29
Will not make it possible	51
No opinion	20
	100

Will bring about improvement in the human rights situation in the Soviet Union	18
Nothing much will be changed	70
No opinion	12
	100

9. France's position

Question: Do you yourself want France to be positioned

Preferably on the United States' side	36
Preferably on the Soviet Union's side	1
On neither side	57
No opinion	6
	100

Despite Mr Gorbachev's visit last month, the Soviet Union's image continues to decline in France. This is the main lesson to be drawn from the poll carried out by SOFRES for LE MONDE and Europe 1. The figures, clear as they are, hardly lend themselves to discussion: while 59 percent of the French people have a "fairly poor or very poor" image of the world policy of the USSR, only 9 percent have a "fairly good" opinion of it.

The SOFRES pollsters, who worked on a 1,000-person sample, encountered no one who has a "very good" opinion of the USSR on this point. At the same time, the United States' "rating" is rising: whereas a year ago SOFRES detected 40 percent of the French people having a "very good and fairly good" opinion of the United States' world policy, today that proportion climbs to 43 percent. The rate of those having a negative opinion of American diplomacy regresses at the same time from 38 percent to 27 percent.

A Majority Favorable to East-West Summits

What is striking in the poll whose results we are publishing today, is that it reveals a negative image of the Soviet Union in all spheres: 36 percent of the people questioned believe, for example, that the USSR and the Eastern countries

are militarily more powerful than the Western countries (only 21 percent have the opposite opinion. What is worse, if the word may be used: 50 percent of the French people think the United States is "more sincerely dedicated to peace in the world" than the USSR (only 6 percent are of the opposite opinion).

A similar disparity appears when social problems are approached: 74 percent of the French people think the United States is ahead of the USSR when it comes to economic development (6 percent are of the opposite opinion); 67 percent believe workers' rights are better protected in Washington than in Moscow (against 9 percent), etc. There are three sectors to be pointed out in this area: the fight against racism (38 percent place the United States ahead, while 10 percent award the palm to the USSR); reduction of social inequities (40 percent for the United States, 21 percent for the USSR); access to health for all (45 percent pro-American, 16 percent pro-Soviet).

All of this certainly explains why 43 percent of the French today are in favor of the United States putting in place a space defense system (against 39 percent a year ago), while only 35 percent are opposed to it. A huge majority favors East-West summits, provided the human rights question is raised there (71 percent), but no one expects great results from those meetings.

Perhaps the myth of Gaullian independence explains this doubt, which is so very French: although 36 percent of the French want their country to be "positioned preferably on the side of the United States" and only 1 percent want it to be on the USSR side, 57 percent want it to lean neither toward one side nor the other.

The breakdown of the poll--by political and professional affiliation--makes it possible to establish that it is the RPR partisans who are the most in favor of the American world policy (71 percent against 64 percent for the UDF, 29 percent for the PS and 13 percent (!) for the PCF). Another surprise: although 38 percent of those who claim to belong to the Communist Party have a good opinion of Soviet policy, 40 percent consider it "fairly poor or very poor".

More bad news for Mr Marchais: although 25 percent of the Communist Party's sympathizers think that public and individual freedoms are respected more in the USSR, 31 percent believe this is true in the United States. Among workers, finally, few have any illusions about the condition of their Soviet brothers: only 10 percent (against 65 percent) believe those rights are better preserved in the USSR than in the United States. In the same category, 8 percent believe that an improved standard of living is better guaranteed in the East than across the Atlantic (69 percent) and 10 percent consider the Soviet health care system to be better in Moscow than in Washington (53 percent) [as published].

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POLITICAL FRANCE

REACTIONS TO U.S. FUNDING OF FORCE OUVRIERE/UNI

Paris LIBERATION in French 28 Nov 85 p 9

[Article by Rene-Pierre Boullu and Annette Levy-Willard: "The CGT: Revelations Concerning the American Money of the Force Ouvriere Are an Anti-CGT Operation"]

> [Text] The reactions, in France as well as the US, to our investigation into the subsidies contributed by the AFL-CIO to the Force Ouvriere [Workers Force] (FO) and the UNI [Union Nationale Interuniversitaire; National Inter-University Union] are tantamount to confirmations. But the use of these monies remains mysterious. The FO pleads international solidarity, and the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] flies to the aid of Bergeron.

The evidence brought forward by LIBERATION, proving that American public monies were secretly making their way into the tills of certain French organizations, chiefly the FO and the UNI, received a whole series of confirmations yesterday. Better yet: the president of the "National Foundation for Democracy" (the American NED), Carl Gersham, in revealing the pedigree of the UNI, seems to have been surprised that columnist Irving Brown has made it the beneficiary of his generosity. He announced to the United States that if there were really a relationship between the SAC [Civic Action Service] and the UNI, he planned to conduct an investigation into the matter. The AFL-CIO, for its part, challenges the figures for the subsidies which Carl Gersham had confirmed to us (see yesterday's LIBERATION), but states that it does not know whether the totals predicted for this year have already been distributed.

The US Embassy in Paris reacted through a communique confirming that the NED, "a private organization, non-profitable and not associated with the government, does make use of monies allocated by the American Congress." With respect to the goals of this foundation, remarks the embassy, they are "everywhere in the world to aid and abet the efforts of peoples desirous of establishing democratic institutions." What democratic institutions is there a question of establishing in France? The embassy replies all the less satisfactorily to this question in that it tries to hide behind the private character of the NED, "twelve of whose fifteen executive board members come from the private sector; among those who belong to the public sector, two are members of Congress and only one is attached to the executive branch," notes the embassy. Let us re-

call that this one is a state department representative. Moreover, the executive board does not number 15 but in fact 17, since Henry Kissinger and former Vice-President Mondale are also members of this board.

What the American diplomats are putting forward is that, although public funds are allocated to the NED--and these, of course, are controlled by Congress--"the organization gives no evidence of clandestine or secret activity," And this is true for the NED, from the American point of view, but not for the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), by means of which most of the capital is forwarded. It is at this conjuncture that the confidential memo enters the picture, the memo requesting that the subsidies contributed to certain countries, including France, be kept secret. By reason of the--somewhat out-of-date--traditions of French anti-Americanism, by reason of the discrete forwarding of certain of this capital toward the East, or by reason of their suspicious use within France itself? These are the questions being asked, and asked first of all of the United States, not without some anxiety, in particular because the least suspicion that public funds may have been used to finance partisan political activities is viewed most unfavorably in an allied country, whatever may be the orientation of these political organizations.

Andre Bergeron also confirmed to all and sundry, for the first time in the more than 25 years that this question has regularly been brought up, that he had been receiving financial support from the American trade unions. The fact that these monies are public capital contributed in the name of the Foundation for Democracy--as he had already informed us in the course of our investigation--is not his problem. As for their being used no longer secretly but openly--"You know me," he confided to the televiewers with a big smile--Andre Bergeron stated that it was a question of financial aid to those free trade union members who have been exiled from totalitarian nations or countries under dictatorship, an aid "which would be all to the honor of the FO," as we mentioned the day before yesterday, even if in this case Bergeron remains only an intermediary between the dissidents of the East and the United States.

In fact, "FO is proud to participate in actions of this sort, and it will continue to do so," announced the confederated bureau of the FO yesterday. But no mention was made of the disturbing closeness between the FO and the UNI in this affair, nor indeed were any particulars revealed about the amounts of money or their respective destinations. Yesterday, the Solidarnosc representative declared on Channel 2 that this organization receives 80,000 francs annually from the FO. We are far from the 8,300,000 francs that were actually received, but there are doubtless many other "solidarities" in the world as far as the FO is concerned.

The FO considers nevertheless that the revelation of these operations of which it "is proud" is part of a "campaign aimed at confederation," that it is a question of betraying the image of the FO," and even, said the confederated bureau, of "one aspect of the on-going propaganda of international communism, which has set as its goal the destruction of free trade unionism."

Strange automatisms of the official line of the cold war. The communists have flown to the aid of the FO in this matter, and this is only to be expected. The revelations of LIBERATION were not responsible, Ronald Leroy, spokesman for the

PCF [French Communist Party], explained yesterday, since "This has been known since 1947." In fact the publication of these American documents, according to him, aims at throwing the finances of all trade union and political organizations into discredit, whereas there is at least one political party in France, and only one, to my knowledge, whose finances are quite clear." Guess which one.

Still clearer were the remarks of CGT treasurer Ernest Deiss, speaking solemnly before the congress of his organization: the information published by LIBERATION on the financial situation of the FO and the UNI represents, according to him, "a desire to destabilize trade unionism, which is struggling, and particularly the CGT." This was bound to be brought up.

Two "explanations" for this very "twisted" reaction from the CGT: first, by reason of a kind of solidarity "among treasurers" of the trade union organizations, Ernest Deiss feels that this matter allows for "the rebirth of old phantasms" concerning the money that the unions allegedly take in "from unmentionable sources." "Would we have organized the 'CGT Emergency' contribution campaign if we were profiting from such funds?" he argued. The squeaking wheel gets the grease; and in this instance the squeak is loudest at the site of the painful problem of financing union activities in France.

Officially, the representative union headquarters take care of up to 80 percent of their own operations, by assessing their (too few) members or at least their (still fewer) dues-paying members. The other 20 percent or so comes from various government subsidies: in 1985, 80 million was paid out to the CGT, the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], the FO, the CFTC [French Confederation of Christian Workers], the CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel] and the FEN [National Education Federation], according to the ministry of labor. (For 1984, according to the same source, out of 46.5 million received, the dues-paying members of the FO received 39.5 million--which would imply that the American subsidies represent a larger percentage than what we put forward in Wednesday's LIBERATION, beginning with a budget estimated at 62 million).

The other explanation for the support given the FO by the CGT in this matter is of a tactical nature. Each group sees the justness of its own cause. For the FEN, for example, "the positions of both organizations (FO and UNI) on the sensitive school issue force one to make inquiries." (concerning an American plot against undenominationalism? --editor's note). For the CGT, "Is this a matter of pure chance (if LIBERATION reveals these documents. --editor's note) at the very time when the battle against flexibility being waged by the CGT finds an echo even within the ranks of the FO?"

There indeed is a "flexible" interpretation of the work of the press.

Communique Reveals FO Reactions

The confederated bureau of Workers Force (FO) reacted yesterday in this communique, the main arguments of which were summed up in the statements of Andre Bergeron.

"As a consequence of the campaign aimed at confederation, the FO office recalls that since 1947--and on numerous occasions--the organization has taken actions

aimed at defending the great principles of democracy and freedom, in consensus with the labor union movement in the United States and the international confederation of free trade unions.

"It is in this spirit that the International Center for Free Trade Unions was created--in exile and sponsored by the FO. It experienced periods of intense activity during the events that happened in East Berlin, Poznan and Czechoslovakia, and at the time of the Hungarian rebellion of 1956. The FO took full charge of financial aid from the American trade unions.

"During the recent period, everyone knows what happened in Poland, Afghanistan, Chile, Latin America, Southeast Asia and even at times in certain African nations. Several years ago, the confederation acted in the same way during the reigns of Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal.

"Traditionally France welcomes many militants who have been forced to leave their countries. They find themselves in Paris without work, without housing and of course without resources.

"In the spirit and with the help of the trade union movement in the United States, FO is proud to have been of assistance to those concerned, both morally and financially, both individually and collectively, notably by contributing to the financing of certain publications.

"The FO confederation is proud to participate in activities of this type. It will continue without concerning itself with 'what others will say' or comments of all sorts, in fact, indended only to betray the image of the FO. This is one aspect of the on-going propaganda of international communism, which has set as its goal the destruction of free trade unionism."

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POLITICAL FRANCE

DGSE OFFICIAL DISCUSSES ACTIVITIES, EFFECT OF PCF MINISTERS

Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI in French 12-18 Sep 85 pp 24-27

[Interview with an anonymous official of the DGSE [General Directorate for External Security], date and place not specified]

[Text] The Greenpeace affair was no laughing matter. The facts have exploded the myth. We learn that the head of the intelligence agency was abducted from his Paris office in 1982 and set free in the middle of the Mediterranean. We discover that the Operations Division has a praetorian guard, unknown even to the "big boss," which is prepared to carry out all manner of dirty tricks. We see the very well-known head of a French weekly getting ready to exploit the emergence of Communist officials from the precincts of the "Piscine" [the headquarters of the DGSE]. We follow two photographers from that same newspaper who will wait in vain for that historic shot that could destabilize the French Government. It is disclosed that governmental authorities are opposed to allowing our intelligence agency to neutralize terrorist targets in Europe. One chuckles over the activities of the "black berets" in Corsica who sabotage an airplane chartered for Chad by the Ministry of Cooperation. We find these same men, with faces masked, preaching a strange sermon in the subterranean depths of Fort Noisy-le-Sec. The clandestine services are beginning to talk. An official of the DGSE--one who is close to the Operations Division, who wants to defend the honor of his comrades and testify to their effectiveness--has agreed to lift the veil covering the activities of the men in the shadows. What he has told EVENEMENT DU JEUDI is absolutely staggering! In the light of these disclosures, it is difficult to accept the comical stories about the DGSE as "gospel."

[Question] The French clandestine services have not always been laughable...For example, in the time of Alexandre de Marenches, who was in charge for nearly 12 years (1969 to 1981). How did it change?

[Answer] "Alexandre," as he was called, was quite the "big shot," and he was very well connected. But in his work he was a loner. And his people followed his example.

[Question] This attitude surely had its drawbacks...

[Answer] Contrary to the legend, our secret services were in a sort of lethargic state. We had many defections in the Eastern countries.

[Question] And the Operations Division?

[Answer] It worked fairly well, but it was hardly outstanding. Some operations, like Barracuda, the overthrow of Bokassa, were much too conspicuous. The attack on Radio Corsica International, toward the end of Giscard's term, was not very clever...

[Question] And in May 1981? How did things go after the change of government?

[Answer] Let us say that the portraits of Giscard stayed on the wall a little longer than necessary at Fort Noisy-le-Sec, the headquarters of the Operations Division, and at Mortier, the general headquarters of the "Piscine."

[Question] Why?

[Answer] You know, a government with Communist ministers--for us it was earthshaking, the end of the world! Especially since the Socialists themselves had lit into us, seizing on the flimsiest tales about us as evidence that we were unscrupulous adventurers.

[Question] And eventually the Communist ministers started causing you real problems?

[Answer] Listen, it was a close brush with catastrophe. Consider that one fine day we learn that the General Secretariat of National Defense (SGDN), on the pretext of familiarizing the chiefs of staff of the new cabinet ministers with security problems, had decided to have all of them visit the DGSE. Naturally, we did not take terribly well to this kind of "open door to the Piscine." Why not ask the secret agents to wear a badge? But the SGDN secretary general, General Rhenter, insisted. High military officials put in their two cents. The list of invitees was requested, and, lo and behold!--it was discovered that the four chiefs of staff of the Communist cabinet members were part of the group! Communists visiting the general headquarters of the French secret services? You can see what a blow it was.

A thing like that could get you shunned by all the other Western services. We barely stopped it in time.

[Question] And that did not have any repercussions?

[Answer] Well, now, there was a real mess. It seems that one of our people had told the whole story to the head of the editorial department at L'EXPRESS, a good friend of the "Piscine," and that several photographers from that paper had cleverly stationed themselves where they could take the historic photo of Communist "agents" inside the barracks of Mortier. I do not know if it is true, or who had cooked up all that business! But I know that a colonel was fired for having connived with the press. He denied it all!

[Question] Is it true that in February 1981 certain officials in the Operations Division called for a scorched earth policy to be implemented if the Left came to power?

[Answer] That is perhaps a slight exaggeration. But all the same, it was not a happy prospect. Besides, when Pierre Marion came on board, de Marenches gave a rather cool welcoming speech. The other replied with a speech that tried for the grand Napoleonic manner but just gave everyone a good laugh. First of all, he was a civilian. And among us, civilians are, well....Then he said he wanted to meet with us all in the "meeting hall." You should have seen his face when we told him there was no meeting hall, and that if people had something to discuss they went into the refectory. You know, from the outside one has a somewhat romanticized image of the "Piscine." One day, Marion was absolutely set on using the operations room to coordinate an operation being carried out in Africa. And he threw a fit because it turned out that it still lacked phone hookups. I admit all this may seem bizarre, but after all the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service] is not the Rosny-sous-Bois center.

[Question] And how did things ultimately work out with that civilian sent to you by a Socialist/Communist government?

[Answer] Actually, it has not been all that bad! He was the one who stopped the business about the four Communist office directors. We found that rather reassuring. Moreover, for several years intelligence work proper had languished somewhat. The watchword was "don't make waves." It might surprise you, but by de Marenches' time we hardly had any agents in the Eastern countries. Imagine, not even in Moscow! And when the events in Poland erupted, we had to send people in--and they had to cross the border on foot--to get a firsthand assessment of the public mood. And they barely avoided discovery. Well, Marion decided to re-open some stations in the Eastern countries, and that also made a good impression. One has to admit that even though he came in as a civilian he took charge from the start, and he gave it everything he had. When he was invited to the secret offices of the Operations Division in the subterranean depths of Fort Noisy-le-Sec, all the guys were there, covered in black from head to toe and faces

masked--just like a Ku Klux Klan meeting. Then they went over some of the traditional "psy-ops" techniques used in commando operations. Marion came out flabbergasted. After that, there were not so many problems. We got a little irritated about his boat that he was always fooling with, and he was also a rather nervous individual; but frankly, for 2 years, there was not a single scandal...That is rather rare. And also, there were some administrative improvements.

[Question] Really, no one is so easily impressed by the military as civilians...

[Answer] You know, when one imagines one has fallen into a nest of somewhat hapless secret agents, and is then confronted with the reality, one quickly changes one's opinions. Listen: one day the guys in Operations told Pierre Marion that despite his bodyguards and his staff they could kidnap him in downtown Paris--leaving him missing without a trace and no one the wiser--and whisk him off to the Mediterranean. In the jargon of the trade this is called "exfiltration." He did not believe them. Well, they did it! Actually, it is a little game they are accustomed to playing; but he knew nothing about it. So one day they succeeded in getting him out of his office, they disguised him so no one would recognize him, they put a cowl over his head, they took him in the trunk of a car to a spot 54 kilometers from Paris. From there a helicopter took Pierre Marion to Avignon. Then, at 0330 hours a car took him to the little port of l'Estaque near Marseille. They put him on a fishing boat, transferred him to another one, and there he was, in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, with absolutely no one any the wiser. Well, believe me, that made one tremendous impression!

[Question] But it takes a lot of people to do that! Is it true, as Jacques Isnard said in LE MONDE, that the SDECE (now the DGSE) is supported by a sort of "old boy network" of ex-agents, a kind of ready reserve?

[Answer] That is quite correct. It is a very compartmented reserve, formed of retirees from the services, under the direction of a person whose whole job is to manage them. Ultimately they are responsible to the chief of the Operations Division. Without those underground reserves, many operations would be difficult to carry out. They are highly motivated individuals who are nostalgic for the service life but who have rather extreme political tendencies. Many of them were victims of Gaullist policy in Algeria, and in their view there is not much to choose between Marchais, Mitterrand, Giscard and de Gaulle.

[Question] Are these the kind of people, for example, who in 1982 at the Figari base in Corsica put together the sabotage of the airplane that was carrying arms for Chad?

[Answer] No, that was the Operations Division itself. It was actually a very clean operation, but we never speak of it. What actually happened? It was learned that an airplane had been chartered with the help of a private company, SFAIR, in order to take arms to Chad, which we ourselves could

have done...Now it turned out that this very company, which was doing work for the Ministry of Cooperation, was doing training flights for Libyan pilots in between two missions to Chad. And those very airplanes "inadvertently" overflew our base at Aspretto where (as everyone knows by now) our frogmen were in training. So, what did we do? We simply decided to stop the flight from taking off. We did what was necessary to accomplish that, and the company in question got the message. No one was hurt!

[Question] In regard to that base at Aspretto, do you think that the commando teams in training there could have been acting in disobedience to their superiors when they organized the sabotage of the "Rainbow Warrior"?

[Answer] Not for a moment. The fellows who train at Aspretto are very conscientious about their responsibilities and their missions. They are incapable of going around their superiors or disobeying orders. Indeed, they are an outstanding group of professionals--good sports, superbly organized, trained in navigation, parachuting into the sea, the surreptitious setting of bombs--and they work in coordination with the navy. What one can say is that they are not intellectuals, and in fact some of them are a bit dimwitted. So when one tells them to "anticipate" or to "think about" something one might be asking for surprises.

[Question] And politically?

[Answer] Listen, people must stop imagining that all the officers of the DGSE are embryonic "fascists." These are people who wish to serve their country, and they have shown they would continue to do that regardless of who governs the country. In general, they stay out of politics. To the extent that they have opinions, they are more diverse than you think. Go ask Marion, since at least two of the "Ouvea" people were involved in that damned boat business!

[Question] But in the last analysis, after the Ben Barka affair, the Greenpeace affair, and various others...one must ask whether our secret agents have been effective in working for our interests...

[Answer] Why? Has the CIA been 100 percent successful? As I told you just now, the problem with the secret services is that, by definition, whenever an operation works no one talks about it. And in fact that is the proof that it worked. There have been successful operations. You yourself alluded to them in EVENEMENT DU JEUDI. For example, there was that business in Central Africa; we learned that a military coup against President Kolingba was being hatched, and indeed the French military attache in that country, Colonel Faure, was more or less a part of it. We managed to get all the details of the conspiracy. And during the night of the putsch itself, we

in Paris succeeded (with the help of our man on the scene) in restoring Kolingba. Radio House was occupied, the president was gotten to safety, and the plotters were arrested. Pierre Mauroy said that Kolingba was still in power; oh, yes, he was. But it was a good piece of work, was it not? In India, before Hugues de l'Estoile arrived in New Delhi with French proposals for the sale of the Mirage 2000, we succeeded in intercepting all the Soviet counterproposals and turned them over to him right on the ramp of his plane. That was a bit helpful, was it not? We also sent a big team to Lebanon, about 20 agents, including some from Operations, who succeeded in locating the headquarters of the terrorist commando teams that were operating in France.

[Question] So what happened after they located it?

[Answer] What followed was not our responsibility. In 1982, as you know, orders were received to intensify intelligence collection against terrorists. We got rather spectacular results. First of all, we succeeded in identifying the "sleeper" agents who were receiving arms through diplomatic channels. We also got a fix on the individuals who were organizing crossings into Switzerland, Italy, and Spain, as well as Belgium. We were able to identify most of them. Lastly, we located several buildings used as "PC's" [expansion unknown] by commando teams in the Abou Nidal group.

[Question] And what was done with this information?

[Answer] Once again, it was not up to us to decide what to do with such information. In all three cases, we proposed prompt violent action against the targets that had been spotted. The political authorities refused. That is their responsibility. They preferred to negotiate. There were meetings with Syrians including Rifaat El Hassad, who from all the evidence was in charge of the Abou Nidal group. There were also contacts with Arafat and his security services. I was and still am completely against this weak and ambivalent way of fighting against terrorism, but I must admit it got results. Middle East terrorists have had to move their activities out of France. The terrorists followed Arafat's man to Lisbon, instead of Paris.

[Question] After 1981, was there a purge in the clandestine services?

[Answer] One could not call it that. Some 25 people were fired, but I do not know if it was for political reasons.

[Question] Pierre Marion claims that they were incompetent and alcoholics...

[Answer] No, they were not all incompetent, but it is true that some were real alcoholics.

[Question] Are there incompetents in the agency?

[Answer] There are people like that everywhere. We had an agent in Nice who unfortunately generated a lot of unfavorable talk. He was incredibly incompetent!

[Question] So there has been no "socialization" of the clandestine services?

[Answer] I must say it would be difficult. I will give you an example: in 1982, the fellow in charge of weekly summaries--consisting of about 30 pages, they were sent every Tuesday evening directly to the president--was Arsene Lux, who is now on the staff of Jacques Chirac.

[Question] When someone gives specific instructions to Operations, is an explicit, written order given?

[Answer] Never.

[Question] Can such operations be put together without asking headquarters?

[Answer] Very difficult.

[Question] Is Louis-Paul Dillais, alias "Dubast," who coordinated the whole Greenpeace operation from New Caledonia, a man who could have taken initiatives that did not conform to his instructions?

[Answer] Absolutely not. He is very strict about discipline. And moreover, he is very intelligent and very astute. I would add that if someone is going to try something fishy, they would not talk to anyone at his level...

[Question] Is there good cooperation between the navy and the clandestine services?

[Answer] Definitely. On several occasions there were exercises in the Mediterranean that involved participation of a submarine from the Toulon base as well as DGSE's fast patrol boats.

[Question] What are the special areas of interest of Admiral Lacoste, the current head of the DGSE?

[Answer] Afghanistan, including aid to the resistance. And Cambodia, where we continue to help the "little prince."

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POLITICAL FRANCE

MARXIST BACKGROUND, ASSOCIATES OF PIERRE JOXE DESCRIBED

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 16 Nov 85 pp 156-159

[Article by Jean-Louis Remilleux: "The Joxe Saga: More East than Left"]

> [Text] A curious, upper-class family, fascinated by Marxism. The father, a moderate compared to his two sons. The younger, Pierre, a minister of the interior who is more red than pink, and Alain, the elder, an avowed leftist and a militant in all the subversive movements.

The latest victory of the Joxe clan? He is a man cut of the same cloth as the Joxe men: Andre Laignel, he of the "juridically wrong because politically in the minority," is leading the electoral campaign in 1986 for the PS [Socialist Party]. He is its flag-bearer. Associated with Pierre Joxe for many years, he is preparing the ground for ultra-socialism, for anti-cohabitation; in short, he is to transform the PS once more into an opposition party.

Why choose Laignel? Why choose unpopularity unless it is to respect that line, more Marxist than socialist, defended by the friends of the minister of the interior, a man whose family, contacts and actual opinions disturb even those Place Beauvau agents termed "secret," those services that had already, as early as 1953, taken an interest in the case of Louis Joxe, the father, the French ambassador to Moscow, after an affair which had brought his independence into question? In 1953, Pierre Joxe was 19 years old. He used to join his father in Moscow frequently.

While still a student in Paris, Pierre was a UNEF [National Union of French Students] militant, and in the "anti-fascist and anti-colonialist" manifestations he never failed to designate himself as a fervent disciple of Marx. He confided these sentiments to Henri Marque, moreover, in the JOURS DE FRANCE of 10 February 1975:

"I believe that the analysis of Marx remains true and gives a guide for action; for example, in transforming the relationships within business enterprises. But Marx never defined what a socialist France might turn out to be. Marxism is the opposite of the unbending philosophy it is often presented as in France, where it is badly understood because it is infrequently studied."

Clear and brilliant Pierre Joxe! As the great advocate of nationalization, which he calls "the extension of public service," he hauled Pierre Mauroy over the coals in 1982, "because there is some misfiring in the ignition." Translation: "The reforms are not going fast enough." He imposed his doctrinary severity on Jospin and opposed Mitterrand on that occasion.

This Joxe is the transformation of the previous Joxe: Louis, his father, the founder of the Center of Studies for Foreign Policy, the Keeper of the Seals in 1967, the minister of state for Algerian affairs in 1961 and the former ambassador to Moscow.

Certainly, Louis Joxe was not a leftist. But neither did he ever take up a position against the Soviet government.

"My father was on the side of the Popular Front before the war, on the side of the Resistance Movement during the war and on the side of decolonization after the war. His choices, therefore, could not oppose us."

Today still, Pierre and Louis Joxe are on very good terms, contrary to what the microcosm claims.

To round out this unique family we must add Alain Joxe, the brother of Pierre, and the whole leftist network which has surrounded the minister of the interior since his first interventions behind the scenes. The "Joxes" form a saga which cruises in the most Marxist, Third Worldist and/or Trotskyite waters.

The recent developments of political current events since 1981 have shown the growing influence of this political clan so unlike any of the others, and the dangerous connections of which are better known today.

What unites the Joxes explains a number of great reversals during the seven-year reign of Francois Mitterrand.

It was the most extremist elements of the leftist police unions that caused a hood to be put on the arrest in Vincennes of the Irishmen wanted by Scotland Yard. That was one way of reacting against the installation of gendarmes in the Elysee [presidential residence].

Then the hatred between the police and the gendarmes doubled, manifested in a political desire to attack the gendarmes, with their rightist reputation, insensitive to the union watchwords and interdicts.

Certain journalists, who were then to sketch ecstatic portraits of Pierre Joxe, nourished all these campaigns with a militant faith.

The Greenpeace affair showed how the entire Joxe clan exploded into action to make known, first to Francois Mitterrand, and almost simultaneously to the press, the errors of the DGSE [General Directorate for External Security], in order to facilitate the ouster of the overly ecumenical Charles Hernu.

These same people were then seen celebrating the Joxe integrity, whereas the telephone number of the DGSE could be identified in the Auckland affair only by a precise response from the Joxe services to the New Zealand police!

The result of this very Mitterrandian scandal? A great victory for the socialist extremists over the moderates. The Joxe clan won a definite victory.

The consequences are well known: the people closest to Mitterrand were either reassigned or dismissed. The disheartened Francois de Grossouvre had departed earlier. Charles Hernu was sacrificed. It was the advent of the Laignels and the Joxes.

The Revolt of the Ayatollahs

What does Mitterrand think of this revolt of the Ayatollahs, which was nonetheless led by a faithful follower with an alarming appearance?

"They will be crushed by the opposition in 1986. How can they be prevented from militating?" sighed the head of state. He leaves the activists up to their own devices in order not to see them revive their activities against him, in anticipation of what will transpire after March.

When we take a close look at the Joxes, one by one, what a lot of surprises we find! Pierre Joxe, minister of the interior, former minister of industry, has a career as a militant and friendships that explain a number of unusual governmental decisions. In January 1975, he supplied significant aid to the "Committee of Support for Imprisoned Soldiers," with Roger Garaudy, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Daniel Guerin or Georges Montaron. The latter was, moreover, a signatory of the "Appeal of the 31" for "a peaceful and democratic solution in New Caledonia." This appeal also received the signature of Alain Joxe, the brother of Pierre.

Does the present minister of the interior recall his participation in an open letter for the liberation of Klaus Croissant?

A member of the "Socialist Rights of Man," the president of the "Franco-Hungarian" parliamentary group, a frequent and recognized tourist in the USSR, he does not miss a chance to emphasize the fact that certain pro-Soviet countries are experiencing "a relative autonomy, including the workings of the political machinery." (LE MONDE, 13 November 1982)

He is also a follower of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor], which for a minister of the interior still in office is quite an interesting situation.

It is easy to believe that Pierre Joxe contends with his brother Alain, 54, a lawyer and journalist, for the right to wear the leftist medals.

Once again an edifying honors-list. Alain Joxe, divorced from Francoise Mallet-Joris, is a member of CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research and Education] and was by turns professor of law in Santiago, Chile, then member of the foreign policy commission of the Socialist Party.

Yet some features of his biography make certain services--which are, however, under the thumb of his brother--the object of general attention.

In 1967 he took part in a meeting of the "Pugwash" group on matters dealing with European security. In 1968 he attended a conference organized by the

"International Peace Institute," an organization whose love for things Soviet is well known.

Better still: in 1971 Alain Joxe was elected a member of the council of the "International Association for Research on Peace" (AIRP); and as a member of the PSU [Unified Socialist Party], he attends the meetings of the national bureau of the "World Council of Peace." The writer Jean Montaldo has demonstrated, with the aid of bank statements, how this movement was financially, and therefore politically, linked to the USSR.

Alain Joxe is also a member of the sponsorship committee of the "Franco-Libyan Friendships" and the secretary of the "Colombia Committee" association.

He also takes an interest in problems of defense, and here lies the drama, for is he not in fact the assistant treasurer of the "French Association for Defense Studies"?

A strange sort of animator for the "Dialog, Information, Research and Exchange" group, he is also secretary of the "Association for the Support of the Cultural Arabic and Hebraic Movement," and president of the "Center for Study and Documentation on Chilean Actuality."

And there is more: the brother of the minister of the interior is active on all fronts and is a member of the "Justice and Freedom Committee in the Military Establishment," secretary of the AIRP, treasurer of the "Committee for the Support of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Chilean People," and an influential member of the "Interdisciplinary Center for Research on Peace and Strategic Studies."

A journalist for the PSU weekly, LA TRIBUNE SOCIALISTE, and for the journal, AMERIQUE LATINE, this son of Louis Joxe regularly contributes his support to the most partisan causes, such as "Guatemala, 20 Years of Struggle," or the return of Simon Malley, the director of AFRIQUE-ASIE.

Leftist Sympathies

In his ideological combats, Alain Joxe militates elbow to elbow with a lawyer of the communist machinery, Attorney Leo Matarasso, a lawyer who, curiously, enjoys very close ties with the lawyer defending the "Turenge Couple": Attorney Soulez-Lariviere, who was chosen by the ministry of defense in the Greenpeace affair.

Pierre Joxe not only has a brother, he is also a father, and in particular the father of a daughter who intervenes regularly at his side on behalf of Toumi Djaidja, the leader of the Minguettes; or Lionel Rousseau, the anarchist-libertarian and president of the National Federation of Free Radio Stations, and who also directs the Parisian cell of the Longo Mai sect, which was involved in a theft of 800 kg of explosives in Belgium. For the use of Action Directe!

Finally, the sister-in-law of the minister of the interior, Cecilia Cadena-Joxe, took part as a PSU member in the last congress of CEDRI [Comite europeen

de defense des refugies immigres; European Committee for the Defense of Refugee Immigrants], an organization founded and controlled by Longo Mai.

CEDRI is also a kind of thieves' kitchen from which the terrorist and extremist movements select their most trustworthy militants.

There you have the family of Pierre Joxe, the political family, that is. He is the minister of the interior, touted by the extreme left and now strongly suspected, since the Greenpeace affair, of leftist sympathies by the actors in the anti-terrorist struggle.

Recent politico-police dossiers and the discovery of the real personalities in his entourage prove that these suspicions were correct.

[Boxed insert by Veronique Grousset: "Will the Fall be Harder?"]

Andre Laignel, named campaign director for the legislative elections of 1986: that news fell without a comment. It is true that it is better than a simple program, better than a declaration of intent.

For Andre Laignel represents the camp of the "tough guys"; a new pawn put forward by Pierre Joxe, who thus outwits Laurent Fabieus, Lionel Jospin and Michel Rocard, as well. So true is this that on the left it is better to err in the name of ideology than to be in the right against dogma.

Laignel is the symbol of four years of failures and blunders. He is Valence. He is that sentence of death for democracy pronounced on the very floor of the National Assembly at the moment when the "heads will roll" congress was opening--the day that saw the Assembly members rise up from their seats in a storm of protest, when the socialist rear guard had been given the mission of winding up the dossier of nationalizations, when the deputy mayor of Issoudun came out with his: "You are juridically wrong because you are politically in the minority."

In 1982, Andre Laignel once again took a liking to Mirabeau. In 1986 he is being nicknamed "Laignel the Lamb," just as before him Quiles-Robespierre had been transformed into "Quiles-Tenderness." And the same may be said of those who know him best, the socialists in the Assembly who are now calling him the "Joxe-terrier"--the one who yaps louder than his master--and his constituents who boast so willingly of their two famous local products, "the Saint-Nectaire [cheese] and the 'Nain-Sectaire' [dwarf sectarian; play on words]"

His slight build--they say it prompts him to consider himself another Napoleon --perhaps once marked him out as a general. But if one judges by the results of the first campaign confided to him--that of the independent schools--the chances of success for the 1986 legislative election campaign will certainly not profit from this choice.

The only certainty is that the campaign will be all the more difficult. And will the fall be harder, too?

PHOTO CAPTION

The clan of the "tough guys"; Andre Laignel, Louis Mermaz and Pierre Joxe, united in extremity, ready to sacrifice everything to the ideology actively supported by the followers of the minister of the interior. Pierre Joxe, the authority on "Modern Marxism," has always defended the Eastern block countries as did his father, Louis Joxe, the former French ambassador to Moscow (seen here on the opposite page, on General De Gaulle's left, at a reception given at the Elysee Palace with King Olaf of Norway.)

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POLITICAL GREECE

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES SEEN LEADING PASOK TO 'HISTORIC COMPROMISE'

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 8-9 Dec 85 pp 1, 3

/Article by Nikos Nikolaou/

/Text/ The economic crisis has united the majority of the country's political world and has awakened the government leadership. It has also set in motion a dialogue and a framework of agreed upon procedures that if they do not remain empty verbalistic plans but move forward to actions, then it is certain that they will help in finding solutions to the country's critical problems. The above sentiment was stressed yesterday by economic observers who expressed their satisfaction over the standard and tone of the Chamber of Deputies' discussions and they hailed the fact that both government and government opposition agreed on the basic need for us to get out from the crisis through a policy that basically is founded on the system of a free economy.

The latter is perhaps the most important lesson that comes out from an analysis of the long speeches of the government prime minister. Mr Papandreou became aware, even though late in the game, that the notorious third road to socialism is now impassable for the future, while its past 4 years have been burdened with the frightful mistakes that led to the present crisis.

Of course, economic observers did not wait for Friday's discussion to confirm the judgement they had repeatedly described in I KATHIMERINI, namely that after 11 October, PASOK has been, in fact, moving along a different path, at least as far as economic policy is concerned, and that this new line will sooner or later have repercussions generally speaking on both the "Movement's" domestic and foreign policies. In any case, however, they cannot hide their satisfaction over the festive mood in the Chamber of Deputies over Mr Papandreou's regret with regard to the role and contribution of the private sector --i.e. of the foundation of the free economy system-- in the economic development process. On Friday noon, he said, "The private sector will inevitably play an important role. It is a summer night's dream to think that the public sector, as it exists today, is in a position to assume responsibilities that are now the private sector's. We are talking about reality."

This has to do with a confession and an admission having broad multifaceted ramifications.

As economic observers have emphasized, this confession is practically leading to a political consequence for a curtailment of nationalization and socialization measures and to a search by the government for a means for harmonious symbiosis and coexistence with the private sector. Of course, the relative political desire expressed by the prime minister now remains to be confirmed with concrete actions that will have as their goal to gradually and progressively remove all obstacles that PASOK itself had placed in the way in a period of 4 years. However, specific first memos coming from troubled companies and enterprises are hopeful. Mr St. Panagopoulos, director of the National Bank, is now looking for capable managers to replaced the unsuccessul party proconsuls.

The same economic observers have stressed that it would be a mistake for the government opposition, without, of course, its relaxing over Mr Papandreou's openings up to now, to show sectarianism and not to appreciate the significance of certain changes that are being made. Thus, it would also be a big mistake and an erroneous political appreciation if everything that Mr Papandreou has been saying recently, and especially what he said on Friday noon in the Chamber of Deputies, would be considered as deceit, maneuvering or a trick.

In no case is there anything like that! And what Mr Papandreou really believes deep inside, that is if he is sincere or not, is of no importance. In politics, psychographs do not count but the objective conditions that make up the framework within which governments act. The objective conditions are well known and their mention again is perhaps unnecessary. It would simply be useful to say only that with a public deficit that will surpass 1 trillion drachmas in 1986, with a frightful gap in the balance of payments the coverage of which is possible only through an EEC loan and with loans from U.S., British or German banks that once again would be guaranteed by the Community, and finally with inflation running at over 20 percent, the demand by the Left that Mr Papandreou commit political suicide by remaining attached to the dogma of state socialism is to say the least naive. For example, the Left criticized Mr Papandreou because he is now beginning to adhere to the principle of supporting private initiative. But did he or the country have any other choice? In neighboring Yugoslavia, in the country of self-managed socialism, inflation, as mentioned by news agencies yesterday, was 78 percent (!) in November, while unemployment went above 15 percent! What value have labels about socialism when they cover completely dissimilar things?

From among the objective conditions that are definitely determining PASOK's future course, economic observers place in the number one position, together with the economic crisis, the recent Luxembourg agreement, and they hail the vast importance of the fact that Mr Papandreou is cooperating and getting along with other leaders in the course for creating a politically and economically united Europe. In fact, the economic core of the agreement by the 12 leaders is the establishment by 1992 of a large united market in which people, goods, services and capital would circulate unimpeded. In other words, it would have to do with a big free market that would basically be founded on private enterprise, big, average or small. By agreeing to have Greece join this market, Mr Papandreou really acknowledged that the Greek economy would remain in the future an open economy with private initiative as the basic motive power. This is the big historic compromise that took place in Luxembourg and this is the political dimension of the agreement that Mr Papandreou signed on the evening of last Tuesday.

The third road to socialism that in practice is expressed through murky and peculiar plans for nationalization, socialization, self-management, etc., cannot be imposed except in closed economies. If the frontiers should open not only will their low competitive goods go down the drain but the state or self-managed industries that produce such goods would at the same time collapse. Besides, it is for this reason that the countries of existing socialism and their imitators in the Third World have been cut off from international trade with which they communicate only through controlled bilateral agreements.

Thus, our joining a big, competitive and free market (that, of course, will come about gradually and with the economic support of partners) legalistically determines the definite selection of the free economy system by PASOK also.

This choice will in a short period of time bear fruit. The state's deep infiltration into many sectors of the economy over the past few years will not be able to stand for long. The government, if it, of course, survives the economic crisis, will be obliged to take back all prerogatives and distinctions it legislated on behalf of state schemes, such as discriminatory treatment on behalf of state insurance companies, the National Drug Administration, the National Drug Depository, PROMET /as published/ and AGREX /Greek Agricultural Products Export Company/, while the preferential treatment of cooperatives must be done away with and the purchase of petroleum liberalized.

Mr Papandreou has realized and has correctly judged that the choice of a competitive market is now necessary. Answering critics of the Left in the Chamber of Deputies, he said, "A turnabout policy and a refusal of every form of participation in competition is certainly not leftist. There exists today an international production network. Greece is also inevitably in it. And it must survive within this framework."

The previous day, the alternate minister of foreign affairs made the same comments stressing to journalists that if Greece does not survive within the framework of international trade, harsh measures would have to be taken that would have dramatic consequences for the standard of living of its inhabitants.

Economic observers, therefore, on commenting on the events and developments, are reinforcing the judgement they came to on the day after the economic measures were taken, i.e. that there exists a clear turnabout in economic policy that will sooner or later force Mr Papandreou to make definite his divorce from the Left and to seek new supports in the liberal arena.

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POLITICAL GREECE

PARTIES, PASOK SEEN SCENE OF INTERNECINE STRUGGLES

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 1 Dec 85 p 3

/Article by Spyros Linardatos; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface/

/Excerpts/ Everything that has become known about the talks and discussions at the recent special session of the PASOK Central Committee has confirmed the fact that there are basically different opinions prevailing within the party. Also, that these differences are now assuming the dimension and form of a crisis, something that had already become evident through the dismissal of trade unionists and members of the central committee, as well as the resignation and withdrawal --for the time being-- from politics of /Kostas Laliotis, deputy minister of press and recent member of the executive office.

A small or large crisis prevails at this time in practically all Greek political parties, big or small. A crisis that is due to a large extent to the fact that 11 years following the overthrow of the dictatorship the political groups that were set up or were revived at that time do not appear to have become modernized or to have adapted to rapidly developing realities.

New Democracy, even after the breakup and the establishment of a new party from the ranks of the Democratic Renewal, continues to be shaken up by an internal struggle over the party leadership, as is now being admitted by one of its ranking cadres and deputies (Prof D. Nianias in two articles in ELEVTHEROTYPIA on 26 and 27 November).

The KKE (Int.) has been broken up into two disputing factions with the main issue of the dispute being the aspect and name of the party.

Even with the KKE, the most "monolithic" party, at least in its outward appearance, there are now open differences of opinion being voiced as evidenced by the dismissal of its cadres in Patras and as admitted to for the very first time in the report of the recent party central committee plenum where mention is made on disagreements over the stance vis-a-vis PASOK that "create more general ideological-political problems." (RIZOSPASTIS, 20 October).

Let us, however, now restrict ourselves to the crisis within PASOK that is of special interest since it has to do with the governing party and since its policy and acts influence greatly and more directly the course of the country, the functioning of institutions and the daily life of the people.

First of all, the most direct connection with the PASOK crisis is the involvement of /the Ministry of/ Justice in GSEE /Greek General Confederation of Labor/ disputes. An involvement that does not glorigy trade unionism, that other pillar of democracy, nor does it strengthen the authority of Justice, that "stronghold of democracy." Of course, the responsibilities of those in PASOK and the two KKE's who are "disagreeing" are not lesser. Instead of seeking a meeting of the minds and understanding, they believed that they had found the opportunity to impose their hegemony over the trade union movement in which they constitute a minority. But the government showed that it considered it almost a disaster --as is usually the case in democratic countries-- if the majority in trade union administrations were not pro-government.

Certainly the basic cause for the crisis being faced by PASOK today stems from its constant change of policy and those who express it in the basic sectors of government policy. The changes in personnel in the ministries dealing with the economy are well known. Also well known is the fate of the administrations that have in the last few years been in the ERT /Greek Radio and Television/. It is evident that with regard to the mass media, that so critical sector for the functioning of democracy, the crisis will not cease becoming endemic if the government does not decide to desist in its stifling control over it and does not ensure legislatively its autonomy from political authority.

Neither a change in government policy in any sector whatsoever nor differences of opinion on any issue whatsoever, alrge or small, do not suffice to lead a given party to a crisis. The fact that there is today a crisis within PASOK is due primarily to the fact that these changes and decisions on major issues are made suddenly, with decisions made /outside of collective governmental or party organs/. This situation, that constitutes a sort of status quo for the big Greek political parties at least, shows /the immaturity of our democracy/.

It is a fact that not only endogenous but exogenous causes are today thrusting the government and generally-speaking our political life toward authoritarianism. The spread of terrorism and blind violence that has turned to new forms, air piracy, the paralysis of entire sectors of public life through extended strkes (lawyers, doctors, air controllers, etc.) are phenomena that /are placing the country on trial/ at a time when it needs prudent and systematic work to confront the economic crisis and its national problems.

Italy managed to confront the terrorist storm of the "Red Brigades" and other terrorist organizations by strenghtening and not weakening its democratic institutions and with complete respect of personal and individual rights and freedoms. Whether or not our country and our democracy will come out of the present crisis /unscathed/ will be judged on the maturity of the political parties and on the necessary democratic solidarity of all political forces.

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POLITICAL GREECE

LALIOTIS RESIGNATION: POSSIBLE CHANCE FOR PAPANDREOU JUNIOR

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 24 Nov 85 pp 13-14

/Article by Titos Athanasiadis/

/Excerpts/ PASOK has gotten itself into a new deep crisis with the resignation last week of government spokesman Mr K. Laliotis and his withdrawal from active political and party activities --at least as he himself has stated. This crisis, unlike previous ones, is ideological and political in nature.

This is something that makes the consequences and repercussions in party ranks greater and more dangerous for the cohesiveness of both PASOK and the government.

From a statement made by Laliotis last Thursday, it is revealed that the basic reason for his resignation from the government and his abstention from political and party activities in the future is the abandonment "of the leftist aspect of PASOK as a radical movement." He indirectly but clearly considers Mr A. Papandreou responsible for this. He criticizes him for abandoning the "third road" to socialism, that is the strategy that differs from "social democracy" and "existing socialism," as the PASOK leader himself had declared at the party congress in May 1984 about which Mr Laliotis reminds him now.

Mr Papandreou's new option became necessary following the tragic failure of his socialist policy in the past 4 years. Moreover, immediate significant assistance from the EEC could not be provided without the assurance of the abandonment of the socialist dreams that led the Greek economy to the brink of catastrophe.

The "big turnabout" took definite shape with the annoucement of measures stabilizing the economy that were considered to be "rightist" in nature. It is expected that these measures will be supplemented with the legislation of developmental measures that are also expected to be liberal in nature.

Mr Laliotis, although he was opposed to this "opening," supported it from his position as government spokesman, becoming furthermore the government's spearhead in the attack on the KKE that sought to gain party benefits from PASOK's leftist wing by criticizing its new economic policy.

However, the "turnabout" that Mr Papandreou had undertaken in October did not concern economic issues only but the more general policy and strategy of the party, as is evidenced now by the sought after warming up of Greek-American relations that are

expected to culminate with an agreement extending the life of the bases and the granting of significant economic assistance from the United States.

It was exactly the widening of this opening by Mr Papandreou that imposed certain intra-party "adjustments" greater than those that, in a first phase, involved the ousting from the PASOK Executive Office of the party's leftist wing leadership (Laliotis, Gennimatas, Vaso Papandreou, Moralis and Rokos) and in a second phase the dismissal of the eight trade unionists who constituted the spinal column of the party's trade union sector. They were dismissed because they disagreed with the new economic measures.

Mr Laliotis, even though he "swallowed" his dismissal from the executive office, as did others in the leftist wing, strongly reacted to the "defenstration" of the "eight" from the Movement and sought to play the role of "bridge builder" with the prospect of having those ousted return at some future date. This policy of his was also expressed with specific acts that provided for PASOK and the dismissed trade unionists to approach each other especially during the days of the big GSEE /Greek General Confederation of Labor/ crisis and even more so during the all national strike of 14 November.

Having at his disposal control over the mass media, Mr Laliotis presented the strike in such a way as to significantly promote the position of the strikers. Indeed, the secretary general of press and information who resigned at the same time as his superior, namely Mr Laliotis, did not belong to PASOK but to a more leftist group, as he himself noted during his resignation. Two of the three individuals in the ERT-1 /Greek Radio and Television/ administration belonged to an even more leftist group.

The ministers who attacked Mr Laliotis, the first one being Mr Koutsogiorgas, told Mr Papandreou that ERT-1's deviation to the Left and the greater prominence of ND and other parties on the same channel was hurting PASOK in the name of "democracy, pluralistic, many-voiced objective television."

What had Mr Laliotis done with ERT-1 and had become the target of these reprimands? He had, in fact, opened up the channel to leftists in whose home grounds he has always sought to play some guiding role. And to balance out this opening to the Left he permitted a greater presentation of ND and other party announcements and cadres.

However, he tried to cover or neutralize these presentations through the projection of more "vitriolic" attacks on ND and Mr K. Mitsotakis personally than in the past. But his "alibi" did not find fertile ground in Kastri.

Kastri also had an additional reason to be concerned over the demonstration of government activities by Mr Laliotis. The government spokesman is of the same "political class" as Giorgos Papandreou, son of the prime minister, whom Mrs Margaret Papandreou wants to see become the political successor of her husband in the PASOK leadership in the future.

Mr Laliotis certainly represents the most significant opponent in Giorgos Papandreou's career. And since the chances of PASOK's remaining in power are dwindling the time for a promotion of a third in the Papandreou dynasty is also growing short. For that reason the onetime friendly relations of the two have become in recent months cool if not bad.

Indeed, the effort to promote Giorgos Papandreou publicly these days and in the days to come is comprehensible.

It should be especially noted that Mr G. Papandreou, once he had taken over the ministerial post that Mr Laliotis had held in the previous government (Deputy Ministry of the New Generation), he is now seeking to displace him also from the leadership of the ideological-political arena that the former government spokesman had (PASOK's leftist wing)!

It is only in this way that Mr G. Papandreou's statement on the anarchists' incidents and his critical stance on the police ("No force to force") can be interpreted.

If any minister whatsoever would have made such a statement he would have found a letter of dismissal on his desk a few minutes later.

Moreover, in his statement, Mr Laliotis himself made two references that when analyzed by Kastri should normally make the latter panic:

1. He mentions that he will continue his confrontation and

2. He lets it be understood that he has "personal ambitions" since, among others, he too is interested in his "posthumous fame." However, Kastri should be even more panic-stricken by the fact that Mr Laliotis is staying in PASOK, is proclaiming his faith in it and is stressing that he visualizes it in the future as being faithful to the principles of its original proclamation.

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POLITICAL GREECE

BRIEF

YUGOSLAV ARRESTED--A small Yugoslav tourist vessel, the Galeb, flying the Yugoslav flag, was seized last night by a Port Corps patrol vessel while it was sailing 2 miles out from the big Araxos airfield. The Galeb was moving with its lights out and did not answer the signals of the patrol vessel to stop and to give its destination and nationality. Aboard the vessel was a Yugoslav citizen by the name of Dragan Miongrad Tosik, 46 years of age, who had sought asylum in the West in 1965. Found on board the vessel were cameras that Dragan acknowledged not knowing how to operate. Also found was a Yugoslav bank account book with 1 million drachmas. Dragan said that he had been living in Greece illegally since October 1984. He has been charged with illegal entry into the country and with lack of navigational documents. The KYP /Central Intelligence Service/ has been informed. /Text/ /Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 24 Nov 85 p 18/ 5671

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RIFTS, CONFLICTS SEEN WITHIN LEFTIST SPECTRUM

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Paulo Portas]

[Text] The parade of candidates that has enlivened the presidential issue over the past 2 years is coming to an end. Candidates who were talked about outnumbered declared candidates 10 to 1. But being a candidate is not a matter of wanting to be one but of being able to be one. Since politics is an art, one does not become a candidate by demanding of fate an encounter with history—one becomes a candidate by knowing that the nature of things or the force of circumstances are working in one's favor. The candidates worthy of our interest are before us like photographs being developed and "fixed" in a lab. The others represent scenery, adventure, or megalomania.

Developing and fixing the real candidates shows us the following: the presidential issue has become simplified in the center and on the right but complicated within the Left. In other words, the center and the Right have a single candidate: Freitas do Amaral. Within the Left, on the other hand, the candidates are increasing in number. While Mario Soares is resisting and Lourdes Pintasilgo is not desisting, Eanism is inserting a wedge into their areas from the top down by running Costa Bras. It is also possible that the PCP will do its usual number: that is, run a tactical candidate who will back out at the right time in favor of the correct candidate from the standpoint of Communist strategy. In conclusion, the presidential election is going to develop and fix three branches of the Left.

The situation is completely different from that in 1980. Then, the candidacy of Eanes brought the entire Left together. The only exception was Mario Soares, who remained silent and outside. Five years later, the personality of Eanes no longer unites—on the contrary, it divides. Even worse, the sponsorship of an Eanist party was and is a challenge to everyone else on the left. The PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] faced the PS [Socialist Party] in the legislative elections, but the candidacy of Costa Bras is emerging to face Lourdes Pintasilgo in the presidential election. All of this is turning the first round of the presidential election into a genuine internal referendum for the Left. And all of this, plus the result of that referendum, will have inevitable consequences in the second round. The reason is that, objectively,

the fight to win that referendum is turning Mario Soares, Costa Bras, and Lourdes Pintasilgo into the chief enemies of each other. As far as Mario Soares is concerned, the chief enemies are Costa Bras and Lourdes Pintasilgo, since the fight with them will be waged vote by vote. As far as Costa Bras is concerned, the chief enemy is Lourdes Pintasilgo, the rebel candidate whom Eanes wants to eliminate. As far as Lourdes Pintasilgo is concerned, the chief enemy is turning out to be Costa Bras, the intruder who may ruin everything. In this panorama, truth commands us to say that we are very far from the days when the entire Left's enemy was the main candidate, Soares Carneiro.

Objectively, there is civil war within the Left. That fact calls for full attention and moderate rejoicing. The thing that makes Mario Soares, Costa Bras, and Lourdes Pintasilgo the chief enemies among themselves is not only personal--it is above all political. What is at stake in this civil war is a series of basic battles. Historically, the battle for leadership of the Left has pitted Eanes against Mario Soares, but it has now shifted to the conflict between Eanes and Lourdes Pintasilgo, with Eanism's chief ally in both cases being the PCP. The battle for civilian government unites Mario Soares and Lourdes Pintasilgo, although for different reasons, in the struggle against the remilitarization of the regime as symbolized by Costa Bras. The constitutional battle places Mario Soares, who favors revision in a liberal direction, in opposition to Costa Bras and Lourdes Pintasilgo, both of whom favor keeping the Constitution as it is. And the battle over the function of the president makes Mario Soares and Costa Bras stand out, although for different reasons, as supporters of the idea of a president as moderator, whereas Lourdes Pintasilgo is pushing the idea of a president as leader. Lastly, there is another battle which is the main one of all: it is the European and Western battle. This is where no one yields: Mario Soares is definitely aligned [with Europe], while Costa Bras and Lourdes Pintasilgo represent, expressly or tacitly, Third Worldism. In short, the three branches of the Left do not constitute a domino game of rivalries. The three branches of the Left are three worlds. Their contradictions are so healthy that they exclude serious alliances.

For those who stand politically in the center or on the right, the civil war among the three branches of the Left means that basic strategic definitions are required. The enemy so far has been Lourdes Pintasilgo. But the threat, one that is growing and is capable of taking the enemy's place, is Costa Bras and the plan for Eanist expansion. In those conditions and for every reason, Mario Soares is only the adversary. No more and no less.

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

COMMENTS ON RETURN OF 'APRIL CAPTAINS'

Return Seen as Regression

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Text] There they are, with the help of that diffuse reality with its populist shape and unmistakable ambition that is called Eanism.

They are the April military who are running in the local elections, are already deputies, or are even, like Lieutenant Colonel Costa Bras, being encouraged to move up to become president of the republic.

In some cases they are emerging with the orthodox and institutional help of the Democratic Renewal Party [PRD], which is the visible and structured face of the Eanist iceberg.

Others are appearing under the discreet and remote halo of sponsorship by the president of the republic himself, Gen Antonio Ramalho Eanes.

But the wave is the same. What separates them is the fact that a few chosen ones merit the personal blessing of their reputed political sponsor, while the others have only bureaucratic clearance from the "emperor's eyes and ears."

We are therefore witnessing an attempt by the "April captains" to stage a sort of comeback as leaders on the national political scene.

That comeback needs to be assessed from five different and complementary angles:

1. It coincides with the end of a politicoconstitutional cycle.

2. It also coincides with the approach of the next and most significant phase in the political-personal career of General Ramalho Eanes.

3. It is happening at a time when the vacuum in civilian political power has objectively strengthened the importance of the military authorities,

introducing a real qualitative change in the application of the Law on National Defense and the Armed Forces that was approved in 1982.

4. It corresponds to renewed theorization concerning national leadership by politicomilitary elites.

5. It is benefiting from the political protection provided by the partial institutionalization of Eanism (in the PRD) and by the PCP's loyal support.

Let us assess each one of those different aspects of the same reality:

First, the 9 years constituting two terms by the same president of the republic have so marked our recent political life that the coming presidential election corresponds in fact to the end of a politicoconstitutional cycle that began when the current Constitution took effect.

The idea that the presidential election is of secondary importance is therefore wrong.

The belief that the results of the legislative elections will take precedence over the presidential election results is illusory.

The theory that everything in Portugal is going to go on as though the elections did not exist or were unimportant reflects a lack of attention, to say the least, since Parliament or the government is the nuclear core of our system of government.

The elections in January or February will mark the end of a cycle that began in 1976 and have the effect of moving the constitutional revision in one of several possible directions. In 1982, a two-thirds majority in Parliament leaned toward a specific balance of powers and a definite profile for the president of the republic. Within the next few months, we will see whether that majority, which won in 1982, again prevailed in 1985 or simply won the first round only to lose the decisive second round.

The return of the April military at this moment means that General Eanes in particular and Eanism in general realize that the presidential election is the essential thing. It was already that in 1976 and 1980, and the same is true to an even greater extent today.

Anyone who does not understand that, but feels that the fatherland will win out in other battles and does not thoroughly commit himself to this one runs the obvious risk of losing all of them--the presidential battle in February and the other battles 6 months later.

Second, the return of the April military coincides in time with the enthronement of Eanes III.

Eanes I was the symbol of democratic stability, the guarantee of the initial steps toward civilian democracy, and the arbiter who demanded, as a condition of governability, that governments be based on cohesive and lasting majorities

in Parliament. Elected with the express support of the PS [Socialist Party], the PSD [Social Democratic Party], and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], he presided over the republic from 1976 to 1978.

Eanes II, however, was to be the new face of the same politician beginning in 1979 and as a result of three decisive events: the unsuccessful experiment with a formula for governments inspired by and based on the president; the confrontation between the president and the Democratic Alliance's majority in Parliament--the result, perhaps, of an erroneous conviction on the part of General Eanes, who, on dissolving Parliament, told the country that he did not expect any substantial change in its makeup--and the PCP's tacit approval of the president's conduct after 1979. As a result, Eanes II was reelected in 1980, this time not with the same backing as in 1976 but with the express support of the PCP and the PS (except for Mario Soares, who had finally awakened to the inevitable course that would be followed by the Portuguese president). The new unifying center of the Portuguese Left had emerged.

While Eanes II had freed himself of the bulk of the burden represented by his electoral support in the PSD and the CDS and replaced it with PCP support, Eanes III disentangled himself from his political commitment with respect to the PS and sponsored the takeoff of the party which, in 1980, it had been agreed that he would not start. With the constant and indefectible support of the PCP, he emerged as a party leader.

The end of the president's second term is thus confirming what is, objectively at least, a political metamorphosis: the president who in 1976 symbolized the first steps toward civilian democracy with support from the PS, the PSD, and the CDS, stating decisively on the RTP [Portuguese Television System] that a victory by his rival Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho would cause him to go into exile, is now, in 1985, backing the return of the April military with support from the PCP, launching his own party through his wife, and offering himself as a character witness for Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

Third, the return of the April military is occurring at a time when, as a result of consecutive errors and omissions on the part of the civilian government, political practice has been nullifying the role of Parliament, the government, and the minister of national defense and strengthening the position of the military authorities in matters concerning the Armed Forces.

Truth compels us to say that foot-dragging by the caretaker government and the unworthiness of those civilian bodies overcame the pretentions of the military, but the result is simple: Portugal is the only country in the Atlantic Alliance where the political status of the organs of sovereignty in the area of national defense is weakest and that of the military authorities is strongest. An example: it is normal that in meetings by the ministers of national defense, our country should be represented by a military leader.

Since the heads of the Armed Forces change from time to time, it is easy to imagine various scenarios in which the current shortcoming in civilian political power will be fraught with consequences.

Not to mention the short step that exists between that vacuum and generalized intervention by the military authorities as such in Portuguese political life. Today the excuse might be an election, tomorrow it might be a budget, and after that some government decree-law or other.

Today the means might be a spokesman, tomorrow it could be a departing statement at the airport, and after that an interview in a newspaper.

Today the one responsible for intervention might be an admirable and esteemed military leader, tomorrow it could be an agitated group of majors, and after that a stirred-up sergeants' mess.

Fourth, a message presented by Dr Medeiros Ferreira (one of those avenged on 6 October 1985) during the series of lectures sponsored by the 25 April Association to mark the 10th anniversary of the fall of the autocratic political regime has just been published as a book. It deserves attentive reading.

It theorizes concerning the excellence of Portugal's leadership by a politico-military elite, the logic behind the development of the MFA [Armed Forces Movement] (which has taken various forms but has endured in our political life), the justification for its survival, and the strength of its current reaffirmation.

Everything is there, clear and obvious. And for those clamoring that utopia exists, it is urgent to read it, reflect on it, and compare it with the reality we are experiencing now and that which is drawing near.

Concerning the topicality of his thesis, we will add that just recently a well-known general officer tried to have inserted in a prestigious military magazine some prose that was identical in many respects with those ideas concerning national salvation by the hand of the Armed Forces.

Fifth, this return by the April captains is occurring, therefore, at a key moment in parallel with the enthronement of Eanes III (no longer the moderator or the unifying center on the left, but a party leader and candidate for monarch through appointment of his successor, who may--who knows?--be an unwilling Hector Campora for 5 years), and at a time when ideas concerning a politicomilitary elite are taking shape again and we are witnessing the civilian power's anemia in military matters. But it is benefiting in a special way from the arrival of the PRD and the loyal support of the PCP.

It is the end of a historical cycle in this area, too. It is a regression to the situation of 9 years ago, with a more brazen PCP and a PRD made up of fellow travelers allied with many of those who restrained the Communists on 25 November 1975. The only thing is that today, the Communists are their preferred allies. Can it be that now, 10 years later, there is recognition that Sa Carneiro was right when he said that 25 November had been a matter of restraining the voluntaristic excesses of a certain element of the PCP precisely in order to save it?

Return not Black and White

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Otelo and the April Captains"]

[Text] In his surprising statements to the court in Monsanto, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho admitted to being the head of an illegal organization aimed at taking power by force. Otelo denied that he was member of the People's Forces-25 April [FP-25]--but he confessed to being the founder of an organization with similar objectives whose only disagreement with FP-25 was over timing.

What this means is that Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho took a definite stand against the regime he had helped establish.

That is a pity.

The reason is that it is always distressing for any regime to have to judge a figure who staunchly exerted himself on behalf of its establishment. By putting Otelo in the dock, the democratic regime was, in a sense, also bringing part of itself to trial.

There is little value, however, in placing ourselves in the romantic position of contemplating the past.

Indications are that Otelo is probably sorry that he did not take power when it was at his doorstep.

But not all the April captains are now sorry for their actions and their pledge to turn power over to civilians.

Their number would include those captains who participated, as candidates for deputy, in the recent legislative elections--and who were sharply attacked by the Right.

Let it be said right now that those attacks were unfair.

Those captain-candidates have said clearly that they are dissatisfied with the way the politicians have been conducting Portuguese politics.

In other words, they have said clearly that they do not agree with the options chosen by those who inherited the regime which they established.

But even though taking that stand, they did not hatch any plots. On the contrary, they adopted an attitude of respect for the "democratic principles" they said they were defending on 25 April 1974: they submitted to the vote of the people, leaving it up to the country to choose them or to choose others.

The captains who were candidates for deputy in the elections of 6 October therefore acted in a straightforward and honorable manner.

They did not tell the country they were sorry for what they had done 11 years earlier.

But, disagreeing with the way the country was being governed, they submitted their proposals to the Portuguese--and did so on an equal footing with the other candidates.

The attitude of the April captains who took part in the PRD's campaign strengthens democracy.

Otelo's attitude rejects it.

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

SALGADO ZENHA ON CANDIDACY, COMMITMENTS

'No Understanding With PCP'

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 22-28 Nov 85 pp 8-9

[Text of interview with Salgado Zenha, former Socialist Party official and presidential candidate, by Manuel Beca Murias, date and place not specified]

[Text] Salgado Zenha, the former leader and number two man of the PS [Socialist Party], has just received the express endorsement of Ramalho Eanes. In his first in-depth interview following the confirmation of his presidenial candidacy, Zenha compared his program to that of an Eanes "in civilian clothes," his primary objective being to defeat Freitas do Amaral, who, according to Zenha, represents the program of "Soares Carneiro in mufti."

Question: On television, Dr Salgado Zenha pledged to make our public administration "transparent," as a way of controlling corruption. At the same time, however, you pledged that, if elected, you would not interfere in government activity. Isn't this a contradiction?

Answer: The proposal to establish what the English call an "open file," or open administration, was the result of my observation of the enormous degree of corruption in Portugal today. I do not believe in combating corruption with repressive measures, not only because they don't work but because I feel that although the High Authority has its positive aspects as an institution, oversight of the public administration is best done by Public Administration itself. So I understand that the best system would be an open administration, giving all citizens the right to consult any "dossier" whatever, of the government or the local governments, at any stage. This issue is extremely important to professional journalists and to public interest groups. The system functions well in many countries and could do so in Portugal as well. The president of the republic does not have the authority to make a law of this kind, but the Assembly of the Republic does. Simply, I think that, at this time when we are talking about the ills affecting our country, we ought to propose solutions.

It is not just the government or the parliament which introduces positive ideas. It is also public opinion. Insofar as public opinion gives shape to this reform, it will come about sooner or later.

PCP Support: "I Combat Ideas, Not Men"

Question: Those who have known you for a long time see you as a man of courage, but not a man of consensus. Do you think this is a good character trait to have if you are elected president?

Answer: I think the characterization is perhaps exaggerated. But I respect differing points of view. I have spent most of my life under a regime in which there were no civil liberties. I became known, above all, as an advocate for the introduction of a regime in Portugal which would respect civil liberties--which, obviously, was a position in conflict with the system then in effect. Whether as an attorney or, later, as a deputy and in the other activities of my public and political life, my actions have in fact been ruled somewhat by this style. Even so, I consider myself to be a man of consensus. To me, consensus does not mean that everyone should think the same way. I even believe that consensus will always involve conflict. Consensus imposed by force or based on hypocrisy is no consensus. What must be created in Portugal is consensus, which does not exist now, on the functioning of the democratic regime. I believe I can help to bring it about. The fact that I fought for the advent of democracy does not mean, quite the contrary, that I am incapable of struggling for consensus on the consolidation of that democracy.

Question: In the past, when two different conceptions of democracy were confronting each other, it was Dr Salgado Zenha who was most pugnacious and toughest against the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], a party which is now going to support your candidacy. How do you reconcile these two things?

Answer: I make a distinction between men and the ideas which they profess to defend. For me, the confrontation is not between men but between ideas. At that time,[1] I was minister of justice and the proposal for a single union originated in a ministry of another political hue. I understood that it would jeopardize the consolidation of democracy in Portugal.

I combated the idea, not the men.

"I Don't Negotiate With Anyone"

Question: The debate was over an exclusive union versus union solidarity?

Answer: That was it; that was the whole thing.

Question: Today, to see you in an understanding with the Communist Party is, on the face of it, difficult to believe.

Answer: I have no understanding at all with the PCP.

Question: You haven't negotiated with anyone?

Answer: I haven't negotiated with anyone. As I said, my candidacy is directed at all the Portuguese people. The first candidacy I ever supported was that of Norton de Matos,[2] which profoundly influenced my political career. I recall very clearly that he was asked the same question, and he replied: "I am a candidate of all the people for the presidency of the republic. If I am elected,

I will be the president of all the Portuguese people." At that time, you couldn't ask: Do you accept the support of the Communists?" because the PCP had no legal existence, but Norton de Matos declared: "The Communists are Portuguese, so I accept their support if they wish to give it to me." The siuation is exactly the same today. If we [rejected Communist support], we would have to reject the votes of everyone who did not have precisely the same ideas as we do. But I do not distinguish between men. I distinguish between ideas. I never fight against men. I assume there are differences in ideas.

Two Projects in "Civilian Clothing"

Question: Are there any terms of comparison between the previous elections, in which you took part as an Eanes supporter, and the present one, in which you are participating as a candidate?

Answer: Situations are never entirely new; they all have some points of reference. In these elections, there is a program, that of Professor Freitas do Amaral, the objectives of which are basically the same as those of Gen Soares Carneiro; there is another project--mine--which is basically the same as that presented by General Eanes. You could say that Professor Freitas do Amaral's project is that of Gen Soares Carneiro "in mufti" and mine is that of General Eanes, also "in mufti."

Today, the problems are different. The issue of the referendum is not under discussion. But Professor Freitas do Amaral's project is for a system in which there is a president, a governmen and a majority--exactly the same as that of Gen Soares Carneiro. For my part, I would argue for a program in which the president of the republic is the guarantor of the constitution, of liberty and of democratic rotation in power. Obviously there are other differences, but this is the basic contrast.

Question: The basic contrast with Professor Freitas. And with Mario Soares? And with Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo?

Answer: I have already had occasion to say that I have always opposed the idea of the president as the leader of a party. I feel that making the presidential function partisan would contribute to weakening democracy. In 1980, and to make a very superficial and simplified analysis, this was essentially my argument wih Mario Soares. As for Eng Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, there are certain points of contact with the views which she defends. Although our political positions are convergent, they had a different origin. As to the points where I am in disagreement, I think she represents a government program that cannot be fulfilled through the presidential function. From what she says, she represents the possibility, if she is elected, of an abuse of the presidential powers. Instead of creating consensus, she would aggravate the dissension.

Eanes Letter

Question: Did you feel any discomfort about the support for you in General Eanes' public letter? Are you starting with a "handicap" greater than the others because of that public endorsement? Don't we have a kind of "dynastic process" here?

Answer: That's your opinion. I don't know of a democratic country--and if one exists I would like them to tell me--in which the acting president of the republic is prevented, as a citizen, from expressing his opinion about a candidacy. Quite the contrary; it is customary for presidents who are leaving office, either because they cannot run again or do not wish to, to support openly and even make public speeches on behalf of presidential candidates. If you think that the president of the republic, having served out his term, is not permitted to exercise his democratic rights like any other citizen, then it is because we are not living in a full democracy, but one which is limited in an arbitrary and antidemocratic way. If the acting president of the republic, as a citizen, accepts my program and decides to support my candidacy, I am honored. The manner in which Gen Ramalho Eanes exercised the office of president of the republic will serve as an inspiration to me. It will not be a matter of copying him--not only because these are two different candidacies but because the problems to be faced will be different--but of taking Eanes as a point of reference. I deem it an honor to be supported by General Eanes.

Question: The other candidates, specifically Professor Freitas do Amaral, speak of an alleged need to change the political system, with the purpose, he says, of strengthening the possibilities for governmental stability. Would you care to comment?

Answer: Government stability was a topic that was done to death by the so-called New State. We had too much stability. Government stability is obviously a good thing, as long as it does not imply a negation of essential values, such as civil liberties, respect for the constitution and a guarantee of the principal of democratic alternation. This does not mean that the people are obligated to change their opinions for each election, but that they cannot be prevented from expressing their will to maintain or change the government.

Question: Dr Mario Soares, for example, has been complaining that his government fell at the precise moment when, in his view, there was some possibility of launching economic recovery.

Answer: The Democratic Alliance government did not fall for want of a parliamentary majority--and this is even more mysterious--it fell apart internally. The democratic system must be strengthened. The constitution is the crystallization of a series of political compromises made at a difficult moment, and its revision is inevitable and desirable. It could be done at any time by a four-fifths majority and in brief by a two-thirds majority. My problem is to see that the constitutional framework of the revision is respected. This being the case, as long as the parties represented in the Assembly of the Republic debate the constitution and introduce the changes they agree on, I think this is positive. The constitutional framework which provides for such revision cannot be violated. But I also feel it is perfectly possible to govern with the present constitution.

Organize Gradually

Question: But specifically with regard to the views set forth by Professor Freitas do Amaral...

Answer: The proposal which I considered the most dangerous (and which is basically a repetition of Gen Soares Carneiro's project) is the one defended by Freitas do Amaral. He thinks the ideal is the English system, in which Mrs Thatcher, with only 38 percent of the votes, achieves a majority in the House of Commons. Well, 38 percent is precisely what the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and the PSD [Social Democratic Party] hold in Portugal. If we are going to install a system to guarantee that the Democratic Alliance will always be in power, democracy no longer has any meaning.

Question: You will have to put together your campaign in a very short time. Signatures of support, organization, advertising, funding and so on. How can you do it?

Answer: I am bound by the laws of Portugal. Naturally, I am going to comply with all the legal requirements.

Question: What kind of support do you have?

Answer: These are not things that I can handle by myself. Professor Henrique de Barros has agreed to be the national campaign chairman. There is a task force which is working closely with me at this time. The various support committees are being formed; everything will get done little by little.

Question: Let us suppose that you are elected and installed in Belem Palace. What would your first three measures be?

Answer: The president of the republic does not have a government plan, but a program in exercise of his presidential functions.

No Ribbon Cutting

Question: But no one sees Dr Salgado Zenha going to Belem to engage in ribbon cutting ceremonies. He has an idea, a political idea of the functions [of the office] for which he is running.

Answer: Freedom, responsibility, information and decentralization--and I will not abuse my presidential powers. I will not be a ribbon-cutter, but if, at the end of my term, I am compared with other chiefs of state, I would rather be compared with the king of Spain than with President Pinochet. Being an active president is not the same as being an activist president. The values which I defend are not to the Right, or Left or Center.

Question: In this office....

Answer: In the presidential office, you cannot have sunshine on the threshing floor and rain in the turnip fields.

Question: In your fashion, are you also going to put socialism on the shelf?

Answer: This is completely different.[3] To exercise an office, one must establish precisely the objectives of that office. In my understanding, the objective of the presidential office is to establish consensus on the functioning of democracy.

Question: Did you ever think, in the past, that you could be running for the presidency?

Answer: No, never. But when I was arrested and the PIDE [International and State Defense Police] asked me if I would rather be "deputy or deported," I replied "neither one" and ended up being a deputy.

FOOTNOTES

1. As would be recounted later in an article published in DIARIO DE NOTICIAS (12 January 1977), Zenha, joining the PS in defending union "solidarity," opposed the idea of a "sole union" by which the "PCP intends to recognize the Intersindical as the sole central union and, through it and its bureaucracy, to take control of the entire labor movement."

2. In 1949, Gen Norton de Matos was the opposition candidate in the fraudulent elections organized by the Salazar dictatorship, which ended in the inevitable victory of the government candidate: Marshal Oscar Carmona.

3. Given his moderate position and his alliance with parties on the Right, Mario Soares is accused of having "put socialism on the shelf," a theme that was brought up in the parliamentary debates on his government program in February 1978.

Zenha Seen Reserved, Dignified

Lisbon TAL E QUAL in Portuguese 29 Nov 85 pp 8-9

[Text of interview with presidential candidate Salgado Zenha, by Hernani Santos, in Lisbon, date not specified]

[Excerpts] In a spacious apartment on Avenida dos E.U.A. live the couple Irene and Francisco Salgado Zenha. Irene, a former tennis champion, is now a housewife. Salgado Zenha, attorney, politician, former high official of the PS [Socialist Party], is currently a candidate for the presidency of the republic.

If a home naturally reflects the personality and style of those who live in it, then the Salgado Zenhas could not have designed a home more in their image, even if they had tried. Elegantly subdued. Comfortably dignified. Above all, graciously formal.

The personal formality of Salgado Zenha shows everywhere, in the decor and in the mood. A certain tradition of hospitality, which the antiques evoke with nostalgia, has been preserved without the austerity of the past, but by the welcome with which one is received, one cannot imagine the host greeting his guests, even his closest friends, in the modern style, with open arms and exuberant back-slapping. One even has the sensation that if the visitor behaved this way, he would be told, in a genteel but direct way, that he had just shown a lack of respect for his hosts.

One might question his political ideas, but Zenha hardly leaves any doubt about his conviction and the integrity of his motives. Unlike the snake oil salesman, he is not seeking to deceive anyone. His product is there to be seen, without colorants or preservatives. His tone of voice, as if deigning to go over a piece of evidence one more time, almost suggests: take it or leave it.

"This tone sometimes leaves people with the false idea of irascibility," we were told by someone who had worked closely with Zenha in the PS. "They could not be more mistaken. Dr Zenha is enormously shy about promoting himself; he almost seems embarrassed when he talks about himself and his ideas. He thinks it is natural to struggle on behalf of the country and that there is nothing out of the ordinary about it."

In fact, Salgado Zenha sets forth his convictions with the simplicity of one who loathes the nonsense and hypocrisy of the dramatic and professional rhetoric, the claims to be the salvation not only of the Portuguese but of all humanity.

At the personal level, Zenha was quite surprised when I commented that his life was almost as obscure as that of Alvaro Cunhal. When I was leaving, this man, who does not appreciate humor for the sake of humor, joked: "If you are deceived about where I live, look in the telephone directory--I donot live in clandestinity."

Message received. Humor, yes, but only with a purpose in mind.

TAL E QUAL: A presidential candidate (Meneses Alves) said recently on television that Dr Salgado Zenha was "physically ill" and "affected psychologically": how is your health?

Salgado Zenha: I am quite well. I am not suffering from any ailments. Only Sr Meneses Alves can explain what led him to make such an observation.

TAL E QUAL: You are known to drink coffee. What other small vices do you indulge in that are harmful to your health?

Zenha: I drink a cup of coffee twice a day. But I don't smoke.

TAL E QUAL: Let us go back to 1975. It was Dr Zenha who wrote up the statutes for the public enterprises and financial institutions. At the time, their social content was considered advanced. Looking at the way the Bank functions today--for example, the millions of contos in bad credit risks--do you feel frustrated?

Dr Zenha: That statute was drafted by a team that included Sr Santos Silva, Dr Vitor Constancio and Eng Sousa Gomes. I am not in agreement with what is happening today. But the excessive political control over the Bank, which was no part of the statute, naturally, has made the Bank administrators irresponsible. In fact, there is much to be criticized.

TAL E QUAL: Your image is one of a European, democratic and civilized politician, who does not confuse the political struggle with personal enmities. Would

you agree that your long personal friendship with Dr Mario Soares may have been, perhaps on both sides, the victim of politics?

Zenha: In a democracy, there is coherence to our ideas themselves and there is a value which we must take as a reference: the welfare of the country. This is a personal interview, right? Well then. We were six brothers in my family and, of the eight people who made up my family, none of them thought the same way as I did. Even today, one of the sorrows of my life is that my parents and some of my brothers, especially my mother, suffered a great deal over my politicial positions, in terms that I will not go into here, but they have never made any recriminations against me because of this. Therefore, I became accustomed to the idea that our positions regarding ideas are our own.

TAL E QUAL: Then you do not renounce the friendship which you have always had with Dr Mario Soares?

Zenha: I respect our past and if we went back I would not have the slightest doubt about having the same personal friendship with Mario. But that friendship can never imply that one is the vassal of the other. I would never condemn Mario for the positions he takes, but neither do I accept or presume that I cannot take my own political positions. This is my conception of life.

TAL E QUAL: You have defended the existence of an open "transparent" government which offers access to information. Would you cite specific cases?

Zenha: This never happens in Portugal. In all the administrative activity of the government and the state with regard to the citizens, the latter do not have access to information, except under juridical conditions that constitute an almost insurmountable barrier.

TAL E QUAL: What has been the reaction to your candidacy from the members of the former secretariat of the PS, which you led?

Zenha: In politics, I am a democrat and a liberal--and liberal. Some of them have taken the initiative to tell me they support me. Others have said they were not supporting me, but this has not changed my relationship with them. I have even said to some of them: I am pleased that you take a political position different from mine; I think this is democracy. I think it is normal that it is this way.

TAL E QUAL: Your political image is well known, but your personal image is almost as obscure as that of Doctor Cunhal.

Zenha: And how is that?

TAL E QUAL: Do you have children?

Zenha: No.

TAL E QUAL: Tell us about a situation--a type of humor--that makes you laugh out loud.

Zenha: I am a cheerful person and I appreciate humor, but not professional humor. For example, in Portuguese literature, I think the humor for humor's sake does not lead anywhere.

TAL E QUAL: Do you enjoy the Brazilian television novellas?

Zenha: I have not seen all of them, but I have watched some of them.

TAL E QUAL: Do you approve of sexual permissiveness?

Zenha: No. I am not a puritan but I think that everything in life has rules and there are rules here, too.

TAL E QUAL: Do you take public transportation? Do you have a public pass?

Zenha: Almost always. I had a pass when I was a deputy. It was a perquisite given us by the parliament. Now I do not have this economy. I often walk from my home to the office. I also use the Metro. It is more difficult for me to use a car. I rarely drive inside Lisbon.

TAL E QUAL: It is said in political circles that Dr Salgado Zenha became a practicing Catholic a relatively short time ago. Has there in fact been a significant change in your life with regard to religion?

Zenha: I am not a practicing Catholic. I consider myself a Christian. I think that every religion in the world has particular characteristics that I seek to understand and that interest me; it is one of the cultural topics of great interest to me. I was brought up as a Catholic. I consider myself a Christian. But I have a horror of using religion to go after votes or for personal prestige.

TAL E QUAL: You are not, then, of the "Opus Dei," as they also say.

Zenha: I am not.

TAL E QUAL: Before announcing your candidacy, you talked wih Engineer Pintasilgo. Did you ask her to withdraw in your favor?

Zenha: If I met with her or not is a question which should be asked of her. I can, however, say that I have never asked and will never ask any candidate to withdraw. This is a personal decision for each candidate.

6362
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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

PINTASILGO'S POPULARITY UP SINCE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 p 17

[Text] Lourdes Pintasilgo would win in a three-way competition for the presidency with Freitas do Amaral and Mario Soares. With one reservation: this survey was taken between 9 and 17 October, in the aftermath of the legislative elections on the 6th, and at a time when the PSD [Social Democratic Party] support of Freitas do Amaral had not yet been defined.

If Lourdes Pintasilgo were to compete with Freitas do Amaral on a second round in the presidential election, she would win by 48.6 percent to 27.1 percent. But her victory would not be distributed equally over the whole of the national territory. Freitas do Amaral would win in Coimbra, Vila Real and Viseu, while Pintasilgo would have the southern part of the country (Lisbon and Evora) and Oporto.

The ascendancy of Lourdes Pintasilgo over the former centrist leader is least clear among the upper class (40.3 percent against 39.3 percent), but she would win the support of the young and the old of all classes and both sexes.

Pintasilgo would also win over Mario Soares, were he her opponent in the second round, with 44 percent against his 26 percent. This would be not so great a victory, but it would be one in which the national consensus would be broader. The socialist leader would only win in Vila Real and Viseu, while the coast (Oporto and Lisbon), Coimbra and Evora would the give the majority of the votes to the prime minister.

Here too the social sectors polled would be unanimous in giving Pintasilgo the majority of the votes. And it would be among the lower classes that the difference would be greatest--56.5 percent against 12 percent.

In direct competition with Freitas do Amaral, Mario Soares would also taste defeat, with the result showing a minimal difference, 29.1 percent and 28.1 percent, favoring the reformist candidate. In this balanced contest, each would win three cities--Lisbon, Coimbra and Viseu for Freitas do Amaral, and Oporto, Vila Real and Evora for Soares.

The social division of those polled, however, provides some curious details. The young people and women prefer Freitas do Amaral, while those over 45 years

of age and those of the masculine sex tend toward Soares (35.2 percent and 32.4 percent, respectively).

However, much political water has passed under the bridge since the period when the field work for this poll was done (9-17 October). One of the most significant events will have been the PSD decision to support the candidacy of Freitas do Amaral, which may change the results of a more recent poll to some extent. In this connection, it can be noted that the percentage of those undecided here came to about 13 percent (in the comparisons between Freitas do Amaral and Pintasilgo, and Freitas do Amaral and Mario Soares), and 11 percent for a Pintasilgo-Soares "final." In other words, indecision increases when Freitas do Amaral comes on the scene.

Voting on the Second Round

		Sex		Age		Class		
	Total	Male	Female	15-44	45+	Upper	Middle	Lower
Between F. Amaral and M. L. Pintasilgo								
Freitas Amaral	27.1	21.9	31.8	33.3	21.4	39.3	25.4	16.6
M. L. Pintasilgo	48.6	53.5	44.1	49.4	47.9	40.3	49.6	56.5
Don't know	13.3	9.7	16.6	7.2	18.9	4.5	14.6	20.6
Would not vote	8.8	11.9	5.9	9.1	8.4	9.2	9.0	6.3
No answer	2.2	3.0	1.5	.9	3.4	6.8	1.3	--
Between F. Amaral and Mario Soares								
Freitas Amaral	29.1	22.9	34.7	40.0	19.1	47.4	25.2	23.4
Mario Soares	28.1	32.4	24.3	20.5	35.2	20.2	31.9	14.9
Don't know	13.9	9.3	18.0	9.9	17.5	6.0	14.3	25.1
Would not vote	26.6	32.4	21.4	28.6	24.8	19.6	27.1	36.5
No answer	2.3	3.1	1.6	1.1	3.4	6.8	1.4	--
Between M. L. Pintasilgo and Mario Soares								
M. L. Pintasilgo	44.3	48.1	41.3	50.5	39.0	33.3	45.8	56.5
Mario Soares	26.7	28.4	25.3	22.0	31.1	28.1	28.4	12.0
Don't know	11.3	5.5	16.6	10.4	12.1	5.3	12.2	15.7
Would not vote	15.2	15.1	15.4	16.1	14.4	26.5	12.3	15.8
No answer	2.2	3.0	1.5	.9	3.4	6.8	1.3	--

5157
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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PINTASILGO REPORTEDLY SUPPORTED BY 25 APRIL ASSOCIATION

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 1 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Pedro d'Anunciacao]

[Text] The role of the military in the presidential election has become a dominant topic over the past few days. The most outstanding supporters of civilian government, Mario Soares and Diogo Freitas do Amaral--themselves personally in the running for Belem Palace--were the first to draw attention to the incongruity of having a military man as chief of state in a Western and European country. After that, about 300 writers of various political hues signed a manifesto rejecting any military candidate for president, "no matter how many civilian charms he presents."

No matter how discriminatory one may consider those attitudes toward citizens who have pursued a military career, the latter have generally respected the legal rules prohibiting them from expressing political opinions publicly while in active service and have remained silent. The only exception would be Lemos Ferreira, who has openly flaunted his intention to be a candidate and has always given a well-known political turn to his official speeches and the interviews he has granted.

But strangely, the first collective manifestation by military men occurred early this week--on Monday night--when a group of members of the 25 April Association, whose number included a few prominent figures in the former MFA [Armed Forces Movement] (among them Air Force General Pezarat Correia, Adm Vitor Crespo, Captains Martins Guerreiro and Almeida Contreiras, Colonels Costa Neves and Fisher Lopes Pires, Majors Sousa e Castro and Sanches Osorio, Col Carlos Fabiao, and Air Force General Pedroso Lima), met at the National Cultural Center with candidate Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo.

Pintasilgo Sweeps 25 April Association

It should be noted that that meeting came along after members of Pintasilgo's campaign team had been emphasizing to the newspapers that the former prime minister had the support of the 25 April Association--a fact which, in their expressed opinion, represented a resounding setback for Colonel Costa Bras, who had just entered the race for president. At the same time, Pintasilgo's

supporters were pointing out that one of the conditions laid down to Eanes by Costa Bras was that his candidacy would require support by the 25 April Association (a report which both men make it a point to flatly deny).

Whether or not support by the 25 April Association was included in the conditions laid down by Costa Bras (and based on the information we have, we presume that it was not), the fact is that the public meeting on Monday carries a very specific meaning--one of undeniable commitment to Maria de Lourdes--that is not without its surprising aspects. It took place after several intellectuals supporting Pintasilgo had signed the writers' "antimilitary" manifesto, after Costa Bras had announced his candidacy with the publicized support of Ramalho Eanes, and after it had become clear that the PCP was not going to give its votes to Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo.

By demonstrating their preference for Pintasilgo, therefore, the members of the 25 April Association were also manifesting their reservations concerning the candidacy of the High Authority Against Corruption.

What is surprising in all this is that those military men, who in the delirious days of the PREC had presented themselves as the exponents of more or less revolutionary front politics (with the exception of Sanches Osorio, who then moved to the right), are now rejecting the candidate who appears most capable of forming a leftist front and are sticking solely with the candidate who may, from all appearances, turn out to be more revolutionary. Especially when one considers that Costa Bras is an old comrade-in-arms, while Pintasilgo is suddenly adhering to the most radically civilian ideas. Even more strange is the fact that military men long linked with the Communists, examples being Martins Guerreiro and Almeida Contreiras, are so conspicuously ignoring the party's theses (thus seeming to return to the days of the PREC, when the PCP's military sector tried to place itself in the vanguard of the revolution and drag the party along behind it).

MFA Reduced to an Image

It can be said that the importance of that meeting by military men is very minor, since only one of them--Pezarat Correia--currently performs prominent operational functions. But for Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo--who knows she does not have the official support of the PCP, the PS [Socialist Party], or the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party]--it is most desirable, for the purposes of the appeal for rebellion which she needs to issue to certain leftist voters, to put across the idea that she has the old MFA at her side. Even though in this case the MFA is appearing in such restricted terms.

As regards the 25 April Association (to which Costa Bras also belongs), the fact that its chairman, Vasco Lourenco (known as a former Soares supporter), did not attend the event in question does not seem to be enough to prevent its commitment.

There are those who say that the association came into being only because of Lourenco's need for political survival--after the Council of the Revolution was abolished, he refused any promotion that might be political in nature,

preferring to remain a major. However that may be, there were attempts to gain control of the institution as soon as it was founded. The result was a victory for leftist front tactics, with Soares supporter Lourenco ending up as chairman and the pro-Communists gaining great influence. We will see whether those front tactics will remain pro-Pintasilgo until the end.

From Absolute Militarism to Absolute Civilianism

Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that this is the first presidential election since 25 April [1974] in which the military have had no power of their own. The election score that Costa Bras, a colonel in the reserve, achieves will be due solely to the political capital built up by Eanes during his 10 years as president of the republic.

In 1976, it was unquestionably the military who nominated the president. They were quickly followed by the most important party leaders, and their choice was naturally ratified by the voters. In that year, it was the MFA that held power, having just put an end to the PREC adventure. A group of officers from the Group of Nine, which was on top at the time, chose Eanes by seven votes at a meeting held in Sao Juliao da Barra--a meeting at which it was necessary to take away the illusions of the man called the "viceroy of the North," Pires Veloso. It should be recalled that even then, Costa Bras was mentioned by Eanes as a possible alternative.

In 1980, Sa Carneiro and Amaro da Costa tried to defeat Eanes within the Armed Forces to force him to withdraw. The president, who was also chief of the General Staff, kept the military hierarchy under his control, despite the fact that Firmino Miguel--opportunely promoted to general by Eanes--had hesitated between Eanes and Soares Carneiro.

From that point on, Ramalho Eanes became a civilian, as he was required to do by the constitutional revision. That put him in the position, obviously, of being able to contend for voters with the most radical supporters of civilian government.

11798
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RECENT POLL GIVES MAJORITY TO FREITAS DO AMARAL

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Nov 85 p 7

[Text] With 29 percent of the vote, Freitas do Amaral would be the candidate receiving the most votes in a confrontation with Lourdes Pintasilgo (24 percent), Mario Soares (17 percent), and Costa Bras (2 percent), according to a poll conducted exclusively for O JORNAL by Marktest.

If Freitas do Amaral and Lourdes Pintasilgo faced each other in a second round, however, Pintasilgo would win with 39 percent, compared to 35 percent for her opponent.

The poll shows that the distribution of votes among the candidates corresponds to the choices made in the elections of 6 October.

This poll was conducted last weekend, with 430 persons of both sexes being interviewed in 16 localities with over 10,000 inhabitants (urban voters).

When asked how they would vote in a runoff election between Freitas do Amaral and Lourdes Pintasilgo, the interviewees answered as follows: F. Amaral: 35 percent; L. Pintasilgo: 39 percent; neither one: 10 percent; and "don't know" or no answer: 16 percent.

If the second round were a runoff between Soares and Amaral, the voters would give Soares 30 percent and Amaral 34 percent, but 21 percent would not vote for either of them, and 15 percent either did not know or did not answer. It should be pointed out that 64 percent of those who said they had voted for the APU [United People's Alliance] in the legislative elections said that they would not vote for either of these candidates.

For Which of These Personalities Would You Vote?

Name	Percent
Freitas do Amaral	29
Lourdes Pintasilgo	24
Mario Soares	17
Costa Bras	2
None of the above	11
Don't know/no answer	17

If the second round pitted Costa Bras against Freitas do Amaral, the latter would be the clear winner with 38 percent, compared to 16 percent for his opponent. Of those polled, 22 percent would not vote for either of these candidates, and 24 percent did not answer or did not know.

If faced with a choice between Pintasilgo and Costa Bras, the Democratic Renewal Party's voters would choose Pintasilgo (39 percent) over Costa Bras (9 percent).

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POPULARITY OF PCP'S ZITA SEABRA NOTED

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Nov 85 p 8

[Article by F.M.]

[Excerpts] "Zita Seabra is the PCP's candidate in the presidential election!" That report circulated with some speed and was repeated every hour on radio without being denied. Reserved and perhaps amused, Zita Seabra commented to O JORNAL: "That report had no connection with reality." And she said no more.

After Alvaro Cunhal, Zita Seabra is the most popular PCP leader in the country. The polls say so. The more Zita Seabra expands her support beyond the borders of her party, the more acute a number of problems involving internal misunderstanding become.

Continue as Deputy

Zita Seabra's possible candidacy for president would be a signal to "deflate" Lourdes Pintasilgo's campaign. By choosing a leader such as Angelo Veloso, the PCP is publicly postponing that decision.

Zita Seabra had been mentioned in some newspapers shortly before as a candidate to chair the city council in Cascais. She has always confirmed to Helena Roseta, with whom she has been on friendly terms since their days in the Assembly of the Republic, that "I will not be a candidate."

A deputy since being elected to the Constituent Assembly, she succeeded Vital Moreira as head of the list for Aveiro, where she was reelected in the legislative elections of 6 October.

Now 36 years old, Zita Seabra went underground in 1969, when she was only 17 years of age. Her future could have been in medicine, but she never completed her training. Her popularity comes from her speeches during debates in Parliament concerning legalized abortion, family planning, and sex education.

Since then she has been closely linked, even within the PCP's structure, with the problems of women. She recently visited the FRG for a meeting by women communist leaders.

When she, along with Bernardina Sebastiao, was elected a member of the PCP's Political Committee, one of the first people to welcome her was another woman Communist, Alda Nogueira. It was an unforgettable moment for Zita Seabra.

Bicycling and Swimming

Party meetings, the Assembly of the Republic, and trips to her constituency in Aveiro provide Zita Seabra with more than enough work. In her spare time, she goes bicycling with her two daughters--Rita and Barbara--from her marriage to Carlos Brito and spends an hour or two swimming.

Reading, movies, and ballet--Zita Seabra almost became a professional ballerina--are the Communist leader's favorite pastimes.

As far as politics is concerned, Zita Seabra sticks to the official PCP line: the pact of silence. Even so, she is a Communist leader who is "different."

11798
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POLITICAL SWEDEN

FUTURE ROLE FOR CENTER PARTY EXAMINED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 31 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Gunnar Andren: "Where Is the Center Party Heading?"]

[Text] In my opinion it is the Center Party in general and Thorbjorn Falldin in particular who possess the key to potential--potential--cooperation across the bloc borders until the 1988 election.

It is of course entirely possible that Olof Palme's thoughts do not run in any other grooves than to continue as during the years of minority rule 1970-96, the closest parallel to today's mandate position in Parliament.

What happened then, however, was--and the same thing was experienced to an even higher degree by the Liberal government in 1978-79--that parliamentary majorities were easily created for increased spending, while it turned out to be difficult either to save or in other ways to increase state revenue.

This was how the budget deficit--that pregnant word for excess spending--was created.

Out of those in the short run individually rather harmless increases in spending, in the long run we got a situation with a collapsing overall economy.

Only a government with a stable government foundation can manage to conduct a consistent long-term spending policy.

What are the party-political preconditions for creating a more permanent parliamentary majority?

It is easy to state that the Conservatives and the Liberal Party, which together strengthened their mandate position in the parliamentary election by a total of 20 mandates, have not the least ambition to assist the Social Democrats with continuous voting support. Besides the VPK--which in the long run perhaps is not much to lean on even for today's Social Democrats--there remains the Center Party.

Can the Center Party conceivably be interested in cooperation with the Social Democrats in some form, not necessarily in a government coalition?

If one is to try to deliver an at least acceptably good reply, albeit without claims of being all-encompassing, it is necessary to try to divide the Center Party along its more or less obvious fractions.

Three directions of intent emerge; the fact that certain Center politicians want to include or belong to more than one does not alter anything:

1. The General Non-Socialist Faction. The key figure here is the Center leader personally, with former Industry Minister Nils G. Asling as his foremost second. They value a non-socialist voter majority very highly, obviously not more highly than voting and mandate strength for their own party--but then no party politician does--but they place a change in the political majority above party profile.

The major change during the late 1960's and the early 1970's was the altered attitude of the Center Party toward cooperation with the Social Democrats. Clearly the most important factual issue for this altered Center attitude was the 1967 agricultural decision, It was perceived as a signal for battle against Sweden's farmers and as a blow in the face of the Center Party.

Simultaneously, environmental awareness grew within the Center movement, supplemented by efforts in regional policy and decentralization.

The party gravitated further and further away from the cooperative spirit of the 1930's and 1950's.

How strong is the general non-socialist faction within today's Center Party? That is difficult to know. In the wake of the election losses, however, there is reason to assume that there are many within the party leadership and the parliamentary group who are inclined to try something at least partly different.

2. The Environmental Faction. The party's second vice chairman Olof Johansson is considered to be its leader together with the leader of Line 3 from the nuclear power referendum in 1980, Lennart Daleus, as both competitor and complement. It is incontrovertible that there are forces which want to change the Center Party into a purely "green" party, but it is hardly likely that this faction can come up with a majority for its distinct one-issue program within the decisionmaking organs. On the other hand, it can certainly be anticipated that the political wishes of the environmental faction will be brought forward with increasing force in the years to come.

Which is Olof Johansson's personal attitude? That of the new party leader?

In Johansson's favor is primarily the lack of available opposing candidates. The fact that Falldin, if he decides to step down before the next election (which no one knows), is in no hurry to announce, may be due to his wanting to give his party room to find another successor besides Olof Johansson. In today's situation he would probably be elected.

Against him argues the fact that Johansson is considered by influential party friends to be encumbered with a serious inability to make firm decisions. This was particularly evident during the years in government. Further, it can be stated that in the city of Stockholm, Johansson's precinct, the Center Party is on the verge of being obliterated. Without the KDS [Christian Democratic Union] support it is extremely uncertain whether Johansson would have been found in the circle of members of Parliament after this year's election.

3. The Agrarian Interest Faction. It is indisputable that the Center Party gathers a large part of those who have direct of indirect ties to agriculture and forestry. This group, far more heavily represented in the Center leadership than among those who vote for the party, puts--no matter how much it is denied outwardly--material conditions above ideological scruples and obstacles.

The agricultural population today feels pressured by increasing costs and high interest rates, tax problems during generation changes, marketing problems for the products and a price squeeze from the consumers.

Just how strong is this pronounced interest group, the original core of the Center Party? That as well is difficult to know for sure. But it is obvious that the agrarian faction can imagine different political ways to progress than those indicated by strict bloc and environmental policies. The fact that the Center Party has appointed newly elected Scanian farmer Karl-Erik Olsson chairman of the Agricultural Committee is undoubtedly also an outline of the emphasis placed by the Center Party on agriculture and its practitioners. It is also a sign that the agrarian faction still holds considerable voting power within the Center Party.

Where does all this lead us?

As long as Thorbjorn Falldin remains as party chairman, that is how long the Center Party's profile will undergo no major changes and the preconditions for party policies to transcend blocs will remain insignificant.

The day Falldin steps down or otherwise no longer maintains his present influence, that day the fighting within the Center Party will concern not only who his successor will be, but also what political profile the Center Party is to have for the remainder of the 1980's.

11949
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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS POSITION, TACTICS EXAMINED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 1 Nov 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Led by the Nose by Social Democracy"]

[Text] After the election loss the Conservatives are discussing the new liberalism. Grassroots people are writing long articles about the terrible cutback policy. And leading representatives of the Conservative Coalition Party reply that the Conservative Coalition Party does not at all represent any new liberalism (Ingegerd Troedsson in DAGENS NYHETER on 30 October).

After its election victory the Liberal Party is devoting itself to discussions of social liberalism. Bengt Westerberg has taken a post-election trip and delivered speeches under the headline "Social Liberalism Returns."

Together the two parties pushed the Social Democrats back in this year's election. The governing party lost seven mandates. Nevertheless, Conservatives and Liberals are now holding discussions on the Social Democrats' terms.

It is Olof Palme who with the stubbornness of the drunkard has harped on the fact that the Conservatives are new liberals, and that for this reason they originate from some kind of Greater Swedish political affinity.

The prime minister has also struck the note for the discussion in the Liberal Party concerning the Liberal Party; it was Olof Palme who made the issue of the Liberal Party and social liberalism into a subject for political debate.

It might seem trivial whether Olof Palme or anyone else started the discussion. If it is important and interesting it should be carried on, of course.

But the discussion about new liberalism and social liberalism is not interesting. What is interesting is obviously what the parties represent in fact. Then people may label these opinion packages any way they care to.

It is pitiful that the two parties should have been lured into the Social Democratic debating trap. Because the discussion about labels carries the two parties away from the issue politics where they are strong and into a

metaphysical battle which is based on fuzzy concepts of dubious relevance to modern political conditions.

At the same time there are no watertight compartments between developing the issue politics and labeling the politics; the pseudo-debate about labels does not become harmless.

Because Olof Palme accused Bengt Westerberg of having failed to place social liberalism on the agenda until the end of the election campaign, Palme turned it into a object for Westerberg to prove that, indeed, he is and always has been a good social liberal. After that, Westerberg devotes himself to giving proof of this very thing, which in turn leads to his having become more reticent in his political stands.

It is similarly with the Conservatives. It was Palme who first maintained that it was the new liberalism which brought the Conservatives down. With that Olof Palme determined the theme of discussion for at least the public part of the post-election debate. Even people in the Conservative Party are becoming a little unsure regarding their own positions.

Olof Palme is of course worth all respect for his superior political cleverness. He practices magic with the political debate according to his own desires. His way of formulating problems is today of considerably greater significance for the internal debate of the Liberal Party than what is being said by the leaderships of the two parties themselves.

It borders on the incredible that Palme can perform his magic act without being caught. It was the Social Democrats who lost the election. It is also the Social Democrats who immediately after election day begin to abandon the political positions they have taken, if any were actually indicated during the election campaign. And it is the Social Democrats who lack both a map and a compass for the political orienteering during the coming mandate period. Nevertheless, it is the Social Democrats who determine the marching route for both Liberals and Conservatives.

Why does this occur? An answer has already been provided, and it is obviously somewhat humiliating for Ulf Adelsohn and Bengt Westerberg. Olof Palme is the far superior political tactician.

At the same time it may be said that it would have been surprising if this had not been the case; Palme's experience in the central political game dates back to the mid-1050's. And as prime minister or opposition leader he has found himself in the midst of every political storm which has blown up in Sweden during the last 15 years. With his experience Olof Palme ought to outclass his challenger when it comes to political tactics.

But it is likely that there is another explanation as well. The brief mandate periods confuse the eye. Politics are all too easily aimed toward the next election. Victory in politics becomes the same as grabbing power within 3 years. But the political process is slower than that. Although the power to govern can be captured in the next election, this does not mean that the politics are won in the same brief perspective of time.

If a party is to capture both the power to govern and a political mandate for changing political course, above all if such a change implies changes in the welfare state system, it takes more than 3 years. This more long-range process is presumably connected with both temporary setbacks and temporary advances.

Problems occur for a party that perceives a temporary setback as a final one; it is then extremely close to abandoning a long-range genuine policy, in the belief that the position can be consolidated in the short term by adjusting to the political middle.

But problems can also occur for the party which perceives a temporary success as a final one. For then the party might imagine that the future lies in preserving status quo.

In both cases new thinking ceases. The political development comes to a halt.

Frustration occurs easily in the necessary alternating consideration for the short-term and long-term perspective. It becomes easy for political opponents to manipulate a party's internal discussion. It is wrong to say that this is precisely what has happened to Conservatives and Liberals.

At the same time as Ingegerd Troedsson takes up the discussion of the Conservatives and new liberalism, she stands up for the Conservative policy that has been conducted; in the Conservative Coalition Party it is probably more the members and less the party leadership which have been caught with both feet in Palme's debate trap.

It is different with the Liberal Party. Its party leader must take into consideration that Palme's debate trap is not just Palme's. Until a few years ago it was established policy in the Liberal Party that one had to define one's standpoints in exactly the manner Palme is now doing.

Olof Palme, with a slight exaggeration, is playing Ola Ullsten's role. Hence, these signals are well-known within the Liberal Party. And far from all the Liberals find any dissonance in them.

11949
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POLITICAL SWEDEN

WESTERBERG VIEWS LIBERALS SIGNIFICANT INCREASE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Nov 85 p 8

[Article by Willy Silberstein: "The Wind Could Turn Rapidly"]

[Text] Bengt Westerberg takes the enormous Liberal advance in Sunday's SVENSKA DAGBLADET/SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] with a large dose of scepticism.

"We have received so much attention in the mass media after the election, the wind could quickly begin to blow from a different direction," he says.

The first SIFO poll after the election was published on Sunday, a measurement which indicates major changes in voter opinion.

It gave the following figures, with the election result in parentheses: Conservatives 19 (21.3), Liberal Party 23.5 (14.2), Center Party 8 (12.4), Social Democrats 43 (44.7) and VPK [Left Party Communists] 4.5 (5.4).

According to SIFO, Westerberg thus heads the biggest nonsocialist party. Only a year or so ago he had major problems reaching out to the mass media. This Sunday was hectic, with interviews and comments to scores of journalists.

"I thought that we might go up, but not this much," he says. "One result will surely be that our policies will be scrutinized more critically than before, something we are not at all afraid of."

"So far the Conservatives have reacted most strongly to our major gain. There is great disappointment among the Conservatives after the election, and they have not yet quite decided how to handle it. It would be unfortunate if we get a quarrel between nonsocialist parties," Westerberg says.

"The Liberal Party wants good relations with the Conservatives. The joint effort is for the nonsocialist parties together to conquer Social Democracy."

If the Liberal Party is the major winner in Sunday's SIFO poll, the Center Party is the loser. The party has never been so low in any poll.

"We are worried by the election result. On the other hand, we do not attach much significance to a single poll, especially not this close to an election. Then success usually breeds more success, while the losers get very poor figures," says Anders Ljunggren, information chief for the Center Party.

He is of the opinion that the party was too indistinct in the election campaign, and the Center Party was felt as too credible.

"We have appointed working groups to look at how to continue our politics. I believe that the Center's profile questions must be given greater importance. This means the environment, decentralization, energy and distribution policy. Conservative party secretary Georg Danell also was not particularly happy after the Sunday poll.

"A decline is something we must not accept, of course. The reason why we have lost votes is, among other things, that we Conservatives were exposed to such heavy attacks from the Social Democrats that it has become convenient for general nonsocialist voters to support the Liberal Party."

However, Georg Danell believes that the Liberal Party has "a few political knots" to untie in the future.

"This involves for example the tax issue, where the party only wants to lower taxes for those with higher incomes."

"We do not intend to attack the Liberal Party. But we intend to reply to their attacks and speak more about Conservative issues and less about the common denominator of non-socialism."

Leif Gustafson, press chief for the Social Democrats, does not ascribe any significance whatsoever to Sunday's SIFO poll.

"After SIFO's action in the election campaign, the institute has no credibility whatever," he says. "SIFO suddenly threw in an unplanned poll at the end of the election campaign and did a poll of major cities which did not agree at all with the election results."

"We feel this was because SIFO deliberately wanted to mislead the voters. On the part of the Social Democrats, we have started to examine the actions of the polling institute during the election campaign," Leif Gustafson says.

Kenneth Kvist, VPK's party secretary, does not believe that there is now a nonsocialist majority, as SIFO is showing.

"Nothing political has taken place that would motivate it," he says.

"On the part of the VPK we are discussing how better to get our policy across, although we do not think that Sunday's figure is any cause for concern."

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POLITICAL TURKEY

USSR OFFICIAL SAYS BORDER AIRPORTS 'THREAT'

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 28 Nov 85 pp 1, 13

[Article by Sedat Ergin: "Are Border Facilities Not a Threat"]

[Text] Ankara - In response to announcements by Soviet authorities that they are unhappy about the two new airports being built in Turkey in partnership with the United States, Ankara was content to recall yesterday that there are about 150 airports in the Soviet Union which could be used for military purposes against Turkey. Nikolay Kinayev, the under secretary responsible for Turkey at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, pointed out in a statement to our correspondent in Moscow, Ergun Balci, that the airports under construction at Mus and Batman could be used for armories and said they would not be conducive to peace and could constitute a threat to the Soviets.

We asked Turkish officials in Ankara for their views on these comments by Kinayev, who once served at the Soviet embassy in Ankara. They pointed out that the Soviet Union has almost 150 airports that could be used against Turkey. "These 150 or so airports do not threaten Turkey, so two new airports in Turkey are going to be a threat to the Soviet Union?" they said.

Colonel Geliy Batenin, deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff Office of Disarmament whom our correspondent Ergun Balci also interviewed, described NATO Commander General Rogers' proposal to fit nuclear warheads to 72 of the F-16 aircraft to be built in Turkey as a "serious threat." Turkish authorities said in response that "no decision has been adopted in this regard."

Colonel Batenin pointed out is a statement to CUMHURIYET that "attaching nuclear warheads to the F-16's will constitute a new nuclear threat for the Soviet Union." "Such a situation may destroy the balance in the southern Soviet Union and the southeastern flank of NATO. F-16's are very modern aircraft capable of carrying nuclear warheads. From this standpoint, we absolutely have to add such a development to the account," he said.

Turkish authorities made the following comments on these remarks by Colonel Batenin:

"The NATO Allied Forces Command in Europe (SHAPE) has made some proposals within the framework of the NATO nuclear modernization program. The study of what form the composition of the alliance's nuclear defense may take was

submitted to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting held in Luxembourg last spring. Studies of SHAPE's proposals are continuing within the alliance and no situation exists as yet involving translation into the planning stage as regards our country."

While Turkish authorities are giving Moscow the message that "no decision has been adopted," circles close to the government in Ankara are reportedly unfavorable in general towards General Rogers' proposal to place nuclear warheads on F-16's. Reports carried by the press not long ago indicated that Chief of Staff General Necdet Urug opposes this proposal by General Rogers. No information was available on whether this was discussed during the chief of staff's visit to the Soviet Union 2 weeks ago.

Meanwhile, authorities in Ankara stress that "one must not lose sight of the fact that, in military plans and actions, Turkey is defense oriented." This stress by Turkish officials is interpreted in Ankara as a show of "reluctance" to have nuclear warheads with a capacity to strike the Soviet Union placed on F-16's.

What are the reactions in official circles in Ankara to statements by Soviet military and civilian authorities that they do not welcome Turkey's conventional modernization efforts and, in this context, the construction of new airports? Although they are not formally reacting to prevent engaging in polemics with the Soviet Union over this, they draw attention to the force ratios between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

What the Turkish authorities refer to is a "force comparison" report published by NATO which reveals the following facts as regards the military "balance" between Turkey and the Soviet Union: The number of Soviet divisions ranged against eastern Turkey is 20. These divisions are equipped with 4,300 tanks and 4,800 artillery batteries. Twelve of these divisions, with 2,435 tanks and 2,735 artillery and mortar batteries, are based in areas close to the Turkish border. These divisions are also able to call in support by airborne, air assault and amphibious divisions. The Turkish army, meanwhile, has only eight divisions in the northeastern part of the country. Another four divisions, located in southeastern Anatolia and assigned to protect the long border, could be used in defense against the Warsaw Pact. NATO's southern flank has a total of 4,000 tanks and 4,600 artillery batteries in Turkey and Greece. In comparison, the Soviets have 11,000 tanks and 11,300 artillery batteries.

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CONSTRAINED ARMS PROGRAM TAILORED TO AREA DEFENSE CONCEPT

Vienna TRUPPENDIENST in German Oct 85 pp 496-505

[Article by Gen Othmar Tauschitz: "The Rearming of Neutral Austria"]

[Text] At the end of the 1970's, the area defense concept addressed a defense system which is tailored to Austrian conditions and not intended for export to other countries. "Addressed" means that its realization has been ongoing since then and, in accordance with the data contained in the country's defense plan, will have reached its first partial fulfillment stage in 1986 in the form of an intermediate step.

This means nothing more nor less than that, starting at that time, a certain realistic defensive effect as outlined in the new area-spanning system of total in-depth staging will first be given in the operationally significant areas. As we know, the anticipated result is to be a deterrent effect.

Meanwhile, planning for the subsequent period is in full swing and the organization of the year 1994 with its approximately 300,000 troops, is largely already set.

The expansion of the Army specifically began in 1979 with the justified assumption that the necessary means for the established units would be made available on a supplemental basis. In the following years we were forced to recognize how little flexibility exists in the budget numbers. In view of this budget ossification, we had to find the courage to continue the development which had been begun with provisional measures of all types until such times as the knowledge that a militia system also costs money began to take hold among the politicians.

The troops are aware of these provisional measures and will have to cope with them for some time to come! But this brings us now to the topic which is to characterize this contribution:

The Necessity To Catch up in the Armaments Area

First, let us establish that the acquisition of usable armaments products is not only connected with costs, but also requires time. Consequently, it would be unjust to lay all existing bottlenecks exclusively at the doorstep of the

budget. Armaments products are not purchased from the bargain basement. Many must be adapted to specific Austrian conditions, some need to be developed. The latter is necessary particularly in the case of innovations by domestic industries whose capacity is, after all, supposed to assure us of a certain independence of foreign sources.

Experiences in the last few years have resulted in the unpleasant finding that preliminary planning target times only apply in extremely rare cases. As a rule, it takes twice as long as one has assumed or even longer until an armaments product can be delivered to troop units in troop-ready form.

By "troop-ready form" one understands full functionality in all types of weather at any time of year as well as handling ability by militia soldiers; and this, generally, requires testing in summer and in winter.

This causes additional difficulties for those responsible for procurement who must convert the sparse funds into armaments products within an acceptable time limit without neglecting quality.

Our materiel structure planning is set down in a 10-year investment program and, since outside of the annual budget there is no legally binding basis for it in the federal administration, has the essential character of a preview of the monetary requirements for the financial area as well as having the character of an intradepartmental planning base. Individual budget proposals must be fought for year after year and, usually, end up reduced in comparison to the wish list submitted. This circumstance, but also other unanticipated planning and procurement events, makes it necessary to subject the investment program to an adaptation process every 2 years. Regardless of this fact, however, it represents an essential orientation aid for military planning without which we would be at the mercy of chaotic happenstance.

The uncovering of scandalous cases in the public administration or in its institutions has, in recent years, led to the "excess regulation" of the allocation system which no longer makes it possible to use up the budget allocations within a specific season of the year. With the introduction of the accompanying controls which were imposed by the various ministries ahead of the audit office, a "control overkill" has arisen which results in the dominance of control over requirements and which assigns responsibility to the procuring sections but sharply reduces their decision power. As a result, at the end of every year there is an unbearable competition against time so as to be able to still bring in that which is contained in the detailed summary of the budget proposals for the current year and which is so urgently needed among the troops.

We have made some progress in our search for ways out of this dilemma and will--hopefully with early success--either have to adapt our working methods to the guidelines or we will have to change the guidelines.

Rearming and the Threat

In military parlance, there is no distinction between acute and fictitious threat. Since armed forces cannot be brought into being in a short period of time, we are compelled to create them as best we can in the long term--even without the presence of an acute threat.

The question as to what type of armaments the armed forces of our neutral Austria should have, however, is not only dependent upon the threat picture, but also depends on our possibilities. Since we began at zero in 1955, we have no weapons inventories like other nations created after World War II under pressure of the then virulent "cold war." When General Spannocchi reversed the helm in the 1970's, he knew precisely that we would never be able to catch up and looked for other possibilities. The theories of "small stitches" and the idea of "running under technologies" have a seductive sound and certainly have something going for them; unfortunately, the general gave us no recipes but only the idea, and that was, in and of itself, a sizable performance. We should now start to convert the idea to reality.

Sufficient Tanks

Whoever deals with armaments products on a daily basis knows the rise in costs in the area of technologically high-quality products for the equipment of mechanized troops which have occurred. In comparison with the consumer price index, applicable to the market basket, costs have roughly doubled and, not too infrequently, also tripled.

When our Federal Army will have completed the purchase of tank destroyers, including the final purchase of 48 such combat vehicles, it will have more than 1,000 armored vehicles at its disposal. The introduction of new weapons systems, such as, for example, the Swiss Army's procurement of "Leopard 2" tanks, will likely not be bearable in our case during this century. At present, we are engaged in modifying the available inventory to meet the requirements of the future battlefield and we are primarily concentrating on the area of ammunition.

How much can be obtained from modifying ammunition is proven by the successful conclusion of our efforts to develop an arrow projectile for the "Kuerassier" tank destroyer together with the Ennstal Metalworks and the French armaments industry. Incidentally, a question to be answered by future development is how long, considering our given budgetary and topographic situation, it will still be purposeful to participate in the competition to defeat the constantly growing frontal armor [on combat vehicles]. If it becomes necessary to first defeat the active armor with high-explosive ammunition and then use shaped charges or arrow projectiles to defeat the remainder of the vehicle, then the concept of future tank combat becomes so complicated that one must ask the question whether the famous Clausewitz saying that "in war, only the simple has any validity" has been completely forgotten or sacrificed to the technical inventor spirit. Our leadership will have to put its imagination to use in order to solve antitank defense within the tactical area instead of running after the wonders of technology. The latter includes, among others, the desire for a 12-cm-caliber tank gun.

Tanks as Mobile Bunkers

Thus far, we have built several hundred combat bunkers all over Austria and are in the process of doubling the density of this defensive network. Experience has taught us that the path from the geographic slide via the acquisition of the land through the construction of a facility is too long and results in a constant slippage of the planned defense readiness.

Apart from that, the permanent location already confronts the tactician today, here and there, with problems because either new findings with respect to defensive tactics or the blocking of the field of fire by industrial construction are in the position of no longer letting many a permanent location appear to be as ideal as it was. Furthermore, the creation of a "center of gravity" position by the defender contains the contradiction which states that the law of action is generally on the side of the attacker.

It was more than 10 years ago for these very reasons and again at the initiative of Gen Spannocchis that a system of bunkers for supplies ("concrete eggs") was considered, was later altered into a finished parts system, and, finally, because of technical difficulties, was again shelved.

Through a stroke of luck, we have now been successful in acquiring a substantial contingent of obsolete "Centurion" tanks at a particularly favorable price in order to utilize their turrets with their high-capacity guns for installation in permanent facilities. However, since a tank offers virtually the same protection as a concrete bunker, the maintenance of a number of such tanks--to a certain extent in the form of "rolling bunkers"--might well be the most immediate solution for this problem. This is primarily so because even concrete bunkers are expensive and show the disadvantages of geographic permanence. I would not wish to be misunderstood: These are not to be mobile combat formations, whose organizational and training requirements are exponentially higher, but rather rolling bunkers which can be employed in a short period of time over small distances in areas where they are certain to be employed.

Combat Value Increase of Armored Infantry Combat Vehicles

Our armored personnel carriers have been the subject of a modification project which is designed to assure their continued use through the next decade. The project particularly involves the replacement of the obsolete steering mechanism with its brake problems by a stick shift or automatic transmission.

In the meantime, armaments planners and users are considering whether it would not be more sensible to use the money planned for this purpose to rather equip a portion of the 460 armored infantry combat vehicles with machine cannons. I fully support an upgrading of the combat value [of these vehicles] but I also feel that both things should be done through reshuffling of funds elsewhere and they should be done immediately!

Tank Defense Over Short Distances

Our planning foresees the new introduction of the one-man throw-away weapon of the "antitank tube--lightweight" category, which has been adapted to the increased requirements, to be followed by procurement of a troop weapon of the "antitank tube--heavy" category. In view of the physical stress upon the operator, action freedom and employment possibilities from enclosed spaces is being promoted. Since this weapons system is currently used in training, it should be of particular interest to domestic industry to develop an appropriate product. A design which is appropriate is being created.

Security for the Infrastructure

It is uncontested that the priority in defensive combat, measured in terms of the status of armaments surrounding us, continues to lie with antitank defense. However, we should not overlook the fact that conflict in the sense of war being a continuation of policy is more and more frequently shifting to the subversive area and using other means. Action groups of the most varied type exist in almost all democratic nations and can threaten everything and everyone. It would appear that inexhaustible quantities of weapons and explosives are at the disposal of the underground forces to be used with the motivation of using force as a means of expression of frustration all the way through the joy in killing. Their employment requires only purposeful control from without and also from within. This has to focus our attention to the maximum extent upon the protection of important objectives--to an extent greater than has been the case hitherto. What use are the best tank formations and bunkers when their fuel depots, ammunition supplies, and important parts of the infrastructure can be disabled? This consideration would have to lead to the final conclusion that we need more guard companies than are currently planned.

Fire Support

With respect to mortars, the need for catching up is more substantial. In the effort to employ this effective and relatively simple to use form of firepower more widely, mortar platoons will be expanded from four to six mortars. The planned procurement will have to overcome not only the existing need for catching up but also take care of a substantial increment. With respect to medium-size mortars, we were successful in having our domestic industry develop a suitable product whose demanding testing by the Office for Military Equipment and by the troops will now also hopefully bear fruit in the export market. The quota for Austria is being delivered. Prototypes of heavy mortars are currently being tested and it is to be hoped that they will enjoy the same success as their lightweight predecessors.

Self-Propelled Artillery or Drawn Artillery?

With the introduction of electronics, including radar, in the fire control systems of artillery components it became possible to determine the position of enemy batteries by radar acquisition of a sector of the projectile trajectory.

The application of computers will make the launching of counterfire possible after a few minutes. This makes the flexibility of the fire unit into a question of survival with the improved shrapnel distribution and the precision of electronic proximity fuses which are currently on the market and which represent supplemental danger for gun crews, having to be taken into account.

In response to this, the proponents of modern drawn artillery, as represented in Austria by the highly capable GN-45 "Noricum" gun howitzer, claim that the above disadvantages can be overcome by greater range, which can be used to evade enemy counterbattery fire, and by a 30-km/hr mobility of the artillery pieces. This may be applicable to large areas or to level territory. In our territory, position selection is rendered substantially more difficult if not occasionally impossible. Consequently, it will remain our effort to request that the three artillery battalions, which are planned to be reinforced artillery units, with self-propelled guns.

New Ammunition or New Weapons Systems?

The search for new types of ammunition can be determined to be worldwide and is clearly the consequence of the fact that new weapons systems are ever more difficult to finance. This is primarily true of all weapons. In the area of indirect fire weapons, mention should primarily be made of final-phase guidance projectiles and cannister ammunition (daughter projectiles), which are already available in series production for mortars and 155-mm guns. Daughter projectiles with final-phase guidance are being worked on. These weapons systems not only expand their effect but also their application spectrum (for example, against tanks at great distances). Even though the costs of this type of ammunition are enormous, their employment is basically a way out of the competition between frontal armament and armor-piercing weapons, which has approached the limits of doability, because they impact from above and strike with accuracy.

Marginally, let us refer to the unfortunately frequently neglected secondary role of the tank as light artillery. In an emergency, the "religious wars" regarding the ideal weapon for a specific purpose, tend to cease. One shoots with what one has!

In an emergency, tank guns can provide enormous supplemental fire support over distances up to 8 km (tank destroyer "K") or 12 km (M-60, "Centurion").

Mines Against Infantry and Tanks

Mines are barrier devices and, consequently, classical weapons to be used by the defender. Consequently, they occupy a priority position in the arsenal of the neutral.

It is proven, but also a little-known fact, that antipersonnel mines of the pressure type, as they have been used thus far, have little effect. There are armies which dismantle the fear of their soldiers with regard to crossing mine fields by replacing the pressure mines with harmless smoke capsules and thus demonstrate that the effect is more psychological. They have found that if a

company of men runs through a mine field taking the longest possible steps that a maximum of two to three capsules can be detonated.

Our Federal Army has, in the meantime, introduced the substantially more effective horizontal infantry mine which, through its fan-type effect, can cover a substantially greater amount of space with a high degree of effectiveness. This is a product of Austrian industry which is already being delivered and which also has substantial chances for being exported.

The next generation of antitank mines is still in the testing stage. They are triggered not in the active mode, like the horizontal antipersonnel mine, by the attacking tank itself which, in the past, had to detonate the mine through the pressure of its own treads. Since the width of the treads only represents a fraction of the width of the tank itself, the required density of the mine field was too great which, in addition to the costs of the material, required much personnel, transport space, and, primarily, time.

In the search for a mine which would be effective across the entire width of the tank, several technologically different systems were discovered, ranging from a simple rod trigger, to electromagnetic ignition through a type of radar ignition which uses an active electronic sensor to scan the arriving object and only reacts when the signal sequence corresponds to a previously input logic (for example, leading edge, first, second, third road wheel). A special frequency coding secures it against deception, an advantage which is not available with any other system. Adjustable to a specific reaction time, the mine can be picked up without risk and reused after the expiration of the preset reaction time.

Nevertheless, on the basis of the previously mentioned citation from Clausewitz we should thoroughly consider which type of technology is appropriate for our conditions and, above all, what price tag is attached to high technology because it is almost always connected with follow-on costs. In the final analysis, since batteries do not have an unlimited shelf life, these costs involve at the very least the storage and replacement of batteries.

Other armies also use horizontal antitank mines which are hand-triggered from lateral positions. Resourceful technicians (also in Austria) have been working on the design of an automatic seismic-acoustic trigger for such mines, whose purpose was the obviation of the need to hand-trigger the device--albeit thus far with little success.

Mines, including the most varied placement systems, are extraordinarily effective, relatively easy to handle and, consequently, militia-specific defensive devices whose purpose is primarily the gaining of time--something which given our area defense philosophy, based on hindering, is of particular significance. This area still has substantial development capacities with respect to our Federal Army and our armaments industry.

New and Old Assault Rifles

In the area of hand-fire weapons, including machine guns, our requirements have been satisfied. Once the currently introduced procurement of the Model 77 assault rifle and the currently ongoing deliveries of the sensationally successful Model 80 pistol, developed by the Austrian Glock, have run their course, an adequate number will be in the inventory. The soldiers of the Federal Army will then be equipped about 50 percent with Model 58 assault rifles and Model 77 assault rifles and this is a status which should remain for now. Mountings for the Model 78 field knife are being tested with respect to both assault rifle models as a self-protection weapon.

Even if one recognizes the fact that the 150,000 soldiers equipped with the older model assault rifles could feel disadvantaged, one must not overlook the fact that the Model 58 assault rifle is a good and still usable weapon and that other procurements have turned out to be more pressing.

Model 75 Field Uniform and the Old-Type Combat Uniform

Only he who can dip from a full bucket can permit himself to discard the old with the introduction of a new uniform system which, to a certain extent, reflects a hard cut. We are not in this situation and we would not have done our textile industry a good turn if we had resorted to imports at the time we were introducing the Model 75 field uniform which turned out to be beyond the capacity of our textile industry. A continuous set of orders is more beneficial to securing jobs than an irregular burst of orders. Currently, some 90,000 men of the Landwehr are still equipped with the old-style combat uniforms and it will presumably be beyond the year 1990 before the Federal Army will be uniformly clothed.

With the some 400 million schillings which are at our disposal each year for clothing and personal equipment, we will have to take care of primarily the second pair of boots for each soldier, as well as an inventory of watertight boots, in addition to the increase in the continually growing requirement for supplemental clothing, based on the expansion of the Army, as well as replacement clothing.

Back to Personal Armor

The cadence, accuracy, and muzzle velocity of modern hand-fire weapons, but primarily the already mentioned effectiveness increase of modern artillery and horizontal antipersonnel mines endanger the unprotected combatant to an increasing degree. It is possible that the "bulletproof vests" of the police favored considerations which have led to the development and introduction in several armies to shrapnel-protection vests. Since a soldier can only protect his fatherland so long as he is himself uninjured, we are well advised to do the best we possibly can for his personal protection. Consequently, we looked around in the world market and have ordered a quota of 1,000 shrapnel-protection vests from 3 different countries; these devices will be tested this year. These are vests of multilayer plastics which absorb the impact energy of shrapnel and infantry projectiles through offering elastic resistance and

which reduce a life-threatening danger of injury to a hematoma or a light wound. The weight and length of such jackets correspond to the compromise between specifically required movement capability and strived-for protection. An antiaircraft gunner who sits on the gun can be protected differently (better) than an infantry soldier who must carry the weight of the flak jacket in combat. Naturally, this additional protection does not represent any absolute survivability assurance for the individual. It is, however, a fact which is documented by actual experiences in theaters of war that average losses can be heavily reduced. Also, the cost in comparison to medical care and sometimes life-long follow-up care is virtually negligible.

First, following appropriate testing, priority protection is to be provided for those fighters who must handle their duties in the open, that is to say, gun crews of drawn artillery and those unarmored antiaircraft gun crews. Then, other arms of services such as motorized riflemen will follow. Naturally, in doing so we shall try to let domestic industry do the work either on license or through native development.

From the Steel Helmet to the Combat Helmet?

Our Federal Army currently has more than 280,000 steel helmets of American design, including a fitting supply, which were manufactured in Austria. For the same reasons which led to the introduction of flak jackets, new helmets are already on the market which, because of their multilayer plastic construction, are no longer designated as steel helmets but as combat helmets. One of the most advanced products is the American Model "Fritz," but there are also other models. The helmet is called "Fritz" most likely because it has that characteristic cutout in the area of the eyes which was, at one time, peculiar to the German helmet, which made possible an elongation of the lateral protection of the head.

Unfortunately, "Fritz" has almost the same dimensions as our current double helmet and this has its reasons: It is certain that a lightweight plastic can be found which can resist an impact of a projectile better than steel; yet the velocity of today's splinters and projectiles cannot be ignored. Since the velocity is not linear but is squared with respect to the energy formula, sufficient mass must be present to catch the impact force, otherwise the latter will have an effect on the vertebrae. In other words, if the shot to the head is to be replaced only by a broken neck, one can hardly speak of meaningful progress.

The problem is currently being studied on the basis of several samples--including one Austrian sample; a prognosis with respect to the introduction of this device, which is also connected with the question of financing, would be premature at present.

Medical Support--Bunkered First-Aid Stations or Medical Tanks?

The fortuitous circumstance of a long-lasting peace in which no war wounds occur can mislead one toward neglecting the mission of medical support in favor of other assignment areas. The soldier has the right to know what happens to

him if he is wounded. This certainty not only influences the dismantling of fear but also the establishment of motivation. The well-known picture of a soldier who carries his wounded comrade on his shoulders should serve us as a guideline for all of our medical support. Medical support consists of making available facilities, equipment, and medicines--in other words, medical-materiel support--on the one hand and medical care for the individual, medical treatment, on the other hand.

Our medical concept is present in usable increments; however, it is far from adequate. It is likely that here the need to catch up is the greatest and, for that reason, I immediately began efforts in this direction after taking over Section IV.

Building on the ongoing fulfillment of troop first-aid equipment on the basis of a good concept (annually, some 150 million schillings are spent on first-aid equipment at all levels, ranging from self-help equipment to first-aid instrument packages in units and formations), which is worthy of recognition, some problems at higher levels remain to be solved. These include the question of coordination with civilian hospital organizations and some significant problems in the Federal Army area.

A substantially advanced project, which is based on the establishment of up to 30 bunkered troop first-aid stations in key zones, had to be turned back because it proved to be too expensive. The purpose of these "first-aid bunkers" in the combat zone area is medical first aid and the establishment of transport capabilities. This requires the provision of wards and operating rooms in secured positions.

Whereas the healthy combatant can protect himself to the extent possible with his self-protection equipment against NBC threats, the wounded soldier who is likely at the border of survival, is, for the most part, not in the position to do so. Consequently, general NBC protection for these facilities cannot simply be neglected. If, however, one places the previously mentioned purpose of this facility in first place, then it is undoubtedly overshadowed by the need to evacuate the wounded as rapidly as possible from the field of battle with its omnipresent intensive fire effect to the area of rear medical facilities. In this area, before spending 1 billion schillings of federal funds, we should, on the basis of a cost-effectiveness analysis, check once more to see whether more armored first-aid vehicles would not be more meaningful than the construction of bunkers for which, basically, the same rules hold true as had been mentioned previously for bunkers in general: they are expensive, will be here 100 years hence, and then will most likely be in the wrong place.

Austria has two prototypes of wheeled armored vehicles which, among others, can be considered as first-aid tanks. Additionally, a project is being followed which has as its objective the splinter-protected first-aid "Pinzgauer" vehicle, as well as some cost minimizing. However, the problem of such projects consists in the fact that they extend over several years until they are ready for introduction to the troops and are accompanied by the risk that they will end without success or will, nevertheless, be too expensive. In my opinion, one should, therefore, concentrate on that which is available.

It would be possible to write a contribution equal in volume to the present work with regard to the first-aid concept. For reasons of space, I must limit myself to a few selected topics and I gladly leave additional testimony to the initiative of qualified specialists.

To Ride or To March?

The need to catch up in the vehicle sector is enormous. In addition, there is a mass of civilian vehicles of all types which, in case of an emergency, could be used by the military. This could have been, consciously or unconsciously, the reason for the fact that procurement of military vehicles has always remained limited to an absolute minimum. It was only after the pain threshold had been crossed that that which was most necessary was done.

In principle, the vehicle inventory in peacetime serves for training purposes, including all exercises and maneuvers as well as to master all necessary real transport missions. For these missions, a specific inventory (some 15,000 vehicles of all kinds) are listed in organizational plans but we have not approached this inventory and will most likely never completely attain it.

Since the total volume of this catch-up requirement is so great as to make the project "airspace monitoring aircraft" appear to be modest, considerations must be initiated with respect to how else this can be dealt with.

To march instead of to ride can cost valuable training time and is, as a recipe, not acceptable without exception. Nevertheless, a considerable share of comfort is present in the system which the planners must identify--beginning with the system and ending in organizational plans which are, after all, the foundation of our procurement system. And by the way, the question arises as to how we will pay for it?

Telephone, Radio, Teletype, Picture and Data Transmission

The processes by which one can transmit information have become multiple and extensively determine the course of our daily lives. Why should things be different with respect to the Army?

Our efforts to integrate the above functions in an automated telecommunications net with a great degree of failure security, with automatic circuit searches, with identity and priority routing led to the very ambitious Project IFMIN-80 which, in addition to the otherwise considerable requirements of the telecommunications service, would have been too expensive. Consequently, it was necessary to throw all the requirements of this type into one pot and to subject them to a sensible type of measurement. The results are available in concept form and will presumably be tackled in 1986. In addition, the renewal of our troop telecommunications facilities is being performed incrementally in adaptation to IFMIN-80, such as, for example, the procurement of shortwave radios with their appropriate encipher sets, and much more.

In view of the order of our magnitude, we will not soon--if at all--be able to approach the so-called C^3I ("Command/Control/Communications and Intelligence"

System) which looms on the planning horizon and which has as its objective the substantial automation of data evaluation in the command area.

Ammunition

The problem of increasingly better and, thus, also more expensive ammunition inventories involves not only acquisition costs but also consumption rates. The golden rule which measures the relationship between an adequate supply and current consumption within the framework of training is very difficult to find unless one has the opportunity of selling obsolete inventories in sufficient time before their expiration. This is very difficult for us since we cannot sell in war areas in which these munitions are used. Consequently, we are compelled to calculate our supplies with particular care.

With the expansion of the military, our ammunition supply will be increased by some 1,000 tons per year and the appropriate storage space will also have to be created. Planning in this regard is on file.

Modern Firing Facilities Save Training Time

A modernization program for our firing facilities, which has been ongoing for several years, has largely removed the picture of the rifleman waiting in front of the firing stand. Electronic indicators and electrically controlled targets facilitate a substantial increase in the capacity of firing training. However, there is a natural increase in housing or shelter needs at training facilities which must be satisfied by accompanying construction measures. The forest camp at the troop training facility at Hochfilzen, which is currently under construction, is a typical example.

The introduction of special training firing devices for 5.6-mm, 7.62-mm, and 12.7-mm small arms in the various garrisons is supposed to be able to save training costs and siphon off a part of the practical firing training from the firing facilities.

Night Combat Suitability--Cheap or Expensive?

As a rule, combat used to begin with the first good shooting light, shortly preceded by artillery preparatory fire. Then, efforts were afoot to create an advantage by being able to see in the dark with the aid of technology. This began with tracer ammunition and ended with infrared night-vision devices.

Beginning with the first active infrared night-vision devices and continuing with residual light amplifiers, one finally arrived today at the still very expensive infrared picture devices which are not only capable of turning night to day but also of penetrating fog, smoke, and dust clouds by day for short distances. If they were not so expensive, they would have replaced all optical devices by now; in comparison with optical devices, their pictures use the heat radiation spectrum as an information carrier in place of the frequency spectrum of light--the former is much less susceptible to electromagnetic interference in dirty atmospheres, ignores darkness, and presents more information. In addition, there are the standard illumination devices which can be

fired as alternative ammunition from available weapons or from special firing devices, the simplest of which is likely to be the Very pistol. Lamps and searchlights are only mentioned marginally, a special role is played by battlefield radar.

A thorough study by armaments planners has brought forth a night-vision concept which, while strictly conservative with respect to costs, contains the best possible combination of all components for appropriate use and which would come close to costing 1 billion schillings in investments and be commensurate with medium-time procurement. The concept particularly weighed the advantages of pyrotechnical, optronic, and electronic means carefully against each other. One can characterize the results as a significant performance adapted to our conditions.

Electronic (Automated) Data Processing--EDV/ADV

In contrast to the civilian sector, we had to stay with the designation of EDV (electronic data processing), because in the defense establishment the abbreviation ADV was already assigned to the definition "general service regulations" (Allgemeine Dienstvorschriften--ADV).

Future planning in this area is essentially characterized by the following:

i. Our personnel have become familiar with the handling of electronic data processing and have facilitated extensive decentralization and, thus, a higher degree of effectiveness.

ii. In certain areas, information systems are being upgraded to processing systems, which means that, in some areas, they can also handle logical administrative procedures.

iii. Office automation helps to save time and makes the mastery of growing administrative work volumes possible with approximately the same number of people.

The center of gravity projects over the next few years involve the DAVERS-II logistics processing system with its decentralized structure, an office automation system for the Army Administration, which is being pilot tested and the merging of partial systems into a military information system. The first considerations for making the frequently still permanently installed electronic data processing systems mobile are under way.

The rising share of electronic data processing in all weapons systems is mentioned only for the sake of completeness.

Simulators

Realistic training of all types not only costs too much time and money but is primarily weather-dependent and, in many cases, does not permit the confrontation of the soldier with certain crisis situations for security reasons. These disadvantages can be more or less overcome with simulators, depending on

the system involved. It is no exaggeration to claim that a good simulation is frequently more realistic than a real situation training problem. But it is a fateful error to believe that simulators can simply be introduced into the customary training system. Moreover, when one introduces simulator training one must reorient the entire training system, otherwise one achieves only partial success which does not amortize the costs to the extent hoped for.

Currently, an antiaircraft training simulator is on order, firing simulators for tanks and antitank weapons are under development and in the planning stages. Nevertheless, in doing all planning, one should see to it that simulator training should not replace live ammunition firing.

Airspace Security--Air Defense

The struggle surrounding the airspace surveillance aircraft is still too real in the memories of all Austrians; there is, therefore, no need to retrace it.

It is likely that since the inception of the Federal Army, there has not been a project which has triggered so much paper printed, for the most part with unobjective, self-interest-oriented but here and there also objectively correct expressions of opinion. The result is modest enough but at least positive. A pleasant side effect was probably unwanted by its opponents: their pressure was instrumental in forming the Bundesheer inwardly.

In the meantime, we are intensively occupied with concentrating on the operational and technological mastery of the "quantum leap" in the supersonic area and we barely perceive the aftershocks anymore. Once the machines, whose general overhauling will be participated in by our key personnel at the manufacturer's plant, are installed, a sense of uneasiness will be lifted from thinking Austrians because then anyone who wishes to intrude into our airspace illegally must, at the very least, bear the taint of using force against a neutral (who is always in the right). This is a circumstance which takes on considerable significance today, not only in international law but in the current world policy practices of other states.

In the area of air defense, we continue to be limited to using guns with calibers of up to 40 mm. The design for a new antiaircraft tank is on the back burner for reasons of costs. When one contemplates that three batteries of a top product which is on the market today cost twice as much as the just now ordered airspace surveillance squadron and that the downward adjustment to a cheaper system would be considerably detrimental to the cost-effect considerations, thorough rethinking is appropriate. With respect to the air defense system using 35-mm-caliber weapons a modification calling for the replacement of worn-out components while, at the same time, increasing the weapon combat value is being examined. An upgrading of Air Defense Battalions 11, 12, and 13 by rearming the second batteries from 2-cm weapons to 3.5-cm guns is being promoted.

Precision Weapons/Guided Weapons

In a comprehensive overview such as this, it is beyond imagination to evade the topic of "guided weapons" even though, here and there, this leads to some annoyance. Five nations, whose peace agreements contain identical language on this point, have introduced them. And neutral Austria is not permitted to do so?

Whereas with respect to antitank defense, possibilities still exist to at least partially compensate for shortages by switching to new ammunition and new procedures, the situation with respect to air defense is barely tenable. Since we military authorities know whereof we speak, and since we are coresponsible for our soldiers, our testimony must occupy an appropriate position in defense policy. Our presentations as to how many of these of the purest of all defensive weapons we require are on file.

Cruise Missiles--To Shoot Down or Not To Shoot Down?

Under this headline, the Swiss--Corps Commandant Wyler and air agency director Kuenzi gave noteworthy testimony in March of this year to the publication WELTWOCHE dealing with the dilemma confronting the neutral in shooting down a cruise missile carrying nuclear weapons. In responding to the postulation that "...no one should be compelled to do anything that lies in the area of the impossible," it must be pointed, in support of Sweden and Finland that: a shootdown must not necessarily result in the detonation of the nuclear charge. The missile will be shot down over our country one way or another, either by us or by others. However, what is decisive is the fact that Europe has a substantial number of manned jet aircraft which are also nuclear weapons carriers. How does one wish to differentiate here? Was the problem thought through to the end?

Fighter-Bombers or Helicopters?

When one considers that Iran and Iraq are today firing artillery rockets at each others capital cities, the concept of wartime operations at the well-known Austrian airfields becomes ever more difficult. Even if the means were at hand to do like Switzerland and bury them underground, the traffic surfaces nevertheless remain exposed. With the projected launching of the Saab 105-Oe in the 1990's, we should not even consider ordering more fighter-bombers and should concentrate on antitank helicopters which, like a "migratory bird," are essentially independent of the permanent infrastructure.

Final Remarks

The present contribution would have become too long had I attempted to treat the equipment of our Federal Army in its totality. The specialized and authoritative officers and officials, who are also my coworkers, have sufficient room to do so in the columns of the specialized literature. I merely attempted to draw together a number of thoughts on the most important questions into a complete and understandable picture which I had personally acquired over the many years of my planning activity in contact conversations with

exponents of other armies, not only in the official sphere but primarily also in confidential table talks. It is not sensational but it is characterized by the reality consciousness of an Austrian whose alert eyes have seen that other more costly armies are also not as perfect as they are depicted in the literature. We should not let ourselves be distracted from continuing on our path.

But the contribution was also intended to point out that our hand-tailored defense concept needs all the necessary weapons and combat means--from domestic production insofar as possible. Without these, our soldiers would be unprotected at the mercy of any aggressor.

5911
CSO: 3620/148

MILITARY DENMARK

GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS CRITICIZE CARRINGTON

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Dec 85 p 7

[Article by Thorkild Dahl]

[Text] Lord Carrington, secretary-general of NATO, criticizes Denmark for going its own ways within NATO. The minister of defense points out that differences of opinion are bound to exist among free countries, and both Bjørn Elmquist of the Liberal Party and several opposition politicians criticize the style chosen by the secretary-general. The special security policy committee of the Folketing will discuss the question at a meeting to be held in Brussels in February.

Lord Carrington, secretary-general of NATO, will be placed in the dock when the special security policy committee of the Folketing arrives in Brussels next February, and the spokesmen of the security policy majority of the Folketing demand an explanation for the unusual and direct criticism on the part of the secretary-general of the Danish security policy in a speech yesterday in the West-German town of Karlsruhe.

Lord Carrington spoke to West German army staff officers, criticizing directly the security policy line taken by the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party, the Radical Liberal Party and the Socialist Left Party, contrary to the wishes of the Danish government.

"Problems arise when the majority of the Danish Folketing takes steps to dissociate itself from elements of the allied strategy," Lord Carrington, secretary-general of NATO, said, adding that, by dissociating itself from the joint strategy, Denmark may risk having its own interests disregarded within the alliance. Less weight may be attached to Danish positions, which, actually, may be disregarded.

Minister of Defense Hans Engell (Conservative Party) tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the speech by the secretary-general may be viewed as reflecting concern that a breach of the solidarity within the alliance may weaken it at a vital point of time.

The minister of defense adds, however, that "NATO's secretary-general should be the first one to recognize that, within an alliance of free countries, differences of opinion may exist," and "I do not quite understand Lord Carrington's statements on the Danish nuclear arms policy."

Bjørn Elmquist, Liberal member of the temporary security policy committee, says that he agrees with Lord Carrington in his evaluation of the footnote policy pursued of recent years by Denmark, but Elmquist does not consider it wise for an international official to rebuke parliamentary majorities.

"In the first place, it is a question of national matters, and he, therefore, will have to respect the decisions that have been made. In the second place, Lord Carrington risks that his statement may have the diametrically opposite effect of the one intended. He risks that the majority may become more stubborn, refusing to listen to sound arguments," Bjørn Elmquist says, drawing a deplorable parallel between Lord Carrington and his predecessor, Joseph Luns.

The security policy majority, too, finds it unfortunate for Lord Carrington to have taken the same line as the controversial Joseph Luns, who did not hesitate to criticize sharply the political lines of the individual member countries when the politicians concerned chose a different course than the one deemed the correct one by Joseph Luns.

"I should find it most deplorable for Lord Carrington to become another Joseph Luns. He has not done NATO a favor with this," says Lasse Budtz, security policy spokesman of the Social Democratic Party, adding that he is not certain that, from a global point of view, the NATO strategy is the right one.

Arne Stinus, spokesman of the Radical Liberal Party, also intends to bring up the question directly toward Lord Carrington when in mid-February the security policy committee will visit the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

"It has been most unwise on the part of the NATO secretary-general. I was under the impression that this line had been abandoned when Joseph Luns resigned from his post.

Such criticism belongs behind closed doors, and Lord Carrington has had the opportunity for raising it toward NATO parliamentarians this fall," says Arne Stinus, who "most certainly" will want to take the matter up during his visit to Brussels.

The leader of the Socialist People's Party, Gert Petersen finds that it shows that the secretary-general of NATO is under pressure from "influential circles to play the same role as Luns," and "we have to take it up in Brussels in order to find out whether Lord Carrington's position is that the majority must dictate the minority, or whether NATO is an association of democratic states of equal standing."

7262
CSO: 3613/43

MILITARY DENMARK

ASPECTS OF 'DEFENSIVE' MILITARY SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Dec 85 p 9

[Op Ed Article by Ole Koefoed, graduate in political science: "Debate on Defensive Defense"]

[Text] BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has most recently published three articles on the so-called defensive defense (Monitor, 18 November 1985, Bjørn Møller, 26 November 1985, and Minister of Defense Hans Engell, 1 December 1985).

Bjørn Møller argues in favor of a defensive defense, although he recognizes that the concepts are still rather abstract, while Monitor and the minister of defense oppose it. Both of them mention that the idea of a defensive defense has arisen within the political left wing and among the peace movements, and that, of course, is true, but, in my opinion, the debate concerning an alternative defense is far too important for us to leave it to the left wing and the peace movements.

I deliberately use the term 'alternative defense,' as I find it illusory to seek to distinguish between an offensive and a defensive defense. However, there are two reasons why it is necessary for us to seriously consider whether we shall be able, in the future, to organize our defense in a better manner than we are doing today.

In the first place, the costs of advanced weapons systems are increasing sharply, and that means that a country such as Denmark will only be able to procure very few weapons, and, in the second place, most modern weapons are, in one way or the other, dependent on radar, and as radar systems may be put out of operation electronically (the so-called jamming), we may thus risk that, at the initial stage of an attack, we have a small number of ultra-modern weapons which we are entirely unable to use.

In contrast to the advocates of defensive defense, I, therefore, find that, without entirely abandoning advanced weapons systems, we have to put the main emphasis on older and more primitive weapons which are not dependent on radar and which, therefore, are not as accurate but which, on the other hand, cannot be put out of action electronically. As these weapons will be relatively

inexpensive, we shall be able to acquire large quantities of them, which will more than outweigh their inferior accuracy. Wanting first to state that the following should not be regarded as a fully worked-out proposal but only as a contribution to the debate, I find that a Danish defense, according to these guidelines, may look as follows:

As far as the Army is concerned, the forces are dispersed over the country in an actual area defense, where the individual units get the responsibility each for its own geographic area. In order for such an area defense to make any sense at all, the total force will have to be considerably larger than it is today, and this may be achieved by extending the period of service to 18 months and by calling up all those who are capable of undertaking military service. The area defense, which consists of conscripts, may, in this way, amount to a standing force of approximately 18,000 troops, approximately 6,000 of whom are in training, the period of training being fixed at 6 months. The area defense is not motorized and is equipped with machine guns, light mortars and light anti-tank weapons. These weapons are allotted in such quantities as to enable the individual force to vary its arms on the basis of its needs.

In a terrain such as the Danish terrain, it will be necessary for the area defense to be supported by a large number of subterranean survival areas. Such subterranean installations are equipped with their own water and power supplies as well as the various sanitary installations, and already in times of peace such large supplies of every kind is provided as to enable the forces to manage for some length of time without supplies from the outside.

In support of the area defense, a mortar force and an anti-aircraft force are deployed. These forces are motorized and consist of permanent personnel; they may conceivably consist of approximately 5,000 soldiers each and may also be dispersed across the country in minor units.

Both Monitor and the minister of defense point out in their argumentations that a defense thus dispersed may not be able to concentrate its forces in any actual counterattack against an invading force, and that is, of course, correct but to this may be added, first, that since the defense agreement was concluded in 1981, the Danish Armed Forces have not been able to concentrate anything anywhere, and, second, such a concentration of Danish forces would constitute an ideal target for nuclear arms, and the Danish Armed Forces would thus be most likely to become destroyed before becoming engaged in combat, while the Danish position on nuclear arms, on the other hand, would make it fairly unlikely for such weapons to be used against the concentration of enemy forces at the bridgehead.

A land defense of the nature described here will necessarily have to be supported by a strong Navy and a strong Air Force.

The Navy will have to consist of a number of fairly large units which may partly participate in the defense against the invading army and which may partly operate far into the Baltic Sea. Such vessels are equipped both with modern missiles and with more old-fashioned guns which, if necessary, may be operated manually. In addition, a naval force of 60 motor torpedo boats will be deployed, similar to the present Sea-Lion class (of which we have only six

at the moment), where the electronic equipment has been reduced to a minimum, but which, by virture of their speed and arms, will constitute a serious threat to an invading navy. In addition, there will be submarines, guard vessels, minelayers and minesweepers, etc. In the debate on the size of the Navy, we ought to bear in mind that our history clearly shows that we have always managed best when our Navy was strong.

The three present forts are expanded and modernized, and another five forts are built to guard the waters of passage. The forts are equipped with guns, which, if needed, may be operated manually and may, furthermore, be provided with misssiles. They are equipped with their own ground defense and air defense systems.

As far as the Air Force is concerned, we probably have to face the fact that we shall not have the financial means to deploy a sufficiently large force of modern fighters, and, for this reason, the actualy fighter defense is left to allied air forces stationed in this country in times of peace. We ought to be able to achieve such an agreement with our allies if, in return, we are able to offer a stronger naval force in the Baltic Sea and more effective guarding of the waters of passage.

We shall ourselves deploy a force of approximately 250 less advanced and thus considerably less expensive aircraft. It will have to be relatively low-flying aircraft that are able to operate at treetop altitudes and which will be used primarily for support of the operations of the Army and the Navy. In addition, the anti-aircraft missiles systems will be expanded.

The Home Guard will leave the resistance tasks to the newly established area defense, but it will be entrusted with new tasks in the form of short-range defense of mortar and anti-aircraft forces. As a result, the Home Guard will have to be partly motorized. In addition, quick-firing guns will be introduced to fight combat helicopters.

A defense such as the one described here will become considerably more expensive than the one we have today. Especially while building the new subterranean installations (which may take 10-15 years), it will be a question of very considerable expenses, but, on the other hand, we shall have a defense which cannot be put out of action at the initial stage of an attack and which will be considerably more effective than the one we have today.

7262
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MILITARY

DENMARK

BRIEFS

CONSCRIPTS PROTEST SERVICE INCREASE--The calling up of conscripts who, in April, will commence a period of service within the combat and engineering troops, has caused the executive committees of conscripts, sergeants liable for military duty and conscientious objectors to rush into print. In an announcement to the press, they repeat their demand for what is described as a realistic analysis of the need for a longer period of service. "Before such an analysis has been undertaken, it would be inappropriate to carry into effect any general, permanently enforced extension of the period of service," it is stated. The said executive committees maintain that it is ultra vires for the Armed Forces to issue calling-up orders and propose that the problem be solved by the conscripts concluding a contract with the Armed Forces on the last 3 months of service. The Defense Command has already some time ago announced that nearly all of the initial batches of conscripts liable for 12 months of duty have volunteered. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Dec 85 p 12] 7262

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MILITARY FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STRUCTURE, MODERNIZATION OF TACTICAL AIR COMMAND DETAILED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Aug 85 pp 34-40

/Article by Lt Gen Joerg Kuebart, commanding general of Luftwaffe's Tactical Air Command: "The Tactical Air Command to Undergo Complete Modernization"/

/Text/ The Bundeswehr is about to have its 30th birthday. That is the longest period of continuous peacetime ever experienced by Germany's armed forces. The Luftwaffe plays an important part in this. While it has frequently been described as a "weapon of the first hour," it has without doubt made a considerable contribution to the long period of peace by its continued combat readiness around the clock, side by side with the ground and naval forces within the North Atlantic Treaty. Thirty years of Bundeswehr and 30 years of Luftwaffe make for an appropriate point in time to determine where we stand today with the operational units of our service--how we are structured, how we are equipped and what the future holds in store for us.

In its 30 years of existence the Luftwaffe has undergone numerous organizational changes. Especially in its establishment phase, which was marked by gradual activation of operational units, the command structure had to be repeatedly adapted to new conditions and tied into NATO doctrines.

With effective date of 1 October 1970 the Tactical Air command was, among others, established as one of the three major commands for the following purposes:

- for a general tightening up of the national defense;

- to remove non-ministerial tasks from the defense ministry, while at the same time creating adequate headquarters to deal with these separate tasks;

- better to adapt the Luftwaffe to the NATO command structure, and

- to implement functional principles (technical command structure) and at the same time to gurantee relationships with the field forces which would be as frictionless as possible.

The Tactical Air Command consists of the Luftflotte's combat units. Thus the Tactical Air Command, which is the major Luftwaffe command reporting direct to the Ministry of Defense, is the command authority for division commands, 16 fighterbombers, reconnaissance and fighter wings, two missile wings, six air defense missile regiments with 15 air defense missile battalions, 4 communications regiments of the radar control service and several liaison commands as well as mid-level command and control organizations. These units are dispersed throughout the entire FRG territory.

Apart from the wings and regiments inside the FRG, the Tactical Air Command also has training facilities in

- Suda Bay, Crete (German share of the NATO missile range);

- Cottesmore, Great Britain (German share of the trinational TORNADO training facility);

- Fort Bliss, TX (German Luftwaffe Training Headquarters United States/ Canada and USAF Missile Training Center);

- Goose Bay, Canada (Luftwaffe tactical training headquarters);

- Decimomannu, Sardinia (German Luftwaffe training area command);

- Beja, Portugal (German Luftwaffe training area command).

In peacetime the Tactical Air Command has about 56,000 military and 9,000 civilian personnel.

In case of emergency and in wartime personnel strength is roughly doubled

The commander, Tactical Air Command:

- commands the subordinate major units and organizations in field service in peacetime, in a defensive situation and operationally until command is assumed by the commander-in-chief or commanders of NATO;

- is required to establish and maintain operational readiness of subordinate headquarters, major units and organizations;

- is responsible to NATO commanders below the level of the commander-in-chief, Central Europe, and to the appropriate allied and national commanders for matters involving operational preparation and execution, standardization, tactical evaluation, NATO exercises and weapon system training;

- identifies flying tasks for the Bundeswehr as well as technical tasks for the Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe air defense technical command for facility protection, ground defense, camouflage and deception, weapon system training, air operational standardization);

- directs the Tactical Air Command as a Luftwaffe major air command and as a technical command.

Tactical Units of the Tactical Air Command

To enable him to carry out his mission, the commanding general of the Tactical Air Command has at his disposal tactical command resources as well as tactical operational materiel, the weapon systems themselves together with their organic weaponry.

The latter consist primarily of combat aircraft which, by virtue of their specific capabilities, are able at any time to form massed concentrations appropriate to the situation, to move them in a very short time over great distances and to attack the enemy in his rear areas beyond the range of his ground-based weapons.

Their mission consists of the following:

- Attacking enemy air forces on the ground (Offensive Counter Air, OCA);

- Cutting off rear areas (Air Interdiction, AI);

- Offensive air support of ground forces (Offensive Air Support, OAS) by isolating the battlefield (Battlefield Air Interdiction, BAI) and Close Air Support, CAS.

For these purposes the Tactical Air Command has a wide spectrum of weapon systems at its disposal. Despite the fact that all types of aircraft are capable of operating in any part of air attack operations, they have been optimally configured for specific types of tasks.

TORNADO

The TORNADO, a third- generation swing wing combat aircraft with high-quality avionics is suitable for air-to-ground operations in any weather and at any time of day.

Its capability of terrain-following very low altitude flight at high speed and the electronic warfare self-defense systems provide the TORNADO with great penetration capability; the weapon computers and navigation devices permit point target attacks in darkness and in bad weather. Great useful load for weapons with a large radius of action complement these characteristics.

In view of these specifications, the TORNADO is particularly well suited for OCA and AI tasks. As part of air support it can be used against certain types of targets in a BAI capacity.

Additionally it participates, by order of SAGEUR, in NATO nuclear warfare operations.

The TORNADO has replaced the F-104G Starfighter, which at the present time is still in use by a fighter-bomber wing. Within a few years these aircraft will also be replaced by TORNADO's. This provides the Tactical Air Command with a considerable increase in combat effectiveness.

F-4F PHANTOM

Despite the fact that it has served in many air forces for more than 25 years, the Phantom still provides a considerable performance capability. With its high useful weapon load it has good penetration capability into useful depths with its electronic warfare defensive devices and is well suited for aerial combat. A program for increasing its combat effectiveness has resulted in improving its hit accuracy in air-to-ground operations and advanced its all-weather combat capability.

In view of its versatility the Phantom occupies a special place among Luftwaffe weapon systems since, depending on the situation, it can also operate as an interceptor in air defense operations.

In the air attack sector it can operate in the full range of the tasks described above.

ALPHA JET

The capabilities of the ALPHA JET fills in the deficiencies in the operational spectrum (Force Mix) of air attack operations. This aircraft was designed specifically for operations in the front combat zone. It is highly maneuverable and can take off from and land on short runways. Its robust, easy to maintain design permits the use of not fully operational airfields and Autobahn sectors. Built-in electronic warfare equipment provides good survival capability; modern avionics provide good hit accuracy.

With these characteristics, the ALPHA JET responds specifically to the requirements for BAI and CAS type operations. In the advanced combat zone it may also operate in the OCA role. The ALPHA JET's suitability for anti-helicopter operations mube be emphasized here; they are becoming increasingly important.

RF-4E PHANTOM

Even though it operates mostly unarmed, the RF-4E, a tactical air reconnaissance craft with a wide range, is still counted among the air offensive weapon systems. This aircraft has a variety of reconnaissance sensors and with its side-looking airborne radar provides the only all weather reconnaissance capability of the Luftwaffe.

PERSHING Ib

The Pershing Ib is the unmanned weapon of air attack. This weapon is dedicated to nuclear operations by NATO. A detailed discussion of the Pershing Ib and its political function within the alliance would exceed the parameters of this article.

Armament

Next to the carrier systems, the armament is of great significance. The Tactical Air Command has a variety of free-fall munition and missiles to combat various targets. Added to this are the on-board weapons of the carriers. The introduction of additional types of munitions will further improve operational effectiveness against various primary targets. They will primarily increase the Tornado's operational effectiveness even more and will provide higher penetration capability of the Alpha Jet in operations against armored army units.

Command System

Since the tactical forces are under operational control of NATO, a NATO command system was established. Wherever possible, efforts were made to observe the principle of central planning (to provide the most economical use of forces) and decentralized execution (for quicker reaction time and to keep from bogging down)

Computer-supported systems for command and control provide information required for the command process

- about the enemy situation

- about the condition and readiness of friendly subordinate units, and

- about the success of friendly air attack operations.

At the same time these systems provide quick transmission of orders. This provides the prerequisites for a rapid, situation-appropriate and economic initiation of operations.

Air Defense Forces

What is the mission of the Tactical Air Command for the integrated NATO Air Defense, and what resources does it have now and/or in the near future?

No reply to this question is specifically directed to the readers of WEHRTECHNIK, whom I believe to have some basic knowledge of the subject and a general understanding of its implications. I will therefore not go into detail on the following:

- the threat

- the tasks and mission of the NATO air defense on the one hand and those of national air defense forces on the other;

- assignment within the alliance, and national assignments;

- combat and command resources in air defense.

I should like however to present one viewpoint on this matter, since there is always talk of "expense" which is said to be obligatory for air defense: air defense must not be regarded as an isolated entity. It is a component of Counter Air Operations, operations against enemy air forces on the ground and in the air.

In an alliance whose basic strategic stance is defensive, it is of particular significance especially at the beginning of combat operations. As a result, the integrated NATO air defense must maintain a high level of commitment and operational readiness which would permit a quick transition from peace to a state of war.

The Air Defense Concept

The operational concept for Central Europe (Central Region)--geographically, roughly the area of responsibility of the Tactical Air Command--presently views the operations of air defense forces primarily in the form of area protection. For this purpose, the HAWK mobile air defense missile system forms an advanced anti-aircraft missile zone extending from Schleswig-Holstein to Bavaria. In peacetime the operational batteries are located in firmly fortified positions, which can serve as their operational bases if necessary. In case of crisis or war they would advance to previously determined, but unprepared field positions. The batteries of the NIKE stationary weapon system, with their strongly fortified positions, for a secondary operational zone extending from the North Sea coast to an area south of Frankfurt/Main. An additional rear-area air defense missile operational zone (presently equipped only with HAWK's) is located in the Palatinate, Saarland/Eifel area. Participants in these air defense missile zones are forces from Belgium, The Netherlands, the United States and the FRG.

The fighter forces of the Central Region concentrate on the protection of areas without air defense missiles, i.e., primarily flanks and possible gaps in the air defense missile zones. Beyond that, they serve as escorts for attacking air force units and for fighter raids into enemy air territory.

Central Region fighter forces have representation from the air forces of Belgium, the UK, the United States, Canada and the FRG Luftwaffe.

The above air defense weapon systems are under the control of an airspace surveillance and control system which is supported by mobile and stationary ground-based resources and the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) system. Both elements operate in an area-covering and mutually complementary manner.

For the sake of completeness, we should mention the Air Defense Liaison Teams (ADOLT), which in exercises and in war maintain at ground force corps level the liaison with the integrated NATO air defense, and which have such tasks as coordinating the movements of the HAWK forces and the low-altitude flight reporting and control service with the movements of the ground forces.

Along with all other NATO partners and military services, the Luftwaffe supplements the effectiveness of the integrated air defense by direct protection of its most important facilities and personnel. At the present time, this facility protection exists in rudimentary form and consists of varied numbers of 20 mm twin antiaircraft guns and the air defense weapons. Until the activation of mobilization reserve personnel, these weapons are operated by active duty personnel as a secondary function. However, today every wing has an active antiaircraft platoon cadre.

ROLAND/PATRIOT Conversion

The introduction of weapon systems PATRIOT and ROLAND will eliminate one of the present-day deficiencies in the Central Region's air defense.

In the article "Air Defense in Central Europe" (WEHRTECHNIK, April 1983) the author used the following subheading: "It can only get better" and cited an anonymous Luftwaffe officer as saying: "NIKE Hercules is totally obsolete, the HAWK is obsolescent, the F-4 is old and facilities protection is lacking entirely."

At that time the Luftwaffe air defense forces had been particularly hard hit by the effects of the 1981 defense investigation. In the meantime the United States and the FRG have signed an agreement about joint procurement of the ROLAND and PATRIOT weapon systems; in addition, the chief of staff of the Luftwaffe has announced a concentrated effort in the air defense area over the next few years.

Replacement of the stationary NIKE system by the mobile PATRIOT system has of course led to a modification of our operational concept. Area protection remains the basic principle; however, in the future HAWK and PATRIOT will operate in the same geographic area. This mixed deployment creates so-called "clusters," high-density antiaircraft missile zones, in which the effects of the various weapon systems complement each other. Having a chain of clusters in a north-south direction creates an advanced HAWK/PATRIOT deployment zone extending from Schleswig-Holstein to Bavaria. To supplement this, additional clusters are formed in the rear areas for the protection of important facilities.

This new structure benefits the fighter forces also: while their mission remains unchanged, they gain operational areas of meaningful proportions. However, mixed deployment of antiaircraft missile and fighter forces in the same area will remain quite difficult within the foreseeable future in view of the well known identification problems.

In peacetime, the PATRIOT batteries, similar to HAWK, will remain in strongly fortified positions and will move to field positions only in case of crisis or war.

The new ROLAND units will be completely manned by ourselves and will primarily be devoted to protecting Luftwaffe TORNADO and F-4F bases in addition to selected USAFE bases. To provide optimum protection, these ROLAND units will be combined into larger formations and will be transferred to the facilities concerned depending on the situation. Deployment at a facility, apart from the 20 mm twin antiaircraft guns presently in use, will consist of up to 10 ROLAND weapon systems and a ROLAND air defense command post as a combat command facility. All ROLAND forces remain under national command.

The actual PATRIOT/ROLAND phase-in, which will reach its peak in early 1987, will last until about 1994. That big a program requires not only major adjustments and extensive preparation in the training and logistics areas. Its primary requirement consists of creating 36 PATRIOT combat batteries and 15 ROLAND combat batteries out of 24 NIKE combat batteries, structural than numerical problems. Nevertheless the Luftwaffe is convinced that the effort is worthwile because:

- the antiaricraft missile forces will have a modern, mobile weapon system with a high rate of fire;

- PATRIOT and HAWK will be used jointly in a mannger which was heretofore impossible;

- aerial targets will be subject to being shot down from medium and high altitudes by antiaircraft missiles in Schleswig-Holstein and Bavaria also;

- a gap of antiaircraft protection existing until now at an interface line will be eliminated;

- air defense facility protection will gain all-weather operational capability for some of the facilities.

Long-Term Planning

The '86 Bundeswehr Plan currently in force includes basically all essential Luftwaffe materiel requirements; procurement of new weapons can be implemented only in a time-sequence manner by concentrating the expenditure of funds for one system at a time. Since this causes the retention of presently available weapon systems for longer periods than originally intended, additional measures must be taken to extend their useful life and maintain their combat effectiveness. This in turn causes another postponement or extension of the phase-in periods.

In the fighter forces, the German Luftwaffe places at NATO's disposal four F-4F fighter squadrons and four F-4F fighter-bomber squadrons (with air defense as a secondary mission). This permits effective defensive operations in short-range VFR fighter sorties, using the M 61 20 mm gun and the AIM-9L SIDEWINDER infrared guided missile. However, we believe that increasing deficiencies can be found in the areas of flight performance, radar-avionics and armament, which could be eliminated during the short and medium planning period only through further improvements in the F-4F combat efficiency and by closing the armament gap. The preliminary phase and the concept phase for such an improvement in combat effectiveness have been concluded; implementation of the program is estimated for 1989, as it is for the AMRAAM radar-guided missile.

Apart from increasing the F-4F's combat effectiveness, action must be taken also to extend the useful life of this weapon system. This is because the introduction of the fighter aircraft of the 1990's (the JF-90) starting in 1997 requires that the F-4F be kept in service beyond the year 2000. Also, there must be continuous modifications to keep pace with the electronic threat.

The Luftwaffe has been fully equipped with the AIM-9L. During the next few years an improvement program is to make this missile even more interference-resistant and thus adapt it to the threat.

The ASRAAM, an air-to-air short-range guided missile, is not expected to become operational until 1993 and not until 1995 in the Luftwaffe, to replace the AIM-9L after a transition phase. Introduction of the AMRRAM medium-range air-to-air guided missile is, as stated above, expected starting in 1990, together with increased combat effectiveness of the F-4F.

Planning for ground-based weapon systems primarily affects the Tactical Air Command with respect to two projects--maintenance of the HAWK's combat effectiveness and planning for facilities protection.

The HAWK, developed during the 1950's and in use by the Luftwaffe since 1963, has been modified twice so far and will presumably remain in service beyond the year 2000. In view of tight funding, the Luftwaffe has committed itself to a minimum program of mandatory improvements of the instrumentation as well as the missile itself. For follow-on planning we are not in favor of a gradual modification of the existing HAWK into a new weapon system, but, for many reasons, prefer a new development, specifically the "medium air defense missile system." Such a system could be contemplated for coming into being after the end of the 1990's.

In describing the materiel which are now or will in the near future be available for the integrated air defense, I have deliberately restricted myself to weapon system programs. In closing at least, I should like to mention that programs have been started also for airspace surveillance and command systems which fully equal the weapon system programs as to

size and financial expenditures. They are known to the people involved by such acronyms and abbreviations as GEADGE, AEGIS and ACCS; the NATO Air Command and Control System is to develop primarily a command system for all tactical air war operations. Also, a reliable Identification/ Friend or Foe system has for many years been near the top of the list of priorities.

Overcoming that particular problem will probably keep us busy well into the next millenium.

Figure 1. Organization Chart



Key:
1. Chief of Staff, Luftwaffe
2. Air Force Office
3. Tactical Air Command
4. Air Materiel Command
5. /1st through 4th/ Air Division
6. Fighter-Bomber Wings
8. Missile Wings
9. Air Base Groups
10. Air Base Squadron
11. Training Base Headquarters (Overseas)
12. Fighter Wing
13. Air Defense Missile Regiments
14. Communications Regiment
15. German Components in Integrated Air Force Headquarters
16. German Air Training Command

Figure 2. Planned Air-to-Ground Weapons for Flying Weapon Systems

Waffen/ Munition 1.	TORNADO	P-4F	ALPHA JET	Primaerziele 2.
MW-1 (Hauptzielgruppe 2) 3.	×			Flugbetriebsflächen, Flugzeug-Schutzbauten, Lähmung 4.
MAVERICK IIR	×	×	×	Gehärtete Infrastruktur, Kampfpanzer, je nach Gefechtskopf 5.
70-mm-Rakete CVR 6.			×	gepanzerte und mechanisierte Einheiten 7.
Startbahnbombe 8.		×		Flugbetriebsflächen 9.
Vertikalbordwaffe 10.			×	Kampfpanzer 11.
HARM	×			Radaranlagen 12.
Abstands-Flugkörper großer Reichweite LR-SOM 13.	×			stark verteidigte ortsfeste Kampfanlagen 14.
Abstands-Flugkörper kurzer Reichweite SR-SOM 15.	×		×	gepanzerte Einheiten auf dem Marsch oder in der Bereitstellung 16.

Key:
1. Weapon/Munition
2. Primary Targets
3. Main Target Group 2
4. Air Bases, Airplane Hangars, Neutralization
5. Hardened Infrastructure, Battle Tanks, depending on Warhead
6. CVR 70 mm Missile
7. Armored and Mechanized Units
8. Runway Bomb
9. Air Bases
10. Vertical Firing Gun
11. Battle Tanks
12. Radar Sites
13. LR-SOM (Long-range Standoff Missile)
14. Heavily defended fixed Battle Positions
15. SR-SOM (Short-range Standoff Missile)
16. Armored Units en route or Ready for Action

9273/12276
CSO: 3620/137

MILITARY

GREECE

DETAILS ON EXOCET FIRING DURING 'KATAIGIS' MANEUVERS

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 24 Nov 85 p 18

/Text/ The Exocet missile that was successfully fired against a target during the "Kataigis" naval maneuvers cost 800,000 dollars but, as navy officials stated, the results were so impressive that it was well worth the cost to confirm the protection given warships.

The "Kataigis" maneuvers were held in the Aegean on 18-22 November. Taking part were destroyers, missile-carrying vessels and submarines. Live ammunition was used. The various phases of the exercise were witnessed from the frigate Limnos by Alternate Minister of National Defense And. Drosogiannis; General Kouris, GEEThA /National Defense General Staff/ chief; Vice Adm N. Pappas, GEN /Naval General Staff/ chief; Lieutenant General Apostolakis, Air Force chief; and Vice Admirals I. Perissakis and Kh. Lymberis. The Exocet missile was fired from the missile-carrying vessel Mykonios against an old British vessel, the Makhitis, at a distance greater than 18 kilometers.

Later, the submarine Papanikolis sank the Makhitis with accurate fire. Prior to the firing of the Exocet missile, Vice Admiral Pappas was brought to the Mykonios by a navy helicopter and lowered aboard by the hoist system.

After the firing of the Exocet missile, Mr Drosogiannis and the military leadership boarded the submarine Poseidon and once again in the open seas they witnessed the firing of a real torpedo against a destroyer.

5671
CSO: 3521/59

MILITARY GREECE

NEW LAW ON MILITARY SERVICE TO ABOLISH EXEMPTIONS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 17 Nov 85 p 8

/Excerpts/ In accordance with a law now being prepared, the practice of buying oneself out of military service is to be done away with and henceforth all Greeks (except for those legally exempt) will be obliged to serve in the army in accordance with constitutional orders. At the same time, all regulations dealing with desertion and insubordination will be reviewed so that --as made clear by the Ministry of National Defense-- "injustices and inequities that have prevailed up to now would be removed."

Through a decision of Alternate Minister of National Defense A. Drosogiannis, Legislative Decree 720/70 on recruitement is being modified and being brought up to date and new concrete measures are being introduced so that there would not be in the future any deviation from or "escape clauses" in the constitutional regulation which in Article 4 determines the obligation of every citizen for military service. This radical revision of the decree has a direct relationship, as a military source stated, with insubordinates.

The insubordinates issues and more generally-speaking recruitments issues were subjects that were discussed by high-ranking armed forces officers at a special meeting last Monday in the operations auditorium of the ministry. Chairman of the meeting was GEEThA /National Defense General Staff/ chief Gen Nikos Kouris. The issue was analyzed by Maj Gen Dimos Lagoudakis, chief of recruitment in GEEThA.

Although the philosophy of military service remains the same with the new law (for example, the length of military service is not decreased), nevertheless, there has been a modernization of the type of training for an improved and fuller development of professionals and even women volunteers (5-year engagement), all the inequities and injustices dealing with conscription are abolished, and primarily "escape clauses" that the prevailing law provides for the conscription of recruits will be ended. GEEThA sources point out that the new law will be stricter but also more specific and more just.

According to reliable military sources, the following regulations have already been approved:

- The practice of buying oneself out of military service, and this applies to all Greeks, is abolished. The special cases of conscripts who have a right for reduced length of service or who are obliged only to receive training are now obliged to

be conscripted even for a short period of time, without being able to buy themselves out of even 1 month of their military service.

- Deferments because of studies is restricted to the minimum. The issue of deferments because of studies (the main reason for subsequent insubordination) will be determined in coordination with proposals by the Ministry of Education. Up to now, a student of even a hairdressing school or a music conservatory could receive a 3 or 4-year deferment. More specifically, a deferment will now be given only to students of higher or advanced schools and, of course, to students doing post-graduate work in schools that are recognized by the Ministry of Education. Deferments (of short duration, however) will also be given to students who were not able to graduate from high school in time, i.e. before completing their 21st birthday (overall, over 20,000 deferments were granted each year because of studies, a figure that is expected to decrease with the new law).

- Certain prevailing "escape clauses" related to studies will also be abolished. The most classic example of these apparently legal exceptions was "the deferment of the TEI /Technological Training Institutes/, as certain students symbolically call it. In other words, those students who did not enter an advanced school but did enter a TEI were able to get a deferment. They did not, however, go to a TEI to study, perhaps because they were not interested. Instead, they just waited until the deferment ended and then went into the military. Now, however, with the new law, those eligible for conscription are obliged to produce a certificate from their school each year certifying that they are indeed studying there or are continuing to study.

- Time for military training will be allocated for educational purposes or for completion of certain public works. Specific regulations will determine the use of military conscripts in public benefit purposes in time of peace.

5671
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MILITARY NETHERLANDS

MARINES TRAIN IN SCOTTISH HIGHLANDS

Amsterdam DE TELEGRAAF in Dutch 16 Nov 85 p 21

[Article by H.F. Van Loon: "Scottish Highlands Do Not Defeat Netherlands Marines. Chatter and More Chatter during Rain-Swept Exercise, But They Still Consider Themselves the 'Best Soldiers in the World' "]

[Text] Garelochhead, Scotland, Saturday--An omelet made of eggs and earthworms found in the field, a rabbit or field mouse they snared themselves--"But when you skin it, there is so little left over." A 4-day march with a 40-kilo pack through marshy terrain where at every step you sink deep into the highland mud. Rain, rain, and still more rain, where no uniform will protect you against it, until you long for the relief of snow and a temperature of -20° C. Those are some the conditions faced by the 600 Netherlands marines currently training in the breathtakingly beautiful but hard-as-nails and inhospitable Scottish Highlands, at the start of their annual mountain and winter training.

They form the core of the 1st Amphibious Combat Group (1 AGGP), on call to defend Netherlands interests "as far as the world reaches" (their motto), but whose main wartime mission is to defend the vulnerable northern tip of Norway along with a brigade of British marines, or to be deployed as a NATO force in defense of strategic islands in the Atlantic Ocean.

Rations

The majority of the marines are career soldiers; that means they will chatter on, they would not be Holland boys otherwise. They complain about the equipment they need but do not get--and so they go out and buy it themselves: if they do not have the proper pans they need to warm up their Arctic rations, then they buy them, and the same is true of the proper compasses that the government does not provide them with, and the caps that keep their ears from freezing off, and the tie-up socks that keep the water out of their mountain boots.

They complain about their bonuses of hundreds of guilders, sometimes of thousands, that they get months late--or sometimes not at all--despite endless promises from the Hague, but even so they get on with it, thanks to cliches like "Once a marine, always a marine!" But they do worry about their families at home and whether they can make ends meet, and then they just make a joke about it, usually with an undertone of melancholy seriousness to it. "We'll have to bring money with us when we go on exercise."

They complain, but naturally they are fully convinced they are the best soldiers in the world--and they are supported in that belief by an evaluation from an unimpeachable source. The chief of the Defense Staff, Land Forces General Goof Huijser, says of them: "Real infantry skills, it's been a long time since I've seen them done so very well."

Inventive

I asked the battalion commander, Lt. Col. H. Ramakers, for an objective comparison between his marines and their British companions in arms: "In routine skills where endless drill is useful, the British may be a bit better. You can tell a British marine to sit in his tent for 12 hours waiting for action. A Netherlander is too impatient for that, he won't take it. Our marines have to be told what's up--then they'll go and think out by themselves how to take care of the business, and then they do it. In the Falklands War--we in the Marines are still analysing every detail of that--it became as clear as day that at the lowest level you have to be independent, inventive--and that you will win the battle if you are. Well, that's second nature to the Netherlands marine."

To man they agree on one thing: the training in Scotland is tougher than in the dangerous Arctic cold of northern Norway. "You can dress for the cold, you can't do anything for the rain." Result: a constant watch for hypothermia ("First they start to weave, walk off in a totally different direction from the rest of the group, and in the end they don't even know where they are") and for trench foot (feet turning black as a result of staying too long in wet socks and boots).

Danger

Then too there is the constant danger of clambering up vertical Scottish mountain walls on thin lines hung from spikes driven into the rock; of wading through churning mountain streams--without letting yourself be carried away by the violence of the water or breaking an arm or a leg (so far only one ankle has been broken); of weaving branches and leaves into wigwams that fit so naturally into the desolate nature that your enemy will not notice them, but that will keep you reasonably warm and dry for a couple of hours, but that take 5 men 4 hours to construct.

It is understandable that young men of 23 already have old-looking, deeply etched faces: "It does keep you young, you go to the limit because you don't want to fail your buddies, but you see the faces getting older by the month," says one of them, a man of the type that says, "For education I have 3 years of advanced elementary education and 2 dancing lessons, but I'm a marine, so I never worry about it, I manage very well in life!"

Their training area among Scottish lochs with romantic names like Gare Loch and Loch Lomond was chosen not just to provide the maximum of training but also because they cannot train for more than a maximum of 3 months in Norway. The Norwegians, who are extremely careful about not irritating their giant Soviet neighbor too much, do not permit NATO troops unlimited training on their territory.

Appreciation

"There is the additional point," says Marine Commander and former frogman General Ties Rudolphie, "that we can hold our exercises much, much cheaper here--on terrain that is virtually identical with that in Norway. The training to be carried out next year again in the northernmost part of Norway from January to March costs the Netherlands twice as much as our stay in Scotland. But when it comes to the Marine Corps we cannot just think in terms of money; what the Marines also need is some appreciation."

That is what they will get in December, when the Corps celebrates its 350th birthday (it is the oldest body in the Netherlands armed forces). At that time Prince Claus will review a parade of the same marines who are now training in soaked-through combat dress but will march past in Rotterdam in immaculate blue.

12593
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MILITARY NORWAY

NAVAL DEFENSE PILOTS REQUEST AMERICAN-BUILT HELICOPTERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Dec 85 p 14

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] Early next year the Defense Ministry will have to make a decision. Will it purchase 12 new Bell helicopters from the Agusta factories in Italy or helicopters produced by Textron in the United States? A brief survey of active pilots revealed unanimous agreement. Good experiences with supplemental deliveries from the United States led all of those asked to express a preference for an American-made helicopter. AFTENPOSTEN has learned that Scancopter Aviation, Inc. submitted a bid of $2.1 million as the base price for a Bell 212 helicopter. There would be extra charges for any additional equipment the Defense Ministry might want to purchase.

The alternative to the Bell 212 produced in the United States is the version made in Italy. It is built on license from the United States and therefore in principle it is identical with the American helicopter. But pilots are currently concerned about poor experiences with Italian airplanes. Actually the machines in question are of purely historical interest. In 1938-39 Norway bought four Caproni planes (from Milan) for reconnaissance and bombing missions. The planes were called codfish bombers because they were purchased in exchange for sales of dried codfish.

Storting has now decided that the existing helicopter fleet of Bell UH 1B's in North Norway should be replaced in the period 1986-88. A reduced number of these planes will be retained in southern Norway. AFTENPOSTEN has been told that the lifetime of the old aircraft will now be extended by using some of them as a source of spare parts for the rest. Thus there will gradually be fewer and fewer of them left and sometime in the 1990's the number of Air Force helicopters will be cut. Since it has been decided to extend the lifetime of the Sea King rescue helicopters as well (if a method can be found to finance this), the armed forces will then be faced with the necessity of choosing a standard helicopter.

The Bell 212 helicopter is a nonarmored "all purpose" helicopter. People in the field call it a work horse. The 12 that will replace the 14 Bell helicopters currently in use at Bardufoss will be used especially for transport purposes and in wartime for evacuation of the wounded. However they can also

be used for observation purposes and minelaying. The cargo hook under the fuselage has a lift capacity of 2.2 tons. This means that the helicopter can lift small artillery pieces, for example.

The American 212 from Bell Helicopters Textron is already sold to a number of countries. Some 770 are in operation in the civil sector and 435 in the military sector.

It is used by both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force. It is also in service in Canada and Korea, as well as in other countries. In the civil sector the 212 is used for offshore flying in the North Sea and in the Far East.

AFTENPOSTEN has heard that reciprocal industrial purchases will be among the deciding factors when the final decision has to be made sometime early next year.

6578
CSO: 3639/47

MILITARY NORWAY

IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE IN SWEDISH DEFENSE POLICY DISCUSSED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 Dec 85 p 8

[Op Ed Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Doubts about Swedish Defense"]

[Text] "Certain changes have been made in the direction of Finland and Sweden and with regard to defending the Danish sound and straits, but as yet they do not provide a basis for important new conclusions from the point of view of Norwegian security."

That is a direct quotation from a speech the chief of the armed forces made to the Oslo Military Society recently and it was probably relayed back home long ago by foreign military attaches. But there has been little public attention devoted to the defense chief's observation on this point here in Norway. That is surprising, for it is not the cautious conclusion that is important in this context but the fact that the Norwegian chief of defense chose to use the prestigious, almost official speaker's platform of the Military Society to warn of developments in the Nordic countries. The defense chief noted that "changes" have taken place in the Nordic countries and he did not commit himself with regard to the time aspect, in other words the exact time when there might be a basis for Norway to arrive at "important new conclusions from the point of view of Norwegian security." Here the top professional military leadership has clearly expressed anxiety and concern with regard to a continuing trend in military developments in the Nordic countries. If the trend does not change things will reach a point sooner or later where Norway must take the consequences of a new situation.

Concern of the kind the defense chief expressed to the Military Society was also apparent in the speeches and discussions at a security policy conference arranged recently by the Armed Forces College Association for a group of interested members. The theme of the conference was the Nordic security policy situation in general, but a great deal of attention was devoted to Sweden.

The underlying concern expressed by several people was that in spite of increased Soviet military capability and activity in the Baltic Sea and the Norwegian Sea, we have seen a clear reduction in Swedish defense efforts in the 1970's and 1980's. There are several indications that Sweden's relative defense capability has been weakened. And that tendency is continuing while the military threat is mounting. For many years after the war Norway never

questioned Swedish military capability which is the very basis for believing in political statements about "wartime neutrality." Swedish defense had a good reputation and defense appropriations were high enough to prevent reasonable doubts from arising. It looks as if that is now changing.

The question now being asked by some people in Norway is whether the Swedish military system is heading toward a point where credibility in its ability to maintain neutrality in wartime would be eroded. In the early 1980's Deputy Private Secretary Leif Leifland referred to this problem in a note to the Swedish government. And the connection between the credibility of Swedish neutrality and a certain level of defense appropriations as an expression of the political resolve to maintain neutrality has also been discussed in detail on the theoretical level by Professor Nils Andren of the Swedish Defense Research Institute.

At the conference questions were also raised about the concept of neutrality as used in Swedish political circles. "Are the declining defense appropriations and Sweden's behavior toward the Soviet Union indications of adjustments that are beginning to be made to new realities in the sphere of power politics?" they asked. Although there is little doubt that the Swedish public still strongly supports the idea of neutrality, it was asked if the same thing is true in some political circles and if it applies to long-range perspectives in the area of relations with the Soviet Union. And what is really involved in the political objective of "wartime neutrality"? There is little evidence that Swedish "neutrality" in the strict sense of the word is accepted in Moscow and many people think that if Sweden came under pressure the concept of neutrality would simply mean that the government would try to prevent active Swedish involvement on either side. Thus Swedish "neutrality," as it might be interpreted on the basis of prevailing power considerations, would not necessarily prevent Swedish territory or air space from being used for an action against Norway.

It was also brought out at the conference that Finnish and Swedish defenses are still formidable and would tie up a lot of Soviet resources. No conclusions were reached in the debate but the Armed Forces College Association is planning a larger conference in the spring on the same topic and prominent Swedish experts on security policy will also be invited to attend.

6578
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MILITARY NORWAY

ACTIVITIES OF KONGSBERG ARMS FACTORY EXAMINED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN WEEKLY SUPPLEMENT in Norwegian 22 Nov 85 pp 38-47

[Article by Terje Gustavsen: "Kongsberg Arms Factory--Bigger Abroad than in Norway"]

[Text] A Mecca of high technology out in the woods. An enormous tangled skein of mechanics, electronics and data. A multinational concern with no information division and no original artwork on the walls. KV [Kongsberg Arms Factory] does a lot more than manufacture weapons.

A strange bird is beating its wings in Norwegian industry. It spreads its wings over the entire world. Out there its feathers glisten and quiver in an elegant and exotic fashion. It swoops boldly to the skies and challenges the biggest birds. No one would believe that it comes from a small town way out in the woods. But here at home it is camouflaged and unapproachable as it hatches out its golden eggs. It can look somewhat heavy and dowdy in flight. And it is a little annoyed that not everyone realizes that it is the most exciting bird in the Norwegian pond.

We are referring to the Kongsberg Arms Factory.

"We are much bigger abroad than we are at home. Just go south of Halden and you'll see that Kongsberg is an important company."

It has hatched out some greedy fledglings that have gobbled up millions--without ever really getting off the ground. The firm has been so depleted by deficits in recent years that it has had a hard time lifting its head over the edge of the nest. But just look--it is bursting with new projects and winning contracts in an unprecedented fashion. It is preening itself and promising to hatch out two new companies this year.

Kongsberg Arms Factory...

"I haven't been bored here for a single day. The goal in life is to be a technological leader. If only we had been able to make money too."

Early each morning a bus leaves Kongsberg and heads out into the world. To Fornebu. The driver knows everyone and morning coffee is served. There is a purchasing engineer on his way to Los Angeles to shop for new parts for the defense division. There is a service representative who was given an assignment in Singapore last night. There are two people from the personnel office who are attending a course in leadership at the Narvik division. There is the director of the newly-hatched subsidiary in South Korea who is going to take care of the final negotiations there. And there are airplane engine people who are going to France to land a long-term contract there. They unfold fresh copies of LAAGENDALSPOSTEN containing local news and a prominent press agency report on a fall offensive in China by the Italian weapons industry.

Kongsberg Arms Factory...

"We perform specialized operations. It is possible to be world champions while sitting out here in the middle of the woods."

Almost every day black limousines bearing the Kongsberg crest glide powerfully up through the Buskerud landscape, bringing imposing and important visitors. There are delegations from Rolls Royce, Pratt & Whitney, General Electric, the Soviet Trade Bureau, the U.S. Navy, British Aerospace, Volvo, Daimler Benz and Porsche. And from Shell, Elf and Agip, the Spanish Telecommunications Agency, the West German armed forces and the French Defense Ministry. For the most important sales arguments can be found at Kongsberg. In the factories and development divisions there. In the very soul of KV, which is an enormous tangled skein of mechanics, electronics and data.

Kongsberg Arms Factory...

"We can do everything here. We don't need original artwork on the walls to impress our customers."

The factory buildings sprawl out in a somewhat undisciplined way--built in response to needs of the moment. Stone buildings from the last century with a touch of grandeur, ramshackle barracks, nondescript pavilions, cramped living quarters, production greenhouses regulated by time clocks. A chaotic lack of distinctiveness. It is certainly not designed to make a lasting impression on important foreigners. It resembles a stolid overgrown provincial company.

The factory has also turned out spade handles, chisels, bottle openers, sledges, dining-room furniture, bicycles, bakery machinery and much more in an effort to provide work in periods of disarmament. These are now amusing items of past history, placed in the company's own museum along with rifles, cannons and rockets.

There are staggering dimensions to the company's present civilian production, which accounts for three-fourths of all its activities. Within a radius of 100 meters you can contemplate the following things:

Down on the ocean floor there is a 400 ton production station in the North Sea Gullfaks field. And soon there will be a network of remote-controlled units at vast depths linked together by robots as much as 20 miles away from the platform.

Up in the air there is a new generation of airplane engines for the big wide-body planes. They look simple but they are huge jewels that have been finely polished to micrometer specifications.

Out in the desert is a gas turbine that is so simple that it does not need constant supervision by trained workers. It takes 2 years to assemble at Kongsberg and can be run on the gases given off by decaying garbage in the big dumps in the United States. And a new engine revolution is about to come off the drawing board. A turbine as powerful as a big fast-turning diesel engine but weighing only a fraction as much.

And there are powerful new computers that take only half a year to develop and are compressed into a small card.

And, gentlemen (for ladies seldom come here to visit), we have the world's most advanced drafting machine. Obligatory for all visitors. A stroke of genius from the 1960's that no one thought would survive the 1970's. Now it is used in almost all the design studios in the European auto industry. It has been developed into a production machine. It makes signs, decorations and boxes. Equipped with a laser it cuts plexiglass, steel and rock.

And so far we have not even mentioned the KV-spawned stock company, SysScan, with computer technology that devours paper maps and can correct them with information provided by satellites. It supervises the 70,000 oil platform construction drawings, the Italian railway network and a map plant in India. It offers a vision of an office without paperwork.

There are also the auto parts factories in Hvittingfoss and Rollag where aluminum is considered a heavy metal. Magnesium must be used. And electronics is built into the clutch system.

And then there is the high-power Albatross subsidiary with equipment that automatically controls propellers and engines to keep drilling ships in precisely the same position even in the stiffest north wind. The company is now looking into actively using the ballast of rigs to keep them rock-steady when they are lifted up in a choppy sea.

Kongsberg Arms Factory...

"It's nothing but arms production and state regulations," say students at the Norwegian Technical College. Like most of the rest of us. And deep within the Norwegian technical community KV is regarded as an obscure state-run arms producer.

For this is surely the only big Norwegian company without a separate information division, not even a separate information secretary.

There are still a lot of people who feel that providing information for Norwegians is a waste of resources:

"Our customers live in other countries, after all."

And what other company could issue its annual balance sheet well into June?

The defense division has partially barricaded itself in the long-established, somewhat dilapidated factory premises down by the river. Not even the administrative director drops in here without warning. Behind coded doors the factory produces firing cylinders for Swedish mortars and Norwegian artillery. Not as simple as it sounds because they must withstand pressures of up to 25,000 G's. (A fighter plane only has to withstand 9 G's.) Here are advanced computer systems that guide submarine firepower. Command control systems for NATO's northern command. And the favorite child, the Penguin, which is now entering the third generation--from ship to helicopter to F-16 fighter plane. An accurate missile with a classified target-seeking system in its nose. It finds its way to strategic warm spots on hostile vessels. It cruises at a low height between islands and skerries.

In the past all the civilian activities at the Kongsberg Arms Factory came out of the defense division. The technology was taken from the defense work. Ideas from the defense division spread to civilian objectives.

Kongsberg Arms Factory...

"We are probably somewhat remote. That is probably due to our defense roots."

But now it is the civilian operations that are developing the new technical ideas and making new breakthroughs. With ripple effects that arms production can now benefit from. Only 3 or 4 years ago all you heard at Kongsberg was that the firm could not get along without producing weapons. That was the basis for everything.

Today one can meet some leaders who say without fearing rebuke that the defense division is no longer so important to the concern. And there are even more who would like to see the arms concept removed from the firm's name. But it looks as if defense will be able to hold the line another year as the division with the biggest turnover. It has added contracts worth billions to its reserves and will probably soon follow this up with an order worth 750 million kroner for controls for the West German Roland missiles. But the offshore sector's turnover will soon be greater.

Kongsberg Arms Factory...

"We are saddled with a large defense complex."

The entrance to the old administration building is appropriately decorated with cannons. The staircase is lined with old hand guns. The boardroom is decorated with stiff portraits, most of them of men in uniforms covered with

medals. The current administrative director, Rolf Qvenild, is the only one who did not come from the defense section. He is a fairytale prince from the new offshore kingdom but he bears little resemblance to the oil-smeared dynamic leaders of the new soap operas. He gives the outward appearance of being a little stolid and provincially modest: "My leadership style? I'm not the one you should ask about that."

At times he feels the pressure of the defense tradition on the system: "There has traditionally been too much respect for administrators here. That is because some people want a captain on the bridge more than I do."

He runs things with a democratic hand that can be quite firm and he often expresses himself in sports terminology: "We must continue to take part in the world championship match. We need to increase our will to win."

His training program is a long-term one. "We have had problems for 4 years but we have not cut back on product development. Of course I can be criticized for that. But I am not willing to weaken our long-term survival capability for a short-term gain.

"The course is set for the 1980's. We have two tasks. We must improve in the areas where we already excel. And we must continue to propagate new activities from the KV core. We have more ideas than we have economic resources."

You can walk around for days at Kongsberg without seeing a glimmer of an arms factory. Or getting the slightest hint of a concern that is undermined with deficits. The auto parts division has always made money. There has never been any red ink on the defense books. Oil has earned money for the last 4 years. Airplane engines are coming out of a slump after Storting vetoed the purchase of more F-16 planes. And new contracts worth millions are being signed across the board.

Then where are the deficits buried? Primarily in the gas turbine division, the computer division and Norcontrol in Horten, which the authorities palmed off on KV.

Now the data division is gone, "structured" out--without a word about it in the annual report. And the gas turbine division is leaving KV and going into a new company in cooperation with the big American company, Dresser. A stroke of genius. Kongsberg had only a product with a big deficit. Now it is getting a partner with capital that can lift the new turbines out of the development nest and send them out into the world.

But the big money consumers are still tearing strips out of the concern's hide. The semiannual balance sheet for 1985 showed a whopping deficit of 71 million kroner. But administrative director Qvenild was still able to attend the traditional industrial council dinner with a good appetite on the basis of rapidly increasing orders, offering a prayer for balanced books for the last half of the year.

New activities will soon appear on the menu, adjusted to the company's reducing diet.

Kongsberg Arms Factory...

"This year alone we have had four new organization plans."

No one at Kongsberg has a guilty conscience about operating as a producer of weapons. Shop steward Roar Flathen put it like this: "It is better to have some of the production taking place in Norway than to buy everyting from foreign companies over which we have no control." And administrative director Qvenild had this to say:

"Producing weapons is a political decision. It is not made by me or by the board, it is made by the political authorities. In certain circles in Norway arms production is not popular. And many more people disapprove of profiting from arms production. And ideally we should not profit from this area of activity."

Kongsberg Arms Factory exists in a state of tension between widely separated worlds. One is the military world with system and order according to precisely drawn-up rules. The other is the humming world of the offshore industry with many swift and sudden solutions. In the military world work on a contract can continue for 10 years. Officers in charge have no authority to make decisions. The national authorities are the customers. In the oil world money is more quickly available. There is more of it. The customers are used to making decisions overnight. And they would just as soon write contracts on paper napkins.

The military atmosphere that dominated the arms factory for many years has weakened considerably. There was a time when the firm moved cautiously with clear lines of command and withdrawal routes. There was a big central staff that had to make decisions on far too many details. The color of the curtains, for example. The staff trampled through the sections and divisions like elephants: "There were times when you had to put your job on the line several times a year in order to get anything done."

But a lot has changed in recent years. The concern is divided up to a greater extent into independent units that are under great pressure to produce results. Few people today regard KV as ponderous and bureaucratic. On the contrary. Now the concern can be aggressive and willing to take risks.

After several years of layoffs there is glowing optimism and a fighting spirit at all levels. And among division leaders there is bubbling enthusiasm.

"Not many firms can offer such a variety of challenges. Here you are able to poke around in uncharted areas. We are thrown into the water and have to strike out on our own. Here you are allowed to make mistakes. There may be a little too much leeway at times.

"In this company you can accomplish what you want to. But you must have initiative and the ability to overcome bureaucratic obstacles. You have to be strong. You have to have guts."

Kongsberg Arms Factory, the most international company in Norway. "But you can stroll down the street to your neighbor's house and have a chat while you solve a problem at work."

Survey of Kongsberg's Activities

Main Company

Administrative director: Rolf Qvenild, 47. Number of employees in 1984: 4488 (approximately 700 fewer than in 1981). Sales: 2.234 billion kroner. Profits: 4 million kroner, but a deficit of 97.3 million kroner before the sale of stocks. A stock company in which the state owns all the stock.

Additional factories in Hvittingfoss, Rollag, Odda and Narvik, a development division in Trondheim and operations in Asker, Halden, Tonsberg, Sweden, England, France, West Germany, Spain, the United States, Canada, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore. The main company also owns stock in a number of subsidiaries, of which Geco and SysScan are the largest.

"It is an old Kongsberg rule that we never leave a customer in the lurch. That costs us a good deal. But we are also selling reliability. I have never heard of the company failing to come up with the solution to a technical problem."

Gas Turbine Division

Division leader: Thorbjorn Westrum, 51. Number of employees: 497. Sales: 447 million kroner. Deficit: 67 million. Left KV and became part of a new company in June 1985. Half of the new company is owned by KV and the other half by the big American concern, Dresser. This division has been an expensive problem child for several years. It was in danger of being shut down.

"We would have had very limited freedom of action in KV due to poor finances. It is inspiring and challenging to have our own company. At times KV could give one a feeling of false security. If things didn't go well there it was not always so dangerous. The employees went from a large firm to a small one. They are no longer overawed by it. They have seen that things can go well."

Oil Division

Division leader: Bjorn Husemoen, 45. Number of employees: 323. Sales: 227 million kroner. Profits: 27 million. This is the division that has the most growth. It will probably double the number of employees within 3 or 4 years.

"Probably a lot of people smiled when we started out in 1974. Many were skeptical about solutions to underwater problems. Our competitors fumbled and faltered. The oil companies were only slightly interested. We began to run out of reasons to keep going. We had only solutions on paper, but no products. Then we got our first contract in 1979. Now we deliver systems to the Gullfaks field. Production will now occur at great depths, between 200 and 600 meters. Divers can no longer be used. This will require totally different production systems--without divers. That is what we have been working on for 10 years."

Auto Parts Division

Division leader: Olav Volldal, 35. Number of employees: 357. Sales: 221 million kroner. Profits: 3 million. Produces brakes, automatic clutch systems and magnesium wheel rims, among other things. A major part of the profits now go into the firm's own product development.

"In our branch orders shift quickly. We have contracts for only a year at a time. Suddenly you can lose several million kroner. With our payroll we are forced to do things differently, to be smarter than the rest. We have to watch every penny. We must improve all the time. Things are never good enough. Somebody is always waiting for a chance to move in. In this branch the winner takes all. We have been fortunate lately. You have to be lucky. The more we work the luckier we are."

Defense Division

Division leader: Jens Charles Width, 58. Number of employees: 1561. Sales: 477 million kroner. Profits: 11 million. Half of the activities involve engineering production for other divisions.

"We have the most advanced production equipment in Norway. We cannot compete with any old basement enterprise. We cannot take on simple jobs. That would make us too costly. Defense contracts are big once they come in. But decisions about public purchases take a long time to make. That affects us.

"It is by selling products to other NATO countries that we are able to maintain a profitable operation. In this country the state purchasing rules lead to much lower profits."

Airplane Engine Division

Division leader: Egil Armo, 55. Number of employees: 375. Sales: 245 million kroner. Deficit: 4 million. Went through a slump in 1983 because Norwegian authorities somewhat unexpectedly decided not to buy more new F-16 fighter planes. Making a comeback with the production of civil airplane engines. There should be big profits starting in 1987.

"We are disappointed that Norway has resigned from the F-16 club while all the other countries stayed with it. Now we are going in as participants in

several civilian projects. We can never become big enough to deliver whole engines. The hectic race to maintain delivery dates has become commonplace. But everyone here steps in and works overtime when the situation is critical."

Computer Technology Group

Leader: Birger Dalen, 43. Number of employees: 60. Sales: 40 million kroner. Profits: 2 million. Established 3 years ago. Develops and delivers computer technology to the entire KV enterprise but outside assignments account for 55 percent of its activities.

"We don't know what will happen in 1987. We don't think that far ahead. Customers must get what they want in half a year. No development project can take longer than a year without showing results, but our own development program can be long-range. We have a time clock like everyone else at KV, but no one takes it seriously. We have to work while the computers are running.

"KV is the country's third largest computer company--after IBM and Norsk Data. More than half our products include computer technology. It is only the computer division that has been shut down, not the computer activities."

Albatross

Administrative director: Nils W. Gulhaugen, 34. Separated from KV as a distinct stock company on 1 January 1985. Number of employees: 153. Sales: 161 million kroner. Profits: 11 million. World leader in the area of positioning ships.

"We have developed somewhat contrary to the KV system. In our world we must have an entirely different style. We are a team of individualists, but we are still a team. The average age is 33. We have gone from being a real circus to being an organized circus. People in town say that Albatross is the place where they use people. We got our first contract in November 1975. If it had come a few months later it would have been all over with us. There was some impatience on the part of company management. Last year we did not lose a single contract. We must be very aggressive at all times. If we start playing it safe our competitors will catch up with us. Albatross could be the core of a new electronics industry. We can start up new companies."

SysScan

Administrative director: Johs. Jamne, 41. Stock company set up in 1983 by KV and Messerchmitt-Boelkow-Blohm of West Germany. Number of employees: 150. Sales: 176 million kroner. Deficit: 13 million. Develops computer systems for map production and the storing of technical drawings. Employees own 5 percent of the stock.

"We did not have to follow the rules of a big concern. The first thing we did was to get rid of the time clocks. The employees had the option of

returning to KV within 2 years, but no one has considered it since. Now we have 100 projects going and we have to land half of them. So far we have lost very few contracts. We have increased our share of the market. After a bitter fight. This is not an easy task. We have to grow faster than the market. And the market is growing at a rate of at least 30-40 percent a year."

6578
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MILITARY PORTUGAL

DETAILS ON 'JUPITER-85' JOINT MANEUVERS WITH SPAIN

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 3 Nov 85 p 11

[Excerpts] The air force and its Mixed Paratroop Corps have cooperated with similar Spanish units in carrying out a 24-hour exercise in Monfortinho.

The "Jupiter-85" exercise began on 29 October, and its first two phases--establishment of an airhead and a coordinated attack--have been completed.

The parachuting that was part of the first phase included 840 jumps with normal and automatic opening of parachutes. Weapons for the heavy equipment company and the antitank company and 16 tons of food were also dropped.

The air forces and mixed paratroop corps of Portugal and Spain are conducting joint exercises in the Idanha-a-Nova area (Monfortinho, Salvaterra do Extremo, Segura, and Zebreira) and at the Alcochete firing range through 8 November.

Over 3,000 men from the Iberian air forces under Portuguese command are conducting joint exercises about 290 kilometers from Lisbon.

The exercise is under the command of General Cardoso, whose advisers for the purposes of operational command are General Vazquez of the air force and Gen Francois Martins, commander of the Paratroop Corps.

The air force chief of staff, Gen Brochado de Miranda, traveled from Lisbon in a Puma that landed at the Monfortinho landing strip on Friday in complete darkness, with all lights out.

Waiting in the dark at Monfortinho was an FAP [Portuguese Air Force] bus. It also kept its lights off while making the trip to the site where the operational command was located.

"Night warfare" is possible only when armies have the means for conducting it, commented one officer in the Portuguese Air Force.

The FAP is equipped with the necessary means--that is, image intensifiers for night vision--and the "Jupiter-85" exercise enabled it to engage in nighttime action for the first time using its A-7 aircraft.

The purpose of the nighttime exercise was the capture of an objective, with air support, by paratroops dropped during the night. In certain situations, air support can only be provided by illuminating the battlefield.

As part of the exercise and to provide training for the personnel, an Aviocar landed on a rudimentary landing strip (called a tactical landing strip) that was illuminated by conventional oil lights.

In this exercise, the Paratroop Corps used new material and equipment consisting of laser rangefinders for measuring distances and UHF radio equipment. Used for long-distance radio links, the UHF equipment allows easy communications in good conditions over a range of about 500 kilometers--making it possible, for example, to link Braganca and Faro.

Portuguese and West German technicians and operators from the Paratroop Corps are testing electronic warfare devices that can translate messages into code using computers.

The transmitting device converts the message into a "compressed package" that is transmitted at high speed (a message whose transmission would take 5 minutes on a normal radio can be sent in 5 seconds to the receiving equipment, which then decodes it).

General Vazquez of the FAP emphasized that the air force must be prepared to remain in action for 24 hours, "since we are convinced that if there is a conflict, it will last 'around the clock,' as we say in military slang, meaning that it will continue day and night."

Paratroop Gen Francois Martins, who commands the Paratroop Corps, said the exercises were proceeding perfectly, "in good weather and with the personnel working hard." He emphasized that the objectives of the exercise were being achieved and that it had been possible to test the reaction capability of those involved, especially the coordination and control capability of the command posts.

Major Saura of the Spanish Air Force Staff emphasized the importance of the joint exercises by the two countries.

He added: "Besides the exchange of knowledge, it is a pleasure to work with the Portuguese Air Force."

He also said: "Our presence here provides greater experience for our pilots, and we therefore consider it necessary that Portugal and Spain continue their joint exercises."

Paratroopers Injured

Eleven Portuguese and Spanish paratroopers were injured--three of them seriously--when they jumped from a C-130 aircraft during a nighttime exercise in Monfortinho on Wednesday night.

Participating in the exercise were 1,500 paratroopers from Portugal and Spain. They were dropped from C-130 aircraft belonging to the air forces of both countries.

A lack of accuracy in the jumps and problems with the opening of parachutes caused injuries among some of the paratroopers.

11798
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MILITARY SWEDEN

DRASTIC CHANGE RECOMMENDED IN POLICY ON SUBMARINES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Nov 85 p 5

[Article by Margareta Zetterstrom: "Grant Right to Sink U-Boats!"]

[Text] Confidence in the Swedish defense would increase if the military were given the right to sink submarines--not just force them to surface and identify them--when despite warnings they do not leave Swedish waters. A concrete change in the government's instructions might act as a deterrent to a foreign power, writes author Margareta Zetterstrom.

During the election campaign nearly complete silence reigned about the Swedish defense and the Swedish security policy. The voters, interested in such issues which in the deepest sense are vital to the nation and the citizens, were left at a loss. The parties kept silent in unanimous agreement and saw to it that other issues were always in the focus of the election campaign. The defense policy should, in their words, not be rendered profane by party squabbles and the mass media with their keen senses followed the signals from the party headquarters.

Not until after the election could this silence be questioned in public. On 16 September DAGENS NYHETER thus published an important article by Bo Ekman, in which he criticized the opposition for joining so docilely with the rash normalization policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. And on 1 November SVENSKA DAGBLADET included an editorial in which it was asserted that "unity and the absence of battle need not necessarily be something positive." If the Swedish strength of defense continues to be undermined "under the paralyzing silence of unanimity," then that silence must be broken. For, as the newspaper wrote, "what concern could be more important for the citizens to voice their opinion on than the defense of Sweden's peace and freedom?"

This election campaign silence regarding defense and security policy issues (among which I also count the boundary-marking in the Baltic Sea and the risk of an insidious gray zone solution), is in fact extremely curious both against the background of imminent defense decisions and the security policy situation in our part of the world. In the latter respect there has been no change for the better whatsoever. No calm of any sort has developed around the Swedish borders. The incursions continue. Prime Minister Palme's words in the government declarations are, unfortunately, nothing but false rhetoric.

The Swedish defense, which during the last decades has seen its striking power drastically reduced, is now in great need of increased material resources. The defense appropriations, and thus the 1987 defense decision, are naturally of particular significance, but it is not enough to discuss solely in terms of figures and money. If Sweden is to fulfill its policy of "non-alignment in peace aimed at neutrality in war," a stated defense willingness and absolute rejection of any policy of concessions are required. It is this political aspect which I would like to discuss here and which, although from a different starting-point, was recently illuminated by Captain Hans von Hofsten.

In October 1982, during a press conference after the submarine hunt in Harsfjarden, Prime Minister Palme said:

"However, I would already like to point out that the Swedish government has the possibility of ordering the military to sink a foreign submarine in Swedish waters. Whoever contemplates a violation of Swedish territory should include in his calculations that from now on the government will make use of that opportunity."

Palme later reiterated this statement in connection with the report of the Antisubmarine Commission in April 1983 and during the Social Democratic party congress in September 1984. But although the u-boat incursions in no way have ceased, and despite both the military's and the government's knowledge that Sweden would be able to protect its territory in a more effective manner than up to now, the government's instructions to the military remain unchanged.

The possibility "of ordering the military to sink a foreign submarine" still exists only in theory and in the rhetoric. The realization of this "possibility" has been postponed into the future, into that uncertain, obscure distance which is called "later on." The government's instruction to the military is still to force foreign intruders in Swedish waters to surface and to identify them. Everyone involved knows that this is an almost impossible task. This knowledge is also shared, of course, by the foreign powers who are guilty of intrusion. The unsuccessful submarine hunting in recent years are practical confirmation of this difficulty, or rather impossibility, of the task of the Swedish military forces.

On the other hand, if the military were granted the right to sink (and not, as now, only to "force up and identify") foreign submarines that despite warning do not leave Swedish interior waters, confidence in the Swedish defense would increase and the rest of the world would respect the Swedish defense willingness and defense capability in a different way than up to now. A concrete change in the government's instructions to the military would, as opposed to Palme's fuzzy "in the future," have a deterrent effect on the foreign power which is contemplating new violations. "Non-alignment in peace aimed at neutrality in war" is not a hollow-sounding solemn phrase but a line of action based upon principled behavior for the defense of the nation.

During World War II the awareness grew--even in Sweden--concerning the value of national independence and the importance of unbroken defense willingness. In 1942 an order was issued by the supreme commander to the entire Swedish defense, that in the event of an attack from outside resistance should be initiated "even if orders from above are missing." The government's famous letter of March 1943 prescribes that in the event of occupation the Swedish

authorities should not cooperate with the occupying power. In the brochure "If War Comes" that same year it was drummed into the minds of all citizens that "each announcement signifying that resistance should cease is false."

Today the situation is in many ways different. The tradition from the wartime years has become lax. The March letter has been abolished. The constitution nowadays permits assistance to a potential occupying power. Parliament is allowed to convene in an occupied region. In various public studies, for which bureau chief Muller's "Regulations for the Activity of Official Bodies During Occupation" (Ds Fo 1978:7) formed the starting point, nearly grotesque interest is shown in the occupation situation itself, while the question of resistance and defense has been pushed into the background. The same tendency is found in the new edition of "If War Comes" (1983). It is no longer the nation's freedom and the nation's survival that is in the focus. Gone are the experiences of the wartime years, and the defense information to the general public in the telephone directories now presents as the most important information that "men and women who organize a resistance movement risk their lives in taking action." It almost seems as if those in power fear the patriotism of the citizens and want to cool it in every way.

The same mistrust of the citizens is also reflected in the recent secrecy surrounding various violations of Swedish territory. When a Soviet fighter on 9 August last year violated Swedish territory, the incident was kept secret from the Swedish public. Likewise during the new intermezzo on 26 June this year. When Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Maltsev visited Stockholm in early August the Swedish administration knew what had taken place in June. But the Swedish public was then still in complete ignorance and would surely still have been until the next quarterly report by the supreme commander, if SVENSKA DAGBLADET had not published the violation (3 Sep).

Such activities of secrecy do not belong in a democracy. "A nation should be given clear information by those who govern regarding all of its own concerns, in all issues involving its own well-being and perils." Thus wrote Wilhelm Moberg in GOTEBORGS HANDELSTIDNING in 1943 on the occasion of the secrecy surrounding the German transit traffic. His words are equally valid today. "Tell the Swedish people the truth in all of its concerns, in all of its vital issues, and it will know that it is doing its duty."

The 1987 defense decision is of major importance. But just as important as strengthening the defense materially is clarifying Sweden's attitude--to the citizens of the country itself and to the rest of the world.

Each attack on the nation's freedom and independence is to be met with arms.

Sweden wants to defend itself, can defend itself and will defend itself.

11949
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REFUSAL TO COMPROMISE BRINGS EC MEMBERSHIP INTO QUESTION

Foreign Minister Defends Position

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Dec 85 p 4

[Article by Kermit Norlund: "Other EC Countries near Compromise at Summit"]

[Text] At the EC foreign ministers' negotiations leading up to the EC summit, Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was criticized harshly for Denmark's opposition, but there were attempts to accommodate the Danish demands.

Luxemburg--"Does Denmark want to continue being an EC member?" Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was asked this question several times over the past 2 days during the foreign ministers' negotiations over changes in the Treaty of Rome. These negotiations precede the EC summit.

The other EC countries have heard about the advice from the Market Committee of parliament, indicating that the government should reject the proposed compromises that have been developed by the EC chairmanship of Luxemburg. On certain points, however, the firm rejection seems to have strengthened the Danish negotiating position.

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen stressed yesterday that the other countries now truly realize where Denmark has problems with the treaty changes and where the serious problems lie. Now the other EC countries are working on changes that could accommodate the wishes of Denmark. It is clear, however, that even if Denmark's demands are met, the Danes will not support the treaty changes at the summit in Luxemburg.

Understanding

"We would have to take the results home and submit them to parliament," Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said.

As one foreign diplomat expressed it, "If there is something that governments have understanding for, then it is problems with parliaments."

The required understanding among an overwhelming majority of the EC countries

on the primary points of an EC reform began to take shape yesterday. Primarily, the countries want to break down barriers among EC countries and begin to work seriously toward a large internal market. Ellemann-Jensen said on Sunday that the proposals in this area have the support of about 11 countries. This means nine other EC countries, in addition to Spain and Portugal, which will become members at the beginning of the new year.

According to the proposal on the internal market, the decision-making process would be changed so that, on many questions, only a prescribed majority would be needed, instead of unanimity.

Great Britain and Ireland have had certain problems with the free admission of all people and with plant imports, but yesterday all indications were that these two countries could reach a special arrangement.

Denmark was the only country that was completely against making decisions by a majority vote. Denmark also demanded an absolute guarantee that Danish legislation on the environment and the workplace would not be undermined and that Denmark could implement tougher regulations than the other EC countries. Trade considerations must not go before environmental considerations, according to Denmark. Several countries believe, however, that such exceptions are against the very concept of establishing an internal market.

The majority of the countries favor giving the European parliament greater authority, according to the proposals that are now on the table. Denmark rejects this idea outright and Italy is skeptical, since the proposals are "so modest that they are an insult to the parliament."

Foreign Policy

The other countries also seem to agree on the need for a new treaty on foreign policy cooperation. Denmark demands a special declaration to indicate that the treaty will not affect our Nordic political cooperation. Denmark also wants the political cooperation to be "open" to the rest of Europe, through associative agreements.

EC Commissioner Argues Benefits

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 Dec 85 Sec III, p 9

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Large EC Market Strengthens Denmark"]

> [Text] Finance Minister Palle Simonsen supports the greatest possible liberalization of internal EC trade, but this must not destroy the economy of individual countries.

Denmark has a real and particular interest in creating a large, internal EC market. It would strengthen Denmark both at home and abroad.

This was stated by the EC commissioner for the internal EC market, Lord Cockfield, in his opening speech at a conference held yesterday at Christiansborg on a "Europe without trade barriers." Lord Cockfield said that Denmark, as a highly developed country that is extremely dependent on exports, would profit greatly if trade barriers among countries were eliminated.

The conference was arranged by the Conservative Party's parliamentary group and the Conservative members of the EC parliament. It was held at the same time that the EC heads of state began a summit meeting in Luxemburg on the future of Europe.

Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative) was advised by the Social Democrats to reject proposals made at the summit, including a proposal that would expand the internal market through a change in the treaty.

In his speech Finance Minister Palle Simonsen (Conservative), who also is acting prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister, distanced himself from the present negotiations in Luxemburg, but said that Denmark should support the continuing effort to eliminate trade barriers.

The finance minister said that sales tax and excise taxes were considered to be trade barriers by some EC countries, but that Denmark could not go as far as the EC Commission wants in standardizing these taxes.

"For Denmark, this would mean that the budget deficit would triple. This would be such a major step that a responsible government would find it impossible," Palle Simonsen said. He added that the demands of the EC Commission went against the policies of the coalition government.

The director of the Brewers' Association, Poul Anthonsen, said it would be devastating to the EC if the various systems of fees were not made more similar. The result would be an increased border trade, he said.

"Liberalization in one area, namely in the beer trade, has meant that one tenth of the country's beer sales occur across national boundaries, since beer can be purchased at half price in other countries," Poul Anthosen said.

The Conservative Party spokesman on market policy, Kent Kirk, said that in the long run the taxes would even out, but that consideration must be given to the economies of the individual countries. For this reason, he called on the EC Commission to make a new proposal.

EC commissioner Lord Cockfield wondered why people believe that the EC could introduce free trade across national boundaries without adjusting taxes.

"The taxes need not be uniform, but they should be closer," Lord Cockfield said. He added that if the boundaries were opened now, within a few weeks the hectic border trade would force governments to adjust taxes and make them closer, as a result of free market forces.

9336
CSO: 3613/36

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

COOPERATION WITH IMF, WORLD BANK PLANNED TO AID THIRD WORLD

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 24 Sep 85 p 23

[Article by os: "Bonn Wants to Help Developing Countries - Through Closer Cooperation with Monetary Funds and World Bank"]

[Text] (Own Report) - The Federal Republic is going to intensify its cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This was the statement made by Treasury Secretary Gerhard Stoltenberg with a view toward the annual meeting of the two institutions, which shall take place from October 8th to 11th in the South Korean capital of Seoul. Central themes would be the continuation of a successful policy of stability, the fight against protectionism and renewed efforts to keep a grasp on the debt problems. The subject of refinancing over several years will have increased significance.

In Seoul, it would have to be made clear that the industrialized nations are determined to not only help the developing countries in overcoming their present difficulties, but also in developing their great economic potential. Despite all the contestations, the IMF and World Bank would have to remain the forums for dialogue and collaboration. In the area of highly indebted developing nations, particularly in Latin America, difficult problems have not been resolved yet. One of the risks is that growth in the developing nations this year will go down to 3.5 percent after having been 4.4 percent last year.

"Much in Agreement"

Among the member nations of the IMF there exists a high degree of agreement in the area of economic policy [so Mr Stoltenberg]. The task at hand is to create, through price stability, sound national finances, elimination of obstacles or open markets, respectively, the basis for a sustained growth process. The central responsibility in the United States is the reduction of the enormous deficit in the federal budget, estimated to be 210 billion dollars for 1985. Japan, on the other hand, should even further open the market for foreign products and also liberalize the financial markets.

In addition, the agenda of the annual meeting includes the following: A special credit program of the IMF, the so-called enlarged access. The Federal

Government is in favor of extending the program for another year, yet of examining--that is to say lowering--the upper credit limits. Stoltenberg fails to see the deficiency in monetary reserves the developing countries claim to have. Therefore it was unnecessary to distribute more "artificial money" (special drawing rights), (SDR). After all, there is the matter of using 2.7 billion SDR of credit reflux from the so-called trust fund that has been dissolved. From a German perspective, the money should benefit the poorest among the poor nations.

Economic Cooperation Minister Juergen Warnke welcomed the recently improved collaboration between IMF and World Bank and thought that the capital of the World Bank was sufficient at this time. However, on a medium-range, a capital increase between 40 and 60 billion dollars would be necessary. Preparations to this effect are to be started in Seoul. As to the International Development Association IDA, an 8th capital appreciation should be discussed soon. For the remainder, the Federal Government is the leader worldwide with a forgiveness of debt in excess of DM 4 billion toward the poorest countries. Bonn plans to subsidize with DM 300 million the fund for the nations south of the Sahara Desert during the years until 1987. The attitude toward the Investment Guarantee Association MIGA remains reserved. A lasting improvement of the investment climate could only be achieved if the respective countries themselves would guarantee sufficient and legally binding investment protection. The present draft regarding MIGA does not yet comply with these conditions. Bonn therefore abstained from voting on the board of directors of the World Bank.

On the eve of the annual meeting of IMF and World Bank in Seoul, the executive committee (interim committee) of the Fund will convene to attend an extensive agenda. Following a discussion of the world economic situation, the subject will be Special Drawing Rights (SDR, a type of "artificial money") which have not been allotted since 1981. As every year, those in the group of the 24 represented developing nations will again demand new special drawing rights in excess of 15 billion SDR, but probably again in vain.

Use Still Undecided

Another point of discussion is a special credit program of the Monetary Fund ("enlarged access") which is to be decreased proportionately to the appreciation of the capital shares (quotas) of the member nations, allowing them improved access to credits in this manner. The special program has to be extended, or else it will expire by the end of 1985. The FRG is likely to vote for an extension with simultaneous continued decrease. Beyond that, a binding agreement has to be reached regarding the balance of the money of the so-called trust fund. Years ago, the latter was being supplied from those profits which the Monetary Fund realized from the sale of gold. In the meantime, the trust fund has been dissolved; 2.6 billion SDR are still outstanding. These shall be assigned to an "Account for Special Use" until the final application has been determined. And finally, the interim committee will present two reports on the world monetary system: one from the industrialized, and one from the developing nations.

13011/12859
CSO: 3620/71

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

IFO INSTITUTE DENIES THAT AID TO SMALL FIRMS INCREASES EMPLOYMENT

Bonn GENERAL-ANZEIGER in German 8 Oct 85 p 17

[Article by Reuter: "Ifo: Small Firms Do Not Have a Key Function. Experts Contradict Opinion held by Federal Government"]

[Text] The Munich Ifo-Institute for Economic Research has contradicted the opinion held by the Federal Government that small and medium-sized companies would be able to assume, through special capital expenditure promotion, a key role in the fight against unemployment.

A study by the Ifo-Institute published yesterday alleges that small and medium-sized firms to begin with have even greater self-financing options in relationship to their respective sales than large businesses.

However, the owners of the small and medium-sized businesses obviously preferred financial investments and private withdrawals as opposed to capital expenditures for expansion and modernization of their companies, the Ifo-study states. In addition, the smaller firms less frequently invested in expansion and more often in replacements than larger businesses. Their capital expenditures definitely occurred more irregularly than those of large enterprises. There does not exist, therefore, any evidence that smaller companies are particularly investment-happy, nor an indication of financial disadvantage which would have to be compensated for by subsidies.

The evaluation of reports from 956 industrial companies, who continuously participated in the Ifo-investment test from 1965 to 1981, had shown decreasing significance of expansion spending with decreasing size of the operation, the Ifo-experts observed. Since capital spending for expansions as a rule requires higher expenditures than other investment goals, there also resulted from this a higher quota of the respective sales than in the case of capital spending for replacements. For this reason as well, the investment quota were likely to be lower for smaller firms.

As a main obstacle for intensified capital expenditure on the part of businesses--from whom a solution to the employment problems is expected to come--it is the difficult financing situation, especially of smaller firms, which is repeatedly being cited and which in turn is being attributed to the poor profit

situation, so the Ifo-report. Therefore, the so-called cashflow before taxes (depreciations plus net income for the year) was examined, i.e. the financing potential as a function of company size. Relative to sales, firms with 20 to 49 employees show the highest value with 6.5 percent, and the lowest with 3.8 percent is evidenced by companies with over 1,000 employees.

Even if one would reduce the cashflow of smaller businesses by deducting "management wages" for the active owner, which correspond to three times the average income of an employee including social security expenses, a margin of financing that is more narrow by comparison for smaller companies is not detectable, says the Ifo-study.

13011/12859
CSO: 3620/72

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

BRIEFS

NEW CREDIT SYSTEM FOR EASTERN TRADE -- Ambassador V. M. Sobolev proposes a new credit system for the trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. In an interview published on Sunday in the newspaper KESKISUOMALAINEN, Ambassador Sobolev considers that essential growth of trade between the two countries will be generated by the cooperative construction of large industrial complexes in Finland and the Soviet Union. "But before large industrial plants are to be constructed in the Soviet Union, and above all, on a compensation foundation, the credit question has to be solved," said Sobolev. The ambassador considers the balance of exports and imports to remain for the next few years as the basic policy for the trade between the two countries. At the same time a payment system could also be developed on the basis of compensation trade so that a part of the approved credit would be paid by the industrial products of the enterprises built in the Soviet Union. Ambassador Sobolev tells us that the main focus of the next 5-year plan in the Soviet Union is placed on the renovation and modernization of industrial plants. In his opinion Finnish firms should closely study the possibilities of participating in the projects. The work could be organized through the task forces of an economic cooperative work commission. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Dec 85 p 28] 12989/13068

NESTE TO BUILD IN SAUDI ARABIA -- Saudi Arabia has decided to participate in an enterprise of the Neste Co and the Italian Enichem Polymer Co to build a factory for the manufacture of a gasoline additive to replace lead at the Jubail oil port on the Persian Gulf. The Saudi Arabian oil company SA-BJC owns 70 percent of the new petrochemical company; Neste Co, Enichem and a Saudi Arabian investment company, APICORP, each own 10 percent. The entire capital stock of the company is $300 million. The factory will be built by the Italians and it is estimated to be completed by 1988, at which time it would begin to produce annually a half million tons of a substance called methyl-tertiary-butyl-ether. It replaces air polluting lead, which, up to now, we have had to add to gasoline in order to achieve the high compression consistency required by modern combustion engines. The markets for the new additive are in Europe, where EC decided last spring to begin moving over to the use of unleaded gasoline in phases beginning in 1989. According to the experts, the lead in the gasoline is at least in part a cause of environmental damage, for example the destruction of central European forests. In Finland the Ministry of the Environment is preparing additional pollution controlling directives for both cars and gasoline. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Dec 85 p 28] 12989/13068

CSO: 3617/40

ECONOMIC NORWAY

STEEL EXPORTS BOOSTED BY NEW EC LIBERALIZATION POLICY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Dec 85 p 49

[Article by Elisabeth Holte: "EC's New Steel Policy Favorable for Norwegian Export"]

[Text] Brussels, 11 December. The new liberalization of the EC steel policy starting the first of the year will probably mean that those engaged in the steel trade between Norway and the EC will go back to the free trade agreement system of price adjustment. That means that Norwegian producers, in competition with EC producers, can if necessary go down to the lowest prices quoted by EC producers.

This development, positive from the Norwegian viewpoint, became apparent during the first clarifying meeting in Brussels recently about next year's exchange of letters on steel.

The Norwegians consider it a very favorable development that they will thereby take part in the liberalization which will take place as a result of the new EC steel policy which was approved in June of this year.

Fall in Prices

There remains, however, a large number of questions which the Norwegian side must now look into more closely. The EC will take measures to prevent a drastic fall in prices, but the big question is whether price discipline will hold within the EC when the steel market continues to be so weak.

As for maintaining the traditional trade patterns for steel, the commission is going in for greater flexibility than before. One form of development guarantee makes export and import more dependent on each other. If it goes well in one direction, then there can be a willingness for greater conciliation in the other direction. There are also several difficult technical aspects in the "package" which Norwegians must consider.

The head of the Norwegian negotiating team is Ivar Stugu of the Ministry of Trade, and the next meeting will take place in the middle of January.

It was in March 1978 that the first exchange of letters took place to regulate the steel trade between Norway and the EC in the difficult market situation which existed for a number of years. The basis for the exchange of letters was that Norway should retain its market share while respecting the minimum prices for importing steel into the EC area.

Since 1978 it has been renewed each year, usually after lengthy negotiations. During these years Norway has strongly disagreed that this exchange of quota letters is necessary, because such a special arrangement is a breach of the free trade principles which apply to industrial products traded between EC and EFTA. The issue was discussed at the meeting in Oslo on 30 May this year between EC commissioner Willy de Clercq and Norwegian authorities.

Last year Norway exported a total of 50,000 tons of armor steel and steel beams to the EC area, mostly to West Germany. Norway finds the quota arrangement all the more unjust because the West Germans themselves export large amounts of steel to Norway, which is a net importer of steel because of the development of the offshore industry.

Ironworks

It is especially Norsk Jernverk which is disturbed by the quota arrangement, as the quota is less than Jernverket planned for in its structural plan, but they have managed to compensate for that through sales to other markets, in which they have incurred certain complaints for dumping.

9287
CSO:3639/48

ECONOMIC PORTUGAL

GOVERNMENT PROPOSES PARTIAL RENEGOTIATION OF FOREIGN DEBT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Nov 85 p 3

[Text] Our country plans to refinance a part of the foreign debt it has contracted with international banks, with a view to obtaining better interest conditions.

This information was obtained from the NOTICIAS DE PORTUGAL agency in London, and this intention on the part of the Portuguese state was confirmed in Lisbon.

The renegotiation will pertain to two loans contracted in 1983, totaling $650 million and, it is expected, will be arranged within the coming months, probably before the end of the year, according to the REVISTA FINANCEIRA INTERNACIONAL, which NOTICIAS DE PORTUGAL also quoted.

According to this same publication, which specializes in financial matters, Portugal would even be prepared to make payments in advance or partially pay off those loans if the European markets were to prove reluctant to grant new credit for the payment of the $650 million loan.

Improvement in the economic situation of Portugal and, in particular, the amount of foreign exchange reserves, would be the reasons underlying this decision by our national monetary authorities.

A source at the Bank of Portugal, also quoted by the news agency, stressed that although it is not an accomplished fact, the intention to make payment in advance on old loans does indeed exist, given the current level of reserves available to the central bank. This same source did not, however, confirm which loans might be refinanced, nor was any time period for the renegotiation of the debt mentioned.

5157
CSO: 3542/22

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK APPROVES 6 MILLION CONTOS IN LOANS

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 1 Nov 85 p 17

[Article by Alvaro de Mendonca]

[Text] The European Investment Bank (EIB) will provide 6 million contos in financing for industrial and energy projects in our country during the balance of this year. This announcement was made by Rex Speller, EIB Portuguese Operations Division director. These will be the last funds we will receive under the agreements covering the period prior to membership in the EEC, since as of 1 January, we will be a member with full rights in the EEC, enjoying the same privileges of access to EIB financing as the countries which are presently members.

One of the immediate advantages will be the elimination of the credit limit established by the EIB. In fact, the 53 million contos we have received in these past 10 years were allocated to us on the basis of agreements we signed with the EEC, wherein a maximum amount to be allocated was always stipulated.

Beginning in January, the EIB will not be able to impose any "ceiling" on the credit granted to our country. On the other hand, Portugal will become a stockholder in the EIB, with all the positive and negative effects thereof.

Obviously, the volume of financing to be allocated by the EIB will depend on the quality of the Portuguese projects proposed and their importance to the development of the country.

The fact that Portugal can be classified as an area with the highest priority for development (excluding Lisbon) may considerably increase the financing we will receive. By way of example, the above-mentioned EIB official recalled that about two-thirds of the bank loans since 1958 have gone to Community regions where the development problems were most serious--the southern part of Italy, Ireland, Greece, Scotland and the western and southwestern parts of France.

The fact that the EIB will only finance half of the project costs means that the success or failure of our entry in the EEC will depend on how we utilize the Community funds. Without Portuguese funds, there are none from Europe. If we want to place our bets on industrial development, an increase in our

independence with regard to energy or the modernization of our agricultural sector, we must finance at least half of the needed investments. Then the EIB will contribute to cover the balance of the cost.

Given the current economic situation of the country, trailing the European Community and lacking resources to rise above the crisis, the European officials are not excluding the possibility of combining the various means of obtaining financial resources to be made available to us by the EEC in a single project.

There is nothing to prevent us from having simultaneous recourse, for the building of a given infrastructure, to the FEDER, for example, and to EIB financing. In such cases, the European funds might even exceed 50 percent of the cost total. What is not allowed is for the EIB alone to provide more than this percentage.

This possibility of combining Community financial funds represents a more open approach by the Community to our country, in a way. Its only justification can be found in the present economic situation of Portugal, which has one of the highest inflation rates on the European continent, gross national product growth below the average levels for the EEC, and social conditions which are very different from those elsewhere in Europe. But the impact of EIB intervention in Portugal will also have a significant effect on the banking system. The EIB distributes a part of its financing to the credit institutions in its member countries, which then distribute them for the projects of the small and average enterprises competing for the funds.

It is a question here of a kind of extension of financial participation, in which the Portuguese banks will serve as the channel linking the European Bank (the main function of which is the direct financing of large industrial and energy projects) and small and average enterprises. Locapor and the no longer extant SPI are two of the enterprises which have already benefitted from the EIB distribution policy. This was, moreover, the subject taken up at the seminar by John VanSchill, of the Treasury Department of the European Bank.

The prospects are good and it appears that the projects are excellent too.

Antonio Marta, the president of the European Integration Commission, even went so far as to warn of the need to revise the community budget which, currently, cannot meet the Portuguese demands.

Moreover, Antonio Marta himself admitted that the benefits of membership will be much greater for Portugal than for the EEC itself. However, when asked what this profitability achieved through membership by our country would be in economic terms, this official evaded the issue and spoke instead of political advantages ("a Europe handicapped on its southern flank would make no sense").

5157
CSO: 3542/27

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION SEEKS BUSINESS CONTACTS

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 1 Nov 85 p 17

[Excerpts] A delegation representing the member nations of the Arab League arrived in our country this week. The reason for the trip is the annual meeting of the Arab-Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the election of the new president of the board of directors of that organization, Alexandre Vaz Pinto.

Some of the leaders included in the delegation took advantage of the trip to make contact with businessmen in the textile and equipment goods branches in the northern part of the country.

These categories constitute one of the larger parts of the very limited Portuguese exports to the Arab world. Also worth mention, for their part, are wood, paper, electrical equipment and food, chemical and pharmaceutical products. It is not unlikely that in this sector too, important contacts between Portugal and the Arab nations have been made.

More ambitious proposals may be made in the future. We refer to the establishment of joint venture companies, agreements for the transfer of technology and exchange in the vocational training sector.

Insofar as we could learn, it is in these cooperation sectors that the Arab proposals have already been studied and made specific. If they are accepted, many doors will certainly be opened for the entry of Portuguese products into the Arab world.

The same source informed us further that "the Arab proposals include some rather interesting projects having to do with complementing our domestic products."

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CSO: 3542/27

ECONOMIC PORTUGAL

SAVINGS INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY; CITIZENS FAVOR INVESTMENT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 1 Nov 85 p 14

[Excerpts] Savings by private individuals in the Portuguese banking system as a whole almost doubled between 1981 and 1984, showing an increase of about 27 percent last year. Private individuals account for a largest part, by far, of the domestic savings total, which increased from about 350 million contos in 1981 to nearly 562 million last year, sources at the General Deposits Fund and the General Mutual Insurance Fund said.

In terms of value, the savings of private individuals increased from 407.5 million contos in 1981 to 731.3 million contos last year, while state savings, through the public administrative sector, declined by 63.7 million to 203.7 million contos during the same period.

The savings of private businesses, although positive, represented a small portion of domestic savings last year. The total came to 6.1 million contos in 1981, with a decline in 1983 (down 21.9 million contos), and a total of 35.3 million contos for last year.

The average rate of savings was 19 percent of the gross domestic product last year, excluding the total for emigrants' foreign remittances, an amount equivalent to that seen in the majority of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries.

Statistically, no figures are available on how the savings of private individuals on deposit in banking institutions are distributed by age brackets.

According to the information provided by the General Deposits Fund, the number of deposit accounts came to about 10 million in 1984, representing an average of 1.7 contos per individual in the active population.

In 1984, about 21 percent of the total deposits were held by the General Deposits Fund, basically representing small and average savings and, together with the General Mutual Insurance Fund, accounting for about 90 percent of such savings.

Term deposits in the General Deposits Fund have developed at a rapid rate this year, already showing an increase in terms of value of more than 221 million contos over last year.

Houses and Land

Despite the increase in the number of bank deposits, the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese citizens who decide to postpone their savings believe it is "safer to put them into the purchase of houses and land," according to a poll recently published.

The poll taken by the Marktest enterprise in 16 Portuguese localities among more than 1,000 inhabitants showed that 67 percent regard the purchase of houses and land as "more advantageous," while 46 percent regard term deposits as better.

According to this same poll, 49 percent of the citizens of Portugal regard the purchase of jewelry as "safer," 41 percent opt for term deposits, 38 percent for the purchase of foreign currency, 26 percent for the purchase of household equipment, 19 percent for investment in life insurance, 16 percent for stocks and bonds and 8 percent for public debt certificates.

Of those interviewed, 2 percent had not put their savings in any of these available alternatives, preferring to keep their funds at home.

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CSO: 3542/22

ECONOMIC PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES--The number of Portuguese families affected by unemployment increased from 13.4 percent in the second quarter of 1983 to 14.2 percent in the last quarter of last year, the employment study made by the National Statistics Institute indicates. Thus the unemployed population has increased by 11.03 percent in 18 months, with the secondary sector being most seriously affected by the decline in employment, with special impact on the civil construction and public works sectors. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 1 Nov 85 p 1] 5157

CSO: 3542/27

ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

ECONOMIC INSTITUTE PREDICTS DOWNWARD TREND FOR 1986

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 21 Nov 85 p 55

[Article by Gabriel Thulin and Par Elfvingsson: "No Crisis Next Year, But Look Out for 1987"]

[Text] Sweden may have the worst economic trend among the industrialized countries in 1986, according to the Market Research Institute, the OECD, and others. Nevertheless, growth next year will probably be greater than many have predicted. There is reason to worry about 1987, however, when growth in Western Europe may slow down.

The economic optimists are beginning to flourish in Europe, but the prospects here in Sweden are not so bright. According to the barometer of the Market Research Institute (KI), the industrial economy took a downward turn at the beginning of this year. The VECKANS AFFARER (VA) index points to a continued downward trend, but at a moderate rate during the first half of next year.

The downward turn does not necessarily mean an end to growth, but simply that it will go more slowly. In 1984 the gross national product (GNP) increased by 3 percent and growth this year is expected to be just about as rapid. The predictions for 1986 are less optimistic, however. In October KI published its fall prediction, which indicated an anticipated 0.4-percent growth rate next year. The OECD office is reported to be working with similar figures, which means that Sweden may be at the bottom of the list of major industrial countries. These predictions have frightened both LO (Federation of Trade Unions) and TCO (Central Organization of Salaried Employees), which are now calling for measures to stimulate the economy.

The KI prediction for growth in 1986 is actually even bleaker than the 0.4-percent figure would seem to indicate. Contract negotiations will involve a carryover that will be determined by comparing December wages with the average for this past year. A similar carryover will affect the GNP. During the first half of 1985 the GNP increased by 1.3 percent over the second half of 1984, seasonally adjusted. KI estimates that there was an additional 1.6-percent increase in the GNP during the second half of the year. In order for the KI prediction of a 0.4-percent increase from 1985 to 1986 to be true, activity in 1986 must be 0.4 percent lower than the level during the second half of 1985.

Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt has rejected the KI prediction, calling it overly pessimistic. It will be interesting to see what the Finance Ministry chooses to predict in the preliminary national budget, which will be published in the budget proposal 2 months from now. Perhaps the Finance Ministry's figure will be between the two alternatives presented by LO just over 1 week ago. LO estimates that, if economic policies remain unchanged, the GNP will increase by 1.2 percent. If investments are stimulated by reduced interest rates, the elimination of restraints on investment funds, and other measures, then LO economists believe that a 2.1-percent increase in the GNP would be possible.

The demand factor that is holding down the predicted figure for next year is investments. In this area, KI predicts a 9-percent drop between the second half of this year and the second half of next year. KI belives that there will be a 6.4-percent drop between the two years. That is pessimistic, to be sure.

The utilization of capacity is at a peak in many industries and the profitability and future prospects of export companies, in particular, remain good. A falling rate of inflation should also provide room for limited reductions in interest rates.

Wage negotiations next year will be of decisive significance, through their influence on both the competitive strength of Swedish companies and the incomes and purchasing power of households. Wages increased by over 9 percent, on the average, in both 1984 and 1985. Wage increases will hardly be less than 6 percent in 1986, even though employers have shown an extremely low profile. In many areas, increases have already been assured by significant carryovers from this year. At the same time, the inflation rate has slowed down considerably. Even at the beginning of next year, the Swedish inflation rate may be below 5 percent. Consequently, disposable incomes may increase by about 1.5 percent next year, thereby providing room for increased consumption.

KI also seems to be painting a bleak international picture. The wheels are rolling faster and faster in our immediate vicinity. The optimists in West Germany and in other European countries are much stronger today than they were last summer. And since the German mark has been strengthened by the drop of the dollar, the competitive strength of Swedish industry may improve. Strong growth in our neighboring Nordic countries will also help stimulate exports.

As a result, growth in the Swedish economy could be much higher than estimated by KI. On the other hand, there is much more reason to be concerned about 1987, when growth in Western Europe could slow down. Thus, the crisis awareness and the arsenal of countermeasures should be calculated to take effect during 1987 rather than at the beginning of next year.



The EC-Climate chart shows how industrial orders and production plans have developed in the 10 EC countries.

Key:

1. Continued upswing in Europe, but worse in Sweden
2. EC economy (IFO index, scale to the right)
3. Swedish economy (KI's resource utilization + VA predictions)
4. Predicted

9336
CSO: 3650/75

ECONOMIC TURKEY

NO OIL EXPLORATION IN DISPUTED AEGEAN WATERS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Nov 85 pp 1, 10

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU) - Following Minister of State Kazim Oksay's statement 2 days ago that Turkey "will explore for oil everywhere it has the right" in the Aegean, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs let it be known yesterday that "places where it has the right" must be understood as "territorial waters." The Foreign Ministry stressed that Turkey "observes" the Bern agreement prohibiting seismic research in the disputed waters of the Aegean and stated that there was no question of exploring for oil in disputed waters.

This announcement was made by Foreign Ministry spokesman Yalim Eralp in response to reporters' questions during yesterday's regular press briefing. The spokesman said, "The minister said we will explore for oil in the places where we have the right in the Aegean. This is extremely clear. Our territorial waters are a part of the Aegean, are they not?"

A reporter asked, "Then do you understand by the minister's comments that exploration will take place only in the territorial waters?" The spokesman replied, "That was certainly his meaning." In response to another question, Yalim Eralp stressed that Turkey observes the Bern agreement.

As will be recalled, Turkey and Greece signed the Bern agreement in 1976 after oil exploration in the disputed waters of the Aegean in 1975-1976 brought the two countries to the brink of hot conflict. Under this agreement, the two countries agreed not to conduct seismic research in the disputed waters until the boundaries of the continental shelf in the Aegean were defined.

8349
CSO: 3554/022

ENERGY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

STATOIL CONSIDERS NEW PIPELINE TO WESTERN EUROPE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Dec 85 p 3

[Article by Morten Woldsdal: "Statoil Evaluating New Pipeline from Troll to the Continent"]

[Text] AFTENPOSTEN has learned that Statoil is evaluating laying a new gas pipeline from the Troll field in the North Sea to West Europe. The company is concerned about the sinking at Ekofisk, and Statoil is skeptical about shipping the large gas deliveries from Troll to customers on the continent via that field. A new pipeline to West Europe will cost several billion kroner.

Because of the problems of sinking at Ekofisk Statoil is now studying a number of possibilities for alternative gas transport to the continent. The Statpipe pipeline from Statfjord, Gullfaks and Heimdal fields now goes into the Norpipe system to Emden in West Germany. There is also an oil pipeline from Ekofisk to Teeside in Great Britain. Nobody knows at the present time what problems the sinking at Ekofisk will cause for these pipeline systems in the future.

There are many indications that Statoil is not taking any chances. AFTENPOSTEN has reason to believe that a new pipeline from Troll to West Europe is perhaps the most likely solution. However they are also considering laying a new pipeline as a loop around Ekofisk and back into the Norpipe system again. Other alternatives are also being considered. Troll will come into production in about 1995.

The Ekofisk field continues to sink at a rate of almost one-half meter per year, despite Phillips Petroleum having begun last August to pump gas into the reservoir to keep the pressure up. The company expects that it will take time, however, for the effect of the gas injection to be fully felt so that the sinking will be reduced. So far certain of the platforms on Ekofisk have sunk by nearly 3 meters.

Reduced Gas Export

Gas deliveries from Ekofisk to the continent have been reduced by 25 percent for a period of 2 years while the gas injection into the reservoir is taking place. In April of next year the owners of the field will negotiate with gas purchasers in West Europe about the size of future deliveries from the field.

Before that time the oil companies must decide how they are going to solve the problems of Ekofisk for both the short and long term. Both the Norwegian authorities and individual shareholders fear that Norway can lose valuable gas market shares in West Europe permanently if it is necessary to continue the reduced gas deliveries beyond the 2-year period. Gas customers in West Europe will then have to ensure deliveries from other sources, and in such a situation it could be very difficult for Norway to recapture its share of the market. Furthermore, less gas to West Europe means less money to our national treasury.

Irritation at Phillips

In the Ministry of Oil and Energy there is strong irritation at the opposition of Phillips Petroleum to expanding and buying gas from the Tommeliten field just southwest of Ekofisk. The ministry wants Tommeliten gas to be pumped down in the Ekofisk reservoir, so that future gas deliveries to the continent will not have to be reduced. Until the Tommeliten field comes into production Phillips could borrow gas from Statfjord, Gullfaks and Heimdal. This gas could later be returned in the form of Tommeliten gas.

Phillips--which is also a shareholder in Tommeliten--has long been opposed both to expanding this field and to buying Tommeliten gas for pumping into Ekofisk. Statoil has had seemingly endless negotiations with the American oil company without reaching a solution. Minister of Oil and Energy Kare Kristiansen will meet today with representatives of Phillips top leadership in the United States. The Tommeliten issue is expected to be prominent at this meeting.

Tommeliten Profitable

At the ministry they do not see the development of Tommeliten as any great problem. The field is estimated to be clearly profitable to develop, and Statoil can eventually undertake the job alone if the other shareholders do not want to go along. But the authorities see Phillips attitude toward the purchase of gas from Tommeliten as more worrisome.

In the longer term a number of possible measures are being considered to counteract the effect of the reduced distance from the surface of the sea to the platforms at Ekofisk. Phillips has already begun an improvement program for the platforms costing over a billion kroner. If the sinking continues, new measures can be undertaken--including jacking up the platforms several meters.

Wave Dampers

Norsk Hydro--which is one of the owners of Ekofisk--is considering several possibilities for building up the ocean floor around the platforms so that large waves will be dampened. If the sinking continues at the same rate as now the waves will be a serious security risk at Ekofisk in one or two years. The time to act is therefore short.

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